IKN #786Premium

The IKN Weekly
Week 786, June 9th 2024
Contents
This Week: Trade heads-up, In today’s edition, The self-entitled Canadian mining club, They
took our jobs.
Fundamental Analysis: Buying Bear Creek Mining (BCM.v).
Stocks to Follow: Contango ORE (CTGO), SilverCrest (SILV) (SIL.to), Minera Alamos (MAI.v),
Western Copper & Gold (WRN.to), Contango ORE (CTGO).
The Copper Basket: Overview, Element 29 (ECU.v), Oroco Resource Corp (OCO.v), Kodiak
Copper (KDK.v).
The Producer Basket: Overview.
The TinyCaps Basket: Overview, Awale Resources (ARIC.v), Surge Copper (SURG.v), Aston
Bay Holdings (BAY.v).
Regional Politics: Bolivia: Evo takes control of the MAS party, Mexico: Sheinbaum and the
English language media, Colombia: ICSID protects the wetlands, Argentina: RIGI slated for
debate this week, Argentina: Metals mining treading water.
Market Watching: Deferred (and I owe you on Mene Inc)
I remind subscribers that no part of this newsletter can be copied, reproduced or
given to any third party without the express permission of the author.
This Week
Trade heads-up
I’m a buyer of Bear Creek Mining (BCM.v) in the week ahead, much to my own surprise. Details
in today’s main fundies section.
In Today’s Edition
 I find myself once again offering apologies for the late arrival of an edition, as well as
asking you to note that the numbers quoted throughout are from the weekend and not
after Monday’s trading. It gives no pleasure to be late publishing and it’s happened too
many times recently, but family matters had to take preference yesterday Sunday and
come that evening, it made sense not to rush the report and force it out (with even
more typos than normal). So, today Monday.
 Today’s report is all about the decision to buy Bear Creek Mining (BCM.v), a decision
that surprised me more than anyone else.
 There are some other things, including thoughts in the way the Mexico election result
was hyped by the English language media and the mundane reality behind the
screaming and lefty fearmongering.
The self-entitled Canadian mining club
Featured in passing in a couple of recent editions, last week saw the contested AGM at Mayfair
Gold (MFG.v) which ended with the removal of the old board of directors and the installing of
the proxy slate led by the Muddy Waters people, i.e. Carson Block and the famous group that
made it big by short selling over-priced and under-researched companies (most Canadians will
remember Sino Forest). The same group was also behind the strategic shift that saw GT Gold
sold to Newmont back in the day, with a handsome profit made by the activist group.
1

That’s the background, but instead of considering the share price or what the new team may do
for the company going forward, this intro wants to take a look in the rear-view mirror and
consider the attitude displayed by the losing side, which is primarily ex-CEO Patrick Evans and
his team (including his son, who was quietly employed to run the company website on a fat
salary without making the required “Related Party” disclosures) but just one step away is the
broader expanse of the chummy, club atmosphere that still prevails in the Canadian mining
sector. I’ve had the opportunity to converse with the Muddy Waters people in the last few
weeks and without making any judgment on the quality or investment potential of Mayfair
(MFG.v) or its Fen-Gibb property in ON Canada (fwiw I’m strictly neutral at the current share
price), the sequence of events is a real eye-opener even for a jaundiced eye such as mine.
 It began last year, when the Muddy Waters (MW) fund dedicated to natural resources
investments (long side) took a 15% position in MFG via placement.
 At the time, the MW fund was happy to remain passive and allow the company to move
on its plans.
 Then in November last year, MFG announced an incentive options award to officers and
insiders that MW considered egregious in size and terms. As a substantial shareholder it
voiced its concerns, which were duly ignored by the C-suite.
 The conversations continued and eventually, MW asked for a seat on the board (in order
to be proactive about any self-serving awards in the future). This was also denied by the
board under Patrick Evans and Harry Pokrandt.
 Up to that point, MW was only looking to replace one director and get a say on corporate
direction into the future, but the entrenched attitude and refusal to budge on any matter
rubbed the fund up the wrong way and in April, they moved to demand a change at
board level at the upcoming AGM. But even at that late stage they were only looking to
change the Chair (Pokrandt) and get one extra seat. However, when that also fell on deaf
ears they went nuclear, proposed a full change and the proxy slate we saw last week.
In other words and according to my conversations with MW executive, if at any point in the
process the then-board of Mayfair had been willing to converse and allow a large minority
shareholder to have a reasonable say in how the company were directed, it wouldn’t have come
to what we saw last week. But there’s more! Once MW went hostile and made its proxy slate
proposal, it came with pledges from large holders of over 50% of the total amount of shares
but even then, the “independent” houses ISS and Glass Lewis recommended that the wishes of
the majority were ignored and that shareholders vote for the current board of directors! In
other words, an entrenched board got permission to remain entrenched from the corporate
institution around it and to this mix, we also add the way that a bevy of MFG officers
“approached the board” (in all likelihood it was exactly the other way around) during the
protracted negotiations with MW and got the board unilaterally to change specific parts of the
company by-laws, aloowing them to carve out just under $4m into a fund that would pay out
Change of Control payments if MW succeeded in its proxy slate. The epitome of self-service, it
was challenged by MW in the courts but once it became clear MW had a majority of votes and
would get its way at the AGM, all the insiders bar (the now condemned) Patrick Evans did a
180° turn, rescinding their intention to resign if the proxy slate won because they knew by then
they were on the wrong side of the field. Astoundingly bare-faced opportunism.
Come last week and the AGM, the MW slate won out with a cool 91.5% of votes cast (so much
for those Glass Lewis and ISS directives) so out with the old and in with the new, but from the
start the attitude of the now jobless board members reeked of arrogance and self-service. It
took a group of people like Muddy Waters, unafraid of taking matters into their own hands and
getting proactive on companies, to face down the chummy club mentality of the outgoing
Evans, Pokrandt and others who have never had to face this type of activism, because it’s as
rare as hen’s teeth in our insular sector. It’s taken an outsider with financial clout and
unencumbered by “long standing relationships” to expose the grubby way of doing business
that is so common in the boardrooms of Canadian junior mining companies.
2

Which brings me to the point of this intro: What Muddy Waters has done is expose the
Canadian corporate scene to a wider audience and offered a template for both itself and others
to pluck some very low hanging fruit. What I wouldn’t give for the serial scamsters at Canadian
board level to feel nervous about their own shareholders! The MFG affair provides a blueprint
that could (and should) be used to oust more selfish boards and put companies into the hands
of people dedicated to creating real wealth for all stakeholders, not just the chosen few with
their hands on the controls.
They took our jobs
We noted it quickly last weekend, but the BLS Employment Report on Friday made waves and
pushed the metals complex lower, capping off a volatile week with a loss for our sector. As it
beat even the optimistic forecasters (at least the ones that get paid salaries by banks to make
their guesses), the world latched on to the blowout +272k NFP jobs number as evidence of
continuing strength in the mighty US economy and how it “does close the door on a July rate
cut” (Mohamed El-Erian dixit (1)) but we soon had other luminaries such as BlackRock CIO Rick
Rieder “still looking for a September rate cut” (2). What we did get was the headline
unemployment rate ping 4.0% for the first time and that’s the start of the psychological effect
that will see the Fed move (or be asked) to act.
The ongoing debate about when the Fed will begin to cut has, to a large extent, become a
moot point at this stage. The market timers see profit in being able to guess right and that’s fair
enough, but the wonderful world of mining has been doing just fine without the tide change
that was supposed to usher in higher gold prices and better margins for mining companies.
That’s because we already have higher gold prices and better margins for mining companies
thanks to the reasonably strong run in gold in Q2 and the cap now on costs after the
inflationary pulse of 2023. Our job today isn’t to second-guess Jerome or try to beat macro
luminaries such as El-Erian at their own game, instead we play the cards dealt to us. That
includes looking around the disaster area and scorched earth left in the silver and gold space by
two long years of drudge and finding bargain basement companies that were beaten to near
death but are now showing signs of life. And on that subject, we step back from the intro and
get to our main event of IKN786.
Fundamental Analysis of Mining Stocks
Buying Bear Creek Mining (BCM.v)
Let Hercules himself do what he may,
The cat will mew, and dog will have his day.
Hamlet, Act 5, Sc1
Preamble: It was a strange feeling to write the above as a working title this week, so I didn’t
bother trying to find something pithier and it made the final edit. Bear Creek Mining (BCM.v)
(BCEKF) is a company that has received little but disdain from this desk over the years and in
this case it really is years, what with our coverage of the drama it caused and suffered around
its Santa Ana property way back in 2010 and 2011. We’ve never liked it at rightly so, as BCM
has seemingly lurched from one problem to another over the year, rarely getting a break at
market with any metals rally coming at bad timing for the company. That unlucky streak
continued into its latest foray and its designs on becoming a successful producer via the
Mercedes mine in Mexico have seen another two years of woe. However, silver’s recent run got
me filtering and re-checking all sorts of dog silver companies, even the ones that make me feel
queasy, and when I got to BCM and its recent 1q24 financials, even my own negative bias and
prejudice wasn’t enough to cover the obvious improvement it’s now showing.
With silver and gold re-tracing last week and pulling precious metals mining companies of all
sizes away from overbought territory, plus the ongoing mediocrity of my second string silver
pick IMPACT Silver (IPT.v) nagging in the back of my mind, I therefore took a closer look at
BCM and the result is today’s note. So for the TL:DR among you, to my own surprise I’m a
buyer of Bear Creek Mining (BCM.v) this coming week at this current price and while there’s
3

execution risk to assume at a Mercedes mine with no formal guidance this year, there’s more
than enough potential reward to justify opening a trade.
Enough preamble and time for some work, starting with our standard structure topbox:
Shares out: 227.6m
Options/RSU/DSU: 10.2m
Warrants: 27.2m
Fully diluted shares: 236.2m
Current share price: C$0.38
Market Cap: C$86.5m
Approx cash per S/O: 3c
All prices are in US Dollars unless stated, USD/CAD forex assumption 0.75x
NB: As BCM reports in US Dollars and that most of the financial parameters are in that currency, Loonies only show up
in this analysis for the share price and target pricings.
Officers and insiders: It’s no exaggeration to say that BCM has a long and varied history as a
corporate entity and we could go back a long way to show where this company has come from
and what it has done over the decades. Founded in 1999 (or 2000, if you believe the current
website) and taken public in 2003, the company has revolved around co-founder Andrew
Swarthout, who led as CEO for many years. These days BCM is headed up by one Eric Caba,
who joined the company in 2018 as VP Project Development to assist then-CEO Tony
Hawkshaw. Caba was promoted to COO and when Hawkshaw stepped aside last year due to ill
health (subsequently passing on, RIP), he became President and CEO. The company is chaired
by Catherine McLeod-Seltzer, who has been on the team for over 20 years in different roles.
Co-founders Andrew Swarthout and Kevin Morano are still on the board of directors, but are
now less involved with the day-to-day running. As for major shareholders, large chunks of
today’s BCM is held by several strategic entities, whether via deals or by share purchases. They
include Sandstorm Gold (SAND) (19.99%), Equinox Gold (EQX) (11.16%), Wheaton Precious
Metals (WPM) (6.9%) and Florida USA natural resources fund Kopernik Global Investors
(9.88%). Those account for nearly half of all issued shares, with small tranches owned by other
instos and around 40% by retail. Notably, insider holdings of just 3.15% means low skin-in-
game for the executive.
As for what is does, BCM’s main, though not exclusive, focus as a developer has been Peru and
to cut what could become a very long story short, these days it has two main assets, Corani
and Mercedes. Here come overviews of each:
Corani: BCM began work at Corani in 2005, made a substantial purchase from previous owners
Rio Tinto in 2008 and became 100% owner of this large, silver/zinc/lead project in 2011. It is
located in South Peru, reasonably close to Lake Titcaca and close to the trans-oceanic highway,
a modern road that connects the East and West seaboards of South America. It sits at high
altitude, at between 4,800m and 5,200m above sea level and next to the eponymous small
town of Corani. It has seen several 43-101 compliant reports raised on the project and the
latest, published in 2019, was a re-working of previous data. That 2019 report estimated capex
at just under U$600m, uses this proven and probable reserve…
…on a machine that would run at 27,000tpd and give a 15 year mine life with average payable
metal production of 9.6m oz silver, 98m lb lead and 69m lbs zinc. Some simple gross revenues
math on those parameters using spot price equivalents…
 Silver U$30/oz = U$288m/year
4

