IKN #771Premium

The IKN Weekly
Week 771, February 25th 2024
Contents
This Week: Trade heads-up, In today’s edition, Conference high season, K.I.S.S. on copper,
Happy Birthday Mister Joseph.
Fundamental Analysis: Western Copper & Gold (WRN) (WRN.to): A special situation
purchase, Equinox Gold (EQX) 4q23 results and 2024 guidance, Ero Copper (ERO.to): 4q23
production, earnings estimates and 2024 guidance.
Stocks to Follow: SolGold (SOLG.to), Pan Global Copper (PGZ.v), Ero Copper (ERO.to),
SilverCrest Metals (SILV) (SIL.to), Minera Alamos (MAI.v): Rio2 Ltd (RIO.v), Adventus
(ADZN.v), Marimaca Copper (MARI.to).
The Copper Basket: Overview, Arizona Sonoran (ASCU.to), NGEx Resources (NGEX.to).
The Producer Basket: Franco-Nevada (FNV), Eldorado Gold (EGO), Newmont (NEM).
The TinyCaps Basket: Overview, Palamina Corp (PA.v), Surge Copper (SURG.v), Kirkland
Lake Discovery Corp (KLDC.v), Viva Gold (VAU.v), South Star (STS.v).
Regional Politics: Argentina: More Glacier Law, More on Bolivia, Peru: Standard Swine Lip
Gloss in 2024.
Market Watching: Gold Fields (GFI) at Laguna Salada: Rodent Solutions, Goldshore
Resources (GSHR.v): The CEO moves on at last, Greatland Gold (GGP.L): Another potential
beneficiary of Newmont dealflow.
I remind subscribers that no part of this newsletter can be copied, reproduced or
given to any third party without the express permission of the author.
This Week
Trade heads-up
I didn’t expect to be doing this for a second week in a row, but the plan is to buy another
copper name. I’m a buyer of Western Copper & Gold (WRN) (WRN.to) as a speculative trade on
its significant and potentially game-changing corporate news last week. See today’s main
Fundies section for more.
In today’s edition
 As well as the reasons for my decision to buy Western Copper & Gold (WRN) (WRN.to),
today’s main section covers the disappointing 4q23 and year-end financials filing from
our “Leverage To Gold” trade, Equinox Gold (EQX.to) (EQX). As a matter of fact the Q4
numbers were fairly reasonable, but there were nasty surprises in its 2024 guidance on
two types of costs. A painful reminder that inflation hasn’t finished wreaking havoc on
our sector yet.
 The other fundies note this week covers the Ero Copper (ERO.to) Q4 production
numbers and 2024 guidance, as announced last week. The reason the stock rallied was
 I keep saying it, but only because it’s true: First the first time in a couple of years I’m
actively enjoying compiling The TinyCaps Basket section of the Weekly in every edition.
There’s a nice cross section of what the smallest end of the market represents and
somewhere among the list. There may even be a story or two that turn into real live big
digit winners.
1

 And while we’re in the mood, a few subjects get lifted off my chest about Newmont
(NEM) in today’s Producer Basket in a good old fashioned rant.
Conference high season
The season seems to stretch all year these days, what with online events, newsletter gatherings
and the satellite conferences scattered around North America and Europe, but there are also
central moments to the mining conference season and that’s where we are today with two of
the big back-to-back dates on the calendar:
 BMO Capital Markets 33rd Global Metals, Mining & Critical Minerals Conference hosted as
always in Florida started today February 25th and runs to the 28th. This is one of the
“Big Boy” meet-ups and gets the Tier 1 and large operators gathered, it’s also a
traditional moment for bigger miners to announce M&A deals so it’s worth watching the
wires in the next 24 to 48 hours.
 PDAC: Generally regarded as the mining year’s main event and certainly the one that
does it for Canada/North America, PDAC is back at its traditional First Week In March slot
in Toronto and the cold should help keep the sidewalk hogging anti-mining activist
numbers down as well. Expect a avalanche of news releases on “PDAC Monday”, as well
as the normal sycophancy as chummy media brown-noses mediocre C-suiters. And if
there ever were a year in which PDAC could do with a few announcements of exploreco
mergers and deal flow, this is it.
So c’mon you mining moguls, make us proud of your efforts.
K.I.S.S. on copper
“If you can’t explain something to
a first-year student, then you
haven’t really understood.”
Richard Feynman
No need to get complicated to understand the opportunity that copper presents to the world in
2024. As usual, we do a lot more on Dr. Copper in its dedicated section below, but our recent
move to start adding exposure to copper juniors in both last week’s edition (PGZ.v, SOLG.to)
and this (WRN) deserves a little extra on the metal and its fortunes and the angle chosen
started as an unlikely source. Without expecting much, somewhere along the line last week I
clicked on a short, 90 second segment from Bloomberg’s YouTube channel called “Copper’s
Outlook in 2024 Is Uncertain” (8), something I would have passed over if it hadn’t been
compiled by sector experts CME. A pleasant surprise awaited, as while the overview was high
level in nature and didn’t offer details or specific stats, it covered two of the three main
influences on the price of copper in succinct and easily digestible style. In fact I was so taken
that I thought a transcript was in order for these pages, so no need to use the link if you don’t
want the full audiovisual experience:
“The essential factors which determine copper prices are China's economy and US interest rates.
After hitting a three year low last October, copper has made a bit of a rebound but the red metal is
still struggling over worries about China's economy. Chinese demand accounts for more than half
the refined copper produced annually, but economic growth has been dismal at best. Even while
their economy continues to struggle though, China still bought more copper in 2023 than in any
other year on record. If China's stimulus efforts do come to fruition, this could possibly boost
demand for metals and, in fact, copper consumption is forecasted to rise this year as demand
increases. Demand from China's green energy sector is expected to provide tailwinds to copper
prices.
“Copper prices are also closely tied to the US Dollar and interest rates. The US Dollar is the world's
reserve currency and copper's pricing benchmark. Higher US rates and a strong dollar tend to
weigh on copper and other commodity prices as it increases the cost of carrying inventories and a
strong Dollar makes raw materials more expensive in other currencies. Though the market is now
predicting that the Fed may not cut interest rates until the summer or perhaps even later, copper
would most likely see the largest immediate price boost in the commodity sector from any potential
rate cuts.”
2

Aside from the small point of not mentioning the third essential factor, that of supply, it’s a
succinct and accurate overview of the copper market dynamic in 2024. It’s also why I’m
confident about extending exposure to copper now that China’s quiet economic season is
behind us. The potential spanner in the works will be demand so it’s going to be worth keeping
an eye on US data to spot any signs of the dreaded Hard Landing, as well as the Chinese
imports and general demand data, but there’s every reason to believe that 1) the Fed will start
cutting rates soon 2) supply crimps due to recent events mean a larger deficit than originally
estimated and 3) demand should at least hold steady. That’s the right mix for higher copper
prices, so leave aside thoughts of the weak Q1 and bet on what’s in the pipeline. Also thanks
due to the great Richard Feynman for his quotable quotes, but we should also note that at
some point when commenting on his own career and discoveries in quantum mechanics he also
said, “If I could explain it to the average person, I wouldn’t have been worth the Nobel Prize.”
So, take it with a pinch of salt.
Happy Birthday Mister Joseph
Last weekend was a heads-up on President’s Day, this weekend a short
note to say that exactly two years have flown by since our wonderful
son Joe was born. The edition IKN667 dated February 27th 2022 (two
days after the birth) featured the photo you see right, that little thing
has somehow and somewhere turned into this:
So far so good. What’s more, we’re only two or three weeks away from the arrival of his sibling
in the outside world. We are a blessed family and for the record, I’m aware of how lucky I am.
Fundamental Analysis of Mining Stocks
Western Copper & Gold (WRN) (WRN.to): A special situation purchase
Before diving in, two statements:
I did not expect to be pulling the trigger on another copper exploreco or developer so soon
after buying Pan Global (PGZ.v) and adding to SolGold (SOLG.to) last week.
I certainly didn’t expect to be pulling the trigger on Western Copper & Gold (WRN)
(WRN.to), a stock we’ve followed and covered for many, many years here at the weekly.
Also one that we’d dropped from this years Copper Basket due to its long-term inertia and
3

more recently, the disappointing (lack of) development and the way it seemingly painted
itself into a corner with its latest strategic link-up.
However, the markets are full of surprises and here we are, so today’s note isn’t about Casino,
its potential mining production or our assumptions for project economics as we’ve chewed over
those many times previously. This is all about last week’s news.
On Wednesday February 21st you wouldn’t have thought anything different was about to
happen at Western Copper and Gold Corporation, what with the company’s softball NR (2) that
day announcing its presence on the recent and upcoming conference circuit. Your excerpt:
“…recently attended the Vancouver Resource Investment Conference (VRIC) and participated in
the Invest Yukon’s Yukon Thought Leader’s Critical Minerals Roundtable. Stay tuned for the
recording.
We also participated in the CEM Whistler conference where we met with active top-level capital
finance individuals through a day of meetings and networking activities.
WRN will be attending the following events and available to meet with registered attendees:
February 22-23 at the Mines and Money Conference in Miami, FL
February 25-28 at the BMO Global Metals & Mining Conference in Hollywood, FL
March 3-6 at the PDAC Convention in Toronto, ON
President & CEO, Paul West-Sells held several interviews recently…”
But then out of the blue something happened and the very next day, we read this (3):
VANCOUVER, B.C. Western Copper and Gold Corporation (“Western” or the
“Company”) (TSX: WRN; NYSE American: WRN) is pleased to announce the
appointment of Mr. Sandeep Singh as Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
effective immediately. Mr. Singh will work closely with Dr. Paul West-Sells, who will
continue in the role of President in connection with the succession process. Further,
Mr. Kenneth Williamson has retired from his role as Director and Interim Chairman.
Current board member, Dr. Bill Williams, has taken on the role of Interim Chairman as
the Company searches for a replacement.
Paul West-Sells has been CEO at WRN since the year dot and in that time, has had his back
covered by its board of directors. His most recent real move was to bring in Rio Tinto (RTZ) as
strategic partner to move forward the Casino project in return for funding and while the deal
came with certain decision point moments that made it look as though RTZ had to come to a
decision as to whether to move on the project and buy WRN out (or not), when those moments
came the big partner used its leverage, committed the minimum (in Tier One terms) to keep its
de facto control and booted the time limit forward. Twice. The latest deferral from RTZ is
testament to the failed plan at WRN board/C-suite level to bring “competitive tension” (as they
say these days) and the resulting collapse in the share price is all about little guys (like me)
walking away and considering WRN as RTZ’s new lapdog. To this we add on a longer timescale
that Paul West-Sells has been phoning it in as CEO for a long time, reaping a nice cash salary
(as well as selling his shares at notably convenient moments) for doing very little else than
dealing with the Yukon Environment people (YESAB)…what’s more, not doing it very well as the
project has failed to move and returned to the permitting start point twice.
Testament to the lack of movement at WRN is its balance sheet items, which show the cahs
injections by RTZ but little else of note. This company has been spinning its wheels, waiting for
the buyout that didn’t come and without a Plan B under West-Sells to generate value.
So even though WRN’s announcement of a change at the top last week came as a surprise, it’s
a welcome one and indicative of backers that have finally (finally!) run out of patience. Bringing
one of Canada’s insto/fund figureheads in can only mean one thing; WRN is about to tell RTZ to
either urinate or get off the pot because otherwise, WRN will find another buyer. Perfectly
understandable under the circumstances because I find WRN annoying and I’m not even a
shareholder these days! If I were a long-term backer I’d be infuriated by now and wanting a
print, if only to get the issue out of my hair and allowing me to move on. Therefore, seeing
Singh arrive makes all the sense in the world and the fact he’s investing $3m of his own money
into the structure (when WRN has all the treasury it needs, see above) is a clear signal about
4

