IKN #886Premium

The IKN Weekly
Week 886, week of May 17th 2026
Contents
This Week: In today’s edition, May Two Four.
Fundamental Analysis: Rio2 Ltd (RIO.to) 1q26 financials.
Stocks to Follow: Overview, Element 29 (ECU.v), RPX Gold (RPX.v), Mayfair Gold (MFG.v), West Red Lake
Gold (WRLG.v), Xali Gold (XGC.v), Tiernan Gold (TNGD.v), Salazar Resources (SRL.v), Amerigo Resources
(ARG.to), BP Silver Corp (BPAG.v), Orecap Inv (OCI.v), Latin Metals (LMS.v).
The Copper Basket: Overview, Andina Copper (ANDC.v), Fitzroy Metals (FTZ.v).
The Producer Basket: Overview, Barrick Mining (B) (ANX.to), Americas Gold and Silver (USAS) (USA.to).
The TinyCaps Basket: Overview, Canex Metals (CANX.v), Radius Gold (RDU.v).
Regional Politics: Mexico: Gold Resource Corp (GORO) says the quiet thing out loud, Bolivia: Widespread
social protests against the Rodrigo Paz government, The IKN Colombia: Two weeks to go, The Peru election
mess: We seem to have a second round.
Market Watching: Mogotes Metals (MOG.v): Plus ça change…, Equinox (EQX) buys Orla (ORLA), Wesdome
Gold (WDO.to) 1Q26 financials, Minera Alamos (MAI.v) reboots.
I remind subscribers that no part of this newsletter can be copied, reproduced or given to any
third party without the express permission of the author.
This Week
In today’s edition
 Today’s main fundies section takes a look at our Top Pick, Rio2 Ltd (RIO.to), on the back of its 1q26
earnings report, a key moment that marks its transition from developer play to a fully-fledged multi-
asset producer in one fell swoop. The balance sheet matters, the first weeks of production at Fenix
matter, the incorporation of Condestable matters, the teething problems matter and what we’ve
learned from management matters, too.
 Another of the larger market cap stocks on our Stocks to Follow list and in my current portfolio,
Wesdome Gold (WDO.to) also reported its Q1 last week but in this case, it was a vastly more
predictable set of numbers. That’s in today’s Market Watching section.
 Also in Market Watching, I have a good old rant about Minera Alamos (MAI.v) and get a few things off
my chest on the occasion of another large-scale board and management reshuffle as well as the
announcement of a name change. I’m not buying this stock again, today’s note explains why.
 Copper shot forward last week in fine style, so I probably bolted on the new copper trade in Element
29 (ECU.v) just in time. A couple of added thoughts on the new trade in Stocks to Follow, plenty of
thoughts on the way the metal traded in the Copper Basket section.
 Do not underestimate the influence of the upcoming Presidential elections in South America, with the
Peru vote now shaping up as most likely Keiko vs Roberto Sánchez and that means a potential dump in
all things Peruvian if the lefty wins. However the big event is in Colombia where we’re now just three
weeks from the round one vote. This one matters and we take the time to walk through why that is in
Regional Politics today.
 Other things, too. There are always other things.
1

May Two Four
Everyone would gather on the 24th of May
Sitting in the sand to watch the fireworks display
Dancing fires on the beach, singing songs together
Though it's just a memory, some memories last forever
Lakeside Park, Rush, 1975
Though I don’t understand why you have to have it on a Monday six days before her birthday instead of on a
Monday one day after, it’s all good. Hope you had a pleasant long weekend, Canada.
There is a reason to mention your day off now that it’s over, too: As the Canadian markets were closed today
and the action in US stocks went on without you, there was some interesting action in OTC tickers of TSX/V
listed companies and first among those, the alternative Rio2 ticker RIOFF. For what it’s worth, I traded the
opening minute dump in RIOFF shares and managed to buy a modest slug at U$1.94, then within minutes
sold them back to the market at U$2.10 for a profitable little round trip. All this doesn’t get a mention in
today’s intro as a way to preen and show off to this audience, not least because most of you already know I
usually suck at very-near-term flip trading. It’s rare for me to run this kind of trade, but when the punctual
opportunity showed itself this morning it felt like free money being offered, so I took it. Also, please be 100%
crystal clear that today’s fast turnaround trade had and has nothing at all to do with my major investment in
this Top Pick stock, it was simply about buying a price that was stupidly cheap and taking advantage of the
moment. Instead, it gets a mention for two reasons:
1) I wasn’t planning on running any intro today, so this came to mind on Monday evening as a filler. Hey,
can’t fault my transparency, right?
2) Mining isn’t about the numbers. Well it is up to a point and the fact I spend most of my professional life
crunching them and elaborating Excel spreadsheets on any number of mining stocks, but there’s a difference
between having a set of numbers from a mining company in front of you and knowing what they mean.
We’re now into a years-long bull market for gold and the metals, we’re all aware of the moves the mining
stocks have made and as flies are attracted to sh….as bees are attracted to honey, that means a whole new
audience are paying attention to these stocks. In the case of Rio2 Ltd (RIO.to) today, its 1q26 financials
wouldn’t have impressed a casual observer and those who run the numbers and compare them against
guidance to make a trade decision were the very same people who managed to sell down the stock to as low
as U$1.90 this morning. Having spent the weekend chewing over the RIO.to 1q26 financials and MD&A, I
knew the company was in good shape and while glitchy, there was nothing to worry about in the report. I
also guessed that we’d see a sell-off while Canada was packing their 24-packs and firing up the barbecues
but when the drop flew the piece straight down and below U$2,
the opportunity to buy and make a quick difference was too
tempting to ignore.
It was a rare trade for me, what’s more it was successful (though I
could have bought slightly lower if I’d been prepared and sold
slightly higher with an hour’s extra patience) so it got me thinking
about the set-up as the morning wore on. Hence, this post (right)
that showed up later on X (1). And with that cobbled together
intro, we now move to what we can ascertain from the first
quarterly earnings report of Rio2 the producer, rather than Rio2
the exploreco or developer. And yes, that Rush song really is over
50 years old now.
Fundamental Analysis of Mining Stocks
Rio2 Ltd (RIO.to) 1q26 financials
Friday evening saw our Top Pick stock file its 1q26 earnings report to SEDAR, with a cover NR arriving today
Monday morning (public holiday or not, gotta tell the world). It’s a major moment for Rio2 Ltd (RIO.to)
(RIOFF) because this quarter marks the moment when the company changes from a mine developer with one
asset and no cash flow to a fully-fledged producer with two working mines, Fenix Gold in Chile and
2

Condestable in Peru. It’s a big deal when any company moves into production but in this case, the company
cut itself a double dose of trouble by moving to commission and ramp the first stage of its own-built Fenix,
while incorporating the established Condestable copper mine after buying it from Southern Peaks, the deal
closing at the end of January.
I’ve had the three (and a half) days to digest the contents of the RIO.to Q1 filings and chew over what it all
means, I’ve also had plenty of time to decide on exactly how to make the points I want to make in this
update report for your consideration. It’s an odd situation in some respects, as the “usual suspect” tracking
charts are largely redundant for a company that’s suddenly a much-changed financial entity so the numbers
can only tell us so much. Equally, it would be at best unfair to judge the company on its first quarter at Fenix
(in fact it would be plain wrong), so standard metrics on production, sales, margins etc are also of limited
use. Instead, I’ve decided to take a somewhat different tack and present the real need-to-know, as well as
intel gleaned and inferred along the course of my weekend.
We will, however, start with a few standard visuals starting with an update of the basic corporate structure
topbox at RIO.to:
Shares out: 548.482m
Options etc: 16.885m
RSUs: 2.045m
Warrants: zero
Fully diluted: 567.412m
Share price: C$3.02
Market Cap: C$1.656bn
Approx cash per S/O: C$0.23
All prices Canadian Dollars unless stated, forex CAD$1 = USD 0.73
The big change is to the share count, though in relative terms the acquisition of Condestable didn’t dilute the
share count massively being a cash/shares deal that leaned on debt facilities. To the plus side, there aren’t
many derivates outstanding even after the recent 1m-and-change RSU award, so the fully diluted total isn’t
that much more than the current S/O count.
RIO.v: Shares out
3
134.181 773.281 71.091 607.091 395.991 968.991 633.452 633.452 586.652 15.752 15.752 165.752 446.752 83.852 357.852 232.952 965.952 995.813 995.813
963.624 495.624 875.724 478.924 902.634
383.845 284.845
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 32q4 42q1 42q2 42q3 42q4 52q1 52q2 52q3 52q4 62q1 62q2
M s/o
source: company filings
Sticking with our standard financial charts a little longer, if only to show the massive changes that have
happened, here are the assets and liabilities overviews:
RIO.v:Assets, per qtr
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 32q4 42q1 42q2 42q3 42q4 52q1 52q2 52q3 52q4 62q1
U$m RIO.v: Liabilities overview
1000
fixed 900
other current 800
cash+ST 700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
source: company filings
02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 32q4 42q1 42q2 42q3 42q4 52q1 52q2 52q3 52q4 62q1
U$m
LT liab
current liab
source: company filings

Those are big columns for 1q26, are they not? Let’s consider the new assets situation first, with the main
changed that fixed assets total. The big change is caused by Condestable and its U$848m asset value, to
which we add the full asset value of Fenix Gold (U$362.5m) now it’s in production. Aside those fixed assets,
we also have improvement in the cash position, booked at U$93.1m in 1q26.
RIO.v: Cash & Eq, per quarter
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
4
02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 32q4 42q1 42q2 42q3 42q4 52q1 52q2 52q3 52q4 62q1
U$m
source: company filings
Now for those liabilities, which at a grand total of U$883.1m comprised of U$203.1m in current liabilities and
U$680m in long-term liabilities looks scary, but it isn't all that. The main pieces are the Wheaton (WPM) loan
RIO.to took to build Fenix (U$186m or so), the royalty Franco-Nevada (FNV) holds on Condestable’s gold and
silver (U$262m or so) and the Deferred income tax liability (U$196m) that came into RIO.to from the
Condestable books and is of little real world consequence. Those three lumps are not going away anytime
soon, with the current parts of those WPM & FNV stream debts coming to a total of U$78.5m so even a
couple of years down the line, they’ll add up to at least U$500m. That’s one of the new features of RIO.to the
producer but it’s not a particular issue and assuming the type of production levels we expect from the two
mines, the streams get covered easily. Having half a billion on your liabilities sheets may look onerous, but
assuming Rio2 does a good job and expands it will become less of a relative weight
As for cash debt, that’s something we need to pay more attention to in the near-term and as at March 31st it
came to U$75.2m. Here’s the note from the financials on that and in its literature, RIO.to stated it had made
a U$20m voluntary early payment on the U$65m debt facility it took out to partially fund the Condestable
purchase. That’s now U$45m (or 44 and change with time value factored in) and alongside that, the
Condestable structure has also brought in three debt lines held by Peru’s BCP (U$15m) and BBVA (U$3m)
banks, as well as an U$11m debt held by the Chinese merchant bank ICBC.
When I consulted management on this subject, they told me the company has the intention of paying down
these debt facilities as quickly as possible. The focus at first will be the Southern Peaks loan and assuming
things go well at both mines, even after taking into account the cash it needs to complete its capex projects
RIO.to believes it can be extinguished by the end of this year. They’ll then look to pay down the other lines
and get as much debt off the books as possible (though it wouldn’t surprise me to see them keep at least one
of the liabilities with the Peru banks, having them on your side is never a bad thing in Peru).
Another note table from the filings shows that the overall situation is easily manageable in 2026 while Fenix
gets into full gear. Aside the capex bill left to pay, the big one in the near term is the Loans Payable and as
we’ve just mentioned, RIO.to is looking not only to pay that segment off, but pay its entire U$45m facility off
and cut into the long-term liability as well.

Regarding the deferred capex projects for the rest of the year, RIO.to offered this breakdown in the MD&A (it
really is a most informative and detailed MD&A, well worth a read if you’re long the stock) showing its plans.
The biggest line items are the completion of the leach pads to cover long-term production and the truck
workshop (which will now cover 45t trucks, of course).
To wrap up the financial side of things, we dial up the working capital position which stood at negative
U$20m as at end 1q26. That comes from the arrival of the stream obligations and the near-term debt to the
balance sheet, but we remind readers that cash stood at over U$90m, there are no liquidity issues, the
stream repayments are baked into production and once the money starts flowing from Fenix Gold sales, that
will quickly turn positive again. We also remind readers that RIO.to would not have made that U$20m early
repayment of debt if it had any financial tightness in its model.
RIO.v: Working capital
5
64.1 60.3
11.11
97.3 16.3 11.7 62.4 34.2
72.61 97.31
47.53 74.43
95.81 02.21
30.92
-19.93
69.31
92.9 19.9
80.0- 68.22 54.91 63.52 78.0 21.5
50
40
30
20 10
0
-10
-20
-30
02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 32q4 42q1 42q2 42q3 42q4 52q1 52q2 52q3 52q4 62q1
U$m
source: company filings
But just in case you still harbour any doubts, this comes from the MD&A;
Management believes the Company has sufficient financial resources to fund its current operating
plans, capital expenditures, meeting working capital requirements, and meet its obligations, including
debt service obligations, for a period greater than 12 months. These resources include, but are not
limited too, its cash and cash equivalents, expected operating cash flows from the Fenix Gold Mine
and the Condestable Mine, and expected refunds of value added taxes within the next 12 months.
That couldn’t be any clearer.
Operations: Condestable
Moving to operations and in general terms, the two months of the Peruvcian Condestable copper mine
attributable to RIO.to went much as expected, with an apparent smooth change of control from the old
management and little in the way of operational disruption. As there’s only one quarter of production to
report, I’m going to lean on the tables offered by RIO.to in its detailed and well-written MD&A (one of the
more informative I’ve ever read, packed with detail, recommended reading for any long or prospective long)
so here it is:

The important ones here are overall production which, at 6.4m lbs copper, is slightly light compared to the
average two month period for the mine but nothing particularly untoward and RIO.to reaffirmed its 2026
guidance for the mine, at 21,500 to 23,500 tonnes copper equivalent.
Operations: Fenix Gold
Unlike Condestable, the newly inaugurated Fenix Gold mine in Chile reported a list of issues, glitches and
problems in its first full quarter of production, even though it’s still not considered commercial production by
the company and won’t be until Q4 of this year. Again, the MD&A is the place to look as the company goes
into considerable detail on this operating quarter and all that went on, here you get my condensed list of the
major issues:
Blasting permit: If there was one problem above all others at Fenix in Q1, it’s this one. In the words of
the company, “…the blasting permit was expected to be issued by mid-November 2025 but was received
in late-December 2025 which effectively set the mine plan for 2026 back by 6 weeks.” At first sight that
looks more of a problem for 4q25 than 1q26, but the knock-on effects of the delay to that permit made the
first half of 1q26 very difficult, the lack of blasted rock means that for the first part of Q! they were
recovering gold from free dig material, which means they could not control the grade going to pad or
expect the same leach kinetics. Be clear, this was a serious headwind for the first weeks at Fenix and its
negative effects rippled through the entire flowchart. Those effects have now dissipated, and shouldn’t
show again, but it stands as an example of what can go wrong during the start of any mining operation.
Glitches appear, often where you least expect them and even though Chile has a good reputation for the
timely expedition of permits, this one hit Fenix at a bad time.
Grade issues: According to my mailbox and DMs, plenty of people picked up on the fact that Fenix
stacked ore head grade averaged 0.452 g/t, plenty below the 0.7 g/t target planned for material in its
first quarters of production. This was a direct consequence of not being able to blast to normal levels and
being forced to put free dig material under leach. Grade control was nigh on impossible, so as the
company knew even 0.45g material would be highly profitable at the current gold price, they went for the
temporary solution of quantity over quality. This again is almost certainly an early teething glitch and
while Q2 grade may now be at the model levels, we should see grade climb as the year grows older.
However, there is good news on this issue as well because the company reports kinetics are every bit as
good as they were modelled (especially now blasted material is under leach) and recoveries are running
at 75% after four months, that's good.
Mine sequencing: Another consequence of the lack of blasting permits at the expected time, the company
decided to change its mining sequence in order to access more mineralization by opening up on the Fenix
South zone earlier than expected. While over time the effect will be a wash, that decision and the re-
tooling involved cost time in Q1.
Staffing issues: You could hear a certain level of lamentation in the voice of RIO.to management when
comparing the work attitudes of Chileans compared to the Peruvian teams they’ve been used to working
6

with. The early days were apparently affected by a high staff turnover as a percentage of those hired
decided after a short time that they didn’t like doing manual work at 4,000m+ above sea level, but this
issue has turned out to be a temporary one. While there was a little continuation of staffing problems at
the start of Q2, the company reports that things are now much better and their contractor agencies have
sourced more willing people for the jobs at hand
Vehicle issues: Part of the teething problems that come along are finding out the equipment you brought
in wasn’t the best for the job at hand, which turned out to be the case with the 35t trucks procured by
Rio2 to do its rock lifting and shifting on site that turned out to be sub-optimal for the task at hand at
those altitudes. Instead the contractor (Stracon, a top level firm) is now in the process of swapping out
the trucks for 42t vehicles that have already improved production.
All those and more. It sounds a lot and when we dial up the operations table for Fenix from the MD&A, the
results are there to see with gold ounces produced at 4,648oz, much low than the type of 5,000oz/month
rate you need for a mine that aims to run at 60,000oz/year.
However, things really aren’t as bad as all that and most importantly, things seem to be back on track in Q2
and for this, we go slightly off-record. I’ve known this management team for over 15 years and have
conversed with the key players no end of times. I also trust this management tram more than any other in
the mining business as, all jokes or personal opinions aside, they are second to none when it comes to frank,
sincere and honest answers to your questions. Obviously there are some things they simply cannot tell me as
it’s illegal for my ears to hear non-public material information, but over the years I’ve became adept at being
able to read between the lines and get the right sort of semi-answer, or even non-answer, to confirm or
adapt expectations. All that’s a rather diplomatic way of telling this audience that we can be fully confident
about RIO.to fixing the Fenix Gold early teething problems and being right back on track during this quarter.
Here’s what I expect (and again, I don’t have any non-public material information at hand, this is inference
and experience of dealing with this team):
 The same approximate grade in 2q26 as in 1q26 (that should improve in the second half of 2026):
Best guess 0.5 g/t, still below the expected grade at these early stages
 Greatly improved mineral throughput:: in 1q26 that averaged around 7,300tpd stacked, but things
started to improve as February became March and we should confidently expect continued
incremental growth in April, May and eventually June. We may even see Fenix Gold reach a steady
state 20,000tpd rate by the end of this current quarter.
 Production in Q2 of around 13,000 to 14,000 ounces, with growth to 20,000 oz/qtr in the second
half of the year. The company reiterated its guidance of 60k to 65k oz gold from Fenix in 2026 and
after talking with management, I fully believe that.
 The world buying RIO.to shares when they read the production and financial numbers. After all, if
Fenix can run an AISC some U$1,500/oz below the gold price during problem–strewn first few
weeks of production and run a profit under the most difficult circumstances it will ever face, once
the mine starts running on rails it will print money.
 And before wrapping up, the company management reports that water procurement for the mine is
running ahead of schedule and they have more water than they currently need on site. So much
for “that’ll never work”.
7

Bottom line to Fenix: When reading through the MD&A and then in discussions with the RIO.to team, it was
an apparent long list of issues in its first quarter and each one must have been a royal pain in the rear end
for the company as they addressed them (especially that blasting permit), but overall and thought the list
may be longer than we’d like, there’s nothing that qualifies as a red flag. These mines rarely start with a
smooth ramp to full production in optimum conditions, there are always going to be fires to put out and they
tend to come from the least expected quarters (bet they didn’t expect the 35t trucks chosen to be sub-
standard for the job at hand). However much they may have affected Q!, there’s nothing there to cause more
than a temporary glitch, even the staff issues get fixed over time (I advised them to pay more and get better
quality contractor teams, nobody sweats an extra U$20/oz on mine cash cost when gross margin is over
U$3000/oz).
Putting the two mines together to consider corporate financial results, instead of copypasting the entire P+L,
this table does a succinct job and for the moment, is sufficient for our needs:
Of the U$65.858m in top line revenues, two thirds came from Condestable and the rest from the
underperforming Fenix. However, even at this early stage we see the type of margin Fenix can offer, so when
production starts clicking up resulting cash flow will start dwarfing the larger mine. We’re still in the non-
commercial production period at Fenix and will remain there until 4q26, as the company has decided to
define commercial production at the point when all major capex works are complete and the mine has
achieved its planned steady-state 20,00tpd run rate. In other words, Fenix Gold will be very profitable even
before commercial production is declared.
Conclusion
Last week in IKN884, the notes on RIO.to included four bullet points on what I wanted in its Q1 report. These
were the four subjects, now find some comments on each:
 A strong treasury and cash position: We got that. Working cap is negative, that’s a temporary thing,
seeing cash at North of U$90m and seeing the company pay down U$20m of debt early is all we need to
know.
 Good production numbers from Condestable: We got okay numbers, rather than good, but the mine is
clearly profitable and with copper doing what it’s doing in Q2, margins can only improve
 No need for perfection from Fenix: Yes indeed, Q1 was glitchy with plenty of teething problems, but
there was nothing of serious concern to the outsider looking in. Or in the word of company chair Alex
Black (quote authorized), “We’re getting over the issues, there’s no fatal flaws, no red flags”.
 Guidance: They didn’t tell us outright when Fenix goes free cash flow positive, but it’s not difficult to
guess that as soon as the mine is running at 20,000tpd, that milestone will be in the past (bar the capex
bills). As for mine guidance, both were confirmed and that’s good.
The early financials show RIO.to is in good shape, importantly Condestable has been folded into the
corporate structure without much fuss and while Fenix didn’t have an easy start to its productive life, all
issues are temporary issues and after conversing with people close to the centre of the story (as they say),
it’s clear most are either solved or are on their way out.
8

I’ll leave you with a chart of the recent
price action in RIO.to compared to the
benchmark GDXJ ETF, which includes its
recent out-performance and that sharp
spike lower this Monday morning, before
recovering most of that dump almost
immediately. If the same thing happens
again, I strongly recommend that you do
the same as your author did on the US
market this morning and buy some
shares; gold price permitting, they could
be the last time we see them this cheap.
Top Pick reiterated, expect good things
from Q2-
Stocks to Follow
This kind of week in mining stocks, when the generalist money suddenly pulls the plug and runs for the door
on a metals price drop, is often the recipe for total carnage in a junior mining portfolio of stocks such as our
Stocks to Follow list. Indeed, the losses taken by gold (GLD proxy down 3.8%) and the PM producers (GDX
down 7.6%) were heavy and sudden, nearly all the damage done on Friday. However in this case and this
week it’s impossible not to be pleased about the relative strength shown by the Stocks to Follow collective
last week, we even managed to get six week-over-week winners (ECU.v, SRL.v, LMS.v, OCI.v, KBX.cn,
BPAG.v) and among those, two large upmoves in Salazar (SRL.v up 26.8%) and Latin Metals (LMS.v up
17.1%). One stock remained unchanged (MIRL.cn) and that means eleven losers, so you don’t get a list,
instead you get the double figure percentage losers: There were none. Yes, that surprised me as well and a
few got close (MENE.v down 9.1%), XGC.v down 9.1%, MFG.v down 9.0%, TNGD.v down 8.8%), but once
again it could have been a lot worse considering the circumstances.
With the recent additions we’re up to 18 Stocks to Follow on our list, two under the self-imposed maximum.
Six of those are in the red, one is unchanged, eleven are in the green and West Red Lake Gold is still the
prime source of concern in my portfolio.
company Ticker this week Avg Price Reco date Current PPS Gain/Loss% Notes
TOP PICKS
Rio2 Ltd. RIO.v STR BUY C$0.80 22-Apr-18 C$3.02 277.5% New C$6.84 tgt Feb'26
RECOMMENDED STOCKS
Amerigo Res ARG.to BUY C$1.54 28-Jul-24 C$6.55 325.3% Core copper position
Tiernan Gold TNGD.v STR BUY C$8.26 29-Dec-25 C$8.69 5.2% new Chile gold jr, adding
Marimaca Copper MARI.to STR BUY C$3.34 14-Jan-24 C$8.17 144.6% Quality Cu dev, M&A tgt
Gold Royalty Co GROY BUY U$1.40 9-Mar-25 U$3.32 137.1% 2nd tgt U$5 hit, hold for buyout
Element 29 ECU.v STR BUY C$1.31 10-May-26 C$1.29 -1.5% Copper exploreco in Peru
West Red Lake WRLG.v STR BUY C$0.82 20-Jul-25 C$0.69 -15.9% re-rate trade, $1.44 tgt close
Wesdome Gold WDO.to STR BUY C$22.42 30-Nov-25 C$27.14 21.1% 2026 M&A tgt, added Mar'26
Mayfair Gold MFG.v BUY C$4.39 16-Mar-26 C$3.94 -10.3% starter position taken
Xali Gold XGC.v BUY C$0.28 2-Mar-26 C$0.25 -10.8% New gold risk trade, Peru
Salazar Res SRL.v BUY C$0.08 5-Jan-25 C$0.26 225.0% Ecuador buyout trade
Latin Metals LMS.v SPEC BUY C$0.19 10-Jun-25 C$0.24 26.3% proj.gen, Cerro Bayo drilling
Orecap Inv OCI.v BUY C$0.08 4-May-24 C$0.135 68.8% top fundy value, illiquid
9

SPECULATIVE TRADES
Minera IRL MIRL.cse avoid C$0.195 22-Jul-12 C$0.015 -92.3% leaving list soon (good)
A WATCHLIST OF POTENTIAL TRADES. NB: I DO NOT OWN
RPX Gold RPX.v watch C$0.17 3-May-26 C$0.20 17.6% gold dev Canada
Kobrea Expl KBX.cn watch C$0.325 3-May-26 C$0.335 3.1% Cu in Mendoza, Arg
BP Silver BPAG.v watch C$0.97 19-Apr-26 C$0.97 0.0% silver exploreco in Bolivia
LONG-TERM NON-MINING HOLD
Mene Inc. MENE.v adding C$0.45 6-Dec-20 C$0.185 -58.9% LT bet, adding slowly
CLOSED TRADES IN 2025 date closed close price
American Eagle AE.v Jan'26 C$0.495 14-Dec-25 C$0.61 27.3% TLS trade, modest, successful
Electrum Disc ELY.v Jan'26 C$0.075 9-Nov-25 C$0.10 33.3% took quick profit on buyout
Amerigo Res ARG.to Jan'26 C$1.54 28-Jul-24 C$5.46 254.5% partial profit-take on port mgmt
XXIX Metal XXIX.v Jan'26 C$0.11 27-Aug-25 C$0.125 13.6% spec copper trade, bad result
Valkea Res OZ.v Jan'26 C$0.36 29-Dec-25 C$0.48 33.3% took NT profit TLS trade
Arizona Metals AMC.to Feb'26 C0.69 5-Oct-25 C$0.66 -4.3% sold to rebalance port, Feb'26
Red Pine Expl RPX.v Feb'26 C$0.12 8-Sep-24 C$0.195 62.5% sold to rebalance port, Feb'26
Minera Alamos MAI.v Feb'26 C$2.10 13-Oct-19 C$6.22 196.2% 75% of trade sold Q1
Blue Moon MOON.v Feb'26 C$4.18 30-Nov-25 C$5.84 39.7% sold to rebalance port, Feb'26
Minera Alamos MAI.v Mar'26 C$2.10 13-Oct-19 C$7.01 233.8% 25% of trade sold, now closed
Aurion Res AU.v Apr'26 C$1.07 21-Sep-25 C$2.56 139.3% Bot by Agnico, good trade
Arizona Metals AMC.to May'26 C$0.53 31-Mar-26 C$0.20 -62.3% failed risk trade
2015 to 2025 annual closed positions in appendices below, 2009 to 2014 closed positions in editions IKN553 or earlier
Now for a few notes on some of our covered stocks:
Element 29 (ECU.v): POSITION OPENED. As per last week’s main fundies report, “Buying a serious
copper junior”, your author bought shares and opened on this new copper exploreco position, paying more
than I wanted to pay at C$1.31 but that’s my problem, not yours. Now for real news and further to last
week’s note, a couple of additional notes to consider:
1) In trying to condense the note, on reading it back I made the impression that ECU is currently not drilling
Elida. In fact it is, there are currently two rigs working the project and they’re looking to add a third soon, all
on the back of its exploration permit. When it receives its DIA permit, the current program will expanded
considerably but even before that happens, we’re
going to get assay results in 2026.
2) Last week saw ECU host an analyst site visit to
Elida, something I only found out about on
Wednesday. As such, it was interesting to see how
well the stock traded later week, that sort of
relative strength is good when it comes at a time
when a bunch of sell-siders are coming down a
mountain with cellphones in their pockets.
Apart from that, nothing much to add to last
week’s typo-strewn opening report on the stock.
Not my best effort at editing, has to be said.
RPX Gold (RPX.v): Its placement closed in correct style last week (2) and, after a second upsizing and near
total use of the overallotment facility raised C$14.1m gross proceeds, that compares to its original target of
C$11m in a mix of hard dollar and flow-through units, with the hard dollar priced at 17c (unit = share + ½
warrant at 27c). The mix of flow-thru and hard dollar sales came to 69.31m units, which puts the new
shares-out total at an IKN-estimated 443.3m, therefore RPX.v now runs a market cap of C$86.7m. Aside that,
a quiet week and a stock price sticky at the 20c line.
10