 Lead U$1.00/lb = U$98m/year
 Zinc U$1.30/lb = U$90m/year
 Total: U$476m/year for 15 years
…show plenty of top line revenue for a mine on this orebody. If we then assume typical
margins for mining, the casual observer comes away with a strong impression of the project at
a theoretical level. Add the fact that to all intents and purposes Corani is fully permitted (with
the caveat that some key permits are up for renewal in 2024, but under the current Boluarte
government we’re bound to see those rolled over successfully) and there’s an interesting mine
to be built here. Indeed, in recent declarations to the press the new Mining Minister, Romulo
Mucho, has made it clear that Corani is one of the country’s top priorities for projects to put
into construction and therefore production. Corani has been on his mind on several occasions
and to varied audiences, for example this (3) Q&A with Global Business Reports while attending
PDAC in March this year
Q: How are mining projects in Peru’s pipeline progressing?
A: The Zafranal project, scheduled for 2026, could move forward if there is a favorable
disposition and surface land issues are resolved. Meanwhile, San Gabriel is actively
undergoing construction. Corani has all the necessary elements in place and is
awaiting the resumption of financing. Conversely, the Magistral project is currently not
on Nexa Group’s immediate agenda, mainly due to its complex logistics, including
access challenges. Romina, a medium-sized project, is progressing. Regarding
Newmont’s Yanacocha Sulfuros project, although it was ready for development, it was
indefinitely postponed during Castillo’s government.
Of if you prefer, this interview last month with Peru trade media “Minenergia” (4) that went
under the headline "Minister Rómulo Mucho: "We Hope To Get Yanacocha Sulfuros and Corani
Into Construction"":
Regarding Corani, Mucho said that as a project it has everything. “The investor
(capital) stepped back and we’re waiting for it to return soon and even start the project
this year. It is a project where good social outreach work has been done and if we (as
a country) regain trust or offer guarantees to investors, it is obvious they will return,” he
said.
With a big silver deposit, favourable economics under current metals prices, permits in place
and backing both at local and national government level, our aforementioned casual observer
can reasonably wonder just why this mine hasn’t been built by now.
The short answer and to borrow from Facebook: It’s complicated. As for a slightly longer
answer (as a really long answer isn’t for today), Corani is a difficult deposit in a difficult zone
that relies on a volatile metal for its economics. The metallurgy is complicated and requires the
use of technology unproven at that altitude. The location doesn’t help matters in other ways,
being remote and high altitude and in a zone with its share of anti-mining, anti-investment and
“anti-outsider” politics (the high-Andean cultural ways are not easy to fathom). To its credit,
BCM has done a very good job with its CSR and outreach with the townspeople of Corani, often
under difficult circumstances. Its main effort is centred around a long-term agreement with the
town of Corani that started in 2017 and has the company paying S/4m (U$1.1m per year) for
community initiative and projects, via a committee that keeps things transparent and away from
accuations of corrupt activity on either side. However, that good work doesn’t detract from the
problems, both theoretical and practical, of building a large mine at altitude in a region that
views outsiders with suspicion.
As for the capex bill, even back in 2019 the U$600m estimate was probably cutting it fine and
these days, it’s going to be substantially more than that. And while it’s a bit of a guess for the
final capex bill once this mine is built, but it’s one thing dedicating something close to a billion
dollars on a project that can rely on the relative stability of gold or copper, another when it
depends on the vagaries of silver and zinc as well as
trusting that other variables, such as the aforementioned
metallurgy and political risk, go according to plan.
5

Long story short (and I’m trying today), I’ve never been a fan of Corani and have avoided the
stock as an investment, despite its “compelling economics” on paper and to date, that’s been
the right decision. However, with silver doing this (right) in recent times (as well as seeing zinc
holding new price levels), there comes a moment in the cycle when eyes turn to this type of big
project. Difficult yes, but equally it’s not impossible and at current valuations, plus the clear will
of the government of Peru to “get a win” on mine development and naming Corani as one of its
prime opportunities, there’s value on offer here. It may have to depend on that clichéd
“optionality on silver” to get marketing traction but with the metal having built a long-term base
around the U$25/oz level and now moving higher, that’s not something we can dismiss so
lightly these days. Even with cost inflation, Corani “works” at U$30/oz silver and if this becomes
a true long-term price, Corani may even be built.
Enough Corani, now we attempt to explain how a exploreco/developer with a focus on Peru
now owns a operating gold mine in Mexico.
Mercedes: When back in December 2021 Bear Creek announced it was buying the Mercedes
mine in Mexico from Equinox Gold (EQX) (5), my reaction was to sigh and comment that mining
is an expensive hobby. It was a deal born from a combination of factors and one that should
never have happened, but it did and as things have turned out, both deal and outcome have
underscored my opinion and why I’ve called “avoid” on this stock over the years. At the time of
the deal, BCM was down to being a one-trick pony of a company with only Corani on its books
and thanks to silver languishing in the markets, it got zero interest from either bankers (to fund
into production) or prospective buyers. CEO at the time was Tony Hawkshaw, who had been
brought in to pep up the company and get the project moving into reality. While certainly an
experienced mining guy with the necessary expertise in Peru, Hawkshaw was a mining operator
at heart and it got to the point where the inertia became too much to stomach. BCM under the
“mining guy” Hawkshaw couldn’t just sit on an asset and wait, it had to DO SOMETHING and
when offered Mercedes by an Equinox looking to offload its non-core asset, then the means to
buy Mercedes by happy lender Sandstorm (where Andrew Swarthout plays an influential role),
it was too tempting to pass up. The main deal terms were U$100m cash ($75m upfront, $25m
paid later), 24.73m shares of BCM (ticket value at the time $25m) and a 2% NSR or if you
prefer, twice the current market cap of BCM today. No matter that gold has ramped by
U$450/oz since then and no matter that it still owns Corani, which should give a decent idea of
how painful a failure this purchase has turned out to be for the company. That ticket price was
a lot for BCM to take on at the time, all for the desire to “Do Something” with an operating
mine, as such it had to open up the balance sheet and bring a lot of debt on board. BCM took a
U$60m facility with streaming company Sandstorm (SAND) that included a stream priced at
$37.5m and convertible debentures to the tune of $22.5m and with that, the acquisition
basically doubled the company size. If you’re going to do that, you’ll want to have bought a
working mine that runs on wheels, has no major issues and can return regular cash flow and
operating profits from the getgo in order to pay off the money you owe, but that did not to be
the case.
Mercedes was sold to BCM by EQX (and therefore to BCM shareholders by BCM) as a mine that
would produce between 15,000 and 20,000 ounces of gold per quarter (with a small silver
kicker) and, with a modicum of investment and know-how, could ramp further from that level in
the years to come. So much for the snake oil, what they got instead was a money pit of
impressive proportions and series of issues that add up to a comedy of errors. Those began
almost as soon as the deal closed, as the BCSC placed BCM on its “Defualt List” due to the lack
of credentials of the people who signed off on its Mercedes technical report. At first the market
gave BCM the benefit of the doubt in 2022 and when, at the end of its first year of ownership,
BCM reported 4q22 production of 13,663oz Au it also offered guidance for 2023 of 65,000oz to
75,000oz Au for 2023, i.e. somewhere between 16,000oz and 19,000oz per quarter. Even that
wasn’t the rosy picture first sold to the world in late 2021, but even that looked good against
what really happened:
6

BCM: Mercedes quarterly production
7
1089
07111 36631 83021
2129 5519
87431 82221
Oz Au
20000
18000
16000
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
2q22 3q22 4q22 1q23 2q23 3q23 4q23 1q24
source: company filings
The 1q23 production of just over 12k oz gold failed wasn’t great, but when more operational
issues showed and 2q23 and 3q23 only managed just
over 9k oz gold per quarter, the market’s patience ran
out. The 12 month chart shows the big dump at the
end of September, that was on BCM’s announcement of
a re-structuring of its gold streaming deal with
Sandstorm (and Nomad) along with a $9.5m bought
deal priced at 38c (6) and you don’t do a big raising at
a massive discount and a deep and expensive refi
because you’re about to return a great quarter, not in
gold mining anyway.
BCM then limped into 2024 under the same cloud and
while it did shows some signs of life during the first part
of the gold price upmove in the first quarter thanks to a second and more comprehensive re-
structuring of its liabilities profile (see below) plus a modest improvement in production (chart
above), it wasn’t until gold and silver legged up at the start of April that the stockstarted to find
new buyers. The final company release we’ll feature here is the April 17th 1q24 production NR
(7), with the headline of 12,228oz gold and this CEO comment:
Eric Caba, President and CEO of Bear Creek, states, “I am very pleased that the
progress made at Mercedes in the fourth quarter of 2023 has continued into 2024.
Increasing the grade and reducing dilution has allowed us to reduce costs while
maintaining the higher level of production. We are still working through a historical
development deficit, but the efforts of the technical staff and management at Mercedes
are bearing fruit. While some challenges continue to lie ahead, we are confident that
Mercedes can ultimately fulfill its intended role within the Company.”
While not 15k oz yet, that was a second reasonable quarter and indicated BCM was on a more
even keel. But equally importance to its cause was the restructuring/refi deals that have
lessened the financial load at the company and brought breathing space to its balance sheet.
Regarding announced in September 2023 and closed in January 2024, the central change to
BCM’s debt restructure is a marked decrease in the amount of metal it delivers to Sandstorm
per quarter. Previously, BCM had to deliver
600oz gold per month, as well as 75,000 oz BCM: Liability payment commitments 2024 on, pre/post refi
silver per quarter to Nomad Royalties. That’s (NB: ex-A/C payable & accrued liabilities)
now down to 275oz gold per month and the
silver stream is deferred until 2028. Clearly a
big change to its debt profile and to give a
visual on that, this chart (right) shows the
annual payment commitments BCM had
before the restructuring/refi (grey columns)
compared to now (gold columns).
It’s a classic “boot it forward” and while the
refi comes at a cost, with $20m added to the
991.62
569.11
15.13
375.01
533.8
508.21
342.6
178.21 69.55
30.001
U$m
110
100
90
80 Before refi
70
After refi 60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2024 2025 2026 2027 2028->
source: company financials

total bill (payment commitments going from $128.25m to $148.24m) and a 1% NSR on Corani
going to Sandstorm, the advantages to the previously cash-strapped BCM facing heavy
repayments both this year and next are obvious. For a clearer view of the differences in the
near-term, this chart uses the same annual data as above but leaves out the 2028-and-beyond
column:
BCM: Liability payment commitments 2024 on, pre/post refi
(NB: ex-A/C payable & accrued liabilities)
8
991.62
569.11
15.13
375.01
533.8
508.21
342.6
178.21
U$m
40
35 Before refi
30 After refi
25
20
15
10
5
0
2024 2025 2026 2027
source: company financials
With Mercedes now performing better and the debt load booted forward, BCM is off life support
in 2024 and while it’s roughly doubled from its lows, its share price is still a long way from
where we were. Essentially, that’s why this report exists.
Now for some nitty gritty on some (not all) of the numbers coming out of BCM recently, with a
eye to highlighting the potential value on offer at the current share price. We begin with
production and thoughts on what mioght be to come, then move to the financials.
Production overview: Our first chart is a re-print of the gold production chart above, but we
add in estimates for the next two quarters by way of context.
BCM: Mercedes quarterly production
1089
07111 36631 83021
2129 5519
87431 82221 00521 00031
Oz Au
20000
18000
16000
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
2q22 3q22 4q22 1q23 2q23 3q23 4q23 1q24 2q24 3q24
source: company filings
At this point, it’s important to note that BCM has not published guidance for 2024 due to the
issues it went through in 2023 (and watch me mention this on a couple more occasions,
below), but we do have solid evidence of improved production in the last two quarters that
show things are not as bad as in mid 2023. We also have a couple of indications in company
literature that things are going better, e.g. in the 1q24 MD&A we were told that its
rehabilitiation of productive zones at Mercedes was “…advancing the development of the Rey
de Oro deposit. Delineation drilling and the appointment of a development contractor are
underway.” Those are the words of a company that has got to the bottom of its asset problems
and turning them around. Thenv later on, buried close to the bottom of the MD&A was this
brief statement:
“The Company continues the process of improving its working capital by updating its
mine production plan and shifting to a bulk mining methodology which is expected to
increase production output and reduce cost of sales moving forward.”
We stress, there’s no formal guidance offered by BCM for 2024 and there’s risk involved in
blithely assuming the numbers I’ve penciled into the chart above are spot on, those
assumptions of 12,500oz gold for the current quarter and 13,000 oz for 3q24 may be out by