what’s going on, a dealmaker and leader of successful turnarounds (as stated in last week’s NR)
putting his own capital on the line isn’t taking this job for charitable purposes.
We should also note that coincidentally (not), NEM last week announced that Coffee is one of
the assets it plans to sell in its post-Newcrest merger dispersal (even though it was owned by
NEM beforehand, coming in as part of the Goldcorpse purchase). Located literally next door to
Casino project, the synergies of combining Coffee are obvious even though WRN’s asset is more
copper than gold and Coffee is the inverse. Location, road access and shared facilities in a
remote location such as this are obvious advantages, so seeing a dealmaker in Singh arrive at
this moment is as indicative of what might happen as the arrival of “Another Sandeep” in the
new Elliott Management vehicle (see NEM segment in The Producer Basket, above).
Discussion: There’s a clear trade opportunity here and as such, after seeing the positive
reception given to the news on Friday (we use the
higher volume USD ticker here right) I’m going to
buy a few WRN and take a chance on a story that
I’ve hated for a long time but may offer a winning
trade on this development. The ouster of West-
Sells and the arrival of Sandeep Singh is a clear
signal of what’s about to happen. RTZ was
brought (or allowed) in to survey and consider
WRN as its next copper project, the deal set to
allow the company time to consider the potential
and then come to a decision but instead, it used
the deal structure and a supine C-suite to boot the
decision moment forward and essentially, turn
WRN into its lapdog project. Its plan was going
swimmingly up to last week and all the evidence you need is in this next chart, a 12-month
timescale which has seen investors leave in droves as WRN’s stagnant situation became
apparent.
But with this corporate move, timed to coincide with Newmont’s now official decision to put
Coffee up for sale, the dynamic changes considerably. We know a Maxit high flyer would only
be here (and only put his own money into the equity if there was a clear exit strategy. We also
know RTZ is interested, as they would have walked away by now (instead of commissioning
another round of drilling on a property that’s been picked over, explored, developed for 15
years and was understood to feasibility level a decade ago. Indeed, the message being sent by
the arrival of Sandeep Singh could not be clearer and those of us that remember the way GT
Gold forced the hand of Newmont in 2021 and got the major to pay $311m to buy out the
junior after coming in as strategic partner at the Tatogga/Saddle project in BC’s Golden
Triangle, will see the pattern here. RTZ will now be cordially invited to either urinate of get off
the pot and with Coffee now up for grabs, Sandeep Singh will be able to sell WRN as a larger
package to any number of companies on either the precious or base metals side of the mining
world if RTZ decides to decline its chance for first refusal.
5

As the first 10-day price chart above shows, WRN moved up sharply on this news but as the
second 12 month chart also indicates, there’s still a
low of blue sky left in this stock between Friday’s 200 WRN.to: Shares Out
180
close and an eventual buyout price for WRN. With
160
162.62m shares out and a share price in USD this
140
weekend of U$1.13, WRN is a U$183.76m market 120
capper with 100% of the treasury it needs to cover 100
80 its plans for 2024 (as well as that new 3m share
60
placement about to close using Singh’s money), it
40
won’t be diluting any further. 20
0
As for my personal decision, I’m aware this trade
set-up isn’t my normal way of doing things and
what’s more, after owning WRN on and off over the
years I’ve recently been vociferously against the stock, mainly because of its mediocre
management and the lack of resolution on the RTZ deal. The news last week changes that 180°
and while there’s always going to be the obvious risk of WRN getting a refusal out of RTZ and
then no suitors from any other mining companies, considering its size, location and now the
potential synergies of bolting on Coffee to any eventual mine there’s a lot of appeal for
potential acquirers. It so happens that I’ve been looking to expand my copper exposure and
started the ball rolling just last week with the addition of SolGold (SOLG.to) shares and the
opening tranche in Pan Global Resources (PGZ.v), I’ve also kept enough personal treasury
intact to make more purchases. I wasn’t planning on doing anything else this quickly, but
circumstances dictate this time and as such, I’m going to go with the speculative flow and buy
some WRN tomorrow Monday, in order to capitalize on the buzz I believe will ensue as the
consequences of Singh’s arrival at the company become more apparent to more people.
Equinox Gold (EQX) 4q23 results and 2024 guidance
The last serious mention of Equinox Gold (EQX) (EQX.to) on these pages came in the Market
Watching section of IKN765 dated January 14th when we checked out the company’s Q4
production numbers, released that week. Art the time I was nonplussed about a low-ish range
Q4 of production and adjusted financial expectations for the quarter accordingly, but still felt
upbeat about the company’s prospects for three main reasons:
1) Though production had been off by about 10,000 oz in Q4 compared to our model, I
srtill thought costs would come in okay, both in Q4 and for the 2024 guidance. We aimed
at U$1,500/oz AISC for 4q23, then U$1,600/oz for 2024 as Greenstone is ramped up and
comes on line.
2) On that subject EQX’s Greenstone expansion project was still on time and budget
according to all indications. Not only something we heard during every Ross Beaty media
appearance, it was also spelled out in company literature and indeed, the conclusion of
IKN765 included a line on it being “apparently still on time and budget”.
3) It still offered a good “leverage trade” on gold, its high annual gold production
combined with upper quartile cash cost the right mix to get strong share price moves if
gold started to move upwards. As long as you went into the trade with eyes wide open
and didn’t think a high cost producer was as profitable or safe as an Agnico or Lundin
Gold, it could serve a purpose.
Here’s what last week’s filing of the EQX Year-End financials (4), including 4q23 results and
2024 guidance, did to my pet theory:
 Costs came in at an AISC of U$1,657/oz for Q4 and even though our lowball received
price for gold was beaten by $83 and the eventual U$1,983/oz reported by EQX, that
was a hit.
 Cost guidance for 2024 came in at between U$1,630/oz and U$1,740/oz.
6
71q4 81q1 81q2 81q3 81q4 91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 tse32q4
source: company filings
serahs
fo
snoillim

 Greenstone may still be on time but for the first time in two years, EQX admitted it
would come in over-budget (if you looked hard enough at the numbers).
 The “leverage to gold” theory continues in place. As a benefit, gold production guidance
was higher than our model however, that higher forecast cost bracket means it’s a case
of “even more leverage than expected”.
And once the market had digested the news…
…the stock sold off and gave up all the gains it had out the week before filing its annuals. Let’s
survey the damage in a little more detail:
Q4 production and costs, 2024 guidance: It wasn’t all bad on this score, particularly the Q4
numbers and the expected gold ounce guidance for this year. The annual production chart
(below left) shows EQX made its guidance for 2023 and our previous best guess of 660,000 oz
for 2024 is now the bottom end of the guidance range of 660,000 to 730,000 oz gold, so we
therefore move the midpoint target to 705,000 oz gold for 2024. That’s a good number, but the
bad news comes on costs as measured by AISC (below right):
EQX: Annual gold production and forecasts
In fact when taken on an annual basis, the painful U$1,657/oz AISC for 4q23 meant EQX
finished at U$1,612/oz for the year, which is above our model estimate but not by a massive
amount. The issue is more about 2024’s guidance, as the new U$1,630 to U$1,740/oz range
(shown as the midpoint U$1,685/oz on the chart above) is plenty above our assumptions, even
after a Greenstone contribution at a top-end U$940/oz (and even there we're not impressed
with Greenstone, as its low AISC assumption is negated by the extra capex costs now flagged
for this year). The damage to 2024 costs is mostly done by EQX’s large Mexican mine Los Filos,
which guides mine AISC at between U$2,090/oz and U$2,190/oz this year and offered some
sobering guidance in the 2023 year-end MD&A, boiling down to "either we spend more money
on the mine and run unprofitably this year, or we put it on care&maintenance and stop
production". As Los Filos is a large part of the production mix, covering 159koz of last year
564koz (around 28%), that matters. Guerrero…a hateful place to go mining.
7
710102 681774 011206 913235 854,465 000507 000028 000058
Oz Au EQX: AISC per year
900000
800000
700000
600000
500000 400000 300000
200000
100000
0
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024e 2025e 2026e
source: company filings, IKN ests
929 5201 7431 2261 2161 5861 0041 0041
1800
1600
1400
1200
1000 800 600
400
200
0
9102 0202 1202 2202 3202 e4202 e5202 e6202
U$/oz Au
source: company filings, IKN ests

Two financial factors are offered as mitigation: Firstly, mine operating earnings weren’t that bad
at EQX, the U$38.607m coming in Q4 coming in some U$6.4m lower than our model, but still
the best quarter in the last two years.
EQX: Mine Op Earnings, per qtr
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
8
91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 32q4
U$m
source: company filings, IKN ests
Sure, not great considering the size (book value U$2.4Bn) but a win is a win. Secondly, though
cash dropped so did cash debt, with EQX paying down its revolving loan facility and aiming cash
at the at-or-about U$200m level that has tend to serve its requirements over time
EQX: loans and borrowings
748.484 27.584
961.982 19.982 156.092 14.192 715.582 126.972 607.372
497.763 521.064 887.065 58.365 675.465
141.296
863.725
1200
1100
1000
900
800
700
600
500
400 300
200
100
0
81q4 91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 32q4
U$m
2023 convert
other
2020 convert (Mubadala)
2019 convert (Mubadala)
revolver
source: company filings
Between its liquidity position and that flexible
revolver position, EQX will have no issues in EQX: Current assets per qtr
1200
covering its capex budget for 2024 and bringing 1100
Greenstone into production, assuming of course 1000
900
that its keeps to the promised timeline. 800
700
600
The nasty Greenstone surprise: We out here in 500
retail land are sadly used to hearing about cost 400
300
overruns in large scale mining development 200
projects, but for the last two years EQX at 100
0
Greenstone and vociferously bucked the trend
with constant declarations on how its 60%
owned project (Orion 40%) was on time and on
budget. Right up until last week, that is. You
have to look closely to spot it, but there are two ways to see that while Greenstone is still
supposedly on time, it’s going to come in over-budget and after hearing the non-stop blather
from Beaty and others at EQX for over two years on this subject, that sticks firmly in the craw
at this late stage. Here’s how EQX broached the subject last week:
91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 32q4
source: company filings
srallod
fo
snoillim
other current
cash & eq