Mayfair Gold (MFG.v): My idea of a serious gold junior in Canada reported its Q1 last week and as MFG is
a fairly new issue, we’ll just copypaste a bit of
its balance sheet instead of running some
uninformative tracking charts (right).
Plenty of money, still expensing its
development work, virtual zero liabilities, we
see no problems here. MFG burned through
C$6.8m in Q1, which is a good, aggressive clip
as it rolls out its development plan for Fenn-
Gib, it also implies it has all the cash it needs
for the next year and a half, which will get it
near (though not to) the feasibility study
publication and eventual construction decision.
In other news, MFG announced (3) the
appointment of one Adree DeLazzer as Vice President, Exploration and Jean François Métail as Vice President,
Mineral Resource Management. Ms DeLazzer comes from Northern Superior and surely has good knowledge
of the local rocks.
As for trading, MFG couldn’t escape the Friday downdraft and fell back to what’s looking like its default
baseline price these days, just under C$4. A drop that looks worse than it is, no real damage done.
West Red Lake Gold (WRLG.v): We continue watching WRLG with concern, as stocks that don’t rally
when the market rallies but sell-off when others do are stocks that need to change their ways. I’m giving
WRLG Q2 to show me they’ve turned a corner, until then I’ll soak up my own worries and your criticisms.
Xali Gold (XGC.v): I don’t care if they spend 75k on an online pumpo campaign, I’m happy to wait longer
to get the right price for the planned addition. In the same vein at Watch List companies, the lower this goes
the better it suits me….in the near-term at least.
Tiernan Gold (TNGD.v): Down on the week, but as the longer-term price chart shows, there’s a stock that
has made its initial revaluation and is now
consolidating its value. We got another “we’re
busy doing plenty of work” NR last week (4)
entitled “Tiernan Advances Multiple Parallel
Technical and Environmental Workstreams”, which
is toop class business English but isn’t going to
move the market. Okay, so, I’m an ornery git at
times but what this NR does is to tell the world
that the company is on schedule and executing on
its plans. Nothing wrong with that.
11

Salazar Resources (SRL.v): From the getgo, the trade thesis here is the most straightforward imaginable,
i.e. SRL’s 15% of El Domo/Curipamba gets bought by Silvercorp
Admittedly, Friday last trade flurry that popped SRL from 22.5c to its 26c close on the week looks pretty
tapey-painty, but it was 66k shares (not bad) and also, that price was the lowest seen all week. From
Wednesday to Friday, somebody somewhere was willing and happy to pay 26c for shares that were 3c higher
than the bid and that’s the right odour for a stock that’s set up for a deal at some point.
Amerigo Resources (ARG.to): While others wilted and died last, ARG lost just five cents on the week and
underscored its newly found market star quality. It also traded above C$7 for the first time, doing reasonable
business with a seven handle before Friday knocked the stuffing out of the whole mining sector.
BP Silver Corp (BPAG.v): I may have done BPAG a bit of a disservice last week by saying it hasn’t been
ebbing and flowing with the rest of the silver stocks,
as this ten-day chart shows a reasonable correlation
to the main silver stocks ETF (SIL), though
admittedly a more jaggedly near-term price action
due to a wide bid/ask. We’re still in watch-don’t-
touch mode here and on that score, please see
today’s Regional Politics segment on the sharp rise
in social protests and resulting deteriorating political
risk in BPAG’s host country, Bolivia. Cosuño is
located in one of the potential flashpoint zones of
conflict, so even though we haven’t heard anything
specific or bad from its region, it’s worth bearing in
mind.
Orecap Inv (OCI.v): Up on a down week, but quite frankly…
OCI.v: Marketable Secs, Investments in Assocs, Cash
ticker shares owned(m) PPS valueC$m Cents/share
AE.v 10.72 1.13 12.11 4.9
ARIC.v 10.631 0.89 9.46 3.8
XXIX.v 23.637 0.125 2.95 1.2
AUME.v 42.75 0.065 2.78 1.1
MERG.v 1.025 0.88 0.90 0.4
MERG warrant 0.5125 0.43 0.22 0.1
ZIGY.cse 4.942 0.55 2.72 1.1
KLDC.v 40.040 0.57 22.82 9.2
subtotal 53.97 21.7
Est.cash 0.70 0.3
Total 54.67 22.0
At 248.332 S/O
…OCI should have put on a lot more than just half a penny, what with notable moves in larger holdings KLDC
and ARIC as well as support moves in ZIGY and AUME. This weekend, you can buy 22c of share price value
12

for 13.5c and a deep discount. Also, before moving on please note the change in the above chart: In the next
few days OCI is scheduled to exercise its 4.166m warrants of ARIC priced at 20c, so as from this week we’ve
lost the ARICV warrants and upped the total ARIC holding to its assumed position of 10.631m fully paid-up
shares. That makes ARICV shares the third largest position by cash value at OCI today
Latin Metals (LMS.v): I strongly suspect that LMS had a good week on the back of this video (5), an
interview by Rick Rule as part of his upcoming Resource conference, at which LMS will be an exhibitor. The
most telling part, for me at least, is when LMS CEO Keith Henderson said
“…we find ourselves with a couple of very good quality partners in place but I also find myself in a
position where this year I can say with some confidence by the end of this year, all of our existing
projects will most probably be partnered out to partners and actively being explored. And that's a very
good place for the shareholders of the company to be because that's where the shots on goals start
to appear.”
That means Cerro Bayo for one, we should recall last year when Anglogold Ashanti handed back the project
after doing all sorts of preparatory work only to get a missive from head office that it was pulling out of
Argentina. It was about to sell its producing Cerro Vanguardia mine (to Mineros SA) and make the exit
complete, but at the last minute the Joburg HQ had a change of heart based on the way gold prices were
suddenly flying and pulled the plug on the big deal. But by then Cerro Bayo was back as a 100% LMS asset,
so the indications last week that Cerro Bayo has attracted a new partner (along with LMS’s other projects) is
indeed good news.
The Copper Basket
After nineteen weeks of 2026, The Copper Basket shows a gain of 33.16% to level stakes:
company ticker price 1/1/26 Shares out m Market Cap current pps gain/loss%
1 Faraday Copper FDY.to 2.73 278.326 1569.76 5.64 106.6%
2 Aldebaran Res. ALDE.v 3.67 185.338 543.04 2.93 -20.2%
3 Los Andes Copper LA.v 9.20 29.573 420.53 14.22 54.6%
4 Pecoy Copper PCU.v 1.32 209.489 360.32 1.72 30.3%
5 Hot Chili HCH.v 1.33 177.47 314.12 1.77 33.1%
6 Andina Copper ANDC.v 0.56 267.638 313.14 1.17 108.9%
7 Surge Copper SURG.v 0.475 377.754 283.32 0.75 57.9%
8 Element 29 Res ECU.v 1.20 187.873 242.36 1.29 7.5%
9 American Eagle AE.v 0.56 192.621 217.66 1.13 101.8%
10 Hercules Metals BIG.v 0.74 342.783 215.95 0.63 -14.9%
11 Fitzroy Min FTZ.v 0.48 327.178 153.77 0.47 -2.1%
12 Copper Giant CGNT.v 0.49 203.927 130.51 0.64 30.6%
13 Metal Energy MERG.v 0.64 45.2 39.78 0.88 37.5%
14 Algo Grande Copper ALGR.v 0.53 42.159 29.09 0.69 30.2%
15 Kobrea Exp KBX.cse 0.51 35.622 11.93 0.335 -34.3%
NB: All stocks in CAD$ Portfolio avg 33.16%
It was a good week for copper stocks that was almost a great week, with our Copper Basket average up
5.5% thanks to eleven winners (not listing them all),
45% The Copper Basket 2026, weekly evolution
just two losers (LA.v, AE.v) and two unchanged stocks
40%
(SURG.v, MERG.v). The best moves were put in by 35%
Andina Copper (ANDC.v up 28.6%) and Fitzroy 30%
25%
Minerals (FTZ.v up 19.0%), with both of those
20%
climbing on the back of good drill numbers.
15%
10%
The reason for all the fun was almost entirely copper, 5%
which saw its near-dated futures contract start the 0%
week at an impressive U$6.30/lb, end it at U$6.30/lb
13
ts1naJ ht4naJ ht11 ht81 ht52 ts1bef ht8 ht51 dn22 ts1raM ht8 ht51 dn22 ht92 ht5rpA ht21 ht91 ht62 dr3yam ht01 ht71
source: IKN calcs

and between those dates balloon to spend three days trading above U$6.60/lb, including a new all-time high
price for the metal U$6.7015/lb, or U$14,774/tonne. That was enough to send nearly anything with the word
“copper” in its corporate title higher and as both ANDC and FTZ above show, a fine time to release a splashy
drill assay.
As for the reasons behind the spike up to new record levels (and perhaps its drop as well), that’s Iran and
Hormuz related, with the world now worried about copper supply drying up if copper heap leach operations
dry up. The world freight traffic disruptions have affected the sulfuric acid market to such an extent that at
the start of May China, the world’s biggest producer of H2SO4, placed a blanket ban on its export. The prime
reason is agro (it’s a key ingredient in fertilizers) and China’s desire to keep its fields as fecund as possible,
but it’s also an important input for copper production or, as Trading Economics put it (6)
"On the supply side, China's export restrictions on sulfuric acid, combines with disruptions to sulfur
production in the Middle East, could tighten global supply conditions and provide additional structural
support for prices."
This trade paper report (7) goes into detail about the biggest customer for China’s H2SO4, which also
happens to be the biggest copper producing country in the world and one of China’s biggest suppliers of the
red metal:
China exports approximately 4.6 million metric tons annually, accounting for roughly 37% of Chilean
imports, the world’s largest importer. In March 2026, Chinese shipments to Chile dropped to zero
from 151,268 metric tons just 12 months earlier. The restriction follows an earlier quota system that
slashed export allowances from 1.3 million metric tons in January-April 2025 to just 700,000 metric
tons in the same period of 2026.
There are anecdotal reports of Chilean mining companies “desperately trying to secure supply” and the spot
price for the acid tripling and quadrupling (which suits Peru, one of Chile’s other big suppliers and a net
exporter of the acid). Here from the same report is an estimate of the scale of potential disruption:
Chile depends on sulfuric acid for heap leaching operations that produce roughly 20% of the country’s
refined copper output, approximately 1.1 million metric tons annually. With half of H2 2026 import
needs uncovered, Chilean miners face a desperate scramble for alternative sources as planting
seasons approach globally.
While it’s clearly scaremongering to write those facts in that way and leave the casual observer to conclude
that Chile has just lost 20% of its copper production (sorry folks, we may see a supply crimp for a while but
thee things don’t go on for a full year) it does show the scale of the issue. We note, once again, that China
has come to rely on Chinese supply for all sorts of things, with Rare Earths a recent topical example from our
own sector, but it’s also true for metals smelters and that means by straightforward logic that sulfuric acid is
another of the raw materials controlled by China these days. Maybe Chile shouldn’t have closed down its
Codelco smelter, after all. At least Rio2 isn’t going to have the same level of issues, its copper mine is in Peru
and as far awe we know, sodium cyanide supply is unaffected by the shipping downturn. Also, it’s fair to say
that if China realizes it’s shooting itself in the foot by denying Chile sulfuric acid and as a consequence paying
much higher prices for copper, it’s highly likely to make some sort of exemption to its current blanket ban.
The move to U$6.60/lb on the three month futures contract was one thing, so we should also note the equal
and opposite drop back to this weekend’s U$6.30/lb or so, suggesting that supply chain issues aren’t quite as
14

bad as people as making out. The obvious bottleneck is the Iran conflict (of course) and the way the market
reacted to the whole Trump/Xi meeting thing, which managed to conflate Iran and Taiwan and make them
into connected subjects /such isa the way of geopolitics), suggests supply lines will loosen sooner rather than
later. What that means to oil is beyond my ken, but the less time-critical world of metals supply chains will
bounce back quickly enough of ships start sailing with regularity though the Hormuz Strait again.
Now for our regular weekly world copper inventories update, data from Cochilco:
 There wasn’t much change to world copper inventories in the three official futures systems last
week, with overall stock moving up by less than 600 metric tonnes (mt) to close the week at
1,143,673mt. Still historically high levels, there’s plenty of copper out there if you’re a buyer.
 SHFE stocks dropped a small 690mt to close at 180,643mt. No biggie.
 The LME copper stock level dropped by a more substantial 5,275mt to close at 395,725mt,
wearing a 3-handle for the first time in several weeks. Still no biggie, though.
 Finally the Comex, registered another small gain and another all-time high copper stocks level of
567,305mt. We await POTUS47 and his next call on tariffs.
Our dedicated SHFE chart finally shows a little flatness in the 2026 line. A quiet week, overall.
SHFE copper inventory levels, 2018 to 2025
500000
450000
400000
350000
300000
250000
200000
150000
100000
50000
0
15
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 01 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 02 12 22 32 42 52 62 72 82 92 03 13 23 33 43 53 63 73 83 93 04 14 24 34 44 54 64 74 84 94 05 15 25
MT Cu 2026
2025
2024
2023
2022
2021
2020
2019
2018
source: Cochilco data
Now for some notes on the two basket component stocks that out-performed on drill assay results:
Andina Copper (ANDC.v): ANDC can do no wrong, it
seems. The 12-month chart continues to document its
impressive rise and while the $1.17 close Friday was 10c
off its Thursday intraday peak of C$1.27, it still managed
to add over 28% on the week on the back of this drill
assay NR (8) entitled “Andina Copper Intersects 152m at
0.67% Cu from 54m, within 272m at 0.50% Cu”. What’s
more, a look at the map shows that cut was a clear step-
out to
the
North
of the
known
project area and continues to correlate well with previous
geophysics results.
Your occasional reminder that this desk decided to pass on
ANDC and is now being made to look stupid on a near-
weekly basis.