some way. However and to allow leeway, there’s also a chance they turn out to be too low
rather than highc because, after all, this is the same mine that BCM thought capable of running
at least 16,000 oz per quarter when they bought it from EQX. If the company gets its wheels in
line, there’s no reason not to expect marked improvement at some point and that may turn out
to be sooner, rather than later.
Other data also indicate signs of life. In 1q24, mined and milled tonnes (below left) were down
though the company said that reductions was “in line with expectations” as they worked on
mine development in other zones of Mercedes (i.e. waste stripping) that should pay dividends
in the second half of 2024 and into 2025. However, the good news came from average head
grades (below right, which increased markedly to 3.69 g/t Au (and silver at 40g was also good).
BCM Mercedes: Tonnes mined/milled
That type of improvement is unlikely to be sheer coincidence and indicates BCM and its
contractors are getting a better handle on the mine and its issues. Indeed, the big production
misses in 2q23 and 3q23 were all about grade dilution and low head grades at the mill.
Financials: Which brings us to what the last quarter and possibly the next can do for the
company. Again, we have to tread carefully when making predictions and forecasts for BCM at
Mercedes this year, because there’s no guidance to go by and the company would be within its
rights to deliver a low production quarter if it decided that its near-term efforts were better
placed on resource development for future quarters. However, if we assume the 12.5k oz for
2q24 and 13k oz for Q3, plus reasonable guestimates for the small silver kicker, we get top line
revenues (green columns) and costs (red columns) like this, along with the difference between
the two (cream columns):
BCM reported higher costs in 1q24 and we assume those continue (even though they were
partly a worse Forex with the Mexican Peso and that’s improved somewhat recently) but the
recent magic of record gold prices and our guess of slightly better production would put top line
revenues at or above U$30m, with our ballpark model forecasting gross mine margins of
U$13m and U$14.5m for the next two quarters respectively. Even 1q24 was a clear
improvement, so a small increase in gold production as Merecedes moves back toward its 15k
oz/qtr potential, plus a U$2,300/oz gold price assumption, makes for clearly improving margins
even after the higher costs we must use in 2024. We still need to back out DD&A from that
“difference” total to get a true gross profits figure and when we do that, we get the red
columns below. Then one step further for the operating earnings by deducting a laundry list of
9
1.38
0.221 4.621 2.841 0.821 0.241 0.431 0.431 5.121 1.521 5.321 2.621 0.811 0.631 0.601 0.901
kmt BCM Mercedes: Gold head grade
tonnes mined
160 tonnes milled
140
120
100
80 60
40
20
0
2q22 3q22 4q22 1q23 2q23 3q23 4q23 1q24
source: company filings
16.2 54.2 11.3 19.2 24.2 04.2 03.3 96.3
g/t Au
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0 1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
2q22 3q22 4q22 1q23 2q23 3q23 4q23 1q24
source: company filings
BCM.v: Operations overview
180.01 255.1 925.8 455.62 127.32 338.2 304.42 730.81 663.6 182.42 573.41 609.9 988.91 216.41 772.5 508.81 743.41 854.4 371.62 869.51
502.01 235.72
97.61
247.01
03
71
31
5.13
71 5.41
40
35
30
25
20
15 10
5
0
22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 32q4 42q1 tse42q2 tse42q3
U$m
revenues
COGS
diff
Source: company filings

costs including the Corani CSR bill, exploration and evaluation costs, corporate salaries, and
professional fees and G&A:
BCM: Mercedes operations, per qtr
10
196.3
619.0
840.3-
328.7-
25.0-
676.9-
62.1-
598.5-
623.3-
944.6-
957.6-
256.11-
419.0-
767.4-
933.3
694.1-
5.5
1
7
5.2
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
-10
-12
22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 32q4 42q1 tse42q2 tse42q3
U$m
gross profit
Op earnings
source: company filings, IKN ests
Notably, gross profit was already back in positive territory in 1q24 after the refi with Sandstorm
closed, but as from this current quarter (as long as BCM delivers our assumed production of
12,500oz gold) we should see it return an operating profit for the first time since early 2022
when first taking over the mine. As for net earnings…
BCM: Operating and Net earnings, per qtr
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
-10
-12
-14
-16
-18
22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 32q4 42q1 tse42q2 tse42q3
U$m
Op earnings
Net earnings
source: company filings
…they are less important at this stage, but a consideratrion of 1q24 compared to what we
expect in the next couple of quarters is a
worthwhile exercise. In 1q24, the BCM P+L BCM.v: Shares Out
swallowed large, one-time items from the refi and
saw a fat bottom line loss, but those aren’t going
to show again and as from this current quarter,
things will look a lot healthier. As from 3q24 (and
again, as long as our sketched estimates for
production hold true) BCM should become a
breakeven company. That’s a marked
improvement from 2023. If we consider operating
earnings on a per-share basis, what with the
couple of equity raies in recent quarters pushing
the S/O total to 227.6m as at end 1q24, we see a
thinly positive number in Q2 and then 1.1c/share in
3q24, which isn’t a king’s ransom but is moving in
the right direction and is enough to justify its recent
move to the 40c-or-abouts level.
A look at the cash flows evolution gives a different
perspective and shows how those low 9koz quarters
in mid-2023 sucked the liquidity out of the company
in the ensuing quarters (Q3 and Q4. More
importantly, it shows that behind that hefty looking
$17m net loss was a mining company that was in
fact working at a decent enough profit. The hits were taken at corporate level as it restructured
72.421 72.421
58.251 14.351 03.451 46.451 46.451 73.171
37.891 85.722 822
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 32q4 42q1 tse42q2
source: company filings/IKN ests
serahs
fo
snoillim
BCM.v: operating earnings per share
10.0
50.0- 60.0-
40.0- 40.0-
70.0- 20.0-
10.0-
00.0
10.0
0.02
0.01
0.00
-0.01 -0.02
-0.03
-0.04
-0.05
-0.06
-0.07
-0.08
22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 32q4 42q1 tse42q2 tse42q3
U$
source: BCM filings, IKN calcs

the weight of its liabilities but with that now clear, there’s every reason to expect BCM to be
able to generate the cash it needs to remain liquid and service its debt load from now to 2028.
BCM: Cash from operating activities, per quarter
11
8.3- 3.6- 8.3- 3.4- 5.2-
6.7-
7.0 7.7
0.4 4.3
4.5- 5.3-
6.6 5.6
5.9
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 32q4 42q1 tse42q2 tse42q3
U$m
source: company filings
As for balance sheet items, this is one of the rare occasions when a balance sheet in a
junior miner looks worse than it actually is. We start with the bad look via our standard
overview assets and liabilities charts. Overall assets (below left) shows how DD&A has depleted
the company’s carry but but without managing to make s profit, so there’s been no replacement
of fixed assets with treasury or other current asset line items and the decadence shows over
the quarters since acquiring Mercedes.
BCM.v: Assets
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
The chart to its right shows the same data, but without the large fixed asset position in order to
get a better look at the current assets only. The cash position has improved into 1q24 and it
needed to (plus there’s now a $2.5m minimum convenant on treasury) and we expect BCM to
be able to collect more cash in the quarters to come. This better liquidity is exactly why BCM
restructured so while obviously positive, it would be particularly bad news if they cannot follow
this pattern going forward.
Meanwhile, it’s easy to see when the liabilities arrived on the books (chart below left), that was
during 2q22 when the Merecedes acquisition closed and from virtually nothing, BCM was
suddenly weighed down by the converts, the debt and around $20m in accounts payable that
rolled over from the EQX books. Since then we’ve seen the overall burden flatline, but the
weighting moved slowly from long-term to current liabilities as the payments under the original
terms came due.
12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 32q4 42q1 tse42q2 tse42q3
U$m fixed BCM.v: Current assets
other current
inventory 40
cash 35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
source: company filings
12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 32q4 42q1 tse42q2 tse42q3
other current U$m
inventory
cash
source: company filings
BCM.v: Liabilities breakdown per qtr
200
180
160
140
120
100 80
60
40
20
0
12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 32q4 42q1 tse42q2 tse42q3
U$m BCM.v: Working Capital per qtr
LT liab
total current
source: company filings
5.22 9.71
7.43-
5.34- 2.15- 0.06- 5.75-
1.66- 7.98- 2.88- 0.48- 0.18-
40
20
0
-20
-40
-60
-80
-100
12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 32q4 42q1 tse42q2 tse42q3
U$m
source company filings

The restructuring has fixed that burden (see
above) and payment considerations in 2024 to
2027 are now much lower, but due to the nature
of the new deal a lot of the restructured debt is
still carried as current liabilities. That makes the
Working Capital chart (above right) rather scary,
standing at negative $88.197m as at end 1q24
and we’re not expecting that to change in the
quarters to come.
So a closer lookis in order and while there are
other influences, such as the increase in accounts
payable to $29m this quarter (here’s hoping that
gets back toward the $20m level soon and the
continued stream liability (that comes out
automatically as gold is sent to SAND and stays
the same on currents, with the decrease showing
in the long-term section), the main events are the
note payable and the convertible debentures,
owed to SAND and to EQX. Even though there are
being carried in the current section (due to being
comprised of a combo ofhost loan and embedded
derivative liability, I think that’s why but need to
check to be 100% sure), there’s nothing in that
$70.3m total that needs to be paid before 2028. In other words, according to the accountanct
rules BCM is running a near $90m working capn deficiency but in real terms and after the
recent restructuring, it’s more like $10m and with the high likelihood of positive free cash flow
in the quarters to come, that “real world” total should get back intot he positive.
All that is a long way of saying that BCM’s balance sheet, while clearly not in prime and
optimum shape, really isn’t as bad as it looks at first sight- In fact, this is one of the reasons I’m
attracted to this trade, its financials are screaming “turnaround trade has begun” and you have
to look further than the obvious lines to spot it. If we get those 12,500 oz gold minimum
produced in Q2, things should start improving and then BCM starts talking up its improving
treasury position and positive free cash flow. At that point, the cat will be out of the bag.
Discussion and conclusion: After considering the two major assets at BCM, noting the recent
performance at Mercedes, acknowledging the recent improvements to its financial situation and
taking on board the improvement in its revenues thanks to the rises in gold and silver, it’s time
to lay out just why I’m a buyer of this stock in the week ahead. I could of course wow you with
a bunch of Excel generated figures and a scientifically proven target price, but in this case we’re
considering a company that’s just had a close brush with insolvency, has just restructured its
financials and doesn’t even have 2024 production guidance to offer us, so anything done with
too much math would be a big stretch. However, there are solid fundamental reasons to like
BCM at this price and moment in time:
Corani: I don’t need to be a fan of this project to know that it’s worth more in 2024 than it was
in 2023. With silver rising fast and apparently consolidating around the U$30/oz mark, Corani
becomes economically robust and offers enough potential reward to overcome the risk of
investing in a remote, high country project with tough metallurgy. This chart (right) tracks the
long-term asset value of BCM’s Peru assets and those bars are almost completely the Corani
asset carry (there’s a little for one minor exploration asset in another part of South Peru, plus
the Lima office stuff). Part of the recent deal to re-structure the Sandstorm debt was to give
SAND a 1% NSR on Corani and that came out of the carry, dropping the value of Corani by
$12m to just under U$80m. That’s a fair yardstick of what Corani is worth today:
 Sandstorm is happy to value 1% of its NSR at $12m. So are we.
12

 BCM is happy to value Corani at around $80m on its books. That’s around 10% of NPV at
+10% silver price according to the 2019 report, which of course has seen costs inflate but
on the other hand, used an implied U$20/oz silver price.
 A 10% NAV looks fair to us, considering that BCM doesn’t have the cash to build the mine
itself and will almost certainly have to sell at some point.
With silver now moving up and making headlines, that “some point” may become sooner rather
than later and even if not, Corani is now surely worth more than the market is factoring into the
share price. BCM is currently renewing some
BCM: Long-term asset value for Peru
key permits, but with the Peru government
waxing lyrical about its potential and looking
to “get a win” somewhere, those won’t be an
issue and in any case, Corani’s major permits
are already awarded. Its good CSR will help vend the project and even if it doesn’t sell in
2024, the market will have to start assuming a
higher value for the company. SAND seems to
think it’s worth $1.2m on its NSR and 10% of
that would be a reasonable price for a buyer
who would then have to spend upwards of
U$600m (and probably something close to
U$800m to get their mine. JMeanwhile, BCM the company carries it at around $80m and that
lower asset value will allow it to sell and improve the balance sheet, as well as turning an
ignored fixed asset into highly desirable cash.
Mercedes: This time last year Mercedes was the epitome of the mining money pit and the BCM
desire to “Do Something” and add value to the company via operations had turned into a
nightmare, there’s no doubt at all that EQx got the better end of that deal. However, EQX and
with SAND have given BCM the financial leeway it needs to turn things around and with major
financial obligations now booted into the future, a mine that’s starting to show decent levels of
production (we keep our fingers crossed for 2q24) and the price of gold moving in its favour,
there’s value here and today, arguably, Mercedes plus its
“optionality value” as it improves covers every penny of
the U$65m market cap, or approx $210m enterprise
value without the need to consider Corani and with a
book value this weekend of 31c, you’re getting two
assets for the price of one.
Put another way, if tomorrow morning BCM announced it
had a buyer for Corani willing to pay U$120m cash (i.e.
in line with the NSR valuation), people would
congratulate the company but nobody would think the
buyer was paying too much. With that money, BCM could
move to pay off its entire convertible and note debt amd
leave the company solvent, with cash liquidity and money to invest into making Mercedes that
75k oz/annum mine it believes it to be and those assets are worth way more than U$65m. With
silver doing what it has been doing, at some point BCM will get due credit for an advanced
stage and (basically) fully permitted silver mine with 15 years of reserves and another 15 years
potential in M+I and inferred to add on later. Therefore, it makes sense to consider the current
U$80m asset value into the share price that just that would mean 47c, 9c above today’s PPS.
The bottom line: The combination of three factors has made Bear Creek Mining (BCM.v) into a
turnaround play for 2024, having been an investment pariah for over a decade. On the one
hand, the rise in silver prices makes Corani an attractive option for any company looking to
expand its operations. BCM doesn’t have the financial heft to build the mine itself, but it’s worth
every penny of its $80m carry today and the market is giving the company far less credit than
that. On the other, the rise in gold prices coincides with better production numbers out of
13
80.421 50.221 61.811 2.511 98.111 77.801 68.601 62.501 85.201 352.99 6.001 308.99 170.79 684.89 856.89 506.29 428.29 590.39 580.39 999.29 441.39 714.18
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
81q4 91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 32q4 42q1
U$m
Source: company filings
BCM book value per share , 2021 to date
1.00
0.90
0.80
0.70
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00
12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 32q4 42q1 tse42q2 tse42q3
source: company filings
erahs/$U