So, we’re told that the U$1,225Bn construction budget is all-but done the construction is all-but
done…so, no problem right? Wrong, check the next line where EQX tells us “initial
commissioning had commenced” after that date/cost milestone, then compare the information
to the original U$1.225Bn budget breakdown, as published in October 2021 (5):
Aha…errr….that “pre-production, start-up and commissioning” that has just started at
Greenstone was originally part of the U$1,225Bn budget (along with U$177m in contingency,
but let’s not dwell too long on that number). The other place to notice the Greenstone Capex
overrun is in the 2024 guidance, which as earmarked U$25m for sustaining capex and U$95m
for standard capex. In the notes, EQX give a little on the breakdown of that U$95m
“$95 million progressing Greenstone projects including $53 million for final costs associated with
construction and $41 million for post construction costs including a new hydro substation,
additional fleet payments, additional generator.”
So to recap, construction was “effectively complete” as at December 31st 2023 except for
U$95m which covers 60% of its pro-rata costs to finish construction. Go figure.
Long story short, Greenstone is somewhere between U$120m and U$150m over budget.
Admittedly not the biggest miss among the build-outs done recently (remember Magino) but
after the non-stop bragging out of EQX in 2022 and 2023, it makes Ross Beaty look more like
the person he really is. In my opinion, of course.
The bottom line: Summing up, EQX delivered a disappointing set of financials last week,
between the cost overrun at Greenstone and the cost inflation that was more than expected in
Q4 and way more in the future, thanks to an ailing Los Filos. The 2023 results weren’t that bad
and if it were only that EQX would be higher today, but the stealth capex overrun at greenstone
brought direct pressure on the equity and is worth around 30c per share, i.e. nearly all last
week’s downside. Add in the AISC guidance for 2024 and the thesis of “leverage to gold” is
obviously the only thing left to recommend EQX at present.
However, I’m not an immediate seller of EQX this weekend: Sentiment was awful in the mining
world last week and even decent results from operators were sold down on the merest hint of
bad news (i.e. Eldorado Gold (ELD.to) (EGO), see below) and I see no reason to bail of EQC at
this point. It wouldn’t take much for the stock to put in a rally, but upside has been capped by
last week’s news so a lot will depend on what gold does from here. The thesis of “EQX does
well at U$2k gold” is intact, but only just and from the cost hikes just delivered, that barrier
may have to move up to U$2,100/oz before we see the type of hockey stick improvement in the
share price I’d previously modeled at the U$2k line. So no sudden rush for the exit, but last
week was a hit to the bull theory on EQX and instead of cahsing in down the line with millions
on profit, I may have to settle for a longer hold and a modest gain, then moving on and not
returning.
Ero Copper (ERO.to): 4q23 production, earnings estimates, FY24 guidance
We opened soft coverage on the biggest copper entity we currently cover, Ero Copper (ERO)
(ERO.to) in IKN753 dated October 22nd and the last time we took a close look at its financials
was in IKN755 dated November 5th, on the occasion of its 3q23 financial report. Back then we
thought Q3 had been slightly soft (but nothing really bad) and taking company guidance into
9

consideration, we expected a good Q4. At the time ERO was a C$18.50 stock and our decision
was to sit back, watch and wait to see how Q4 comes in, as one of the reasons ERO was on the
Watch List rather than an open position was its tendency to suddenly dump and offer a deep
value entry point. Here’s the closing paragraph from IKN755:
“Back in IKN753 it was an C$18.94 stock, its lost a few extra pennies since then and
with its Q3 now in the rear window, the “look don’t touch” call has been borne out. We
put ERO.to on the Stocks to Follow Watch List for precisely this reason, as the recent
drop to under C$19 has made for a value entry point but it could get cheaper still.
Now, with the (in)famous Canadian Tax Loss Selling period now upon us, we may see
more pressure and while a lot will depend on what the price of spot copper does from
here to the end of the year, our deep value bargain entry point may eventually appear.
This is one to watch, as its combo of share price dip, growth in 2024 and what we
expect from the price of copper as the world economy starts to pick up again next
year and bring that forecast copper supply deficit into sharp relief could make this
company at its current price a bargain for the ages. Very likeable and while I wouldn’t
blame anyone from starting to build a position right now, it’s one I’ll continue to
monitor for the time being.”
That was then, this is now and on Wednesday Feb 21st ERO announced (6) its 4q23 production
numbers as well as giving guidance for this year
and 2025. That’s why this update exists, time for
some numbers.
First up the main product copper from its flagship
Caraiba complex in Bahia, Brazil. That came in at
11,760mt Cu, or 25.93m lbs in old money. While the total looks reasonable compared to previous
quarters (chart right) it is in fact a miss, as ERO
had been guiding higher for this quarter. Our
model assumed the company would reach the
mid-point of annual guidance, 44,000mt to
47,000mt, in fact they only managed to get to
43,857mt for the year. Here’s what they said about that:
“Although the Caraíba mill expansion design capacity was achieved by year-end,
throughput volumes and copper production for the fourth quarter and full year were
impacted by approximately one week of additional unplanned downtime related to the
integration of the expansion circuit.”
A week’s worth of unplanned downtime made the difference. Fair enough, it’s mining and these
things happen. So that’s a miss on the quarter and the year, but not a big deal in the great
scheme of things.
Now for its other producing asset, the Xavantina gold mine in Mato Grosso (also Brazil) and
here’s the updated tracking chart:
ERO at Xavantina: Gold production and sales, per qtr
10
6257 4838
5489 00101 02001 3599 5869
9777 3108
84401
70921
38501
79031
61901
75451
00081
20000
18000
16000
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 32q4
ERO: Copper production & sales, per qtr (Mlbs)
Au oz prod
Au oz sold
source: company filings, IKN ests
A good quarter at this asset, with 16,867oz gold and exactly one thousand eight hundred and
sixty-seven ounces higher than our model number, as seen in IKN755. With the catch-up of
sales expected from Q3 (see chart right) we therefore guesstimate sales of 18,000 oz gold in
0.32 3.32 4.52 6.22 5.72 3.22 7.32 3.72 1.22 5.82 2.32 3.92 9.02 6.52 2.22 9.52
35
30
25
20
15 10
5
0
02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 32q4
Mlbs Cu
Cu prod (lb)
Cu sales (lb)
source: company filings, IKN ests

4q23, an excellent number that will go a long way to fill in the hole made by the low Caraiba
copper production
So to the money end of the deal: We take those two production numbers, then assume
production = sales at Caraiba, assume the 18k oz is sold out of Xavantina, then apply
reasonable received prices to both gold and copper (compared to spot and ERO’s normal
friction) and get this chart as our Q4 estimate:
ERO: Revenues breakdown
19.14 19.00 18.14 18.09 17.06 14.01 15.49 19.64 22.63 18.68 24.13 21.39 29.63 34.7
11
91.57 52.27
04.401 26.201 47.49 68.021 24.39 62.59
82.36
99.79 38.67 45.38 65.57 03.19
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 tse32q4
U$m
Est total Caraiba revs
est total Xavatina revs
source: ERO data, IKN calcs and ests
That adds up to U$126m, which is around U$4m lower than the estimate made in IKN755. Not
bad and that’s largely thanks to the good
quarter at Xavantina (plus those catch-up sales
ERO.to: operating earnings per share, per qtr
ounces we assume will pad out the quarter),
making up for most of the copper shortfall.
As for revenues, we’ll keep it to just one chart
to frame what we expect from the 4q23 and YE
financials when they show up. Our previous
estimate for operating earnings was 44c, that’s
now down to 40c and still a good result,
enough to add net cash to the balance sheet
for the first time in a long time as the Tucumã
build-out comes to a close.
To sum up what we know about 4q23 so far; not bad. Despite the lower copper production that
expected, ERO is going to generate plenty of margin and cash from its quarter and while not
quite as good as we’d like, nothing so far to worry about. Now for the reason why ERO was
applauded last week, the forward guidance starting with the 12 month and three year guidance
for the main product copper. These charts break down what to expect from Caraíba and the
new Tucumã mine, about to come on line:
Caraíba is forecast at a constant 42,000mt to 47,000mt over the next three years, in other word
a close match with previous years and the epitome of the steady state producer. Meanwhile,
Tucumã starts contributing later this year and ramps up to between 53,000mt and 58,000mt Cu
28.0 18.0
56.0
97.0
35.0
54.0
80.0
73.0
52.0 22.0 12.0
04.0
1.00
0.90
0.80
0.70
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00
12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 tse32q4
U$
source: company filings, IKN
MT Cu ERO: Caraiba production and guidance MT Cu ERO: Tucuma guidance
60000
70000
50000 60000
40000 50000
30000 40000
30000
20000
20000
10000 10000
0 0
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024* 2025* 2026* 2024* 2025* 2026*
source: company filings *ERO guidance source: company guidance

in its first full year of production before settling back at 48kmt-53kmt Cu in 2026 (and likely
beyond). Put those numbers together for the consolidated copper production chart you see
below left:
ERO: Total copper production and guidance
Then above right is the guidance for Xavantina gold, which at between 55,000 oz and 60,000
oz constant for the next three years shows that 2023 was no flash in the pan.
Bottom Line: While both 3q23 and 4q23 weren’t particularly impressive out of ERO due to lower
than expected copper production out of Caraíba, the market paid up for ERO stock last week on
the back of its forward guidance, and rightly so. With Tucumã capex now all-but fully baked in,
ERO becomes a free cash flow monster as from the third quarter of this year and that strong
copper production will see lower overall cash costs due to the more efficient new mine. All this
is backed up by the small, but high grade and highly profitable gold ounces coming out of
Xavantina which are forecast to remain at these new high rates. All in all, there’s a lot to like
about ERO going forward and while it’s an expensive producer these days, the expect profit
margins fully justify this equity mark up. With copper production set to double, I will leave ERO
on my Watch List for the moment and if the market
offers up a window of weak prices, I’ll open on it for
real as long as I can get in before Tucumã comes online
because once that mine is running, lower share prices
would signify something seriously wrong. Very likeable
and if you own you won’t hear a word of dissent from
this desk, we now await the 4q23 financials to see if a
liquidity event offers a discount. I’ll leave you with a
three year comparative of ERO vs the main copper
producers’ ETF (COPX), one that shows the volatility
ERO brings to the table. Aother downside run and I will
no longer hesitate, that forward guidance is most
attractive.
Stocks to Follow
Of the 15 open positions on our Stocks to Follow list last week, five returned week-over-week
wins (SOLG.to, NCAU.v, ERO.to, PAU.cse, MENE.v), three were unchanged (MAI.v, PGZ.v,
MIRL.cse) and the other seven were losers (EQX, RIO.v, MARI.to, ADZN.v, CTGO, ALDE.v,
SILV). The biggest mover of them all was a winner, namely SolGold (SOLG.to up 13.0%),
nastiest loser was the bucket of cold water poured over Equinox (EQX down 8.3%).
We currently have 15 open positions, that number goes up to 16 when WRN joins the list next
weekend but will still leave plenty of space for other purchases or new Watch List names, as
our ceiling is 20. Just four are in the green and that continues to suck.
12
41824 11454 17364 75834
00027
000501 000001
MT Cu ERO: Xavantina gold production and guidance
120000
110000
100000
90000
80000
70000 60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024* 2025* 2026*
source: company filings *ERO guidance
03863 89773 96624
22295 00006 00006 00006
Oz Au
70000
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024* 2025* 2026*
source: company filings *ERO guidance