Fitzroy Metals (FTZ.v): Up 19.0% on the week, FTZ decided
to place a halt on trading to announce the latest drill assay
results (9) from its flagship Buen Retiro project and while for
sure the grade was eye-catching…
Drill hole BRT-DDH059 returned 78.0 m @ 1.70% Cu from
58.0 m, including 40.0 m @ 3.02% Cu from 92.0 metres.
Drill hole BRT-DDH058 returned 75.0 m @ 0.82% Cu from 9.0
m, including 8.0 m @ 3.77% Cu from 12.0 metres.
…particularly that 78m of 1.7% Cu cut, a look at the drill map
shows that what we were given were essentially two infill holes
that may improve overall inferred tonnage a little in their specific
zones, but aren’t going to make a massive difference to the
eventual first pass economics when this band of sequin-throwers
comes out with their PEA, further down the line.
The Producer Basket
After nineteen weeks of 2026, the Producer Basket shows a gain of 2.22% to level stakes:
company ticker price 1/1/26 Shares out MktCap(U$Bn) current pps gain/loss%
1 Newmont NEM 99.85 1079.933 117.78 109.06 9.2%
2 Agnico Eagle AEM 169.53 500.989 90.34 180.33 6.4%
3 Barrick B 43.55 1705.994 69.28 40.61 -6.8%
4 Wheaton PM WPM 117.52 454.037 59.21 130.41 11.0%
5 Alamos Gold AGI 38.58 419.947 16.89 40.23 4.3%
6 Lundin Gold LUG.to 114.02 241.808 15.11 86.76 -23.9%
7 IAMGOLD IAG 16.49 588.8 10.00 16.98 3.0%
8 B2Gold Corp BTG 4.51 1343.243 6.58 4.90 8.6%
9 Eldorado Gold EGO 35.92 198.571 6.29 31.66 -11.9%
10 Americas G & S USAS 5.11 318.26 1.99 6.25 22.3%
All prices and stock quotes in U$, except share price of LUG (in CAD$) Port. avg 2.22%
Last week’s whoosh turns into this week’s splat. It wasn’t a great week for precious metals producers before
Friday came along, but the last day of the week and that gold/metals tumble turned a slightly negative week
into a full-scale loser and all ten of our Producer Basket stocks were down. The other signal from the week-
over-week moves is the fairly homogenous level of the losses, with the least worst (USAS down 5.7%, B
down 5.8%) and the worst (IAG down 9.2%, LUG.to down 9.6%) not that far apart and the rest congregated
around the GDX median. In fact we did slightly better than the GDX on the week and our very slight deficit to
the benchmark is now a very slight lead, but there’s not much in it.
The 2026 Producer Basket: Weekly performance and
comparative to GDX control
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
-5%
-10%16
ts1naJ ht4naJ ht11 ht81 ht52 ts1bef ht8 ht51 dn22 ts1raM ht8 ht51 dn22 ht92 ht5rpA ht21 ht91 ht62 dr3yam ht01 ht71
The 2026 Producer Basket: Percentage diff. Between
GDX benchmark & basket (negative = IKN ahead)
4%
ikn 3%
gdx control
2%
1%
0%
-1%
-2%
-3%
-4%
-5%
source: IKN calcs -6%
ts1naJ ht4naJ ht11 ht81 ht52 ts1bef ht8 ht51 dn22 ts1raM ht8 ht51 dn22 ht92 ht5rpA ht21 ht91 ht62 dr3yam ht01 ht71
source: IKN calcs

Barrick Mining (B): Not difficult to see the reaction day to Barrick’s 1q26 earnings report:
Yes, it was Monday. As things turned out B was as affected by the Friday sell-off as anything else, there was
also clear profit-taking in the stock in the Tuesday to Thursday period and B was already coming back to its
field, but overall and taken over the two week period of that chart, Barrick did okay at +4.5% GDX.
So here’s the thing with Barrick: Its Q1 was okay, on the strict 96c EPS result it was a modest beat of official
forecast consensus but short of the whisper
number you’d normally need for a solid rally. It’s
Barrick: Gold sales (per qtr)
obviously reaping in the cash at an AISC of just
over U$1,700/oz and that showed most clearly in
its reported free cash flow of U$1,575Bn in the
quarter, only marginally lower than the previous
quarter (4q25 U$1.619Bn) despite a significant
drop in gold ounces sold. That's the gold price
once again, ladies and gents, we've seen time and
again in Q1 how it turns mediocre quarters from
under-performing companies into good quarters.
and good quarters into great ones.
So overall I get why the stock rallied on Monday,
but I also get why people were quick to take profits and why the drop on Friday didn't have bargain hunters
rushing in to buy. In a nutshell, right now Barrick is complicated. On many occasions, your author has
noted in passing that The IKN Weekly isn't a service that covers the large caps in any great depth, mostly
because it takes plenty of time to get a real handle on a multi-asset company such as B and that's time taken
away from my focus sub-sector. And right now, in the case of Barrick, things are especially complex and
there's more than an air of "why bother?" about it. For one thing there are other companies in its universe
priced in the same bracket for multiples etc, but more importantly its move to split into North American
Barrick and "Other Barrick" (or maybe "risky Barrick”, or “3rd world” Barrick, you choose) would mean a
whole lot of extra DD time for a task that, I strongly suspect at this point, would end up with a "market
perform" call after several weeks of digging.
Barrick's share price is ruled by quants and metrics and the type of benchmarks they use in the S&P500
stocks, not by bottom-up research. That means may be a trade here and deep diving into B may show it's
sorely undervalued in this period before the split. To be honest I don't know, but what I do know is that as
interesting as it might be as a subject for academic research, there are better uses of my DD time out there
than trying to guess how a company this size decides to split its balance sheet and how the resulting entities
will be able to create value under new strategies.
Americas Gold and Silver (USAS (USA.to): USAS reported its quarter with a trumpets and fanfare NR on
Thursday evening (8), entitled “Americas Gold and Silver Reports Record Production and Sales in Q1 2026 as
Execution on the Growth Plan Continues at Galena”. Record this, record that, all fair enough in this price
environment but what really matters is the reason why the stock dumped by 12.6% on the day:
17
459
1001 7201 2401
019 659 769 569 157 077 738 069 847
1200
1100
1000
900
800
700 600
500 400
300
200
100
0
32q1 32q2 32q3 32q4 42q1 42q2 42q3 42q4 52q1 52q2 52q3 52q4 62q1
source: company filings
uA
zO
s000

Record sales are one thing, but record costs and an EPS of a thin looking U$10m, representing an EPS of just
3c for a stock that closed at U$7.15 Thursday evening, gets one asking about the location of the beef. Yes, I
get that USAS is a “growth story”, but it is essentially two mature operations and this unprecedented price
environment of gold and silver means any miner worth its salt should be able to report fat margins. It’s worth
recalling the run USAS had at the start of the year, getting to within a whisker of a double YTD before giving
most of the gains back. In that context, the Friday dumpage was another double, this time around double its
peers as measured against GDX and a clear sign of a market beginning to tire of this story…unless it starts to
deliver real money profits, of course.
However and before moving on, it’s worth mentioning the market action just before the close on Friday:
There was a sudden influx of buying in USAS, somebody or some thing seemingly determined to see the
stock close off the -12% deck it had been bouncing on all afternoon. The final seconds saw a sharp spike and
all asks taken to U$6.45, but it couldn’t hold and the final trades saw USAS back from whence it came, down
at U$6.25 and around 12% off on the day. That may have been GDX coming for its rebalance purchases,
we’ll find out in a few days’ time.
The TinyCaps List
After nineteen weeks of 2026, the TinyCaps show a loss of 1.70% to level stakes:
company ticker price 1/1/26 Shares out Mkt Cap current pps gain/loss%
Auriginal Min AUME.v 0.07 264.51 17.19 0.065 -7.1%
Canex Metals CANX.v 0.215 208.63 61.55 0.295 37.2%
Sranan Gold SRAN.cn 0.30 60.42 8.76 0.145 -51.7%
Enduro Metals ENDR.v 0.155 114.06 20.53 0.18 16.1%
Latin Metals LMS.v 0.21 138 33.12 0.24 14.3%
Precore Gold PRCG.cn 0.26 32.093 8.34 0.26 0.0%
Radius Gold RDU.v 0.14 115.7 15.62 0.135 -3.6%
Silver Wolf SWLF.v 0.135 62.18 8.08 0.13 -3.7%
Trifecta Gold TG.v 0.195 47.7 9.78 0.205 5.1%
Viva Gold VAU.v 0.19 182 26.39 0.145 -23.7%
Prices in CAD$, data from TSXV basket avg -1.70%
This section attempts to track the tinycap mining sub-sector of the market, our ten companies chosen under
the following criteria to put together a list representing the state of play in the sub-sector of tinycap
exploration company stocks. At least, that’s the plan.
 Market capitalization of under $25m They have to be tiny. In one cases I’ve stretched the window a little and allowed
sub-U$25m market capper in, but the spirit is unaltered.
 A “non broken” stock price and project story. There are literally hundreds of tinycap juniors of the right size, our task is
to trawl through the TSXV and find companies that are small but with life in them. The vast majority of tinycap stocks are
broken stories, either traded to death on the exchange or with projects that are a bust or with entrenched management more
interested in their monthly paycheck than anything else.
 Likelihood of meaningful newsflow in 2026. This connects to the company’s “unbroken” status, as we
want news and potential catalysts from companies with projects that can work.
18

 Decent management if possible. When you are down among the little guys it doesn’t pay to be too choosy, but still I
preferred companies that have teams or people with good peer reputations.
Weird but true, out TinyCaps List had a positive week and
while the average remains underwater for the year the TinyCaps, 2026 weekly tracker
negative 1.7% reading is the least worst since the Iran 20%
mess kicked off. That’s way better than what happened to 15%
10%
the bigger producer stocks and the headcount of five
5%
winners (AUME.v, CANX.v, LMS.v, RDU.v, VAU.v) versus
0%
five losers (SRAN.cn, ENDR.v, PRCG.cn, SWLF.v, TG.v)
-5%
shows it wasn’t on the back of one or two lucky moves,
-10%
either. The biggest winner on the week was Latin Metals -15%
(LMS.v up 17.1%), followed by Canex Metals (CANX.v up
15.7%) as that company seems to have got through the
worst of its legal weeds now.
Canex Metals (CANX.v): The reason to include Canex Metals in the 2026 TinyCaps List was to follow its
attempt to succeed in a hostile takeover of neighbour Gold Basin Resources, as the potential to consolidate
the region and make a viable junior out of the two was in the cards. To cut a very long story short, Gold
Basin's entrenched management fought against the deal, lost by vote in February and since then has been
fighting a sort of rearguard action to get as much out of their exit as possible. That process seems to have
come to an end last week, CANX announced (10) on Tuesday the “…Arrangement Agreement to Facilitate
CANEX’S Acquisition of Remaining Gold Basin Shares” and as CANX CEO Shane Ebert put it:
"Today's announcement of an agreement to combine the two companies will allow us to consolidate
and advance a promising gold district in Arizona. CANEX will be pleased to welcome Gold Basin
Shareholders as new shareholders of CANEX."
Two days later, Gold Basin announced (11) it was filing for its own EGM to approve the arrangement with
CANX, thereby franking the deal in public. And this is why the shares popped last week, there's resolution in
the air and once the rubberstamping is done, the combined CANX+GoldBasin assets, which include the Gold
Basin mine and its own chequered history, can start working together to add value.
Radius Gold (RDU.v): Here’s this week’s NR from the serial jokers at RDU. No news on that Tierra Roja
permit (zero surprise), instead it’s adopingt the new option for financial reporting offered by the TSXV (12):
Vancouver, British Columbia – Radius Gold Inc. (TSXV: RDU) (“Radius” or the “Company”) announces that it has
adopted semi-annual financial reporting (“SAR”) pursuant to Coordinated Blanket Order 51-933 – Exemptions to
Permit Semi-Annual Reporting for Certain Venture Issuers (the “Blanket Order”).
The Blanket Order allows eligible venture issuers listed on the TSX Venture Exchange (the “TSXV”) to voluntarily
move from a quarterly to a semi-annual financial reporting framework. By adopting SAR, the Company aims to
reduce the administrative and financial burden associated with quarterly reporting.
This isn‘t the first junior to announce they are taking up the option to file on a six-monthly basis, rather than
quarterly, and I’ve quietly noticed that 100% of the companies that have done so to date are complete
wastes of time and space. That makes logical sense of course, as this new rule will most suit the zombie
juniors or those that want as least transparency on what they’re doing as possible. As such, I applaud the
TSXV for offering a new filter for my early DD process on explorecos and making my life a little easier: If they
report every half year instead of every quarter walk away, close that website tab, move on.
NB: Please be clear that The TinyCaps list is NOT a list of recommended tinycap stocks. It is a list of companies with market caps of
under $25m offering a reasonable representation of the wider tinycaps market. It’s possible in the future I may buy shares in one or
several of these stocks, at the moment both my opinion and wallet are strictly neutral.
Regional politics
Mexico: Gold Resource Corp (GORO) says the quiet thing out loud
The occasion was the Gold Resource Corp (GORO) 1q26 conference call (recording here (13)), the moment
was toward the end of the Q&A when an analyst on the call noted that the upcoming fusion between GORO
and Goldgroup Mining (GGA.to) would expose GORO to zones under the control of narco gangs. The answer
19
ts1naJ ht4naJ ht11 ht81 ht52 ts1bef ht8 ht51 dn22 ts1raM ht8 ht51 dn22 ht92 ht5rpA ht21 ht91 ht62 dr3yam ht01 ht71
source: IKN calcs, TSX data

from GORO CEO Allen Palmiere shed light on the reality of working in, let’s say….sensitive regions of Mexico
in 2026. The segment is minute 30 of the 32:30 confcall:
CEO Palmiere: "One of the hidden assets with Goldgroup is a very very strong Mexican team that has
been together for many years working on social...err… maintaining social licence. That goes for
Federal government, the State government, municipalities, indigenous communities and the cartels.
And they've been dealing with these various groups for many years successfully. So that is a very
significant hidden asset that we are acquiring by putting these two companies together."
One wonders whether Mr. Palmiere realizes that the company he’s buying is operating illegally.
 Things that are okay: Hiring the trucks for third party supply work from Mr X, instead of Mr Y, even
though Mr. X charges three times the market rate. Or catering services. Or security guards.
 Things that are not okay: Going on record to say that you’ve been dealing with cartels successfully
for many years.
Now for sure we are all big boys and girls here and personally speaking, Latin America beat the naïveté out of
your author many moons ago, but you’re not supposed to say the quiet thing out loud.
Bolivia: Widespread social protests against the Rodrigo Paz government
One of those situations that I could have mentioned in last week’s edition but decided not to, as protests of
some-or-other variety are always springing up in LatAm and if we mentioned tem all, the Regional Politics
section would get long and boring very quickly (better said “more boring”, right?). However, it needs some
space this week because the social protests against the Rodrigo Paz government in Bolivia are now nearly
two weeks old and instead of fading in that time, have spread and become stronger. They’re now disruptive
to the point where Peru sent a military aircraft to make an emergency airlift of citizens trapped inside Bolivia
and Argentina this weekend sent in humanitarian aid via its own airdrop.
The reasons behind the conflict are complicated (and this is not the place to go into socioeconomic and
ethnic issues) but in a nutshell there is a rise in complaints against the reforms that President Rodrigo Paz is
trying to push through. For some groups (eg political), it’s the pursuit of ex-President Evo Morales and the
way the new government wants him behind bars. For others (eg truck drivers), it’s the rise in fuel costs as
well as the poor quality of fuel that’s being brought in to cover a supply drought. For others (e.g. smallholder
farmers), it’s the agrarian reform bill they fear will hand control of large land areas to big business and leave
them with nothing, yet more (e.g. mineworkers) are pushing for wage increases that they say the
government promised them but has failed to deliver. These issues and more, but the upshot is a joining of
forces against the Paz government and a concerted move to demand the resignation of President Rodrigo Paz
and his government. Weapon #1 is roadblocks around the country, with particularly effective blockades
around the La Paz/El Alto location where a great many Bolivians now live. This weekend the government sent
in the army to break through those roadblocks and violent clashes have been widespread. Weapon #2 is the
protest march, which have become larger and more frequent over the last two weeks with the latest large
columns in La Paz city broken up by forces of order using tear gas, all the usual chaotic photo opportunities
forthcoming. This Sunday, a second concerted effort was made by military and police personnel to clear the
roadblocks surrounding La Paz and while the efforts seem to have been partially successful, they were also
met by a protest march in El Alto of what looks like hundreds of thousands of people in an impressive display
of public discontent.
This is a big moment for Bolivia, be in no doubt that the current government is under serious pressure. The
President and his admin are pushing back as hard as they can and getting complaints from the other side of
the political spectrum from those who demand “the hard hand” (the Spanish phrase for no compromise
government ready to use forces against protesters, “mano dura”) against protesters and the immediate
banging of heads together, arrests and the re-taking of the streets, with both anti-protest civilians and the
government claiming anti-democratic forces want to cause the country’s collapse into anarchy and pointing
the finger at Evo Morales as the instigator. In the near-term, the key will be to clear roadblocks that have laid
virtual siege to La Paz and that either happens, happens with violence or doesn’t happen with violence. After
that and once La Paz has supply of food and fuel again, we’ll see how this plays out but the social uprising
over the entire country is not to be taken lightly. History does not repeat, but it tends to rhyme and the
current rarefied atmosphere and a populace pushing back against the government trying to impose a
neoliberal political agenda is similar to the Bolivia of the early 2000s that saw Evo Morales first rise to power.
20