Mercedes, the right combo for the positive free cash flow that has been elusive to date. But
with the company now address ing the issues at the mine and production getting back toward
the 16k to 19k per quarter originally envisaged. And then behind all that, the financial
restructuring, while expensive, has brought breathing room to the balance sheet and will allow
BCM to make the money it needs to improve production, not merely pay off its creditors on the
old schedule. Today’s C$86.5m market cap (U$65m) is justified by Mercedes alone, which
means any deal (or even envisaged deal) for Corani would
add something between U$80m and $120m of pure gravy
on top, or iof you prefer C$0.47 to C$0.70 per share.
To my own surprise, a company that I’ve treated with
disdain and avoided for over a deacde is now a buy. I will
open a position in Bear Creek Mining (BCM.v) this coming
week and add it to the Stocks to Follow list as from next
weekend as a high risk, high reward precious metals play
that will compliment my recently opened trade in IMPACT
Silver (IPT.v) and for my target price, anything below 40c
will be fine. Give this stock the right circumstances in 2024
and it could double in a heartbeat. We leave you with the
ten year price chart for BCM, a reminder that its share price has seen better days.
Stocks to Follow
The metals dropped for a second week running and this time, our portfolio of gold, silver and
copper exposed juniors couldn’t resist the pressure. It wasn’t all one-way traffic, as there are
three week-over-week winners (MIRL.cse, RPX.v, PAU.cse) and one unchanged stock (OCI.v)
among the 16 open positions, but they’re all minor holdings and were outnumbered in no
uncertain terms in both number and portfolio weighting. No need to list all of the 12 losers,
we’ll merely highlight the big drops seen in Top Pick Minera Alamos (MAI.v down 15.4%),
Western Copper & Gold (WRN.to down 12.6%), Mene Inc (MENE.v down 12.5%) and
SilverCrest Metals (SILV down 10.5%).
We have 16 open positions on the list, I have shares in 13 of those and the other three are on
the Watch List as possible trades. The count is the same as last week, with nine of the sixteen
in the green, one unchanged since inception and six in the red.
company Ticker this week Avg Price Reco date Current PPS Gain/Loss% Notes
TOP PICKS
Minera Alamos MAI.v STR BUY C$0.21 13-Oct-19 C$0.33 57.1% $0.75 first tgt, #1 idea
RECOMMENDED STOCKS
Rio2 Ltd. RIO.v BUY C$0.80 22-Apr-18 C$0.49 -38.8% Momentum now building
SilverCrest Met SILV STR BUY U$6.90 31-Mar-24 U$7.98 15.7% Quality Ag/Au, U$12.96 tgt
Pan Global Res PGZ.v BUY C$0.19 19-Feb-24 C$0.17 -10.5% 3 adds,big position,cheap Cu
Marimaca Copper MARI.to BUY C$3.05 14-Jan-24 C$3.78 23.9% Quality Cu developer
Western Copper WRN.to BUY C$1.57 26-Feb-24 C$1.59 1.3% M&A trade, gone off boil
Orecap Inv OCI.v BUY C$0.06 4-May-24 C$0.06 0.0% Exposed to several good jrs
Contango Ore CTGO STR BUY U$18.70 30-Jul-23 U$23.77 27.1% Production re-rate in Q3
Newcore Gold NCAU.v SPEC BUY C$0.205 23-Oct-22 C$0.335 63.4% Cheap Au in West Africa
SPECULATIVE TRADES
Aldebaran Res. ALDE.v SPEC BUY C$0.72 16-May-21 C$1.00 38.9% into FY24 news season now
IMPACT Silver IPT.v SPEC BUY C$0.30 14-Apr-24 C$0.265 -11.7% Silver spec, added IKN783
Minera IRL MIRL.cse avoid C$0.195 22-Jul-12 C$0.03 -84.6% leaving list soon (good)
A WATCHLIST OF POTENTIAL TRADES. NB: I DO NOT OWN
Ero Copper ERO.to WATCH C$18.94 22-Oct-23 C$27.00 42.6% Hi-quality but no longer cheap
Red Pine Expl RPX.v WATCH C$0.08 4-May-24 C$0.10 25.0% Special situation, poss trade
14

Provenance Gold PAU.cse WATCH C$0.085 8-Oct-23 C$0.08 -5.9% Idaho gold drill play
LONG-TERM NON-MINING HOLD
Mene Inc. MENE.v adding C$0.63 6-Dec-20 C$0.175 -72.2% LT bet, adding slowly
CLOSED TRADES IN 2024 date closed close price
Amerigo Res ARG.to Jan'24 C$1.36 12-Dec-21 C$1.34 -1.5% reduced Cu exposure
Fortuna Silver FSM Jan'24 U$2.92 13-Aug-23 U$3.09 3.4% Time ran out on NT trade
Argonaut Gold AR.to Jan'24 C$0.42 17-Dec-23 C$0.395 -6.0% NT specflip closed on poor Q4
Equinox Gold EQX May'24 U$4.42 30-May-23 U$5.57 26.0% Took sm.profit, disappointing
Adventus Mining ADZN.v May'24 C$0.305 7-Jan-24 C$0.445 45.9% bot out, nice win
SolGold SOLG.to May'24 C$0.22 19-Feb-23 C$0.165 -25.0% ran out of patience
2015 to 2023 annual closed positions in appendices below, 2009 to 2014 closed positions in editions IKN553 or earlier
Now for notes on just a few of our covered companies this week:
SilverCrest (SILV) (SIL.to): Down 10.5% on the week but the one larger-sized position that
didn’t have me worrying about the near-term losses. SILV is making too much money at these
gold and silver prices to ignore or see it dump back to 2023 prices.
Minera Alamos (MAI.v): Victim of outside circumstance or not, this was a painful reversal to
witness after having seen MAI put in all that good work at market to re-gain the 40c line
recently. The combo of scare stories on the Sheinbaum win and then the weakness in gold was
the double whammy event that too over 15% from the MAI share price and while there weren’t
hoards of big volume sellers rushing for the door in a panic attack, the lack of buyers was the
killer and the selling into thin bids did all the damage.
Western Copper & Gold (WRN.to): Utterly frustrating to have bought so well into this stock
and see it back to the same levels. For me at least, because if you sat on the fence in February
you now have your window to buy this at cheap levels.
Contango ORE (CTGO): It was volatile on thinnish volume and seemed to race from 24 to 22
and back again, but once the dust had settled CTGO ended the week as one of the better “least
worst” performers. It’s showing plenty of backbone at market these days, so if you see a
bargain price don’t hesitate. At a pinch, it’s even flippable between the sides of this trading
range.
The Copper Basket
After twenty-three weeks of 2024, The Copper Basket shows a gain of 10.79% to level stakes:
company ticker price 1/1/24 Shares out Market Cap current pps gain/loss%
1 NGEx Minerals NGEX.to 7.16 186.824 1774.83 9.50 32.7%
2 Solaris Res SLS.to 4.13 179.221 847.72 4.73 14.5%
3 Marimaca Cop MARI.to 3.43 93.11 351.96 3.78 10.2%
4 Los Andes LA.v 11.80 29.53 295.30 10.00 -15.3%
5 Hercules Silver BIG.v 1.38 231 175.56 0.76 -44.9%
6 Aldebaran Res. ALDE.v 0.89 169.819 169.82 1.00 12.4%
7 Faraday Copper FDY.to 0.63 204.72 163.78 0.80 27.0%
8 Arizona Sonoran ASCU.to 1.75 109.17 155.02 1.42 -18.9%
9 Oroco Res OCO.v 0.375 236.911 99.50 0.42 12.0%
10 American Eagle AE.v 0.26 116.75 68.88 0.59 126.9%
11 Kodiak Copper KDK.v 0.58 63.93 30.69 0.48 -17.2%
12 Element 29 Res ECU.v 0.18 106.25 28.69 0.27 50.0%
13 QC Copper QCCU.v 0.12 173.7 24.32 0.14 16.7%
14 C3 Metals CCCM.v 0.61 61.885 21.04 0.34 -44.3%
15 Camino Min COR.v 0.07 206.66 11.37 0.055 -21.4%
NB: All stocks in CAD$ Portfolio avg 10.79%
15

The Copper Basket 2024, weekly evolution
25%
20%
The Copper Basket average dropped for the third
15%
week running and this time, it was a sharp drop
with just three winners from the list of 15 10%
(SLS.to, LA.v, ECU.v) and all the others losing 5%
ground on the week. The biggest losers were 0%
among the smallest stocks, namely C3 Metals -5%
(CCCM.v down 15.0%), QC Copper (QCCU.v -10%
down 12.5%) and Kodiak (KDK.v down 11.1%).
Overall a poor week for copper stocks and for
our juniors list and the reason was the same as the last couple of weeks:
Copper prices dropped further and our benchmark near-dated futures contract dipped under
the U$4.50/lb line for the first time since April and for the reason, here’s a Reuters headline (8):
Copper nears one-month low as real demand lags expectations
We’ve been saying this for what seems like forever, though it¿’s only really in the timescale of
the above chart. When trade papers were full of “China Smelters Closing Down!” news in April
we reminded readers that “smelter output is one thing and real, end-user demand is quite
another” (IKN778). When Nicholas Snowdon of Goldman Sachs was warning about a “stockout
episode” and inventories dwindling to zero, we pointed to the obvious weakness in Asia demand
and opined “that the current price run in copper is all about market speculation, not about
what’s going on in factories along the Pearl River” (IKN782). Then came the blowoff top,
another move we put down to market factors rather than true fundies and since then, it’s been
selling all the way and a media posse finally taking the weak demand story more seriously. For
example, here’s a segment from the above Reuters note:
Fundamentals were not there before the copper rally, and after the price rally, it got even worse,”
Liberum’s Tom Price said.
Top copper consumer China’s inventory was last at 321,695 tons, the highest since April 2020,
while LME inventories have hit 118,950 tons for their highest since April 24.
Sellers have had to pay their Chinese clients to destock copper since mid-May instead of being
paid a premium on top of the exchange price.
However, the funniest copper report of the week came out of Bloomberg and with a title
“Copper’s Spike Isn’t Justified By Fundamentals, Trafigura Says”, I have to share it (9). Here’s
what it said:
Copper’s recent surge to a record wasn’t justified by real-world supply and demand, according to
Trafigura Group — the top copper trader and usually one of the market’s most bullish voices.
“Prices of non-ferrous metals have moved much higher than fundamentals in the physical spot
market might indicate or justify, especially for copper,” Trafigura chief economist Saad Rahim wrote
in a commentary accompanying the trader’s first half results on Thursday.
Copper prices surged to an all-time high of $11,104.50 a ton last month, but have since retreated
about 10% to trade at $10,025 on the London Metal Exchange on Thursday. While investors have
piled into copper futures, the market in leading consumer China has been flashing signs of
weakness.
16
ts1naJ ht7naJ ht41 ts12 ht82 ht4bef ht11 ht81 ht52 dr3raM ht01 ht71 ht42 ts13 ht7rpA ht41 ts12 ht82 ht5yam ht21 ht91 ht62 dn2nuj ht9
source: IKN calcs