company Ticker this week Avg Price Reco date Current PPS Gain/Loss% Notes
TOP PICKS
Minera Alamos MAI.v STR BUY C$0.21 13-Oct-19 C$0.275 31.0% $0.75 first tgt, #1 idea
RECOMMENDED STOCKS
Equinox Gold EQX STR BUY U$4.42 30-May-23 U$4.22 -4.7% Leverage trade at U$2k/oz Au
Rio2 Ltd. RIO.v BUY C$0.83 22-Apr-18 C$0.335 -59.6% Permit approved, rebounding
SolGold SOLG.to BUY C$0.22 19-Feb-23 C$0.13 -40.9% Avged down Feb'24
Pan Global Res PGZ.v BUY C$0.17 19-Feb-24 C$0.165 -2.9% Feb'24 new Cu trade, cheap
Marimaca Copper MARI.to BUY C$3.05 26-May-23 C$3.56 16.7% Quality Cu developer
Adventus Mining ADZN.v SPEC BUY C$0.285 7-Jan-24 C$0.23 -19.3% EIA permit received, now dev
Contango Ore CTGO BUY U$18.70 30-Jul-23 U$16.06 -14.1% FY24 production, now moving
Newcore Gold NCAU.v SPEC BUY C$0.205 23-Oct-22 C$0.12 -41.5% Showing signs of life
SPECULATIVE TRADES
Aldebaran Res. ALDE.v SPEC BUY C$0.72 16-May-21 C$0.69 -4.2% drilling again
Minera IRL MIRL.cse avoid C$0.195 22-Jul-12 C$0.02 -89.7% leaving list soon (good)
A WATCHLIST OF POTENTIAL TRADES. NB: I DO NOT OWN
Ero Copper ERO.to WATCH C$18.94 22-Oct-23 C$22.43 18.4% High quality Cu prod, cheap
SilverCrest Met SILV WATCH U$5.62 21-Jan-24 U$5.17 -8.0% potential silver trade end Q1
Provenance Gold PAU.cse WATCH C$0.085 8-Oct-23 C$0.08 -5.9% Idaho gold drill play
LONG-TERM NON-MINING HOLD
Mene Inc. MENE.v adding C$0.63 6-Dec-20 C$0.255 -59.5% LT bet, adding slowly
CLOSED TRADES IN 2024 date closed close price
Amerigo Res ARG.to Jan'24 C$1.36 12-Dec-21 C$1.34 -1.5% reduced Cu exposure
Fortuna Silver FSM Jan'24 U$2.92 13-Aug-23 U$3.09 3.4% Time ran out on NT trade
Argonaut Gold AR.to Jan'24 C$0.42 17-Dec-23 C$0.395 -6.0% NT specflip closed on poor Q4
2015 to 2023 annual closed positions in appendices below, 2009 to 2014 closed positions in editions IKN553 or earlier
Now for notes on some of our covered companies:
SolGold (SOLG.to): ADDED. I may have paid too much by paying C$0.13 on Wednesday
morning, but at least I didn’t pay the 14c when trading re-opened and when your average-
down price is less than half your cost basis and you’ve decided to do something, it wasn’t tough
decision. SOLG got another boost our the traps on Monday when London trading bid the stock
up on the back of that improved PFS we considered last weekend in IKN770, but the fruit-fly
attention span of this market and general hatred for all things mining did their thing as the
week wore on and SOLG’s improved economics became yesterday’s news quickly.
Pan Global Copper (PGZ.v): POSITION OPENED. It took a little time and it wasn’t easy to
get a fill, but after a modicum of patience I got what I wanted and must say, I’m happy with
the 17c cost average to begin this trade, no matter the slightly soft end to the trading week. Be
clear, I’ll be happy to apply more patience to this position, no sweating any near-term chop and
with eyes on the moves it should make once copper reveals its price hike later this year. I also
have some room to add if another cheap entry point (with the right copper market conditions)
shows up.
Ero Copper (ERO.to): We do plenty of ERO in today’s
main fundies section above, here we note that share
price action on the week and leave the blah-blah for
later. That’s a reasonably good week (or very good if
you count the last five trading days and start two
Fridays ago) considering ERO reported a Q4 miss on
copper production, with the market seemingly willing to
forgive Strang’s baby and look forward to better things
13

as Tucumã comes online this year. But before leaving, a note that as at January 31st big ERO
holder Rowe Price Associates, Inc. has added 1,814,179 shares to its position and now owns
15,938,224 sahres, or 15.56% of shares out. A good signal.
SilverCrest Metals (SILV) (SIL.to): On Tuesday and a week or so before it reports its Q4,
SILV announced its guidance for 2024 (7) which looks like this:
As production levels go, that jives closely with the revised plan for Las Chispas as seen in the
July 2023 Technical report, however that estimated AISC range of U$15.00/U$15.90 per ounce
AgEq is between 12% and 18% higher than last year’s 43-101 report. Here below is a copy-
paste of one of the overview charts from the document for an idea of the parameters they used
at the time:
That’s quite a cost hike, though we are getting used to the idea in this sector by now. It’s not
all bad news though, because last week SILV used reasonable price estimates of U$23/oz for
silver and U$1,850/oz for gold. While silver is currently trading around or about that level,
gold’s something like 10% higher and as gold is close to half all revenues out of Las Chispas
(indeed, in Q4 we expect it to cover more gross revs than the mine’s main target metal) that
lowball pitch should make a positive difference to top line revenues.
This chart breaks it down and while we need to make broad brush assumptions on production
for the quarters (we assume mid-point production for both metals, then cut them in to four
equal parts with a small adjustment for the planned downtime in 1q24), the model guides us to
expect top line revenues of around U$60m/quarter from the company.
SILV: Calculated revenues by metal, per qtr
14
66.12
02
86.62
82.13
86.62
23.53
82
28.53
38.13
23.92
82
9.92
3.82
2.23
3.82
2.23
6.82
2.23
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 32q4 tse42q1 tse42q2 tse42q3 tse42q4
U$m
Au calc revs
Ag calc revs
source: company filings, IKN calcs
That compares to the results seen in 2023 (plus our forecast for Q4, we’ll find out soon on that)
and shows SILV will continue to be a highly profitable mining company this year. And you

cannot say that about many of them. The next scheduled news from SILV comes on March 6th
when it is set to file its 4q23 and YE financials.
SILV: Quarterly Earnings overview
15
7.2 8.0 9.1
8.04
3.41 5.62
0.85
4.22
6.53
0.26
7.32
3.83
8.36
4.62
5.73
2.16
0.32
2.83
U$m
80
revenues COGS Mine Op. Inc
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
3q22 4q22 1q23 2q23 3q23 4q23est
source: company filings
Minera Alamos (MAI.v): On Thursday 22nd MAI published the anticipated release of its “Plan
B” for production at Santana this year, one that re-jigs its options to make do with the current
permits and leach pad space availability. The NR is here (8) and for more background and extra
thoughts, you may want to check out this 19 minute episode of Mining Stock Daily (9) in which
company President Doug Ramshaw offers insight behind the moves and what we can expect
from Santana in future quarters. Mixing the information in the NR and the interview, here are a
few bullet point on the main takeaways, then a discussion and opinion:
 “Plan B is not Plan A”: If it wasn’t clear in the NR, President Ramshaw makes sure we all
understand that if it weren’t for the delay on the permit to enlarge the heap leach
footprint, the company wouldn’t be doing things this way. Therefore, we shouldn’t expect
the performance originally planned until and unless that elusive permit amendment is
granted.
 Regarding the permit amendment, we learn that all the observations on the application
have been fielded and there’s nothing stopping the Santana expansion permit from being
awarded, aside from the internals at SEMARNAT and the wider Mexico political situation.
That means the permit could come at any time (or not, obviously) and if it does, MAI has
designed its “Plan B” so that they can flip back quickly to the original plan of action.
 As for Plan B, in essence the program is to leach and extract some 20,000 oz gold from
available mineralization which is either already stockpiled or easily mined. That makes the
plan quick to implement and according to the interview, that should start as early as next
month (March) so considering the known metallurgy and cycle times at Santana, the
improved production regime should start kicking in at the end of 2q24. With the tonnage
to produce around 20,000 oz earmarked for a 12 month period, we therefore envisage
this type of production outlook:
MAI: Santana sales and forecast, per qtr
104 8512 9213
6324
0582 5762 1701 636 005 007
0051
0003
0054 0054 0054
6000
5500
5000
4500
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000 1500
1000
500
0
12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 tse32q4 tse42q1 tse42q2 tse42q3 tse42q4 tse52q1 tse52q2
Oz Au
source: MAI data, IKN ests
 In general terms, this chart frames a MAI at Santana that delivers two more quarters of
residual level production, the type we saw in 3q23. Then once those tick over numbers
are done for 4q23 and the current 1q24, we move into real cash flow generation. On that
count and once running at full clip, Plan B should be good for around 1,500oz gold per
month and with Santana’s low mine cash cost, that would represent significant free cash