The IKN Colombia: Two weeks to go
A couple of voter intention surveys hit the wires last week, both interesting for different reasons. We'll do the
less important first, as a company called "Genesis Crea" published its survey that put Cepeda first, Paloma
Valencia second and Abelardo de la Espriella third. It also gave Paloma a three point advantage over Cepeda
in the eventual run-off, while predicting a dead heat if Cepeda met de la Espriella in the run-off. The thing
with this survey is that "Genesis Crea" is a virtually unknown pollster with no track record that's being
connected to the world of Álvaro Uribe and potentially biased against Abelardo de la Espriella in order to
influence the voting public.
With that in mind, the results out Friday night from the well established Atlas Intel polling company
(considered one of the best in the country) makes for interesting reading. In round one:
 Iván Cepeda (lefty, Petro's dauphin): 37.6%
 Abelardo de la Espriella (very right wing): 32.9%
 Paloma Valencia (right wing, Alvaro Uribe dauphine): 16.7%
That's an eye-opening poll result from Atlas Intel, as it suggests the collapse of support for Valencia and a
voting public on the right side of the spectrum that is now gravitating toward the very-right-wing de la
Espriella. As for the likely run-off scenarios, very-right-wing Abelardo de la Espriella has a 3.6% advantage
over Cepeda, while "uribista" Paloma Valencia has 1.6% over the lefty. This survey is bound to kick off an
enormous fuss among the Uribistas on the right, their assumption that support for Abelardo de la Espriella
would fall apart is beginning to look very shaky, along with their warnings that only Paloma can beat Cepada
in the run-off.
There’s all to play for in round one, the vote May 31st. We know Cepeda will make it to the run-off, we don’t
know his opponent, but equally importantly we don’t know which of the pollster predictions are closest and
that’s the key to predicting who becomes the next President. If Cepeda performs to the higher end of poll
surveys (40%+, up to 44%) he’ll be favourite to win, if his vote comes in at the lower end (31% to 33%)
whoever is up against him will be favourite. For what it’s worth, I still handicap the right wing as the most
likely winner, be it de la Espriella or Valencia, but it’s notable how the strident confidence of the right wing
support has become more muted over the last few weeks and nobody is taking the Cepeda candidacy lightly
these days.
The Peru election mess: We seem to have a second round
The Peru electoral authorities finally reached 100% count of the votes on Thursday and made the formal
result announcement this weekend, here are the three numbers that matter:
 Keiko Fujimori 2,877,678 votes (17.181%)
 Roberto Sánchez 2,015,114 votes (12.31%)
 Rafael López Aliaga1,993,905 votes (11.904%)
The rest is noise so by 21k votes or so, lefty Sánchez makes the run-off with the vote scheduled for Sunday
June 7th, i.e. three weeks from now. This coming week sees the two candidates “present their teams” in
normal Perupolitik style, with the people that come in to support each candidate supposedly a reflection on
what type of government they will offer and what they want to achieve.
Market Watching
Mogotes Metals (MOG.v): Plus ça change…
…plus c'est la même chose. Two weeks ago, in the Market Watching section of IKN884, we ran the note
"Mogotes Metals (MOG.v) and risk management" which was based on the price moves we'd seen in MOG.v in
2025 and 2026 to date, but was more about the second subject mentioned in the title line, that of risk
management. We considered the way in which MOG.v had risen from around 15c this time last year to reach
50c-plus at the start of 2026, only to see a retrace back under 20c on the back of persistent selling and the
first drill results from its flagship Filo Sur project, in San Juan Argentina.
21

And sure enough, famous last words etc, last week MOG released its second drill hole assay to the market
under the title (14) “High-grade, Shallow, Copper-Gold-Silver-Molybdenum Discovery in Drill Intercept at Filo
Sur Project, Vicuña District, reported by Mogotes Metals” and this happened:
Whoosh, the stock took off like a rocket on the back of hole DDH016, or more precisely partial hole because
the company was so keen to tell the world that it went ahead and published with results of the first 194m of
the total 464m of hole (i.e. 270m pending). Here’s the table for the hole…
…and there’s no doubt, that’s a good porphyry copper hole with good copper grade, good gold kicker
numbers (as well as silver and moly) and most significantly, similar grades to the Lundin/BHP Filo de Sur
project next door. However, it hasn’t changed my mind on whether to own the stock and despite missing a
winner, in fact it underscores the reason why it’s not for me. In IKN884 we outlined the risk/reward factor of
holding a hot stock with high levels of speculation built into its price:
The definition of equity, or market cap, i.e. company’s value at any given point in time:
“Assets minus liabilities equals equity”.
Or as one wise market brain once told me, “Equity is the small sliver of hope that sits between assets and
liabilities on the balance sheet”. When a tinycap has a $10m fixed asset, $5m in the bank and total liabilities of
$2m, anything above a market cap of $13m is the exploreco equivalent of good will, or intangibles. That can
come in many shapes or forms, but more often than not it’s the quality of the story it’s telling and in this case,
MOG managed to weave a narrative that was briefly worth around C$200m. An expensive story.
Thanks to the explosive move last week, we’re right back at those levels and this weekend, MOG runs a
market cap of just under C$300m implying “good will” of over C$200m on its story. In other words, the
market last week assigned a value of C$200m on one partially reported hole, measuring less than 200m. For
sure a good story and one its proponents will quickly support, but it’s still a $200m story on one partial hole.
Once again, an expensive story so I’ll repeat the closing paragraph of the IKN884 note to lay out my position:
I rarely buy extended and hyped companies such as MOG.v, but at the same time I rarely short them because
this is junior mining, weird things happen and it only takes one hole to change a company forever. What I do is
easier, simpler and neater; I avoid them and look somewhere else because with upward of 1,500 explorecos and
juniors available as vehicles for my speculative cash in the Canadian markets alone (TSX/TSXV, CSE) there’s
always one that offers a more amenable balance of risk to reward.
If you managed to buy MOG shares at 20c then I congratulate you and wish you the best of fortune, but I’m
not going to join you in the trade. Half a hole isn’t worth that much money and there are a lot of other trades
that offer a better risk/reward balance.
22

Equinox (EQX) buys Orla (ORLA)
Suppose they gave a War and Nobody Came
Charlotte Keys, 1966
Wednesday saw the latest big M&A deal land in the mining space (15):
Equinox Gold Corp. (TSX: EQX, NYSE American: EQX) (“Equinox”) and Orla Mining Ltd. (TSX: OLA,
NYSE American: ORLA) (“Orla”, and together with Equinox, the “Companies”) are pleased to
announce that the Companies have entered into a definitive arrangement agreement (the
“Agreement”) for an at-market combination to create a new North American senior gold producer with
approximately 1.1 million ouncesi of expected annual gold production and an $18.5 billion implied
market capitalization. The combined company will be anchored by three long-life Canadian gold
mines, with a clear path to more than 1.9 million ouncesii of annual gold production from an internally
funded North American growth pipeline. Pursuant to the Agreement, Equinox will acquire all of the
issued and outstanding common shares of Orla pursuant to a court-approved plan of arrangement
(the “Transaction”). The combined company will continue under the name “Equinox Gold Corp.”
(“Equinox Gold”).
Despite the U$18.5Bn ticket price of the deal and the glowing prose that flowed from the usual Lassonde and
Beaty sycophants (i.e. anyone after their money), the market took one look at the deal and its terms and
shrugged its shoulders:
You won’t see this size a deal get a totally neutral
response from capital markets, neither buyer or target
shifting away from the market median. So while it’s
good to see the move to consolidate the sector and
retire one ticker, this smacks of “deal for deal’s sake”.
Not the first time we’ve seen EQX grasp for scale at any
cost, in fact it’s not even the 5th time. Here’s EQX vs
GDX over the last five years, which provides its own
perspective:
Wesdome Gold (WDO.to) 1Q26 financials
Some of the work on the Wesdome Gold (WDO.to) Q1 was done in IKN882, dated April 19th 2026, as WDO
pre-announced its production numbers, plus sales and a couple of other data points such as its treasury
position. That was enough to ballpark its quarter and by the bottom line, we considered it “An upbeat 1q26
from WDO…” and that “Fundamentally speaking, WDO delivered well in Q1.” The details on the quarter came
this week when WDO filed its 1q26 financials and MD&A (16) post-close on Tuesday May 12th and, as the
chart right shows, got polite applause as WDO was bought up during two down days. Sadly, it couldn’t avoid
the sector-wide funk on Friday (gold down U$100+/oz tends to do that) and seemed to get some extra
special treatment from profit-takers, dumping 11% and stripping much of the good work away from the price
23

run, but we can’t fault its performance vs peers last week and on the chart, franked our original assessment
four weekends ago.
So no big dive on the production numbers today, we’ll go with a reminder of the overview gold production
and sales chart and be done:
WDO: Gold production vs sales, per qtr
24
22333 00753 53044 00004 90154 00924 76594 00784 29654 00354 18724 00954 56405 00474 83664 03494 30354 00654
55000
50000
45000
40000
35000
30000 25000 20000
15000
10000
5000
0
42q1 42q2 42q3 42q4 52q1 52q2 52q3 52q4 62q1
Ozt Au Production
Sales
source: company filings
From here on in we’re doing dollars and the financials, starting with the overview revenues (below). Our
guesstimate in IKN882 was C$306m, the reality is
C$299.793m, the difference caused by our assumption
WDO would sell its gold at an average realized price of
C$6,700/oz. The reality was C$6,561/oz and that’s fair
enough, it’s not easy to second-guess that average over a
quarter in a fast-changing price environment.
Costs came in at C$77.9m, just C$900k higher than our
forecast and I’m giving myself a checkmark on that guess.
Here’s the COGS breakdown as per the Q1 notes, which
shows the continued cost creep across the board.
WDO: COGS breakdown
7.72 6.72 1.72 8.92 8.13 1.23 4.23 9.63 7.83
WDO.to: Revenues
C$m
80 site admin/camp
70 processing
mining
60 20.5 22.2
50 17.9 17.3 17.5 18.7
14.9 15.7 15.4 10.9 10.9
3 4 0 0 8.6 9.7 8.8 9.4 9.9 10.4 10.0
20
10
0
1q24 2q24 3q24 4q24 1q25 2q25 3q25 4q25 1q26
source: company filings
Taken over a two year lapse…
 Mining costs are up 39.7% since 1q24
 Processing costs are up 26.7% since 1q24
9.001
8.721 9.641
6.281 6.781 5.802 3.032
9.782 8.992
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
42q1 42q2 42q3 42q4 52q1 52q2 52q3 52q4 62q1
CAD$m
source: company filings

 Site administration and camp costs are up 49% since 1q24
That’s a lot, but it’s less about what’s happening at WDO
or its two working mines specifically, more about what’s
happening in the Canadian mining sector. We’re heard
plenty about input costs inflation from companies in the
jurisdiction, here we have quantifiable numbers from a
company is as close to steady state at its ops as they
come. That 49% added to sit admin/camp really sticks
out, for example. Anyway, add those three together for
C$71.771m, then add the change in inventories
(C$2.441m) and royalties paid (C$3.688m) for total mining
process costs as seen in the P+L, C$77.900m to three
significant figures. We then add DD&A, G&A and that
favourite of Canadian GAAP, “other” for a total of
C$122.043m, i.e. what it cost WDO to mine and sell its gold last quarter (above right).
With revenues and costs done, we can put them together:
WDO.to: Operations overview chart
25
9.001 2.58 347.51 8.721 1.38
707.44
9.641 2.88
66.85 6.281
5.69
841.68
6.781
9.39
457.39
5.802
7.88
48.911
3.032
1.201
51.821 9.782
8.811
21.961
8.992
0.221
57.771
350
325
300
275
250
225
200
175
150
125
100 75 50
25
0
42q1 42q2 42q3 42q4 52q1 52q2 52q3 52q4 62q1
WDO.to: Costs overview
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
C$m
revenues
total op expenses
Op earnings
source: company filings, IKN calcs
Operating earnings at C$177.75m were good without blowing the world away, our forecast of C$191m was a
little high but in hindsight, knowing what we now know about the average received gold price and costs, in
the ballpark. That makes operating EPS C$1.20 and as the
chart here shows, we’re expecting Q1 to be the worst
quarter of the year. The bottom line, net profit of
C$118.882m was only slightly higher than 4q25, but the way
of these companies means they’re more reliably tracked by
the operating numbers so as far as I’m concerned, it’s a
shrug (quant programs care more about net numbers).
With profits laid out, we get to the important part of the Q1
report (yes folks, Balance Sheets Matter) starting with the
assets and liabilities overview charts. The only real change
to liabilities is an income tax bill payable, what matters most
is the continued expansion of balance sheet assets, with cash accruing and additions to fixed asset of $19m,
net of depletion. Total sustaining capex spend in the quarter was around $52m, right on schedule with 2026
guidance of just over $200m for the year.
32q1 32q2 32q3 32q4 42q1 42q2 42q3 42q4 52q1 52q2 52q3 52q4 62q1
CAD$m
other expenses
G&A
depletion
mining process costs
Source: WDO.to filings, IKN calcs
WDO.to: operating earnings per share
11.0
03.0 93.0
75.0 26.0 55.0
58.0
21.1 02.1
73.1 54.1 05.1 1.60
1.40
1.20
1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00
42q1 42q2 42q3 42q4 52q1 52q2 52q3 52q4 62q1 tse62q2 tse62q3 tse62q4
$
source: company financials/IKN calcs
WDO.to: Assets 1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 32q4 42q1 42q2 42q3 42q4 52q1 52q2 52q3 52q4 62q1
$m 240 WDO.to: Liabilities Breakdown per qtr
220
200
fixed 180
other current 160
cash
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
source: WDO.to filings
91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 32q4 42q1 42q2 42q3 42q4 52q1 52q2 52q3 52q4 62q1
source: company filings
srallod
fo
snoillim
long term
current