Trafigura has long been one of the copper market’s most bullish voices, with former head of copper
Kostas Bintas predicting in 2021 that the metal was set for a long-term bull market that could see it
hit $15,000.
Last autumn, Rahim acknowledged that the copper market hadn’t played out as Trafigura had
expected, blaming dollar strength for its underperformance.
On Thursday, he attributed copper’s rally to a record to “investment flows.”
Still, he predicted that the market would tighten as a result of supply constraints, with issues such
as the closure of First Quantum Minerals Ltd.’s mine in Panama triggering a record-breaking
squeeze in the market for semi-processed copper ore, known as concentrates.
Disappointing mine supply “has led to a significant concentrates shortage, resulting in smelters
having to cut production, and pointing to tighter inventories of refined metal even if demand is
lacklustre,” Rahim wrote.
Hearing that from Trafi, the very house that was short squeezed by the market and forced to
cover for physical delivery at over U$5/lb, was as ironic as it was hilarious. Yes, Saad Rahim, we
know copper prices moved much higher than fundamentals in the physical spot market might
indicate or justify, because it was your traders that moved them! More seriously, his comments
are correct and fit into the way we’ve been seeing this market in April, May and now june. Last
week’s comment that “At some point something will have to give, but for the time being buyers
seem to be content with running down bought stocks instead of purchasing copper at any old
price” still applies and while I’m surprised copper has falled as much as it has (I thoughtb
U$.470/lb or so was a likely floor), Im can’t go as far as saying I’m shocked to see it because
markets overreact; it’s what they do.
Now for our regular weekly taking of the world copper inventories pulse, data from Cochilco:
 More copper added to the aggregate of three world official systems, against normal
seasonality and the general run of play as Asia (Chinese) buyers stay away from the
market. We added another 20,657 metric tonnes (mt) to the total last week, with
473,893mt now under roof. Said it before and I’ll say it again, this is highly unusual.
 The magic is centred on the SHFE, where we saw another 15,269mt of copper hit its
warehouses to push the running total to 336,964mt. The tracking charts below have
the visual reminder of the strangeness unfolding.
 The LME added to the evidence of soft Asia demand, as it added a total of 7,325mt to
its inventories across its warehousing system to reach 123,800mt. Howeverthat
included a net gain of 225mt in its Europe houses and 1,875mt in its North American
houses (with New Orleans down to a barrel-scraping 1,675mt) while its Asia stocks,
mainly in Taiwan, added 9,425mt.
 The only silver lining for copper demand continues to be in North America, as seen in
LME New Orleans above and as seen at the Comex, with another 1,937mt drawdown to
close Friday at 13,129mt. In the great scheme of things Comex is still “no biggie”, but
its small arrow points in the same direction as its larger sisters.
The dedicated SHFE shows the strangeness. Even though it’s off a lower level, up to last week
we could just about draw a common thread to the movements we saw in 2021 but even that
comparative is left in the past as SHFE stocks continued to climb in week 22 of the year when
China is normally drawing heavily on reserve stocks.
SHFE copper inventory levels, 2019 to 2024
400000
350000
300000
250000
200000
150000
100000
50000
0
17
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 01 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 02 12 22 32 42 52 62 72 82 92 03 13 23 33 43 53 63 73 83 93 04 14 24 34 44 54 64 74 84 94 05 15 25
MT Cu 2024
2023
2022
2021
2020
2019
source: Cochilco data

As for the longer-term view, this weekend’s 336kmt is now approaching the records seen in
March 2016 (394kmt) and March 2020 (384kmt). Again, please note when SHFE stocks
normally peak and what’s happening this time around. In the words of Lennox, things have
been strangely borne.
Shanghai Futures Exchange Warehouse Stocks, 2014 to date
400000
350000
300000
250000
200000
150000
100000
50000
0
18
31'13ceD dr32 ht51 ht7 ht03 dn22 ht71 ht9 ts1von ht42 ht71 ht01 dn2tcO 7102ts1naJ ht62 ht81 ht01 dr3ced ht52 8102ht72rpa ht91 ht11 9102
dr3bef
9102ht82rpa ts12 ht31 0202ht5naj 0202ht92ram ts12 ht31 0202ht6ced ht82 dr32 ht51 ht7 2202ht03naj 22ht42rpA ht71 22ht9tco 3202
naJ
ht62 ht81 ht01peS dr3ceD ht52beF ht91
Mt Cu
|
source: Cochilco
Now for notes on some of our basket stocks:
Element 29 (ECU.v): The week’s biggest winner by quite a
distance, ECU has been on a tear for the last couple of weeks
after languishing at/around 15c all year. However, traded
volume remains low and as good as those gains look, they’re
on a lack of rela interest and no news.
Oroco Resource Corp (OCO.v): Back in IKN783, just after
OCO had announced its $6m, 45c financing that dumped the
stock from 51c to 45c (closed that week 43c) during a week
other copper stocks were ripping higher, we wrote the following:
“At that price compared to the recent run, we should expect OCO to fill the placement and
overallotment, so that’s 15.555m units and C$7m in gross proceeds to make the treasury position
more like one that can run a drill campaign this year.”
The placement closed on Friday and the NR (10) started this way:
“…its previously announced brokered private placement of 14,051,127 units of the Company (the
“Units”) at a price of $0.45 per Unit for aggregate gross proceeds of $6,323,007.15 (the
“Offering”), which includes the partial exercise of the Agents’ option.”
The failure to fully fill surprised me, but it is what it is and the partial overallotment fill still
brings useful extra money. The stock has remained in the low 40s since the placement was
announced and that didn’t change on the closure.
Kodiak Copper (KDK.v): This one wasn’t difficult to predict. After getting shellacked in Q!,
then rallying with the new interest in copper into May, it only needed a glance at the financials
to know KDK didn’t have enough treasury to execute on its plans for its MPD project this year
and would have to raise money. The news came on Tuesday (11), with KDK looking to raise
$4m and on Thursday, that turned into a $6.6m raise due to strong investor interest (as they
say). The raise is a blend of standard, Flow-Thru and Charity Flow-Thru shares
 Standard: 1,173,064 units priced at 47c (unit = share + ½ warrant priced at 65c)
 Flow-through: 3,838,704 shares priced at 54c, with no warrant
 Charity flow-through: 5,095,745 units priced at 79c (unit = share + ½ warrant
priced at 65c)
So that’s 10,107,513 new shares (plus 3.3m new warrants) to add to the total once the
financing closes. A fairly dilutive placement but at least they got a good response and can fill
treasury.

The Producer Basket
After 23 weeks of 2024, the Producer Basket shows a gain of 12.76% to level stakes:
company ticker price 1/1/24 Shares out MktCap(U$Bn) current pps gain/loss%
1 Newmont NEM 41.39 1152.6 46.52 40.36 -2.5%
2 Agnico Eagle AEM 54.85 497.971 31.77 63.80 16.3%
3 Barrick GOLD 18.09 1756 28.36 16.15 -10.7%
4 Franco-Nevada FNV 110.81 192.119 22.59 117.56 6.1%
5 Pan American PAAS 16.33 364.439 7.25 19.88 21.7%
6 Lundin Gold LUGDF 12.64 237.68 3.32 13.97 16.9%
7 Hecla Mining HL 4.81 617.768 3.30 5.34 10.5%
8 Eldorado Gold EGO 12.97 202.472 3.05 15.04 24.7%
9 Dundee PM DPMLF 6.43 183.278 1.43 7.82 28.8%
10 Wesdome Gold WDOFF 5.83 148.95 1.19 8.02 39.1%
All prices and stock quotes in U$ Port. avg 12.76%
Gold was down hard (GLD proxy down 1.72%) and unsurprisingly, there was no escape for
equities. Our basket average dropped over 7% on the week and while it was choppy from
Monday, Friday’s big sell-off was the difference. All ten of our basket components in 2024 were
weel-over-week losers and most were down at least 5%, with the only real least-worst being
Wesdome (WDOFF down 1.1%), while the worst of the lot were the silver plays Pan American
(PAAS down 9.6%) and Hecla (HL down 9.3%). That’s a poor week by any standards and to
rub some salt in, our basket lagged the GDX benchmark by around 1.5% on the week, which
cuts our 2024 lead to +4.6%. Leverage to silver is a double-edged sword.
The 2024 Producer Basket: Weekly performance and
30% comparative to GDX control
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
-5%
-10%
-15%
No notes this week, you don’t need to hear that “silver stocks got beaten up” as you knew that
already and news from these stocks was light after the recent regulatory flurry.
The TinyCaps List
After 23 weeks of 2024, the TinyCaps show a gain of 71.64% to level stakes:
company ticker price 1/1/24 Shares out Mkt Cap current pps gain/loss%
Aston Bay BAY.v 0.065 248.82 27.37 0.11 69.2%
Awalé Res ARIC.v 0.135 85.319 56.31 0.66 388.9%
District Metals DMX.v 0.170 106.98 41.72 0.39 129.4%
Endurance Gold EDG.v 0.18 150.136 27.02 0.18 0.0%
Kirkland LDC KLDC.v 0.100 88.625 5.32 0.06 -40.0%
Latin Metals LMS.v 0.075 71.476 7.15 0.10 33.3%
Palamina Corp PA.v 0.130 71.285 12.12 0.17 30.8%
South Star STS.v 0.750 48.8 31.72 0.65 -13.3%
Surge Copper SURG.v 0.090 284.79 44.14 0.155 72.2%
Viva Gold VAU.v 0.120 118.384 20.72 0.175 45.8%
Prices in CAD$, data from TSXV basket avg 71.64%
19
ts1naJ ht7naJ ht41 ts12 ht82 ht4bef ht11 ht81 ht52 dr3raM ht01 ht71 ht42 ts13 ht7rpA ht41 ts12 ht82 ht5yam ht21 ht91 ht62 dn2nuj ht9
The 2024 Producer Basket: Percentage diff. between
GDX benchmark & basket (negative= IKN ahead)
2.0%
ikn 1.0%
gdx control 0.0%
-1.0%
-2.0%
-3.0%
-4.0%
-5.0%
-6.0%
-7.0%
source: IKN calcs -8.0%
ts1naJ ht7naJ ht41 ts12 ht82 ht4bef ht11 ht81 ht52 dr3raM ht01 ht71 ht42 ts13 ht7rpA ht41 ts12 ht82 ht5yam ht21 ht91 ht62 dn2nuj ht9
source: IKN calcs, NYSE data

This section attempts to track the tinycap mining sub-sector of the market, our ten companies
chosen under the following criteria to put together a list representing the state of play in the
sub-sector of tinycap exploration company stocks. At least, that’s the plan.
 Market capitalization of under $20m (though this year I’m making one clear exception and one rule
stretcher). They have to be tiny. In two cases I’ve stretched the window a little and allowed sub-U$20m
market capper in that are just over the C$20m level, but the spirit is unaltered.
 A “non broken” stock price and project story. There are literally hundreds of tinycap juniors of the right
size, our task is to trawl through the TSXV and find companies that are small but with life in them. The vast
majority of tinycap stocks are broken stories, either traded to death on the exchange or with projects that are
a bust or with entrenched management more interested in their monthly paycheck than anything else.
 Likelihood of meaningful newsflow in 2024. This connects to the company’s “unbroken” status, as we
want news and potential catalysts from companies with projects that can work.
 Decent management if possible. When you are down among the little guys it doesn’t pay to be too
choosy, but still I preferred companies that have teams or people with good peer reputations.
One of our ten TinyCap basket stocks managed to TinyCaps, 2024 weekly tracker
100%
eke out a weekly win, so a cheer for Awale 90%
Resources (ARIC.v) and its Friday rally against strong 80%
70%
headwinds that put it up a penny on the week. Three 60%
others were unchanged (DMX.v, KLDC.v, LMS.v) and 50%
40%
that leaves six losers, (BAY.v, EDG.v, PA.v, STS.v, 30%
SURG.v, VAU.v) including the big percentage drops in 20%
10%
Viva Gold (VAU.v down 18.6%) and Surge Copper 0%
(SURG.v down 16.2%).
Awale Resources (ARIC.v): Since its contentious
financing in April, the one that saw shareholder rebellion changes at the top of the company as
a result (see editions passim), ARIC has bounced off the 60c line on several occasions. I wasn’t
expecting it to revisit that number now we have a new Chair, seemed to have resolved the
issues casting a shadow over the company and with drilling now on the agenda, but that’s what
happened last week and Thursday’s seller didn’t seem to care about the nuances of their exit.
That allowed ARIC to rebound on Friday while most other
Surge Copper (SURG.v): SURG last week decided to top up its coffers with a snap financing,
which must have come via interest from outside parties. The first announcement was for $1.6m
and the next day Friday that was upped to $2.2m (12), with SURG now looking to close on
“…8,966,667 charity flow-through common shares at a price of $0.245…”. All good and we
appreciate the lack of warrant in the mix.
This latest placement comes quick on the heels of the ARM strategic placement and the
additional $1.0m sidecar placement that was opened along with that investment by ARM (see
last week), so SURG is clearly making hay while the sun shines and unafraid to dilute the count
in exchange for treasury cash. We’ve adjusted the share count above to assume the $2.2m
placement fills as advertised, so we’re up to nearly 285m shares. However, it’s also up nicely on
20
ts1naJ ht7naJ ht41 ts12 ht82 ht4bef ht11 ht81 ht52 dr3raM ht01 ht71 ht42 ts13 ht7rpA ht41 ts12 ht82 ht5yam ht21 ht91 ht62 dn2nuj ht9
source: IKN calcs, TSX data