flow generation. At this stage we need to leave plenty of leeway and MAI could find ways
of improving and developing the mine using the cash being generated, but seeing a
million per month in free cash flow is a reasonable target at this point.
Now to sum that up and add some personal opinion: I understand the need for MAI to “Do
Something”, given the inertia at the company and the lack of forward movement on the
permitting for its projects, primarily for Santana (see above) and then for Cerro de Oro and the
permits it requires for development of its expansion project. Indeed in the interview with Mining
Stock Daily Doug Ramshaw uses phrases such as “Put a bad 2023 behind us” and “Feels like a
big step forward” regarding this new plan to increase production at Santana. And that’s fine,
but one moment when the reality of the situation shone through was when company President
Ramshaw was asked how much of the decision to run Plan B at Santana was economic. In
other words, what part of this was due to the company needing to generate cash flow and
adding funds to a treasury that may or may not be dwindling. Here we quote two segments of
his reply:
“We finished the year with probably C$13m in cash, I mean we weren’t in dire straits,
but you also want to husband…and we’ve always done I think a really fantastic job
when it comes to protecting the balance sheet.”
“I think the biggest thing for us is to deliver something for our shareholders.”
In other words, this isn’t about necessity. With C$13m at bank at end 2023 and a corporate
culture that’s always been about the careful protection of the balance sheet (something I
greatly admire, be in no doubt) MAI didn’t need to put Plan B into operation, instead it wants to
do this. Again, that’s all for laudable reasons as shareholders large and small (who include Doug
Ramshaw, owner of nearly 10m shares these days and all bought on the open market) but
there’s a clear difference between want and need, it’s worth considering that point. Now,
adding about a million dollars a month to treasury once Plan B is fully would up is also welcome
money and can go towards the eventual construction of Cerro de Oro (or the pad expansion at
Santana once the permit amendment is awarded), it gives the company more of an air of action
and busy ness, it’s image improves. No arguing those points, but this Plan B initiative does not
change the basic issue at MAI, the thing that’s been holding back its expansion plans and let us
face the cold facts, until Mexico begins to award permits, the share price won’t move.
That didn’t change with last week’s announcement. We also know that as Santana can survive
on tickover mode without draining the balance sheet of treasury and the company ended 2023
with C$13m in cash, there was no imminent threat of dilution through equity placements or
suchlike. And as the news from 4q23 shows, MAI is fully capable of raising all the money it
needs to develop Cerro de Oro and bring it into production using outside capitals. If things go
well it may have the luxury of being able to tap its own treasury but once again, there’s no
need to do so. Or put another way, I fully understand this:
While I’d be quick to argue that MAI is woefully undervalued on a longer-term timeline (and do
so with my money), the near-term reaction to last week’s Plan B news was a market that
shrugged, said “okay fair enough” and moved on without altering the price action or creating a
volume spike, one way or the other. Plan B is MAI’s decision to “Do Something” and while
16

welcome on primary levels, we shareholders must understand that there’s no prize until the
permits begin to flow out of Mexico’s government structure again and when it comes to the real
prize and the real reason to own this stock, last week was style over substance. Personally I’m
willing to wait and, as laid out in IKN769, February 11th 2024 and the main fundies note “A
decision on what to do with Top Pick Minera Alamos (MAI.v)”, will allow the company more time
(with the current flaccid state of the market another reason why there’s little point in getting
cute right now), but that stance didn’t change one iota on reading last week’s news and as
noted above, the lack of share price movement didn’t come as a surprise.
Rio2 Ltd (RIO.v) and Adventus (ADZN.v): Why throw these two together in this weekend’s
notes? Step forward Wheaton Precious Metals (WPM), which reported its annuals last week and
made mention of the flagships of both these juniors in its cover presser (10). We do a little
more on WPM below in The Producer Basket as it provides a foil for a point about direct peer
Franco-Nevada (FNV), here let’s quote the specific part of WPM’s NR at the point where this big
royalty/streamer looks to its future and guides its production growth. We also add a little bold
type:
Production is forecast to increase by approximately 40% over the next five years to
over 800,000 GEOs3,4 by 2028, primarily due to growth from Operating assets
including Salobo, Antamina, Peñasquito, Voisey's Bay and Marmato; Development
projects which are in-construction and/or permitted including Platreef, Blackwater,
Goose, Mineral Park, Fenix and Santo Domingo; and Pre-development projects
including Curipamba, Marathon and Copper World, for which production is anticipated
towards the latter end of the five-year forecast period.
That’s good to see, as both ADZN and RIO are relying on WPM to fund capex and construction
phases at the projects.
Separately, we also had news from ADZN (11) in which the company announced it had received
its exploitation (i.e. operating) permit. This is a good thing of course, but we repeat that the big
one was the previously granted EIA which unstopped the permitting bottleneck. With that
paperwork in hand, all other permits should be granted in near-automatic status as long as
ADZN at Curipamba is doing everything the right way. Finally, those still concerned about
rodents at altitude in Chile may want to check out the note on Gold Fields (GFI) below and the
news that the company’s chinchilla house move and monitoring plan is allowing the much
delayed Salares Norte mine to go into production. Better late than never, but solutions exist in
this region and if you ever put together a list of possible names for the eventual buyer of Fenix,
make sure GFI is close to the top of your piece of
paper.
Marimaca Copper (MARI.to): Volume remains
very thin and we saw another early week downspike
to a price that quickly disappeared. A position I’d
consider adding to if the market offers another of its
deep bargain entry points in the next few weeks, but
I strongly suspect those days and opportunities are
now gone.
The Copper Basket
After eight weeks of 2024, The Copper Basket shows a loss of 5.76% to level stakes:
17

company ticker price 1/1/24 Shares out Market Cap current pps gain/loss%
1 NGEx Minerals NGEX.to 7.16 186.824 1545.03 8.27 15.5%
2 Solaris Res SLS.to 4.13 179.221 686.42 3.83 -7.3%
3 Marimaca Cop MARI.to 3.43 93.11 331.47 3.56 3.8%
4 Los Andes LA.v 11.80 29.53 313.61 10.62 -10.0%
5 Hercules Silver BIG.v 1.38 231 173.25 0.75 -45.7%
6 Arizona Sonoran ASCU.to 1.75 109.17 126.64 1.16 -33.7%
7 Aldebaran Res. ALDE.v 0.89 169.819 117.18 0.69 -22.5%
8 Oroco Res OCO.v 0.375 222.86 88.03 0.395 5.3%
9 Faraday Copper FDY.to 0.63 175.97 81.83 0.465 -26.2%
10 American Eagle AE.v 0.26 108.87 55.52 0.51 96.2%
11 C3 Metals CCCM.v 0.61 61.885 30.94 0.50 -18.0%
12 Kodiak Copper KDK.v 0.58 63.93 27.49 0.43 -25.9%
13 QC Copper QCCU.v 0.12 173.7 21.71 0.125 4.2%
14 Element 29 Res ECU.v 0.18 106.25 14.88 0.14 -22.2%
15 Camino Min COR.v 0.07 206.66 14.47 0.07 0.0%
NB: All stocks in CAD$ Portfolio avg -5.76%
Week eight was a tough one for copper The Copper Basket 2024, weekly evolution
4%
exploreco sub-sector, despite seeing the copper
3%
metal improve in the same lapse. The basket 2%
average lost a chunky 4.23% to close at 5.76% 1%
0%
underwater with just three of our 15 basket
-1%
component stocks returned week-over-week wins -2%
(NGEX.to, OCO.v, QCCU.v). All the other 12 were -3%
-4%
losers and among them there were large losses
-5%
taken by several of them, namely Arizona -6%
Sonoran (ASCU.to down 17.7%), C3 Metals -7% source: IKN calcs
(CCCM.v down 13.8%), Los Andes Copper (LA.v Jan1st Jan8th 15th 22nd 29th feb5th 12th 19th 26th
down 13.0%), Kodiak Copper (KDK.v down
12.2%) and Hercules Silver (BIG.v down 9.6%).
Those are big losses compared to the metal and
all while watching the world’s hot tech sector
launch higher. As the tracking chart (right) shows,
that’s a tide change from the first weeks of the
year and fits the generalized disdain shown for the
mining sector last week. And all this while copper-
the-metal managed to improve on early post-
Chinese New Year price support and the copper
producer complex made gains, as seen in this ten-
day chart pitching the continuous copper contract
(HG00) against copper producer ETF (COPX)
As for a longer view of the metal, this chart takes in the last couple of months and what we
care about the most is the decent little rally we’ve had in the last two weeks, however and
notably, as soon as it bumped its head up against the U$2.90/lb line the rally petered out. So in
the same way we weren’t fretting too hard about low point two weeks ago (and here’s a quote
from IKN769 dated February 11th which shows as much)…
“In this context, last week’s drop is still in the world of the sober and bearable. The
issues begin at U$3.60/lb and would get smellier if U$3.55/lb gets broken to the
downside. So for the moment we’re taking it easy and not worrying about Friday’s
closing price but by the same token there doesn’t seem to be any pressing reason to
buy the copper complex this weekend
18

…now is not the time to get frothy and overly bullish about the near-term prospects in the
metal. For sure it’s good to see prices back near the top of their recent range, but we’re still
firmly inside that range and will remain there until new influences take over. Those may turn
out to be the return to work in China and better end user demand than expected, or may be
the eventual rolling over of US interest rates and the Fed’s loosening schedule.
On those scores, we quote from a couple of
carefully curated reports from last week. First up
ING, who in a note to clients (12) stated the
following:
“Copper prices will be supported by a weaker
US dollar on the back of US Federal Reserve
easing. We believe the Fed’s interest rate path
will continue to drive copper’s short-term price
outlook. Copper prices will benefit from looser
monetary policy, which will alleviate the
financial strain on manufacturers and
construction companies by reducing borrowing
costs. But if US rates stay higher for longer,
this would lead to a stronger US dollar and weaker investor sentiment, which in turn,
would translate to lower copper prices,”
Full agreement from both this desk and those happy, jolly, utterly transparent gentlemen and
ladies at Goldman Sachs who never ever have ulterior motives in their public declarations. In
their own note to clients (picked up by Reuters (13)) The Vampire Squid put some approximate
quants on the effect of a 100 bps rate drop in The USA and ran it on a range of commodities.
Here’s the quote:
"The immediate price boost from a Fed driven 100 basis point decline in U.S. 2-year
rates is the largest for metals, especially copper (6%), and then gold (3%), followed by
oil (3%)," Goldman Sachs said in a note dated Feb. 20.
If we take U$3.80/lb as our baseline, that would suggest a forward price for copper of
U$4.03/lb if and when the market perceives that the Fed will begin and continue with a cutting
cycle. Again, that seems reasonable to this desk and even on the conservative side so once
again I get that weird, creepy feeling that happens when I find myself agreeing with Goldman
Sachs. But overall, I’m happy enough about getting more bullish on copper from this point and
there’s more likelihood of a breakout than a breakdown from the current trading range. The
market is primed and ready for new news, which will probably come from China now that it’s
back to work. In that subject, we move to the weekly copper inventories health check with
data, as always, from those reliable souls over in Chile’s Cochilco:
 China came out of its New Year break and the effect was the classic one we get in most
years, with the big jump in copper inventories we’ve been waiting for across the world’s
three official systems. The total this weekend stands at 329,342 metric tonnes (mt), up
90,264mt on the week.
 The main event was at Shanghai, where SHFE inventories rose by over 50% and
94,803mt entered its warehouses, bringing this weekend’s total to 181,323mt. The
visuals offered in the dedicated charts below shows the timing and size is as per the
normal year.
 However, LME stocks dropped once again and maintained the trend we’ve seen in the
first two months of this year. This week’s inventory drawdown totaled 7,775mt to close
Friday at 122,900mt, with the lion’s share of those exits out of the LME’s New Orleans
USA (-3,050mt) and Hamburg Germany (-3,200mt) warehouses.
 Meanwhile, the Comex copper inventory added a chunky 3,236mt to its stores and
closed at 25,199mt, a de factor negation of the drop in LME USA stocks and one that
smacks of arbitrage.
19