We isolate cash treasury (below left) to see the accrual of C$76.8m in the quarter, even more impressive
when we consider WDO spent C$49m on share buybacks. Meanwhile the working capital tracking chart
(below right) shows the evolution is right on schedule and while it’s never easy to second-guess what a
company does with a burgeoning treasury position, at this clip WDO would leave 2026 with C$580m
cash…and that’s a lot of money for a company this size.
There are no problems with any of this, WDO is delivering on its promise to become a rock solid corporate
entity. To wit, we also note its recent spate of share buybacks
 4q25: 706,100 shares repurchased
 1q26: 2,125,200 shares repurchased
 April 2026: 182,000 shares repurchased
That maxxed out the NCIB facility announced by the company in October 2025, so it was interesting to read
that alongside the earnings NR, WDO on Tuesday published a second NR (17) announcing it had received
approval from the market authorities to repurchase an extra 3m shares and, considering the cadence of re-
buying we’ve seen, we expect WDO to make full use of the extension to NCIB. We may see a few
options/RSU/DSU made whole along the way (there are currently around 2.4m outstanding) but if we take
the 30,000ft view it’s fair to assume WDO leaves 2026 with a share count at around 146m. Here’s the share
count tracking chart (please note the cut-down Y-axis) to put that in context:
WDO.to: Shares Out
(NB: cut down Y-axis)
26
303.631 97.631 22.731 299.731 544.831 544.831 380.931 213.931 276.931 520.041 388.041 436.141 24.241 784.241 784.241 80.441
625.741 259.841 259.841 769.841 463.941 375.941 478.941 198.941 391.051 39.051 769.051 183.051 134.841 492.841
641
641
155
150
145
140
135
130
125
120
115
110
91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 32q4 42q1 42q2 42q3 42q4 52q1 52q2 52q3 52q4 62q1 tse62q2 tse62q3 tse62q4
source: company filings/IKN ests
serahs
fo
snoillim
WDO.to: Cash treasury per qtr
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
The instos WDO is looking to impress and woo as long-term holders will like that policy decision. Our final
chart is a re-cap of what we expect from gold production numbers from the two mines for the rest of 2026:
91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 32q4 42q1 42q2 42q3 42q4 52q1 52q2 52q3 52q4 62q1
source: company filings
DAC
fo
snoillim
WDO.to: Working Capital per qtr
600
550
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
-50
91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 32q4 42q1 42q2 42q3 42q4 52q1 52q2 52q3 52q4 62q1 tse62q2 tse62q3 tse62q4
source company filings
srallod
fo
snoillim
WDO: Gold prod/qtr
2115
43391
4198
65771
8025
50471
4169
20552
7787
95102
7418
54822 19302
9637
44121
47042
3248
99842
36742
27291
12412
88632
56822
20762
39661
99982
96171
21652
96161
69243
77722
16832
75471
64872
00022
00082
00022
00082
00052
00062
55000
50000
45000
40000 35000
30000
25000
20000 15000
10000
5000
0
22q1 22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 32q4 42q1 42q2 42q3 42q4 52q1 52q2 52q3 52q4 62q1 tse62q2 tse62q3 tse62q4
Ozt Au Kiena
Mishi
Eagle River
source: WDO filings

In so many words, we’re looking for WDO to average 50koz/qtr for the rest of 2026, which would total
196,303oz if perfectly accurate (it won’t be), which is slightly above the median of the WDO guidance for the
year (180k – 205k oz). The company has guided production to improve as the year goes on so if the Q2
number is optimistic then so be it.
Bottom line: A lot to like about the way Wesdome Gold (WDO.to) is executing in 2026, less pleasant is the
high volatility of the stock compared to peers. Last week’s note covered that angle and ended with “…the
natural progression of higher highs should take WDO to C$30 or so. And that would be nice.” which turned
out to be spot on, indeed it topped out at nearly C$31 on Thursday before the hammered came down. Its
price this weekend would look oversold even without the strong Q1 it filed last week, so under the
circumstances the drop was way too much. However, I’m sure CEO Bath and her team isn’t losing sleep at
night about the swings of the near-term market, the trajectory is in its favour and while the C$30 near-term
target was taken out, that doesn’t mean we’re at the bottom of this price run, not by a long chalk. With gold
trading where it is, C$6,500/oz or so, WDO can go a lot higher even if our traded thesis doesn’t play out on
my preferred timeline. But I still think it will, as the owner of two high grade gold mines in an enviably low
risk jurisdiction in this extended market is a screamingly obvious M&A target. Good quarter, more please.
Minera Alamos (MAI.v) reboots
As most readers are aware, I closed my trade in MAI.v earlier this year after holding the stock for over five
years and making around 200% on my money. The trade didn’t go as
expected, the decision to leave came last year when the company
changed direction and the new management team decided that
misrepresentation was the way it would treat its legacy shareholders, so
when my target price pinged in February and March I unloaded the
stock, took my profit and waved farewell.
Today the company gets a revisit because of the news it dropped on
May 11th of significant corporate-level changes, in this NR (18) entitled
“Minera Alamos Strengthens Board and Management Team and
Proposes Name Change to Mining Americas Inc.” because I’ve been
asked the same question by several people on the back of this post I
published when the news dropped (19) (right).
The question: “What’s the problem with Blasutti and Mexico?” Answer
coming, but there isn’t just one subject to consider on the back of the
NR:
1) The name change: Nothing unexpected here, as MAI flagged its desire to change name back in Q3
when the big change happened. The choice of name, “Mining Americas” is a little dull but reasonable,
they’ve made sure it fits with the current ticker so less bother there, they’ve also done the right thing by
waiting until the next AGM. No worries.
2) Board and management changes: MAI announced plenty of changes at officer and board level and I'm
not going to touch on them all, but there are some that matter. The most positive is seeing Darren Pylot
come in as Chair, with Jason Kosec departing. Darren Pylot has been dabbling as a board member or
advisor of juniors since leaving Capstone (CS) but this is the first higher profile role he's taken and
according to reports, he's been buying MAI stock recently, too. He's a definite upgrade to the outgoing
Jason Kosec, who is a liar. The other important change is the decision to move Darren Koningen from
CEO to COO and promote Darren Blasutti to CEO. This suits Koningen, who much prefers a lower profile
role and to focus on the business of mining and process rock and getting the metal out of it. It also suits
Blasutti, who's done CEO roles before and the fact the arrival of Blasutti is the main reason I dumped my
stock is another chapter and a personal opinion. Please see the NR for the other board and officer moves,
there are several to consider.
3) Why MAI.v’s Mexico permitting track is compromised: In my opinion, at least. In a nutshell, it’s
because MAI has decided to make Darren Blasutti its CEO and for this point, we need to go back in time.
This desk has mentioned the issue before, back in 2025 when Mr Blasutti came into MAI as Executive VP
Corporate Development and immediately made it clear his role at the company was more than a second rank
officer who immediately took over presentation, webinar and NR comments duties as well as telling people
27

how much he’d invested of his own money in the company (sidebar note: in discounted placements and not
on the open market). The most obvious problem is his track record as a CEO; his last job was CEO of
Americas Gold and Silver (USAS) (USA.to), from the mid-teens until his departure in late 2024, during which
time he made a series of poor leadership decisions that resulted in the underperformance of the company. It
would be unfair to compare the USAS share price when he left to the price today, as we all know what the
metals have done since 2024, but it is fair to compare USAS to the GDX in the period to end 2024:
On that chart, GDX up 150% in the same period that USAS is down 75%, the timescale ending roughly when
Blasutti departed the company. We could go into detail on other strategic errors made by Blasutti during his
tenure at USAS but instead, we’ll stick to the two big snafus at Relief Canyon and Cosalá.
Relief Canyon: In 2028, USAS paid way too much for Pershing Gold and its Relief Canyon gold mine property
in Nevada USA, despite clear evidence its resource was uneconomic due to difficult metallurgy (carboniferous
material mixed in the gold bearing rock). But Blasutti didn’t care, he diluted USAS via the all-paper deal, then
spent the tens of millions required to build out the operation, then declared commercial production in early
2021, only to be told this in May of the same year (20):
“As a result of the differences observed between the modelled (planned) and mined (actual) ore
tonnage and the carbonaceous material identified in the early phases of the mine plan, an impairment
charge of $55.6 million has been taken in Q1-2021, reducing the carrying value of the Relief Canyon
mineral interest, and property, plant and equipment. An additional reduction of $23.0 million was
taken to inventory as a result of the decreased recovery expected from crushed gold ounces already
placed on the leach pad.”
A total car crash, totally avoidable by anyone who’d care to have listened. Relief Canyon remains “under care
& maintenance” to this day.
Cosalá: We now get to the major issue, the one that directly affects today’s MAI. For sure there are always
two sides to every workers’ protest and industrial action and, if you check out the USAS website, you’ll see
how many times the company called the protest that closed the mine for almost two years a “illegal strike
action”, but it’s also true that the winners write history so let’s take this from the side of the workforce at the
USAS Cosalá mine. The problems began in 2020 when workers brought in the controversial union leader and
senator, Napoleón Gómez Urrutia, to inspect conditions at the mine. “Napito” is no angel, you may well
remember his name as the union leader who fled to Canada and spent years there to avoid corruption
charges in Mexico, only returning when his political ally AMLO became President. He then became a Senator
in the Mexican Congress (and is still there). Anyway, he’s the head honcho at the (deep breath) “Sindicato
Nacional de Trabajadores Minero, Metalúrgico, Siderúrgico de la República Mexicana” (breatje out), normally
known as the SNTMMSSRM. But before we get to the meat of this issue, we need to explain the back story to
unions in Mexican mines, as the way some companies have colluded over the years with some unions in
Mexico is a highly corrupt corner of the mining world. The basic scenario is:
 Company allows one union to represent workers
 A “friendly” union chosen that doesn’t fight hard for workers’ rights
28

 Envelopes stuffed with money are exchanged
 Workers suffer sub-standard pay and conditions, little changes for the better
 Unions bosses enjoy new 4x4 cars and nice vacations, company enjoys low op-ex
While I must stress that it varied from mine to mine, until AMLO came to power the above scenario was
common in Mexico and the USAS Cosalá was one of the more obvious guilty parties. Then AMLO changed the
law and to makes a long and complicated story short, closed shop union representation was made illegal
workers now had the right to be represented by more than one union. However, getting a new union in
required a vote and while the company officially has nothing to do with the process, it is in its powers to use
a host of legal mechanisms to stop any election from taking place or slowing down the election process so a
snail’s pace. As having one “friendly” union representing workers suits the mining company just fine, it will
often do all it can to help the friendly union repel any attempt by a second union from getting a foothold in a
mine and we recently saw one example of this at the Camino Rojo mine (Orla Mining), that was accused of
turning a blind eye when representatives of one union received threats from narco gangs in order to stop
them from gaining power.
Be clear, I’m trying to sum up a complicated situation in as few words as possible, there are many
permutations of how the friendly dance between a single union and the mining company can work, but
there’s also a simple conclusion to draw: Neither side wanted a new union butting in and doing crazy things
like getting reasonable pay and working conditions for its members. Which brings us to early 2020 and the
day Senator Napito of SNTMMSSRM visited the Cosalá mine. Again, this story could fill 10,000 words to cover
every angle and you would of course hear a different and much more company-friendly version, from the
other side, but the way the workers tell it is something along these lines:
 January 2020: Napito visits, sees working conditions and sees the low wages.
 Orders blockade, strike begins, workers pressure company to allow his union in to company.
 Point blank refusal, both sides dig in for the long haul.
 Napito uses his friendly relationship with the AMLO government to his advantage, government orders
new elections for union representation at the mine.
 Company refuses, says it doesn’t negotiate with criminals (i.e. Napito), mine stays closed for over a year
 In late 2020, a vote is held and the Napito union wins the right to represent workers. The company
refuses to recognize the new union.
 In early 2021, after national-level ministers are dragged into the conflict, negotiations begin. In mid 2021
and after year and a half with the mine closed both sides reach a tentative agreement but the entrenched
union, in cahoots with USAS, rejects the deal at the last minute using dubious legal tactics.
More political back and forth, more intransigence on the part of the company hat refuses to allow its
sweet deal with the closed shop union to be disrupted, but eventually in early 2022 the Napo side wins
out, the deal to re-open the mine is struck, workers win their battle for better pay and conditions as well
as new representation with Napito’s union.
 Within days the strike starts again, the Napito union claiming the company had reneged on the deal and
was refusing to recognize its union reps.
 Finally, three weeks later, the strike ends with USAS brought kicking and screaming to the negotiation
table and the Napo union given the right to negotiate for the mineworkers.
It’s worth noting that before the conflict began, the Napito union claimed the average wage was 543 Pesos
per day (Approx U$30), way below the national average for their type of mine work, that safety conditions
were poor and both employees and townsfolk complained that the Cosalá mine tailings were leaching into the
local water supply. These days, workers earn the national average, enjoy bonuses, safer working conditions
and the company has cleaned up its environmental act. So you can say what you want about Napito, and I
fully understand he’s far from a squeaky clean character, but the result from industrial action has done well
for the workers at the mine. It’s also worth considering the stance taken by USAS all through the protest and
mine blockade, such as this statement made by erstwhile CEO Darren Blasutti in September 2020 (21):
“Really, this is extortion. As a foreign company, we face a blockade that’s been orchestrated internally
by a Senator who was exiled in Canada due to all the illegal things he did, such as stealing money
from his own union.”
29