the year and on that, it’s worth remembering why SURG is down here in the TinyCaps basket
and not a personal shareholding on the main Stocks to Follow list. Here’s what I wrote in
IKN763 dated December 31st on SURG while presenting the 2024 lists:
“Still likeable enough to follow here, but as noted above I presently prefer Pan
Global (PGZ.v) as a potential trade.”
And here are those two stocks’ squiggly lines, 2024 to date:
Time for those famous last words, “I’m not wrong, just early.”
Aston Bay Holdings (BAY.v): Another that raised capital last week, closing on the second
tranche of its late April private placement (13). In total, the two tranches bring gross proceeds
of C$3.517m into the company and that should be enough money for BAY to do its thing this
year. That doesn’t preclude any further “strategic” (luxury) placements in 2024, but if they do
run one they’ll need a good excuse. As with SURG, we’ve adjusted the TinyCap Basket table’s
share count accordingly.
NB: Please be clear that The Tiny Dogs is NOT a list of recommended tinycap stocks. It is a list of companies with
market caps of under $20m offering a reasonable representation of the wider tinycaps market. It’s possible in the future
I may buy shares in one or several of these stocks, at the moment both my opinion and wallet are strictly neutral.
Regional politics
Bolivia: Evo takes control of the MAS party
This desk has been keeping an eye on the political powderkeg that is Bolivia without making
weekly reports, because it’s not directly about mining (yet) and outside the countey itself, only
real LatAm political nerds like me will care. However, this weekend requires a word because ex-
President Evo Morales has just pulled a rabbit out the hat and is about to take full control of the
ruling MAS party, compromising the position of the current President Luis Arce and setting up a
direct fight for the Presidency next year between the two MAS players. Once close colleagues
and now sworn enemies, Arce has tried all sorts of maneuvers to stop Evo Morales from
standing as a candidate for President, including getting a court judgment against Evo last year
that was supposed to impede him from running. But Evo is having none of its and has
demanded a primary-style election for MAS members to decide who will be the party’s
candidate next year (which Evo would almost certainly win, Arce’s presidency has made him
unpopular and Evo still has the political charisma of old).
The matter was supposed to be settled at the upcoming MAS annual meeting (akin to a GOP or
DEM convention) in July, but this week Evo, as president of the MAS party, has pulled a fast
one and brought the meeting forward to this Monday June 10th and in a bastion region of
support (14). His plan is to declare himself candidate and get Arce to agree to his primary
election plan and while he’ll certainly do the former, Arce will almost certainly refuse to attend
and get the meeting declared unofficial, but whatever the official response is, this is a strong
21

move by Evo and shows the amount of control he has over the MAS rank and file. We remind
readers that we care about this battle because one of the central criticisms leveled against Arce
is his willingness to sell out to private companies and foreign capitals and Evo has already made
plenty of noise about rolling those policies back, including in the mining sector.
Mexico: Sheinbaum and the English language media
I’m used to reading pure BS in the English language about LatAm politics, but last week on
Mexico takes a lot of beating. The first wave came from the mainstream, which managed to
combine the words “Woman” “Left” “Socialist” “Jew” and “Climate Scientist” in a couple of
dozen different ways and even the media outlets that weren’t sog-whistling didn’t give much
more than that. Then came the Business Media Fears, as the same combo plus “supermajority”
was wheeled out by the likes of Morgan Stanley and Vampire Squid to put the Reds Under Bed
fear into the investment world at large. So before we get any further, let’s cover the bare vote
numbers from the election (15):
 Claudia Sheinbaum: 59.75%
 Xóchitl Gálvez: 27.45%
 Jorge Álvarez Máynez: 10.32%
There was zero surprise about the win, but the margin of victory was a record for modern day
Mexico and the number of votes cast for Sheinbaum, 35.92m, is an absolute record that beat
AMLO’s total six years ago by a cool 5.81m votes. By any standards, this is a blowout victory.
That brings us to the second point, as the size of Sheinbaum’s victory pulled more of the
candidates in her coalition MORENA, Green Party (Partido Verde (PV)) and Worker's Party
(Partido del Trabajo (PT) into lower House and Upper House seats across the country. Along
with a poor showing by the right wing opposition, this means her party is very close to what’s
been dubbed “supermajority” that would allow MORENA to pass any law it wants in the next
legislature, including changes to the Constitution that require a 2/3rds majority in both houses.
Though we’re still waiting on the final count, as at this weekend we have as mentioned buy
normally known as the "Qualified Majority" (mayoría calificada) and can only happen when
separate parties form a voting alliance. Here’s how things stand this weekend for the next
parliament, starting with the lower House of Deputies:
Deputies (lower house): 500 seats
 MORENA: 243 seats
 Green Party: 74 seats
 Worker's Party: 48 seats
 Total MORENA coalition: 365 seats
"Qualified Majority" (mayoría calificada): 334 seats
So in the House of Deputies, the MORENA-led coalition has more than enough seats to achieve
its supermajority. Now for the Upper House, the Senate:
Senate: 128 seats
 MORENA: 60 seats
 Green Party: 14 seats
 Worker's Party: 9 seats
 Total MORENA Coalition 83 Seats
"Qualified Majority" (mayoría calificada): 85 seats
Early in the week, pundits were supposing that the MORENA coalition had the 85 seats it
required for full control of both houses but in reality, the count is 83 and that’s not the Qualified
Majority used by the worrymongers early last week to scare people out of their Mexico
positions. For sure we’re now getting “Oh, it’s virtually the same” but frankly, it’s not. MORENA
was always going to have the win that gets them simple majority in both houses, but
Constitutional changes are a serious matter in Mexico and those not aligned with MORENA and
Sheinbaum now have political leverage against the government.
All that said, let’s not underestaimate the size and scale of Sheinbaum’s win as along with
Congress, MORENA aligned candidates also won 24 of Mexicos’s 32 governorships across the
22

country. She’s been handed a bona fide mandate to promote the MORENA cause and a franking
of her manifesto, so let’s zero in on the part of her policy promises that matters most to us. The
way the English language media painted the President-Elect as “anti-mining” and even “worse
than AMLO” was impressive, as a check on her academic background seems to have been
enough for our intrepid media. I was going to run a couple of US mainstream headlines to
prove a point, but as even Northern Miner got in the act (16) and sent me this headline in the
Saturday:
Claudia Sheinbaum, you will note, is not the elected MORENA candidate, neither is she the
mayor of Mexico City who stood down to run for the top job. Instead she’s a “climate scientist”
who is “expected to continue the anti-mining policies” of AMLO. Inside the note, NM chose this
quote to clients sent by Colin Hamilton, BMO Capital Markets director of commodities research,
last week:
“From a mining sector perspective it is unclear whether this will mean any lifting of restrictions,
such as the de facto ban on new open pit mines, though we would see this as only a possibility
rather than a probability in the near term.”
The near term may of course just refer to the transition period and then her honeymoon period
as President, a time in which we shoulsdn’t expect any moves from Sheinbaum. She is a close
ally of AMLO’s and will be keen to keep MORENA united, so her own policies course won’t
happen overnight. But we know SIMPLY BY READING HER MANIFESTO (underlined and bold
typed for a reason, as it’s something most English language correspondents couldn’t be
bothered to do last week) that Sheinbaum has a course laid out for the mining industry. We
covered this in IKN777 and then in IKN779 once the final manifesto was available, along with
her campaign statements on mining and here’s the list of points that most matters, taken from
the end of IKN779 and though we’ve repeated this section before, it’s worth a final showing:
Overall, what Sheinbaum said last week fits very closely with our call on her likely mining
policy a couple of weeks ago. So to recap and highlight, expect the following:
 No new concessions for open pit mining
 Prior consultancy with locals to become the norm for permitting
 Open pit mines to start seeing permits flow again, as long as locals are onside
 The government will still block controversial projects.
All in all, a lot better than the last couple of years under AMLO.
IKN786 back and while yes, she’ll please MORENA lefty climate warriors with clear and loud “no
more concessions” statements, the other points are a departure from AMLO’s staunch anti-open
pit position and ll allow permits to come for projects and operations alike.
To wrap up, a final point needs to be made that, once again, the reactionary Northern media
have missed almost in its entirety: You cannot compare Mexico to real anti-mining jurisdictions
such as Colombia, Costa Rica, Chubut Argentina, Ecuador etc because those places don’t have
what’s best described as “mining culture”. There are always exceptions and enclaves (e.g. El
Oro in Ecuador) but there’s also a need to speak in generalizations and on that, it’s important to
recognize that Mexico is in the same boat as Chile, Peru or Brazil (to name but three). These
are places where large-scale formal mining activity run by private capitals companies have gone
on for generations, often multiple centuries and are part of the fabric of large areas of their
societies. In very recent times, we’ve seen how ostensibly “anti mining” or “anti-FDI”
governments in places such as Chile or Peru have scared people, but ultimately they have too
much at stake economically to turn away from mining for the sake of ideology. You cannot say
the same about most of Colombia, or most of Ecuador, where there’s little or no history of
formal, large scale mining (outside of coal in Colombia, I’m focused on hard rock metals here).
23

Mexico is in the same boat as Chile and Peru, it depends on mining at a macro national level
and entire regional economies really depend on mining (Zacatecas, Sonora, etc) and there’s
simply no way that national government can be “anti mining” under those circumstances.
During her campaign trail, Sheinbaum recognized this and made the right noises in the right
places about promoting “energy transition mining” (lithium and copper were fast from her lips)
and it’s obvious to anyone in this sector that means she has to permit open pit activities. She
ahs enough in her manifesto to please the climate change people inside MORENA, but she is
clearly set on moving in her own direction on mining and that will be more permits, not less,
compared to her mentor.
Colombia: ICSID protects the wetlands
Last week saw the second occasion in which the ICSID/CIADI tribunal ruled agains the mining
industry and for the country of Colombia over the banning of mining in the Páramo de
Santurbán high country wetlands. Last year the court ruiled against the claims made by Red
Eagle, this week it was the turn of Galway Gold to hear that Colombia was within its rights to
prohibit mining in the environmentally sensitive ecosystem that provides the source for water
supply to the wider region. The lead lawyer for Colombia told the press that “Colombia had
beaten the arbitrage proceedings regarding the prohibition of minng in Santurbán in an
absolute manner” and that the precedent of two cases put them in good stead to defend the
third case, borught against it by Eco Oro Minerals.
We should note that this ruling also casts a long shadow over the Soto Norte project, now
majority owned by Aris Gold (ARIS.to) and in the same zone, as the project has long been
opposed by the regional government and now has the national government of Gustavo Petro on
its side (17) (18).
Argentina: RIGI slated for debate this week
With nearly six months in charge and no laws passed, the Milei government is clearly having
trouble in getting its policies through a Congress that is doing what Argentina politics does best;
muddying the waters and slowing down the executive. In our case, The IKN Weekly has made
mention of the “Lety de Bases” law package that Milei is trying to get through Congress on
several occasions in the last month and mostly due to one part of the omnibus package, the so-
called RIGI law bill (Regimen of Incentives to Large-Scale Investors law, in Spanish “Régimen
de Incentivo a las Grandes Inversiones”, i.e. RIGI) which is set to offer tax and fiscal
advantages to foreign investment projects worth U$200m or above. That new law would be
very big news for the mining industry and open the doors for FDI for large-scale projects, so
there’s plenty at stake.
And the opposition knows it.
Here’s Maximo Kirchner in a radio interview last week. As well as being the son of Cristina and
Nestor, Maximo these days is a member of Congress and the President of the Peronist party of
Buenos Aires and carries plenty of political heft in his own right, not just for his nepo
background. The issue being presented to Milei’s government is “Time To Negotiate With Us”
and it’s not difficult to read between the lines: If he’s willing to drop RIGI, the opposition will
allow the other parts of the Ley de Bases package through. Here’s the relevant section
(translated) (19):
The president of Buenos Aires Peronist Party and member of Congress, Máximo Kirchner, has
asked that the section of the “Ley de Bases” law project that establishes new investment rules,
called “RIGI”, that’s due to be debated next week by the Senate and warned that “if this is passed,
in three years’ time if the Argentine people want to revert the law it won’t be able to, because its
outcome will be defined by foreign tribunals.”
Kirchnerism has strongly criticizes the Ley de Bases and noted that Congress voted against the law
project, but the point that he most question is the RIGI investment project, what Cristina Kichner
has called “A framwork for Colonialism.”
The Regimen of Incentives to Large-Scale Investors (RIGI) is one of the central points of the Ley de
Bases (Bases Law omnibus package) to attract foreign investment, focused on large-scale
hydrocarbon and mining projects with a minimum level of U$200m. In exchange, those investors
would get tax incentives in Sale Tax (IVA) and corporate tax.
24