The dedicated SHFE charts show how stocks have finally made their big move and it’s come
right on time:
SHFE copper inventory levels, 2019 to 2024
400000
350000
300000
250000
200000
150000
100000
50000
0
20
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 01 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 02 12 22 32 42 52 62 72 82 92 03 13 23 33 43 53 63 73 83 93 04 14 24 34 44 54 64 74 84 94 05 15 25
MT Cu 2024
2023
2022
2021
2020
2019
source: Cochilco data
Shanghai Futures Exchange Warehouse Stocks, 2014 to date
400000
350000
300000
250000
200000
150000
100000
50000
0
31'13ceD dr32 ht51 ht7 ht03 dn22 ht71 ht9 ts1von ht42 ht71 ht01 dn2tcO 7102ts1naJ ht62 ht81 ht01 dr3ced ht52 8102ht72rpa ht91 ht11 9102
dr3bef
9102ht82rpa ts12 ht31 0202ht5naj 0202ht92ram ts12 ht31 0202ht6ced ht82 dr32 ht51 ht7 2202ht03naj 22ht42rpA ht71 22ht9tco 3202
naJ
ht62 ht81 ht01peS dr3ceD ht52
Mt Cu
|
source: Cochilco
As the first chart shows, the timing fits most years and almost exactly what happened in 2019,
those halcyon days before Covid and all the ensuing weirdness. The second chart shows how
the spike last week is nothing new or scary, the question isn’t whether this would happen but
how high we go. Now for note on a couple of our basket stocks:
Arizona Sonoran (ASCU.to): Wednesday midday-ish
saw ASCU deliver on the promised “Standalone PFS” for
its Cactus project in AZ USA (14) and here in the chart
(right) how the market reacted. Ouch. The selling began
on Wednesday after the release and the stock was
already down 11% or so come the close, but the real
avalanche hit at the opening bell on Thursday when large
lumps exited the stock and in Canada trading, it hit the
Loonie mark on several occasions (and I saw one trade
go through at 99c, there may have been a couple more).
Sadly, what happened to ASCU last week was an
accident waiting to happen and didn’t come as much surprise to this desk, aside from the
severity of the selling we saw first thing Thursday morning. After being overhyped by the high-
traffic newsletter brigade for a long time, when you deliver what can only be called a mediocre
economic report into this current sentiment your share price is going to be punished, no matter
how “snapshot in time” its C-suite thinks it may be or with all the potential optimization events
in its future (e.g. relaying on RTZ’s Nuton is akin to UG gold projects leaning on ore sorting to
make their projects viable). Here’s how we put it in IKN769, two weekends ago:
We’re now on the cusp of getting the “Standalone PFS” (i.e. no help from Nuton) on
Cactus, as that’s due at some point in 1q24. If the market is any guide, it’s not going
to impress the world…A couple of weeks ago ASCU was talked up to retail at the
Vancouver trade events (by its usual suspects, all exuding the air of knowledge) but

once that buying spurt was done, the market went back to its previous attitude toward
ASCU and buyers dried up. I see no reason at all to get involved with this stock before
we known the contents of the upcoming PFS.
The stock managed to bounce from the oversold lows and close Friday at a slightly less painful
C$1.16, but there’s still no reason to expect a reaction from ASCU shares until and unless the
sector-wide sentiment for miners improves. When instos and funds are in their current mood
and looking for any excused to liquidate holdings, the next “illogical” downleg could happen at
any time.
Nobody has an unblemished track record and companies I cover, own or point to as possible
interesting trades have been whacked this current market along with everyone else’s. You only
have to consider recent price action in companies such as Fortuna Silver, Equinox Gold,
Eldorado Gold and the extremely painful Minera Alamos to know that. However, this is one
bullet that seemed obvious to me and one we did managed to dodge, no matter how “great the
rocks” or how “great the management” may be. As for what’s left, we may get a dead cat
bounce out of ASCU.to and at some point, the same usual suspects that talked up this stock at
$2.50, $2.00, $1.80, $1.50 and all prices in between are bound to try again, that may see the
price bounce a little too (if they have anyone left who believes them anyway). However, this
story looks broken to me and the only real improvement would be with a zoom in the price of
copper and if that happens, I’ll be making money by riding other boats on the rising tide.
NGEx Resources (NGEX.to): Now a Dot Tee Oh stock, NGEX delivered another impressive
drill assay NR from its high grade Lunahuasi target on Wednesday morning, when it reporting
(15) two and a half holes, including the lower end of the long hold Hole 10 (DPDH010), plus
holes 11 (DPDH011), and 14 (DPDH011) and here’s the headline they ran:
NGEX DRILLS 23.0 METRES AT 23.02% COPPER EQUIVALENT WITHIN 71.9
METRES AT 9.63% COPPER EQUIVALENT AT LUNAHUASI
The company’s block caps, not mine. Those are eye-popping numbers for sure and come from
Hole 14, but holes 10 (new intersection at depth) and 11 (same target as hole 14) also returned
hit grading hits over long lengths. You’re encouraged to check out the assay chart on the NR
for more numbers and if you do you’ll surely agree
that Lunahuasi is highly prospective and looking
good as a potential source of grade-adding feed to
the main Los Helados project owned by NGEX.
However, the share price didn’t move much even
though the news of these latest stellar holes from
Lunahausi also came just one day before NGEX’s
move to debut on the main TSX board, the lack of
reaction didn’t surprise this desk.
The reason is location. The company provided two
drill maps with the NR, this (right) is a close-up of
one of them and it shows that what we had last
week was nothing new. Great numbers
yes and not exactly infill drilling, but as
this high-grade zone has already been
mapped out it was more a case of
confirming the geological theory, or if
you like it would have been bad news for
the share price if they hadn’t hit strong
grades to confirm what we know
already.
That and the sector sentiment is in the
dumpster, of course. We know
Lunahuasi is a source of high grade, we
21

also know it comes with plenty of arsenic and as such, the plan is surely to incorporate it into
some type of Vicuña District model, most likely with the low grade bulk tonnage that exists at
Los Helados. Great on paper, but we also need to point out that putting these deposits together
also means crossing the political barrier of the Argentina/Chile border and that might sound
easy enough, but Pascua Lama showed the complications can arise quickly.
Am I a Debbie Downer on NGEX? Maybe, but it’s here in the 2024 Copper Basket because 1) It
got to the point where covering copper explorecos without having one of the big Lundin
vehicles in the list became illogical and 2) NGEx is the most accessible name on a market cap
basis (and even then we had to make an exception to our normal market cap limit). So be clear
that among the Lundin developments in this zone, Josemaria is the more advanced project and
Filo is a more exciting company. Both of those will generate their own momentum and interest
organically, while NGEX.to is behest to Lunahuasi for the pizzazz and flair, as Los Helados is a
known entity (and has been for a long time). If Lunahuasi can’t move its dial, NGEX only has
the copper price to move its market cap from here and that puts it in much the same boat as
many other copper explorecos out there.
The Producer Basket
After 8 weeks of 2024, the Producer Basket shows a loss of 10.81% to level stakes:
company ticker price 1/1/24 Shares out MktCap(U$Bn) current pps gain/loss%
1 Newmont NEM 41.39 1152.6 36.05 31.28 -24.4%
2 Barrick GOLD 18.09 1761.54 25.97 14.74 -18.5%
3 Agnico Eagle AEM 54.85 496.54 24.64 49.63 -9.5%
4 Franco-Nevada FNV 110.81 192.119 20.70 107.72 -2.8%
5 Pan American PAAS 16.33 364.439 4.68 12.85 -21.3%
6 Lundin Gold LUGDF 12.64 237.68 2.85 12.00 -5.1%
7 Hecla Mining HL 4.81 617.768 2.23 3.61 -24.9%
8 Eldorado Gold EGO 12.97 202.472 2.14 10.59 -18.4%
9 Dundee PM DPMLF 6.43 183.278 1.20 6.53 1.6%
10 Wesdome Gold WDOFF 5.83 148.95 1.00 6.72 15.3%
All prices and stock quotes in U$ Port. avg -10.81%
Our basket of ten stocks managed to squeak a week-over-week gain of 0.08%, which beat the
GDX benchmark (-0.7%) once again and means we’re 3.22% ahead of the pack with eight
weeks gone…that’s a good start to the year. As for the performances this week, we saw a
mixed bag of five losers (NEM, FNV, PAAS, EGO, WDOFF) and four winners (GOLD, AEM,
LUGDF, DPMLF) and one unchanged stock (HL). The biggest loser was Newmont (NEM down
6.4%) and I have a good rant about that one below, the biggest winner was Dundee (DPMLF)
and that stock gets ignored, even though it’s now back in the green for the year.
The 2024 Producer Basket: Weekly performance and The 2024 Producer Basket: Percentage diff. between
4% comparative to GDX control GDX benchmark & basket (negative= IKN ahead)
1.5%
2%
1.0%
0% 0.5%
-2% 0.0%
ikn
-4% -0.5%
-6% gdx control -1.0%
-8% -1.5%
-2.0%
-10%
-2.5%
-12%
-3.0%
-14% source: IKN calcs -3.5%
-16% -4.0% source: IKN calcs, NYSE data
Jan1st Jan7th 14th 21st 28th feb4th 11th 18th 25th Jan1stJan7th 14th 21st 28th feb4th 11th 18th 25th
Franco-Nevada (FNV): Last week provided another reason why it was a smart move to swap
out Wheaton Precious Metals (WPM) and bring FNV back into our 2024 Producer Basket:
22

However, that comparative YTD chart isn’t offered as a Toldyaso, more like a word of warning.
We already know…
 The market is using any Q4 report day as a liquidity event
 Wheaton’s quarter and year was reasonable, as was its guidance for 2024, but anything
short of “wow” gets hammered by selling and that’s what we saw on Wednesday.
 Franco-Nevada (FNV) still has to report, with its YE filing slated for March 5th
If recent action is anything to go by, FNV will close that gap on WPM in two weeks’ time and
not in a good way.
Eldorado Gold (EGO): EGO offered up its 4q23 filings and failed to deliver on the scenario I
outlined last weekend in IKN770, mainly because of this (16):
Canada-based Eldorado Gold has increased the capital expenditure (capex) estimate
of the Skouries project, in Greece, to $920-million, but between the project finance
facility and balance sheet, the project remains fully funded.
And…
“…more recent and pending contracts incorporate labour rates and labour hours that
are higher than the feasibility study estimate, resulting in the capex rising from the
initial $845-million.”
And…
Further, the time it took to negotiate key contracts has had a “modest” impact on the
production schedule, the company reports. Skouries is now expected to deliver its first
copper/gold concentrate in the third quarter of next year, rather than the previously
guided mid-2025.
Despite returning a set of good results on the back of that rather unjust price drop two weeks
ago due to fallout from SSRM Turkey pit failure, EGO was hit again by a market that’s looking
for excuses to sell down mining shares. Yes the Skouries capex increased and yes its timeline
was set back one quarter, but neither of those are reason for this stock to have dropped 12%
on Friday’s opening bell. It clawed about half of that initial drop back by the end of Friday’s
session and quite right too, but I still think this company has been hard done-by in the last
couple of weeks and deserves more rally in the days to come.
I did more numbercrunching on EGO
during the week and still like it from here,
but other companies took preference this
weekend as I’m not supposed to be
fixating on Tier 2 producers focused on
Turkey and Greece (and this edition got
long anyway). Enough requests would get
me to run the numbers in a longer note
next weekend.
23