In another interview around the same time, Blasutti also stated “We do not negotiate with criminals”, which
was cute. No matter whether true or false, he thought it smart to publicly call a Senator in the Mexico
Congress who also happens to be one of the most powerful figures in the country’s mining industry and a
close personal friend of the President at the time, AMLO, as well as a leading figure in the ruling Morena
Party, an extortionist. And that person is still the head of the union, he’s still a Senator, he’s still a kingpin in
Mexico’s mining world and he’s still a close ally of the ruling government party and of President Claudia
Sheinbaum.
For a blow-by-blow on the 18 months of conflict, we offer this selection of Spanish language links
(22)(23)(24) to offer deeper details than our quick overview and show we’re not making any of this up. While
researching for today’s note, I also found this English language statement (25) made by North America’s
United Steelworkers union that came late on the in the process, here’s an extract:
TORONTO – The United Steelworkers union, representing 800,000 workers in Canada and the USA, stands in
solidarity with the members of Section 333 of the National Union of Mine, Metal, Steel and Related Workers of the
Mexican Republic (Los Mineros), led by Napoleón Gómez Urrutia, who are on strike against Americas Gold and
Silver, a Canadian mining company, at the San Rafael mine in Cosalá, Sinaloa, Mexico since Jan. 28.
The striking miners are demanding that the company recognize the national leadership of the union, which won
control of the collective bargaining agreement in a government-certified election in 2020, and negotiate in good
faith; pay back wages owed to the workers; and drop criminal charges against current and former workers at the
mine.
“CUSMA [the Canada-US-Mexico trade agreement] establishes strong labour obligations for Canadian companies
in Mexico,” said USW National Director for Canada Ken Neumann. “Americas Gold and Silver must respect these
laws, and Mexico must enforce them.”
“We urge Americas Gold and Silver to initiate a dialogue in good faith with Los Mineros and stop all threats to the
safety of its members and any violent actions. We also support the union’s demand to pay all owed wages and the
reinstatement of unjustifiably dismissed local union leaders.”
We could continue, but you should have the picture by now. Darren Blasutti decided that waging war against
the unions in Mexico in order to keep his cushy deal at a mine intact was a good idea. He thought it was a
great idea to continue with a policy of not budging an inch and ignoring the Mexican law that allows workers
to be represented by other unions and worked in conjunction with the closed shop union to keep the Napito
union out (and tactics included violent threats against workers and their families, see those links for more on
that). He decided that calling union leader Napito, a personal friend of President AMLO and the powerful
senator at the centre of the conflict, an extortionist and a criminal (amongst many other things). And after
refusing to budge and making sure the mine closed for business for over two years, he eventually caved in
and gave the striking miners exactly what they wanted.
This is the person Minera Alamos, soon to be called Mining Americas, has installed as its CEO while it tries to
move forward on the process of permitting for its Cerro de Oro (and potentially Santana and La Fortuna)
mines in Mexico. Now, you may of course decide that as one process does not necessarily connect to the
other and that the MAI.v issues are with the Mexican government’s SEMARNAT environment and not the
unions, there’s nothing to be concerned about and no reason to worry about MAI.v not getting the permits
for CdO etc. If so, I have a bridge for sale, lightly used, price negotiable, mail me for further details.
Bottom line: Darren Pylot brings positive cachet to Minera Alamos, Darren Blasutti does not and of the two,
the decisions and image of the CEO are going to be far more important to the company than those from the
oversight board. It would be enough to reject Blasutti on his basic track record as a CEO (see above chart),
but the fact he decided to go to war with the key figureheads of the same Mexican government that MAI.v
wants its notoriously difficult to obtain environmental permits from is so bad, it’s almost comical. So here’s a
confident prediction:
MAI.v will not get its key permits for Cerro de Oro as long as Blasutti is in charge of the company.
Period. True for all other permits it wants in Mexico, too. Take that one to the bank, after that we can debate
on whether he’ll be able to learn from his long list of mistakes while running USAS (and his other executive
positions) and become a competent CEO this time around. You may want to give him another chance on that,
that’s your decision (and your money). When I learned Blasutti was joining the company last year, as a
shareholder I immediately contacted the company and voiced my concerns. At that time, I was told by the
outgoing Chair Jason Kosec that the Cosalá issue had been “complicated” and wasn’t Blasutti’s fault, instead
it was all about the narco cartels that had de facto control of the region in question and while the latter is
true, the excuses offered for the mess Blasutti made there were simply outright lies and as I mentioned at
30

the time, I do not like being lied to by the management of a junior mining company, not one little bit. With
Blasutti now promoted to CEO, I am glad I sold my shares in MAI.v when I did. Rant over.
Conclusion
IKN886 is done, we close with just one bullet point because this edition is already too long.
 Don’t worry about the apparent soft Q1 out of Fenix, these are early days and mines are allowed to
have problems early. In fact, it’s the best time to have them. This is a drop dead bargain of a stock and
it’s going higher.
I wish you good trading fortune, ladies and gentlemen.
Best wishes, Mark.
Footnotes, appendices, references, disclaimer
(1) https://x.com/i/status/2056391044011331591
(2) https://www.rpxgold.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/RPX-Gold-2026-Spring-Financing-Closing-Press-Release-FINAL.pdf
(3) https://www.stocktitan.net/sec-filings/MINE/6-k-mayfair-gold-corp-current-report-foreign-issuer-43b6f45ad6fb.html
(4) https://www.tiernangold.com/news/2026/index.php?content_id=94
(5) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NGdNECohCzc&t=8s
(6) https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/copper-falls-for-second-consecutive-session/
(7) ttps://eciks.org/4192-95763-sulfuric-acid-prices-surge-as-china-bans-exports-commodity-supply-faces-worst-cr
(8) https://andinacopper.com/news/news-2026/andina-copper-intersects-152m-at-067-cu-from-54m-within-22026-05-13-030003
(9) https://fitzroyminerals.com/news-releases/fitzroy-minerals-intersects-78.0-m-at-1.70-cu-from-58.0-m-including-40.0-m-at-3.02-cu-
from-92.0-m-at-the-buen-retiro-copper/
(10) https://www.accessnewswire.com/newsroom/en/metals-and-mining/canex-and-gold-basin-resources-announce-arrangement-
agreement-to-facilitate-canex-1166057
(11) https://investingnews.com/gold-basin-resources-announces-filing-and-mailing-of-meeting-materials-for-special-meeting-to-approve-
arrangement-with-canex/
(12) https://radiusgold.com/news/radius-gold-adopts-semi-annual-financial-reporting/
(13) https://goldresourcecorp.com/investors/events/
(14) https://www.mogotesmetals.com/news/high-grade-shallow-copper-gold-silver-molybdenum-discovery-in-drill-intercept-at-filo-sur-
project-vicuna-district-reported-by-mogotes-metals
(15) https://www.equinoxgold.com/news/equinox-and-orla-mining-combine-to-create-north-americas-new-senior-gold-producer-built-to-
grow-built-to-last/
(16) https://www.wesdome.com/English/investors/latest-news/news-details/2026/Wesdome-Reports-Record-Quarterly-EPS-and-Free-
Cash-Flow-for-Q1-2026-Reaffirms-2026-Guidance/default.aspx
(17) https://www.wesdome.com/English/investors/latest-news/news-details/2026/Wesdome-Announces-Second-Tranche-of-Normal-
Course-Issuer-Bid/default.aspx
(18) https://mineraalamos.com/news/2026/minera-alamos-proposes-name-change-to-mining-americas-inc/
(19) https://x.com/i/status/2053943855343370714
(20) https://americas-gold.com/news-releases/2021/americas-gold-and-silver-corporation-reports-first-quarter-2021-results-and-provides-
operational-update/
(21) https://laotraopinion.com.mx/minera-canadiense-acusa-a-senador-de-morena-napito-de-extorsion/
31