In his interview, Kirchner said the best result would be to reject the entire Ley de Bases package,
but highlighted that one point which must be eliminated is RIGI and to “discuss an investment
regime between all political forces” that also takes into account the interests of Argentine national
companies.
He waned that if RIGI were approved, “in three years’ time if the Argentine people want to revert the
law it won’t be able to, because its outcome will be defined by foreign tribunals. The Argentine
national entrepreneut should also pay attention to this and comment, because the fact and that if
you look at different large-scale investment projects the current laws worked for Chevron and were.
We can say, one of the companies that has most increased production in the Vaca Muerta (oil and
gas field in South Argentina). We can point to the produciton of gold and silver near Perinto
Moreno, in Santa Cruz, where Cerro Vanguardia has been since 1997 and in tandem with the
government, has been mining metals for 27 years in a joint effort that works.”
So with that, the scene is set for the possible (and it’s only that, never say never in Argentina
politics) debate on the RIGI project this week in Argentina and while mining companies will be
lobbying hard to get it passed, it won’t have an easy passage through a Senate that, we repeat,
failed to pass a single law to Milei’s desk since he took office in December last year.
Argentina: Metals mining treading water
When reports starting doing the rounds last week
about the sudden expansion in Argentina’s mining
industry, that “lies, damned lies and statistics”
phrase came to mind so I followed the breadcrumbs
and found the source, namely the new report from
Argentina’s government beancounter people INDEC
that included this graphic (20) (right). I’ve left that
in the original Spanish, because it shows the
headline 10.4% growth in the sector compared to
the same month of last year, the +0.7%
improvement in April compared to March, but also
the breakdown because in Argentina “mining”
includes hydrocarbons and that’s where most of the
growth is found. But also because oddly, INDEC
counts lithium in the “non metallic mining” section,
somebody should gift them a periodic table
wallchart.
We also get a somewhat optimistic +9.0% number
for metals mining however, if you download the
entire PDF and have a read (get yours here (21)),
you see the true state of metals mining in Argentina
via the gold line in this chart (below).
25

The long-term chart shows the decline once the Bajo La Alumbrera mine was closed (the last
copper mine in the country) and since then, it’s been plain flatlining. Something Maximo
Kirchner should consider when putting forward his objections to easier FDI next week.
Market Watching
I owe you on Mene Inc (MENE.v)
I’ve been meaning to update on the only “non mining” play we cover, the small but interesting
online 24k jewelry company Mene Inc (MENE.v) for a while. Firstly because I haven’t done so
for a while, and secondly because of this:
Not only has selling been constant for the last six months, but the volume has accelerated and
there seems to be no bottom. Add into this recent executive changes and insider purchases by
founder Roy Sebag, plus the continued strength in the balance sheet, and MENE has become
quite an enigmatic stock that shouldn’t be doing this, even though it is. I did have a half-built
plan to address MENE this weekend but BCM took on the protagonist role and time pressed, but
I’ll get to this soon and have more complete thoughts, hopefully next weekend.
Conclusion
IKN786 is done, we end with bullet points:
 The reception to Claudia Sheinbaum’s victory in Mexico had my eyes rolling, please
don’t fall for the spin being put on this by the Northern business media. She may not be
mining’s biggest fan ever, but she’s pragmatic and will have a different, less conflictive
stance no matter what the “she’s a climate scientist!” shillers say.
 Copper has gone lower than I expected, but should bottom out at some point, the lack
of near-term demand in China will only push it down so far and those end users
relating on stocks will have to come back to market soon.
 Bear Creek Mining (BCM.v) surprised me. I now get to surprise myself by owning some
shares.
 Once again, apologies for the late arrival of this edition.
I thank you in advance for any feedback. Our Top Pick stock is Minera Alamos (MAI.v). Flash
updates will be sent if required by events.
I wish you good trading fortune, ladies and gentlemen.
Best wishes, Mark
26

Footnotes, appendices, references, disclaimer
(1) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m14OOjmN_Qg
(2) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dqayWHdYrGs
(3) https://www.gbreports.com/interview/romulo-mucho
(4) https://minergiaperu.com/blog/2024/05/08/ministro-romulo-mucho-tenemos-esperanza-en-sacar-adelante-
yanacocha-sulfuros-y-corani/
(5) https://www.equinoxgold.com/news/equinox-gold-announces-agreement-to-sell-its-mercedes-gold-mine/
(6) https://bearcreekmining.com/news/2023/bear-creek-mining-announces-9.5-million-bought-deal-financing/
(7) https://bearcreekmining.com/news/2024/bear-creek-mining-announces-q1-2024-mercedes-production-of-12-228-
ounces-of-gold/
(8) https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/copper-nears-one-month-low-as-real-demand-lags-expectations/
(9) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-06/copper-s-spike-isn-t-justified-by-fundamentals-trafigura-says
(10) https://orocoresourcecorp.com/news/oroco-announces-closing-of-brokered-private-placement-for-gross-proceeds-
of-63m
(11) https://kodiakcoppercorp.com/kodiak-copper-upsizes-private-placement-to-6-6-million/
(12) https://surgecopper.com/news-releases/surge-copper-announces-upsize-of-private-placement-to-2.2m/
(13) https://astonbayholdings.com/news/aston-bay-holdings-closes-2-137-860-second-tranche-of-non-brokered-private-
placement-for-3-517-860-total-to-date/
(14) https://efe.com/mundo/2024-06-07/evo-morales-adelanta-el-congreso-del-mas-e-invita-al-presidente-luis-arce-a-
participar/
(15) https://www.globovision.com/internacional/22529/claudia-sheinbaum-confirma-su-victoria-oficial-en-las-elecciones-
con-el-100-de-las-actas
(16) https://www.northernminer.com/news/new-technocrat-mexican-leader-unlikely-pro-mining-even-as-she-replaces-
whim-and-bombast/1003868040/
(17) https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2024/06/07/colombia-se-salvo-de-pagar-700000-millones-por-la-prohibicion-de-
mineria-en-el-paramo-de-santurban/
(18) https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/investigacion/primicia-colombia-gana-otra-millonaria-demanda-por-la-prohibicion-
de-la-mineria-en-paramo-de-santurban
(19) https://noticiasargentinas.com/politica/maximo-kirchner-pide-eliminar-de-la-ley-bases-el-rigi-
_a66634c47e12f019498414f88
(20) https://twitter.com/INDECArgentina/status/1798792488271941970
(21) https://t.co/5rsragrS4P
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2023
CLOSED TRADES IN 2023 date closed close price
Altiplano Metals APN.v jan'23 C$0.31 17-Set-21 C$0.17 -45.2% delayed and will dilute soon
Western Copper WRN.to mar'23 C$2.02 13-Nov-22 C$2.32 14.9% sold on reduced M&A prob.
Chesapeake Gold CKG.v may'23 C$3.07 20-Feb-22 C$1.75 -43.0% Closing on legal action news
Amerigo Res ARG.to may'23 C$1.36 12-Dic-21 C$1.48 8.8% sold 20% to raise cash
Amerigo Res ARG.to oct'23 C$1.36 12-Dic-21 C$1.21 -11.0% sold 10% raise to cash
QC Copper&Gold QCCU.v oct'23 C$0.265 25-Abr-21 C$0.12 -54.7% sold raise to cash
Faraday Copper FDY.to oct'23 C$0.79 26-Mar-23 C$0.68 -11.4% sold raise to cash
AbraSilver Res. ABRA.v oct'23 C$0.36 4-Dic-22 C$0.28 -22.2% sold raise to cash
Orecap inv OCI.v oct'23 C$0.04 20-Nov-22 C$0.03 -25.0% sold raise to cash
Western Explor. WEX.v nov'23 C$1.87 9-Abr-23 C$0.60 -67.9% poor trade, cutting loss
27

Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2022
Closed in 2022 date closed close price
Great Bear Res GBR.v Jan'22 C$15.83 26-Aug-20 C$28.58 80.5% Bought out by Kinross, print
Copper Mountain CMMC.to Jan'22 C$3.40 18-Jun-21 C$3.78 15.9% Sold 1/2 position in rebalance
Copper Mountain CMMC.to Feb'22 C$3.40 18-Jun-21 C$3.70 8.8% Sold rest on FY22 guidance
Trilogy Metals TMQ Mar'22 U$1.84 15-Sep-19 U$1.04 -41.3% killed by US permit reversal
McEwen Mining MUX Apr'22 U$0.89 2-Jan-22 U$0.82 -7.9% No 2022 turnaround, cut loss
Abrasilver Res. ABRA.v May'22 C$0.42 24-Apr-22 C$0.33 -21.4% sold to reduce Ag exposure
Strategic Metals SMD.v May'22 C$0.42 31-Jan-21 C$0.30 -28.6% trade flatlined 1.5 years
Discovery Silver DSV.v Jun'22 C$1.77 24-Oct-21 C$1.39 -21.5% Cutting Ag exp.& raising cash
Element 29 ECU.v Jul'22 C$0.58 6-Mar-22 C$0.30 -48.3% sold to cut Cu exposure
Superior Gold SGI.v Oct'22 C$0.95 3-Apr-22 C$0.24 -74.7% Q3 prod fail was last straw
Goldshore Res GSHR.v Nov'22 C$0.18 23-Oct-22 C$0.34 88.9% Quick profit taken
Palamina Corp PA.v Dec'22 C$0.295 21-Nov-21 C$0.08 -72.9% Clear-out of underperformer
Pure Gold PGM.h Dec'22 C$0.14 26-Sep-22 C$0.015 -89.3% tiny trade on vh risk, went Ch11
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2021
Closed in 2021 closed close price
Fiore Gold F.v jan'21 C$0.98 21-May-20 C$1.17 19.4% closed as part of rebalance
Norsemont Min NOM.cse feb'21 C$1.55 6-Set-20 C$0.70 -54.8% Cut loser to reduce Au exp.
Element 29 Res ECU.v feb'21 C$0.49 7-Feb-21 C$0.54 10.2% Cut Peru exposure
Kuya Silver KUYA.cse feb'21 C$1.66 8-Nov-20 C$2.51 51.2% Cut Peru exposure
Pucara Gold TORO.v apr'21 C$0.65 4-Oct-20 C$0.26 -60.0% Cut loser, Peru risk call
Copper Mountain CMMC.to apr'21 C$1.40 22-Nov-20 C$4.18 198.6% tgt hit, profit taken
New Gold NGD may'21 U$0.76 9-Feb-20 U$2.14 181.6% Sold to buy AGC, nice win
Orezone Gold ORE.v jun'21 C$0.79 21-Jun-20 C$1.61 103.8% sold on pop, leaky boat
Wolfden Res. WLF.v sep'21 C$0.30 11-Apr-21 C$0.19 -36.7% Failed spec trade, cut loss
Cartier Res ECR.v sep'21 C$0.32 21-Mar-21 C$0.235 -26.6% Failed spec trade, cut loss
Amarillo Gold AGC.v sep'21 C$0.31 30-May-21 C$0.30 -3.2% Capex story changed: Out
Excelsior Mining MIN.to oct'21 C$0.93 10-Mar-19 C$0.53 -43.0% May return in 2022
Royal Road Min. RYR.v nov'21 C$0.155 17-Mar-19 C$0.275 77.4% Closed on Nica pol risk
Aurelius Min. AUL.v dec'21 C$0.75 28-Jun-20 0.24 -68.0% cut end 2021, failed trade
Argonaut Gold AR.to dec'21 C$2.95 25-Jun-21 C$2.15 -27.1% cut on capex blowout
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2020
Closed in 2020 closed close price
TMAC Resources TMR.to Jan'20 C$3.41 20-Dec-19 C$3.61 5.9% TLS flip play, sold new year
Regulus Res REG.v Jan'20 C$1.10 20-Dec-19 C$1.30 18.2% TLS flip play, profit taken
Bonterra Res BTR.v Jan'20 C$1.90 9-Dec-19 C$1.66 -12.6% TLS flip play, loss taken
McEwen Mining MUX Jan'20 U$1.12 2-Dec-19 U$1.18 5.4% TLS flip play, profit taken
Core Gold CGLD.v Jan'20 C$0.255 7-Apr-19 C$0.305 19.6% arb trade, profit taken
HudBay Min HBM Jan'20 U$3.56 9-Dec-19 U$3.36 -5.6% TLS flip play, loss taken
Midas Gold MAX.to Feb'20 C$0.71 5-Jan-20 C$0.57 -19.7% sm & silly trade
Warrior Gold WAR.v Feb'20 C$0.08 3-Aug-18 C$0.05 -31.3% clean out non-perf sm stocks
Contact Gold C.v Feb'20 C$0.40 19-Aug-18 C$0.18 -55.0% clean out non-perf sm stocks
Sandstorm Gold SAND Feb'20 U$3.73 17-Apr-16 U$7.21 93.3% Sold during port rebalance
NexGen Energy NXE Feb'20 U$1.20 2-Dec-19 U$1.06 -11.7% TLS flip play, loss taken
MAG Silver MAG Apr'20 U$8.95 1-Mar-20 U$10.07 12.5% Sold to cut silver exposure
Alexco Res AXU Apr'20 U$1.69 7-Sep-17 U$1.69 0.0% sold to close Ag exp. in FY20
Bonterra Res BTR.v Jun'20 C$1.62 2-Feb-20 C$1.10 -32.1% under-performer cash moved
Regulus Res REG.v Jun'20 C$0.64 6-Apr-15 C$0.79 23.4% moved $ TMQ/MIN & Au stocks
Great Panther GPR.to Aug'20 C$0.60 21-Jun-20 C$1.10 83.3% Profit taken, good trade
Jaguar Mining JAG.v Aug'20 C$0.42 21-Jun-20 C$0.65 54.8% Profit taken, good trade
28