Newmont (NEM): Just when you thought this sector of capital markets couldn’t get any
worse, it got worse. We’ll leave the obvious pain from NEM’s Q4 and YE filings to the reporters,
e.g. this headline and subhead (17):
Newmont records $2.47bn loss in 2023 on impairment charges
The company is planning to sell six non-core assets and cut headcount to reduce debt.
We’ll also leave the media apologists and sycophants to continue supporting this mess without
IKN’s help, e.g. this from BNN last week (18):
“Newmont's Bold Move: A Strategic Shift Towards Tier 1 Assets and Dividend Adjustment”
Bold moves and strategy shifts, so help me Lord. Neither do we need to crunch numbers on
these pages that have been crunched by every sell side
data base this week, instead IKN steps back to make a
couple of wider points and what we may see in 2024.
Firstly, company guidance on the current hot button
topic among the big operators, that of costs. Last week
NEM told us it was aiming for an AISC of U$1,400/oz in
2024 which looks like this compared to recent years
(right). You need to go back to 2018 to find a year in
which NEM managed to trim its AISC YoY, since then
it’s been an inexorable uphill hike for costs. The
U$1,444/oz result you see for 2023 also compared to
company guidance at the start of 2023, which we quote
thusly (19), “Gold all-in sustaining costs* are expected to be between $1,150 and $1,250 per
ounce in 2023” (20). Nearly U$200/oz over the top end of guidance is a sizeable miss by any
measure, which the company blamed on the Peñasquito strike among other things. Now for
sure NRM may surprise us all and managed to keep AISC per ounce to or even below its
targeted U$1,400/oz, but between its long-term track record of adding to AISC every year and
the 2023 cost debacle, there’s very little reason to believe them at this juncture and for further
reading, we suggest Aesop’s “The Boy Who Cried Wolf.”
Secondly, the news that NEM was cutting its dividend to 25c/quarter. Here’s a chart that tracks
the company’s quarterly dividend payments since 2019 and while it isn’t one of those entities
which fixes its divi in stone, the drop from 55c quarters to what instos and holders can expect
this year is a heavy one and there’s another point to be made here:
Newmont: Quarterly dividend
24
41.0
20.1
41.0 41.0
52.0 52.0
04.0
55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0
04.0 04.0 04.0 04.0
52.0 52.0 52.0 52.0 52.0
1.10
1.00
0.90
0.80
0.70
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00
91q1 *91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3 22q4 32q1 32q2 32q3 32q4 tse42q1 tse42q2 tse42q3 tse42q4
Newmont: Annual average AISC/oz Au
U$
source: company filings *2q19 incl 88c special dividend
Newmont isn’t just any old gold miner, instead it’s the only precious metals mining company in
the Fortune 500 list (for the moment, anyway), it’s the market cap #1 and leads our sector and
it’s also held by plenty of generalist and non-mining funds and instos that known precious little
about the ways of the mining industry and hold this stock as a Top Down pick when they “want
to get long gold” (pace Druckenmiller last week, see IKN770 intro). As such, your author invites
this esteemed audience to take a step back as well, forget what you known about the slings
and arrows of our covered sector and consider NEM from a generalist fund manager’s point of
view:
 The broad market is hitting record highs…
429 909 669
5401 2601 1121
4441 0041
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
7102 8102 9102 0202 1202 2202 3202 tse4202
U$/oz
source: company filings

 …gold is trading above U$2,000/oz on a regular basis for the first time ever…
 …inflation is dropping by all standard measures…
 …and the world’s biggest, most widely held precious metals mining company and
flagship for its sector is cutting its dividend
Step back, take away the “mining excuses” and see for yourself how bizarre and pathetic these
results. You cannot blame a dividend cut during record gold prices on “the cyclical nature of the
sector”, this is managerial incompetence of the highest level and planning that may manage to
see a quarter or two into the future, but lacks the strategic vision to manage ship this size, all
by the hand of people pulling down multi-million dollar salaries and providing negative value to
their backers. If you were a fund manager moving big money and looking for a place to provide
returns to your clientele, how long would you look at NEM as a potential vehicle? Three
minutes? Two, perhaps? And apparently this is the best our sector has to offer the world! It is
simply shameful that the world’s supposed #1 PM mining company is where it is today, a sad
indictment of managerial ineptitude that runs through our sector from top to bottom. The
people who have boldly moved and strategically shifted NEM to this point in its history shouldn’t
just be fired, they should be publicly shamed while being booted out the front door. Tier One
companies such as NEM need to hire Tier One business brains, people who know how to run
businesses in the 21st century. This is a shambles and unbefitting of a company of its size and
supposed prestige.
To round off and insult to injury, another part of last week’s announcement was that NEM will
divest some of its non-core assets in order to pay down debt (as well as cut the corporate
payroll). The asset sale doesn’t come as any surprise after the merger with Newcrest (ex-NCM)
but NEM got specific last week, naming eight non-core assets on its sales list. They include the
producing mines Éléonore, Musselwhite, Porcupine, Cripple Creek & Victor, Akyem and Telfer,
then the two non-core projects Havieron and Coffee. We mention Coffee below in Market
Watching when considering the “coincidental” news out of Western Copper (WRN.to) (WRN)
last week, we also mention Havieron when floated Greatland Gold (GGP.L) as a potential trade
on its Havieron connection. But here we’re going to consider another angle of the Havieron
project, as along with Telfer they provide an interesting package of old producer and new
project that would appeal to certain buyers. So step forward Paul Singer (21):
Feb 23 (Reuters) - U.S. activist investor Elliott Investment Management is setting up a
company to hunt for mining assets worth more than $1 billion, according to sources
familiar with the matter.
Elliott's new venture, called Hyperion, would have a mandate to buy across all assets,
including base and precious metals and commodities used in electric vehicles, the
sources said on condition of anonymity. The new venture will be led by former
Newcrest Mining CEO Sandeep Biswas, they added.
Paul Singer’s Elliott is no stranger to the mining world, being active in the sector for many years
and most recently being the 66% owner of Triple Flag, the activist entity that got Kinross to
start share buybacks, etc. But it just so
happens that Singer has hired the ex-head of
Newcrest to run his new U$1Bn fund just
months after his old company sold both Telfer
and (its 70% of) Havieron to Newmont and
now Newmont has put them both up for sale.
It’s almost laughable, but Sandeep Biswas is
about to get his mines back thanks to the
price (over) paid by Newmont for Newcrest,
all in the name of strategy. Here’s a ten-year
chart of NEM, strategize this, Mr. Palmer.
25

The TinyCaps List
After 8 weeks of 2024, the TinyCaps show a gain of 2.84% to level stakes:
company ticker price 1/1/24 Shares out Mkt Cap current pps gain/loss%
Aston Bay BAY.v 0.065 221.5 22.15 0.10 53.8%
Awalé Res ARIC.v 0.135 67.27 9.08 0.135 0.0%
District Metals DMX.v 0.170 106.98 31.02 0.29 70.6%
Endurance Gold EDG.v 0.18 150.136 19.52 0.13 -27.8%
Kirkland LDC KLDC.v 0.100 88.625 7.98 0.09 -10.0%
Latin Metals LMS.v 0.075 71.476 4.65 0.065 -13.3%
Palamina Corp PA.v 0.130 71.285 7.13 0.10 -23.1%
South Star STS.v 0.750 48.8 33.18 0.68 -10.7%
Surge Copper SURG.v 0.090 219.21 16.44 0.075 -16.7%
Viva Gold VAU.v 0.120 118.384 14.80 0.125 4.2%
Prices in CAD$, data from TSXV basket avg 2.84%
This section attempts to track the tinycap mining sub-sector of the market, our ten companies
chosen under the following criteria to put together a list representing the state of play in the
sub-sector of tinycap exploration company stocks. At least, that’s the plan.
 Market capitalization of under $20m (though this year I’m making one clear exception and one rule
stretcher). They have to be tiny. In two cases I’ve stretched the window a little and allowed sub-U$20m
market capper in that are just over the C$20m level, but the spirit is unaltered.
 A “non broken” stock price and project story. There are literally hundreds of tinycap juniors of the right
size, our task is to trawl through the TSXV and find companies that are small but with life in them. The vast
majority of tinycap stocks are broken stories, either traded to death on the exchange or with projects that are
a bust or with entrenched management more interested in their monthly paycheck than anything else.
 Likelihood of meaningful newsflow in 2024. This connects to the company’s “unbroken” status, as we
want news and potential catalysts from companies with projects that can work.
 Decent management if possible. When you are down among the little guys it doesn’t pay to be too
choosy, but still I preferred companies that have teams or people with good peer reputations.
The TinyCaps basket average dropped hard last
week and is back just above breakeven, even though TinyCaps, 2024 weekly tracker
12%
five of the ten component stocks were week-over-
10%
week winners (ARIC.v, DMX.v, PA.v, STS.v, VAU.v).
8%
That’s because most of the winners were on the
6%
small side, the only one to put up good gains was
4%
Viva Gold (VAU.v up 19.1%) and overall they couldn’t
2%
compete with some of the losses among the five
0%
losers (BAY.v, EDG.v, KLDC.v, LMS.v, SURG.v),
particularly those of Kirkland LDC (KLDC.v down
35.7%( and Latin Metals (LMS.v down 13.3%). Now
for a couple of notes:
Palamina Corp (PA.v): I caught up with Andrew Thomson of PA last week, who told me that
with cash in treasury (thanks to the Winshear tribunal result) and permits now in-hand after a
crazily long wait last year, we will soon get news of the drills turning at its preferred targets at
the Usicayos project in Puno region, South Peru. We remind readers that this time PA won’t be
limited by less-than optimum permits and will be drilling what the team considers to be one of
the sweet spots of the Puno Orogenic Belt (their title, not mine). As this project and target is
basically the reason why we’ve kept an eye on PA.v the last two years, I’m obviously interested
in what comes out the ground and as under-the-radar drill plays go, this one is highly
prospective and exploring a great looking target.
This is not a market in which we need to pile in and hope for good drill numbers, far smarter to
see what comes from The Truth Machine first. As with any drillplay, we’re in high risk / high
reward world but even if the stock runs on good assays, there would be plenty of potential to
buy in after the news and make good money.
26
ts1naJ ht7naJ ht41 ts12 ht82 ht4bef ht11 ht81 ht52
source: IKN calcs, TSX data