(22) https://www.jornada.com.mx/notas/2022/01/29/politica/intransigencia-de-minera-provoco-huelga-en-cosala-gomez-urrutia/
(23) https://www.sinembargo.mx/3910699/aqui-nadie-se-raja-175-obreros-de-mina-en-sinaloa-estan-en-huelga-casi-desde-el-inicio-de-
la-pandemia/
(24) https://mexico.quadratin.com.mx/como-delincuentes-califican-a-dirigentes-mineros-de-cosala/
(25) https://usw.ca/usw-supports-los-mineros-strike/
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2025
CLOSED TRADES IN 2025 date closed close price
Arizona Sonoran ASCU.to Jan'25 C$1.39 22-Dec-24 C$1.68 20.9% nice NT trade, took profit
Libero Copper LBC.v Jan'25 C$0.34 20-Oct-24 C$0.245 -30.0% small spec loser
Barrick Gold GOLD Feb'25 U$15.70 22-Dec-24 U$18.26 16.3% taking profit on NT trade
Ero Copper ERO Mar'25 C$19.37 22-Dec-24 C$17.64 -8.9% closed badly timed trade
IMPACT Silver IPT.v Apr'25 C$0.30 14-Apr-24 C$0.195 -35.0% closed small Ag trade fail
Pan Global Res PGZ.v Apr'25 C$0.19 19-Feb-24 C$0.11 -42.1% closed sm Cu on -ve mkt turn
Aftermath Silver AAG.v Jun'25 $0.425 22-Dec-24 C$0.64 50.6% took profits, decent result
Lumina Gold LUM.v Jun'25 C$0.78 23-Feb-25 C$1.25 60.3% successful buyout trade.
Eldorado Gold EGO Aug'25 U$15.93 11-Aug-24 U$21.73 36.4% took profit, underperf'd peers
AbraSilver ABRA.to Aug'25 C$2.73 26-Jan-25 C$5.67 107.7% took profit, good result
Minera Alamos MAI.v Aug'25 C$0.21 13-Oct-19 C$0.345 64.3% lightened overweight position
Surge Copper SURG.v Sep'25 $0.105 22-Dec-24 C$0.215 104.8% took profits, good result
Provenance Gold PAU.cse Oct'25 C$0.15 27-Aug-25 C$0.265 76.7% took profits, good result
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2024
CLOSED TRADES IN 2024 date closed close price
Amerigo Res ARG.to Jan'24 C$1.36 12-Dec-21 C$1.34 -1.5% reduced Cu exposure
Fortuna Silver FSM Jan'24 U$2.92 13-Aug-23 U$3.09 3.4% Time ran out on NT trade
Argonaut Gold AR.to Jan'24 C$0.42 17-Dec-23 C$0.395 -6.0% NT specflip closed on poor Q4
Equinox Gold EQX May'24 U$4.42 30-May-23 U$5.57 26.0% Took sm.profit, disappointing
Adventus Mining ADZN.v May'24 C$0.305 7-Jan-24 C$0.445 45.9% bot out, nice win
SolGold SOLG.to May'24 C$0.22 19-Feb-23 C$0.165 -25.0% ran out of patience
Western Copper WRN.to July'24 C$1.57 26-Feb-24 C$1.53 -2.5% Sold on regional risk
Contango Ore CTGO Sep'24 U$18.70 30-Jul-23 U$20.23 8.2% Port rebalance sale
Florida Can. Gold FCGV.v Oct'24 C$0.63 21-Jul-24 C$0.71 12.7% failed trade with a lucky win
Bear Creek Min BCM.v Oct'24 C$0.35 10-Jun-24 C$0.67 91.4% took profits on spec trade
American Eagle AE.v Oct'24 C$0.43 25-Aug-24 C$0.69 69.8% taking profit on NT flip
SilverCrest Met SILV Nov'24 U$6.90 31-Mar-24 U$9.76 41.4% sold on CDE buyout
Newcore Gold NCAU.v Nov'24 C$0.205 23-Oct-22 C$0.32 56.1% sold on advisor appt
Aldebaran Res. ALDE.v Dec'24 C$0.72 16-May-21 C$2.11 193.1% closed trade, took profits
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2023
CLOSED TRADES IN 2023 date closed close price
Altiplano Metals APN.v jan'23 C$0.31 17-Set-21 C$0.17 -45.2% delayed and will dilute soon
Western Copper WRN.to mar'23 C$2.02 13-Nov-22 C$2.32 14.9% sold on reduced M&A prob.
Chesapeake Gold CKG.v may'23 C$3.07 20-Feb-22 C$1.75 -43.0% Closing on legal action news
Amerigo Res ARG.to may'23 C$1.36 12-Dic-21 C$1.48 8.8% sold 20% to raise cash
Amerigo Res ARG.to oct'23 C$1.36 12-Dic-21 C$1.21 -11.0% sold 10% raise to cash
QC Copper&Gold QCCU.v oct'23 C$0.265 25-Abr-21 C$0.12 -54.7% sold raise to cash
Faraday Copper FDY.to oct'23 C$0.79 26-Mar-23 C$0.68 -11.4% sold raise to cash
AbraSilver Res. ABRA.v oct'23 C$0.36 4-Dic-22 C$0.28 -22.2% sold raise to cash
Orecap inv OCI.v oct'23 C$0.04 20-Nov-22 C$0.03 -25.0% sold raise to cash
Western Explor. WEX.v nov'23 C$1.87 9-Abr-23 C$0.60 -67.9% poor trade, cutting loss
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Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2022
Closed in 2022 date closed close price
Great Bear Res GBR.v Jan'22 C$15.83 26-Aug-20 C$28.58 80.5% Bought out by Kinross, print
Copper Mountain CMMC.to Jan'22 C$3.40 18-Jun-21 C$3.78 15.9% Sold 1/2 position in rebalance
Copper Mountain CMMC.to Feb'22 C$3.40 18-Jun-21 C$3.70 8.8% Sold rest on FY22 guidance
Trilogy Metals TMQ Mar'22 U$1.84 15-Sep-19 U$1.04 -41.3% killed by US permit reversal
McEwen Mining MUX Apr'22 U$0.89 2-Jan-22 U$0.82 -7.9% No 2022 turnaround, cut loss
Abrasilver Res. ABRA.v May'22 C$0.42 24-Apr-22 C$0.33 -21.4% sold to reduce Ag exposure
Strategic Metals SMD.v May'22 C$0.42 31-Jan-21 C$0.30 -28.6% trade flatlined 1.5 years
Discovery Silver DSV.v Jun'22 C$1.77 24-Oct-21 C$1.39 -21.5% Cutting Ag exp.& raising cash
Element 29 ECU.v Jul'22 C$0.58 6-Mar-22 C$0.30 -48.3% sold to cut Cu exposure
Superior Gold SGI.v Oct'22 C$0.95 3-Apr-22 C$0.24 -74.7% Q3 prod fail was last straw
Goldshore Res GSHR.v Nov'22 C$0.18 23-Oct-22 C$0.34 88.9% Quick profit taken
Palamina Corp PA.v Dec'22 C$0.295 21-Nov-21 C$0.08 -72.9% Clear-out of underperformer
Pure Gold PGM.h Dec'22 C$0.14 26-Sep-22 C$0.015 -89.3% tiny trade on vh risk, went Ch11
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2021
Closed in 2021 closed close price
Fiore Gold F.v jan'21 C$0.98 21-May-20 C$1.17 19.4% closed as part of rebalance
Norsemont Min NOM.cse feb'21 C$1.55 6-Sep-20 C$0.70 -54.8% Cut loser to reduce Au exp.
Element 29 Res ECU.v feb'21 C$0.49 7-Feb-21 C$0.54 10.2% Cut Peru exposure
Kuya Silver KUYA.cse feb'21 C$1.66 8-Nov-20 C$2.51 51.2% Cut Peru exposure
Pucara Gold TORO.v apr'21 C$0.65 4-Oct-20 C$0.26 -60.0% Cut loser, Peru risk call
Copper Mountain CMMC.to apr'21 C$1.40 22-Nov-20 C$4.18 198.6% tgt hit, profit taken
New Gold NGD may'21 U$0.76 9-Feb-20 U$2.14 181.6% Sold to buy AGC, nice win
Orezone Gold ORE.v jun'21 C$0.79 21-Jun-20 C$1.61 103.8% sold on pop, leaky boat
Wolfden Res. WLF.v sep'21 C$0.30 11-Apr-21 C$0.19 -36.7% Failed spec trade, cut loss
Cartier Res ECR.v sep'21 C$0.32 21-Mar-21 C$0.235 -26.6% Failed spec trade, cut loss
Amarillo Gold AGC.v sep'21 C$0.31 30-May-21 C$0.30 -3.2% Capex story changed: Out
Excelsior Mining MIN.to oct'21 C$0.93 10-Mar-19 C$0.53 -43.0% May return in 2022
Royal Road Min. RYR.v nov'21 C$0.155 17-Mar-19 C$0.275 77.4% Closed on Nica pol risk
Aurelius Min. AUL.v dec'21 C$0.75 28-Jun-20 0.24 -68.0% cut end 2021, failed trade
Argonaut Gold AR.to dec'21 C$2.95 25-Jun-21 C$2.15 -27.1% cut on capex blowout
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2020
Closed in 2020 closed close price
TMAC Resources TMR.to Jan'20 C$3.41 20-Dec-19 C$3.61 5.9% TLS flip play, sold new year
Regulus Res REG.v Jan'20 C$1.10 20-Dec-19 C$1.30 18.2% TLS flip play, profit taken
Bonterra Res BTR.v Jan'20 C$1.90 9-Dec-19 C$1.66 -12.6% TLS flip play, loss taken
McEwen Mining MUX Jan'20 U$1.12 2-Dec-19 U$1.18 5.4% TLS flip play, profit taken
Core Gold CGLD.v Jan'20 C$0.255 7-Apr-19 C$0.305 19.6% arb trade, profit taken
HudBay Min HBM Jan'20 U$3.56 9-Dec-19 U$3.36 -5.6% TLS flip play, loss taken
Midas Gold MAX.to Feb'20 C$0.71 5-Jan-20 C$0.57 -19.7% sm & silly trade
Warrior Gold WAR.v Feb'20 C$0.08 3-Aug-18 C$0.05 -31.3% clean out non-perf sm stocks
Contact Gold C.v Feb'20 C$0.40 19-Aug-18 C$0.18 -55.0% clean out non-perf sm stocks
Sandstorm Gold SAND Feb'20 U$3.73 17-Apr-16 U$7.21 93.3% Sold during port rebalance
NexGen Energy NXE Feb'20 U$1.20 2-Dec-19 U$1.06 -11.7% TLS flip play, loss taken
MAG Silver MAG Apr'20 U$8.95 1-Mar-20 U$10.07 12.5% Sold to cut silver exposure
Alexco Res AXU Apr'20 U$1.69 7-Sep-17 U$1.69 0.0% sold to close Ag exp. in FY20
Bonterra Res BTR.v Jun'20 C$1.62 2-Feb-20 C$1.10 -32.1% under-performer cash moved
Regulus Res REG.v Jun'20 C$0.64 6-Apr-15 C$0.79 23.4% moved $ TMQ/MIN & Au stocks
Great Panther GPR.to Aug'20 C$0.60 21-Jun-20 C$1.10 83.3% Profit taken, good trade
Jaguar Mining JAG.v Aug'20 C$0.42 21-Jun-20 C$0.65 54.8% Profit taken, good trade
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Sandstorm Gold SAND Aug'20 U$7.76 10-May-20 U$9.37 20.7% Profit taken, good trade
Integra Resources ITR.v Aug'20 C$2.23 13-Aug-18 C$5.40 142.2% Profit taken, good trade
Wesdome Gold WDO.to Aug'20 C$2.37 14-Oct-17 C$14.82 525.3% last 1/2 of big win closed
INV Metals INV.to Sep'20 C$0.40 17-May-20 C$0.45 12.5% Cut all Ecuador exposure
Cartier Resources ECR.v Nov'20 C$0.155 3-Aug-18 C$0.25 67.7% Exact close price TBA
Tinka Res TK.v Dec'20 C$0.195 19-Apr-16 C$0.195 0.0% Closed on a round trip fail
2015 to 2019 annual closed positions in appendices below, 2009 to 2014 closed positions in editions IKN553 or earlier
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2019
Closed in 2019 closed close price
Atico Mining ATY.v jan'19 C$0.55 24-Jul-16 C$0.32 41.8% patience ran out, made room
Candente Copper DNT.to jan'19 C$0.075 3-Aug-18 C$0.05 -33.3% tiny trade, made room for new
B2Gold BTO.to feb'19 C$2.11 12-Sep-14 C$4.05 91.9% Took 1/2 profits, reduce size
Western Copper WRN.to mar'19 C$0.80 20-Jan-19 C$0.81 1.3% Spec trade that didn't work
B2Gold BTO.to mar'19 C$2.11 12-Sep-14 C$4.15 96.7% Took rest of profit.
GT Gold GTT.v mar'19 C$1.17 10-Oct-18 C$0.90 -23.1% Took loss. Story changed
NovaGold NG apr'19 U$3.84 13-Jan-19 U$4.15 -8.1% Short that didn't work, sm loss
Zinc One Z.v jun'19 C$0.47 14-Sep-17 C$0.025 -94.7% clearing out dead trade
Amarillo Gold AGC.v jun'19 C$0.24 22-Aug-18 C$0.20 -16.7% clearing out dead trade
New Gold NGD aug'19 U$1.44 31-Jul-19 U$1.23 14.6% ST short win thru Q2 earnings
IMPACT Silver IPT.v aug'19 C$0.39 21-Jul-19 C$0.46 18.0% took a quick profit
Fiore Gold F.v aug'19 C$0.34 26-May-19 C$0.56 64.7% Took profit, 2q19 avg
Chakana Copper PERU.v oct'19 C$0.84 22-Mar-18 C$0.16 -81.0% Exploreco trade fail. Want space
Wesdome Gold WDO.to oct'19 C$2.37 14-Oct-17 C$7.57 219.4% Sold half, profit taking
Superior Gold SGI.v oct'19 C$1.46 8-Apr-18 C$0.47 -67.8% Failed sm spec on Au. Moved on
Amerigo Res ARG.to nov'19 C$0.91 23-Sep-18 C$0.50 -45.1% worst trade of year, hefty loss
Guyana Goldfields GUY.to dec'19 C$0.94 14-Apr-19 C$0.56 -40.4% taking the loss, financials weak
Tethyan Res TETH.v dec'19 C$0.30 8-Sep-19 C$0.16 -46.7% tiny trade, word of probs in co
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2018
Closed in 2018 closed close price
Amarillo Gold AGC.v jan'18 C$0.38 24-Mar-17 C$0.31 -18.4% Cut away losing trade
Riverside Res RRI.v jan'18 C$0.39 27-Jun-16 C$0.31 -20.5% Cut away losing trade
Eros Res ERC.v jan'18 C$0.175 1-Mar-17 C$0.16 -8.6% CEO sudden exit, not good
Excellon Res EXN.to jan'18 C$1.54 9-Oct-16 C$1.66 7.8% 4q17 poor, one too many bad qtrs
Wesdome Gold WDO.to jan'18 C$1.68 15-Dec-17 C$2.06 22.6% Near-term trade block, took profit
Sabina G&S SBB.to apr'18 C$2.06 17-Dec-17 C$1.77 -14.1% Near-term trade, bad timing, small
B2Gold BTO.to May'18 C$2.11 12-Sep-14 C$3.67 73.9% sold 25% to reduce exposure
Lara Expl. LRA.v May'18 C$0.65 11-Feb-18 C$0.58 -13.8% Spec on Brazil didn't work
Solitario XPL June'18 U$0.72 19-Mar-17 U$0.41 -43.1% Failed trade, may return in 4q18
SolGold plc SOLG.to July'18 C$0.475 19-Nov-17 C$0.415 -12.6% cut, trade didn't perform
Pan American PAAS July'18 U$17.90 1-Jun-18 U$16.30 8.9% modest win on short position
NGEx Res NGQ.to Sep'18 C$1.01 22-Oct-17 C$1.00 -1.0% Closed to reduce Argentina exp
Sandstorm Gold SAND Oct'18 U$3.73 17-Apr-16 U$4.13 10.7% partial sale to raise cash for GTT
Aldebaran Res ALDE.v Nov'18 n/a n/a n/a n/a liquidate spin out of REG
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2017
Closed in 2017 closed close price
Continental Gold CNL.to Jan'17 C$2.68 22-May-16 C$4.17 55.6% trade closed, profit taken
Focus Ventures FCV.v Jan'17 C$0.23 1-Jul-12 C$0.05 -78.3% Give up, a disaster trade
Wesdome Gold WDO.to Feb'17 C$1.72 28-Aug-16 C$3.00 74.4% Target hit, sold, good trade
Belo Sun BSX.to Mar'17 C$0.90 30-Jan-17 C$0.90 0.0% failed near-term flip trade
Lara Expl. LRA.v Mar'17 C$1.15 8-Apr-12 C$1.05 -8.7% cut to make room for new trade
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Rye Patch Gold RPM.v Apr'17 C$0.31 2-Sep-16 C$0.32 3.2% cut for doubts & new stock
Cordoba Min. CDB.v Jun'17 C$0.75 15-Sep-16 C$0.63 -16.0% closed
Constantine Metal CEM.v Aug'17 C$0.135 9-Apr-17 C$0.28 107.4% spec trade closed, good win
Red Eagle Min. R.to Sep'17 C$0.67 13-Dec-16 C$0.27 -59.7% IKN's biggest failure in years
Starcore Intl SAM.to Sep'17 C$0.61 10-Jan-15 C$0.31 -49.2% Patience ran out
B2Gold BTO.to Dec'17 C$2.11 12-Sep-14 C$3.39 60.7% sold small portion for liquidity
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2016
Closed in 2016 closed close price
Phoscan Chem FOS.to jan16 C$0.28 29-mar-15 C$0.265 -5.4% Buyout trade, bot but poor deal
True Gold TGM.v jan16 C$0.18 23-aug-15 C$0.25 38.9% okay trade, sold on pol risk
McEwen Mining MUX jan16 U$1.09 25-jan-15 U$1.20 10.1% sold due to lack of value
Lake Shore Gold LSG.to feb-16 C$1.10 07-apr-15 C$1.69 53.6% bot out, sold early in process
Atacama Pacific ATM.v feb-16 C$0.19 26-apr-15 C$0.40 110.5% sold for a double on big pop
New Gold NGD feb-16 U$2.06 24-jan-16 U$2.96 43.7% closed good near-term trade
Sandspring Res SSP.v mar-16 C$0.195 18-oct-15 C$0.32 64.1% Hit tgt, took profit
Teranga Gold TGZ.to mar-16 C$0.54 15-feb-15 C$0.60 11.1% disappointing trade
B2Gold BTG mar-16 U$0.85 13-jan-16 U$1.30 52.9% Separate trade on B2, hit tgt
Dalradian Res DNA.to mar-16 C$0.67 27-oct-13 C$1.00 49.3% Hit target, sold, good win
HudBay Min. HBM may-16 U$4.10 03-apr-16 U$4.36 -6.3% Short trade, poor timing
Nevada Sunrise NEV.v may-16 C$0.185 28-feb-16 C$0.23 24.3% V. small, no big deal either way
Richmont RIC jun-16 U$7.60 01-may-16 U$9.30 22.4% near-term trade, profit taken
INV Metals INV.to jul-16 C$0.25 03-apr-16 C$0.95 280.0% Trade closed on time
HudBay Min. HBM aug16 U$4.98 09-jun-16 U$4.80 3.6% short trade covered, no big deal
Miranda Gold MAD.v oct-16 C$0.125 03-jul-16 C$0.10 -20.0% tiny spec trade, didn't work
Avino G & S ASM nov-16 U$2.00 21-oct-16 U$1.40 -30.0% Abandon trade on bad bot deal
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2015
Closed in 2015 closed close price
Argonaut Gold AR.to jan'15 C$1.47 14-dec-14 C$2.53 72.1% Big gain small time, profit taken
Amerigo Res ARG.to jan'15 C$0.405 20-jul-14 C$0.285 -29.6% Given up on weak Cu prices
Reservoir Min. RMC.v jan'15 C$6.05 18-jun-14 C$4.12 -31.9% sold on Cu downturn
Coro Mining COP.to jan'15 C$0.075 26-jan-14 C$0.035 -53.3% sm, sold on Cu downturn
Fortuna Silver FSM mar'15 U$4.12 10-nov-14 U$3.75 9.0% Short used as hedge
GoldQuest Min. GQC.v mar'15 C$0.26 27-oct-13 C$0.085 -67.3% given up ghost
Rio Alto Mining RIO.to apr'15 C$2.30 07-apr-11 C$3.57 55.2% Top pick, bot out, big win
Timmins Gold TGD jun'15 U$0.60 19-apr-15 U$0.62 3.3% near-term trade, out of time
First Majestic AG jul'15 U$10.51 10-aug-14 U$4.55 56.7% horrible failed trade
NovaCopper NCQ.to jul'15 C$1.05 09-apr-14 C$0.50 -52.4% no more Cu exposure, sm sell
McEwen Mining MUX aug'15 U$0.695 21-jul-15 U$0.92 32.4% Closed nearterm flip for win
Midas Gold MAX.to sep'15 C$0.39 21-sep-15 C$0.35 -10.3% Sm. trade idea that didn't work
New Gold NGD oct'15 U$2.18 23-aug-15 U$3.05 39.9% trade closed, profit taken
Legend Gold LGN.v nov'15 C$0.085 01-mar-15 C$0.035 -58.8% tiny "land grab" idea, failed
Timmins Gold TGD nov'15 U$0.245 20-sep-15 U$0.15 -38.8% small near-term loser
Please note that due to space considerations closed positions 2009 to 2014 are now available on
request, or were published in any edition to IKN553 (end 2019).
Important Disclosure
The information and opinions contained within this report reflect the personal views of the author and therefore all material within should
not be construed as accurate or reliable or be utilized as advice for investment or business purposes. Independent due diligence and
discussions with ones own investment and business advisor is strongly recommended. Accordingly, nothing in this report should be
construed as offering a guarantee of the accuracy or completeness of the information contained herein, as an offer or solicitation with
respect to the purchase or sale of any security or as an endorsement of any product or service. All opinions and estimates included in
this report are subject to change without notice. It is prohibited to copy or redistribute this report to any type of third party without the
express permission of the author.
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