Sandstorm Gold SAND Aug'20 U$7.76 10-May-20 U$9.37 20.7% Profit taken, good trade
Integra Resources ITR.v Aug'20 C$2.23 13-Aug-18 C$5.40 142.2% Profit taken, good trade
Wesdome Gold WDO.to Aug'20 C$2.37 14-Oct-17 C$14.82 525.3% last 1/2 of big win closed
INV Metals INV.to Sep'20 C$0.40 17-May-20 C$0.45 12.5% Cut all Ecuador exposure
Cartier Resources ECR.v Nov'20 C$0.155 3-Aug-18 C$0.25 67.7% Exact close price TBA
Tinka Res TK.v Dec'20 C$0.195 19-Apr-16 C$0.195 0.0% Closed on a round trip fail
2015 to 2019 annual closed positions in appendices below, 2009 to 2014 closed positions in editions IKN553 or earlier
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2019
Closed in 2019 closed close price
Atico Mining ATY.v jan'19 C$0.55 24-Jul-16 C$0.32 41.8% patience ran out, made room
Candente Copper DNT.to jan'19 C$0.075 3-Aug-18 C$0.05 -33.3% tiny trade, made room for new
B2Gold BTO.to feb'19 C$2.11 12-Sep-14 C$4.05 91.9% Took 1/2 profits, reduce size
Western Copper WRN.to mar'19 C$0.80 20-Jan-19 C$0.81 1.3% Spec trade that didn't work
B2Gold BTO.to mar'19 C$2.11 12-Sep-14 C$4.15 96.7% Took rest of profit.
GT Gold GTT.v mar'19 C$1.17 10-Oct-18 C$0.90 -23.1% Took loss. Story changed
NovaGold NG apr'19 U$3.84 13-Jan-19 U$4.15 -8.1% Short that didn't work, sm loss
Zinc One Z.v jun'19 C$0.47 14-Sep-17 C$0.025 -94.7% clearing out dead trade
Amarillo Gold AGC.v jun'19 C$0.24 22-Aug-18 C$0.20 -16.7% clearing out dead trade
New Gold NGD aug'19 U$1.44 31-Jul-19 U$1.23 14.6% ST short win thru Q2 earnings
IMPACT Silver IPT.v aug'19 C$0.39 21-Jul-19 C$0.46 18.0% took a quick profit
Fiore Gold F.v aug'19 C$0.34 26-May-19 C$0.56 64.7% Took profit, 2q19 avg
Chakana Copper PERU.v oct'19 C$0.84 22-Mar-18 C$0.16 -81.0% Exploreco trade fail. Want space
Wesdome Gold WDO.to oct'19 C$2.37 14-Oct-17 C$7.57 219.4% Sold half, profit taking
Superior Gold SGI.v oct'19 C$1.46 8-Apr-18 C$0.47 -67.8% Failed sm spec on Au. Moved on
Amerigo Res ARG.to nov'19 C$0.91 23-Sep-18 C$0.50 -45.1% worst trade of year, hefty loss
Guyana Goldfields GUY.to dec'19 C$0.94 14-Apr-19 C$0.56 -40.4% taking the loss, financials weak
Tethyan Res TETH.v dec'19 C$0.30 8-Sep-19 C$0.16 -46.7% tiny trade, word of probs in co
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2018
Closed in 2018 closed close price
Amarillo Gold AGC.v jan'18 C$0.38 24-Mar-17 C$0.31 -18.4% Cut away losing trade
Riverside Res RRI.v jan'18 C$0.39 27-Jun-16 C$0.31 -20.5% Cut away losing trade
Eros Res ERC.v jan'18 C$0.175 1-Mar-17 C$0.16 -8.6% CEO sudden exit, not good
Excellon Res EXN.to jan'18 C$1.54 9-Oct-16 C$1.66 7.8% 4q17 poor, one too many bad qtrs
Wesdome Gold WDO.to jan'18 C$1.68 15-Dec-17 C$2.06 22.6% Near-term trade block, took profit
Sabina G&S SBB.to apr'18 C$2.06 17-Dec-17 C$1.77 -14.1% Near-term trade, bad timing, small
B2Gold BTO.to May'18 C$2.11 12-Sep-14 C$3.67 73.9% sold 25% to reduce exposure
Lara Expl. LRA.v May'18 C$0.65 11-Feb-18 C$0.58 -13.8% Spec on Brazil didn't work
Solitario XPL June'18 U$0.72 19-Mar-17 U$0.41 -43.1% Failed trade, may return in 4q18
SolGold plc SOLG.to July'18 C$0.475 19-Nov-17 C$0.415 -12.6% cut, trade didn't perform
Pan American PAAS July'18 U$17.90 1-Jun-18 U$16.30 8.9% modest win on short position
NGEx Res NGQ.to Sep'18 C$1.01 22-Oct-17 C$1.00 -1.0% Closed to reduce Argentina exp
Sandstorm Gold SAND Oct'18 U$3.73 17-Apr-16 U$4.13 10.7% partial sale to raise cash for GTT
Aldebaran Res ALDE.v Nov'18 n/a n/a n/a n/a liquidate spin out of REG
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2017
Closed in 2017 closed close price
Continental Gold CNL.to Jan'17 C$2.68 22-May-16 C$4.17 55.6% trade closed, profit taken
Focus Ventures FCV.v Jan'17 C$0.23 1-Jul-12 C$0.05 -78.3% Give up, a disaster trade
Wesdome Gold WDO.to Feb'17 C$1.72 28-Aug-16 C$3.00 74.4% Target hit, sold, good trade
Belo Sun BSX.to Mar'17 C$0.90 30-Jan-17 C$0.90 0.0% failed near-term flip trade
Lara Expl. LRA.v Mar'17 C$1.15 8-Apr-12 C$1.05 -8.7% cut to make room for new trade
Rye Patch Gold RPM.v Apr'17 C$0.31 2-Sep-16 C$0.32 3.2% cut for doubts & new stock
29

Cordoba Min. CDB.v Jun'17 C$0.75 15-Sep-16 C$0.63 -16.0% closed
Constantine Metal CEM.v Aug'17 C$0.135 9-Apr-17 C$0.28 107.4% spec trade closed, good win
Red Eagle Min. R.to Sep'17 C$0.67 13-Dec-16 C$0.27 -59.7% IKN's biggest failure in years
Starcore Intl SAM.to Sep'17 C$0.61 10-Jan-15 C$0.31 -49.2% Patience ran out
B2Gold BTO.to Dec'17 C$2.11 12-Sep-14 C$3.39 60.7% sold small portion for liquidity
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2016
Closed in 2016 closed close price
Phoscan Chem FOS.to jan16 C$0.28 29-mar-15 C$0.265 -5.4% Buyout trade, bot but poor deal
True Gold TGM.v jan16 C$0.18 23-aug-15 C$0.25 38.9% okay trade, sold on pol risk
McEwen Mining MUX jan16 U$1.09 25-jan-15 U$1.20 10.1% sold due to lack of value
Lake Shore Gold LSG.to feb-16 C$1.10 07-apr-15 C$1.69 53.6% bot out, sold early in process
Atacama Pacific ATM.v feb-16 C$0.19 26-apr-15 C$0.40 110.5% sold for a double on big pop
New Gold NGD feb-16 U$2.06 24-jan-16 U$2.96 43.7% closed good near-term trade
Sandspring Res SSP.v mar-16 C$0.195 18-oct-15 C$0.32 64.1% Hit tgt, took profit
Teranga Gold TGZ.to mar-16 C$0.54 15-feb-15 C$0.60 11.1% disappointing trade
B2Gold BTG mar-16 U$0.85 13-jan-16 U$1.30 52.9% Separate trade on B2, hit tgt
Dalradian Res DNA.to mar-16 C$0.67 27-oct-13 C$1.00 49.3% Hit target, sold, good win
HudBay Min. HBM may-16 U$4.10 03-apr-16 U$4.36 -6.3% Short trade, poor timing
Nevada Sunrise NEV.v may-16 C$0.185 28-feb-16 C$0.23 24.3% V. small, no big deal either way
Richmont RIC jun-16 U$7.60 01-may-16 U$9.30 22.4% near-term trade, profit taken
INV Metals INV.to jul-16 C$0.25 03-apr-16 C$0.95 280.0% Trade closed on time
HudBay Min. HBM aug16 U$4.98 09-jun-16 U$4.80 3.6% short trade covered, no big deal
Miranda Gold MAD.v oct-16 C$0.125 03-jul-16 C$0.10 -20.0% tiny spec trade, didn't work
Avino G & S ASM nov-16 U$2.00 21-oct-16 U$1.40 -30.0% Abandon trade on bad bot deal
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2015
Closed in 2015 closed close price
Argonaut Gold AR.to jan'15 C$1.47 14-dec-14 C$2.53 72.1% Big gain small time, profit taken
Amerigo Res ARG.to jan'15 C$0.405 20-jul-14 C$0.285 -29.6% Given up on weak Cu prices
Reservoir Min. RMC.v jan'15 C$6.05 18-jun-14 C$4.12 -31.9% sold on Cu downturn
Coro Mining COP.to jan'15 C$0.075 26-jan-14 C$0.035 -53.3% sm, sold on Cu downturn
Fortuna Silver FSM mar'15 U$4.12 10-nov-14 U$3.75 9.0% Short used as hedge
GoldQuest Min. GQC.v mar'15 C$0.26 27-oct-13 C$0.085 -67.3% given up ghost
Rio Alto Mining RIO.to apr'15 C$2.30 07-apr-11 C$3.57 55.2% Top pick, bot out, big win
Timmins Gold TGD jun'15 U$0.60 19-apr-15 U$0.62 3.3% near-term trade, out of time
First Majestic AG jul'15 U$10.51 10-aug-14 U$4.55 56.7% horrible failed trade
NovaCopper NCQ.to jul'15 C$1.05 09-apr-14 C$0.50 -52.4% no more Cu exposure, sm sell
McEwen Mining MUX aug'15 U$0.695 21-jul-15 U$0.92 32.4% Closed nearterm flip for win
Midas Gold MAX.to sep'15 C$0.39 21-sep-15 C$0.35 -10.3% Sm. trade idea that didn't work
New Gold NGD oct'15 U$2.18 23-aug-15 U$3.05 39.9% trade closed, profit taken
Legend Gold LGN.v nov'15 C$0.085 01-mar-15 C$0.035 -58.8% tiny "land grab" idea, failed
Timmins Gold TGD nov'15 U$0.245 20-sep-15 U$0.15 -38.8% small near-term loser
Please note that due to space considerations closed positions 2009 to 2014 are now
available on request, or were published in any edition to IKN553 (end 2019).
Important Disclosure
The information and opinions contained within this report reflect the personal views of the author and therefore all
material within should not be construed as accurate or reliable or be utilized as advice for investment or business
purposes. Independent due diligence and discussions with ones own investment and business advisor is strongly
recommended. Accordingly, nothing in this report should be construed as offering a guarantee of the accuracy or
completeness of the information contained herein, as an offer or solicitation with respect to the purchase or sale of any
security or as an endorsement of any product or service. All opinions and estimates included in this report are subject to
change without notice. It is prohibited to copy or redistribute this report to any type of third party without the express
permission of the author.
30