Surge Copper (SURG.v): After throwing dos centavitos of thoughts out there regarding SURG
and the potential that “The Vizsla People” may be putting together a roll-up vehicle that covers
the type of large, low grade bulk tonnage copper projects found in BC Canada, I got several
interesting mails and one of them was from Leif Nilsson, the CEO of SURG. His mail was a
personal one so I can’t share it here, but he noted several points on the note ran last week and
provided plenty of insight. Here are three bullet points to cover the general thrust of the
subjects he mentioned:
 He noted that the Surge people and the Vizsla people have done business previously
and know each other.
 The “roll up” idea has crossed other people’s minds previously, which isn’t a surprise.
After all, if it occurs to me sitting far away, it must have occurred to plenty of others
there on the ground.
 SURG isn’t particularly interested in that type of deal for the moment, it’s focused on
real exploration work rather than fancy corporate footwork. Also fair enough (as any
move would likely come from Vizsla people, not any of their potential targets).
 He’s leery about the terms of any deal being able to add value to SURG shares (and
therefore its shareholders) at current levels. It won’t be a shock to learn he believes his
shares to be very undervalued (and for what it’s worth, I agree).
Thank you to Leif for writing and, with the company’s high level position framed, I’d be happy
and willing to hear more from you people in order to continue this subject next weekend. For
the moment and for today, I’d add that while it’s correct for CEO Nilsson not to entertain my
roll-up thoughts or dedicate company time to them at this stage, if SURG or any other
exploreco in the region with a large bulk copper project were approached, it would be good
business practice to at least hear the idea out and give it some thought so to repeat, the Vizsla
team’s move on Universal Copper and Poplar may be the start of something, not an end.
Kirkland Lake Discovery Corp (KLDC.v): So much for that bright thought, too:
When I wrote that KLDC was looking perky even with thin volume and if it dropped a couple of
pennies in order to find a trading range nobody should mind much, I wasn’t thinking of 5c
down and 35.7% ripped from its market cap. Such is the life of the tinycap at the moment and
when there’s no market maker and you can drive a truck through the bid-ask spread, it only
takes one of two people who need to sell a small position for their own sweet reasons for this
type of thing to happen. I wish them good fortune, but nothing will truly happen until they
deliver real market moving news via the drillbit.
Viva Gold (VAU.v): Friday brought news (22) that VAU insto backer “…RAB Capital Jersey
Limited ("RAB Capital"), a private investment holding
corporation controlled by Mr. Philip Richards..” had taken
2.5m units of the recently closed placement and as a
result, its holding in VAU had risen to “…approximately
17.62% of the outstanding Shares on a non-diluted basis
and approximately 24.53% on a partially-diluted basis”,
quote/unquote. On the same day, VAU spiked hard from
10c to the 12.5c at which it closed, but that was much
27

more about the inertia and ennui down here at the tinycap end of the market, as only 500
shares were traded all day and that went through at the open. At least we can’t accuse the
people around VAU for late-day tape painting. The drills are now turning at VAU’s Tonopah
project and they’ll have real news soon enough.
South Star (STS.v): In a similar vein, a late Friday SEDAR filing confirmed that Brazil-focused
fund Fitpart upped its holding in STS during the recently closed placement. Fitpart added
2,098,117 shares to its previous holdings, and now owns 9,447,610 shares, representing
19.35% of shares out, as well as 7,373,884 warrants (which if exercised would put them at
29.93%). That’s a big position from tight hands and a fund that did very well by backing
another EV-aimed miner based in Brazil, SGMI.
NB: Please be clear that The Tiny Dogs is NOT a list of recommended tinycap stocks. It is a list of companies with
market caps of under $20m offering a reasonable representation of the wider tinycaps market. It’s possible in the future
I may buy shares in one or several of these stocks, at the moment both my opinion and wallet are strictly neutral.
Regional politics
Argentina: More Glacier Law
First a very quick line or three on the general political situation, as a full round-up of what’s
been going on in Argentina this week would take around 10,000 words. We’re not going there,
instead we’ll sum up the #1 story in three bullet points:
 The Milei national government is trying to impose its austerity policies on the
provinces, part of its plan to impose hard medicine on the country and turn it
around quickly
 The provinces, led by the hydrocarbon-rich Chubut, have pushed back hard against
the national executive’s cuts in provincial funding and in the case of Chubut, whose
governor is part of the Macri PRO party and supposed political ally of President Milei,
has threatened to stop all oil & gas exports out of the province.
 In response, Milei has threatened to jail the governor of Chubut. Other provincial
governors have voiced their support for the Chubut governor and at this point on
Saturday evening, we are heading for potential crisis in the country.
All this flies in the face of the narrative being sold by biz-friendly media channels to the outside
world, mostly in English language, that want you to believe Milei’s plans are going swimmingly.
And that’s where we are this weekend, hilarity ensuing in the days to come no doubt and if you
want to know more, I’m sure you can find an English language media source covering
Argentina politics because I cannot be the only gringo addicted to this soap opera.
We now get back to our focus subject of mining, via an update on our series on the Milei
government’s push to get that pesky Glacier Law adapted. This week we got confirmation from
Milei’s Interior Minister Guillermo Francos* that the government plans to present many of the
bills and articles in the failed mega-package of law bills, the so-called Omnibus Law, in a one
by one piecemeal manner. Francos also made it clear that the plan to change the Glacier Law
and make things a lot easier for mining companies in the Andean Cordillera a lot easier. Francos
had plenty to say during a radio interview this week (23) and much of that was about the (then
brewing) conflict with Chubut and other provinces, but he also covered the latest on the policy
matter we most care about on these pages, Milei’s plans to change the so-called Glacier Law.
Here’s a quote:
“…all the parts of the (failed Omnibus) law bill that was concerned with the
hydrocarbons, mining and the protection of large investors are those aspects that the
(provincial) governors have been asking for. The governors in the South of the country,
the governors in mining provinces, they all agree with this part of the (failed Omnibus)
law and due to that, they were surprised that the law didn’t move forward.”
Minister Francos’s declarations on the government’s desire to present a law bill to the national
Congress that provincial governors would like is a carrot to those same governors now moving
into conflict with the Milei government. Now that’s fine, but it also means that if this provincial
28

insurrection snowballs the Glacier Law runs the risk of becoming another political football and
withdrawn by the national government if governors don’t play nicely.
*A member of the Milei inner circle and a case study in his own right, we could do 5,000 words on this guy easily. He’s
become one of the go-to mouthpieces in the Milei admin and is in the centre of the fight with the provincial governors.
More on Bolivia
Two weeks ago in IKN769 dated February 24, 2024 we ran a brief note “Bolivia: Evo is back”,
the first time the country has been mentioned on these pages for a long time. It was admittedly
brief and glossed over all types of political background, but the thrust of the note was simple
enough:
 Ex-President Evo Morales is now at loggerheads with the national government of Luis
Arce, who was Evo’s hand-picked successor from the same MAS (Movement To
Socialism) party as Evo but since then the two men have fallen out bigtime.
 Evo is looking to run for President again when the Bolivian elections come around again
next year and his supporters are causing problems as they protest the Arce
government’s mediocre performance.
 Evo is now aligning himself with leaders of large mining syndicates and co-operatives as
part of his political maneuvering to run for President again and this is bad news for a
mining industry that shouldn’t be on your shortlist of a destination for your junior
mining risk capital anyway, not even at the best of times.
That brief overview note generated more feedback and mailbag than I’d expected, so by
popular demand today’s update fills in a couple of the more important political holes in the back
story, in order to lay out the risk to capitals exposed to Bolivia a little more clearly (as it seems
several of you have trades running in Bolivian explorecos…there’s no accounting for taste I
suppose. There are two main points to make:
1) At present, Evo is barred from running again. Late last year the Bolivian Supreme Court
handed down a ruling which stated that as Evo had already been President for three
terms in Bolivia, he couldn’t run again. Unsurprisingly, Evo disagrees with this decision
(his point being that the current Constitution prohibits consecutive terms of Presidency
and Arce has been in power most recently, thereby allowing him to run again) and says
the court decision was politically biased and motivated.
2) The current unrest in Bolivia stems from that court decision, as Evo Morales pushes for
a change to the current law (or perhaps a referendum on whether he can run, an idea
floated this week by one of the Arce government ministers), plus the generally poor
shape of the current Bolivia economy which has suffered from asthenic growth and
spikes in inflation ever since the Covid crisis. President Luis Arce has become singularly
unpopular with the rank and file in Bolivia, both to the Left (a large faction of his own
party want Evo back in power) and to the right (where several opposition politicos
sense an opportunity to run in 2025 and win over the current admin with its poor track
record and split along Evo/No Evo lines.
The crisis has now morphed into full scale civil disobedience, with strikes and roadblocks in
place for almost a month in strategically important pro-Evo zones of the country. Although you
hear very little about it outside of Bolivia, the country is going through a period of singular
political instability and that’s unlikely to improve as 2024 unfolds and we get closer to the
election year 2025. With quasi civil war inside the MAS party, and Evo Morales who would
become an instant frontrunner if allowed to run, a judiciary apparently set on stopping him and
right wing fiefdom chiefs in the rich Santa Cruz region ready to pounce and attempt to win
power, literally anything could happen this year. Finally, in much the same way as IKN769
today’s note is more about what I can leave out and keep the focus on mining as much as
possible, so if you have any specific question about the political situation in Bolivia feel free to
write in.
29

Peru: Standard Swine Lip Gloss in 2024
On the subject of wildly unpopular governments, the Dina Boluarte admin in Peru is sure to
make its presence felt at PDAC in two weeks’ time, what wioth Peru Day now one of the
standard dates at the event and a government team that will be out in force to promote the
country and its desire to grow mining after several years of ambivalence toward the industry.
You’ll see new Mining Minister Romulo Mucho’s face pop up here and there and its leading
lights will be on had for the soundbites (Roque Benavides, Victor Gobitz, an Arias, a Rocha, a
Ganoza or two, etc). Meanwhile in the country the selling of mining as the country’s saviour
continues, with all the pro-Tia Maria coverage you could ever want and a government that is
now promising U$5Bn in investment in the sector this year. That’s a hefty number, but once
you see the details of the six projects on which it depends it turns out once again to be as
much wishful thinking on the part of a government than solid plans. Here’s that list with a few
notes:
Toromocho Phase Two (Chinalco): To be fair, this is sure to happen and has been in
progress since September last year: The budget for 2024 is around U$1.355BN
Antamina pit extension (Consortium): While this has just been green lighted by the
government and is likely to happen, works won't start until September and most of the
U$1.6Bn budget gets spent in 2025, not this year.
Corani (Bear Creek Mining): This is where the massaging stops and the outright lies
begin. While budgeted at around U$570m, this simply isn't going to happen because
there is no company mad enough to spend this amount on a complicated zinc/lead
mine with a silver kicker at 4,000masl. I read a report published by Peru's Scotiabank
(part of the Scotia empire, but separate in many ways) which blamed the project delays
on the zone's community issues and social conflicts, which is just so much BS. Isn't
happening.
Las Bambas Chalcobamba Phase One (MMG): Another project with serious question
marks over its head, the interminable delays at Las Bambas are indeed more about
social conflicts than anything else but those are more than enough to stop it from
happening this year. Even if it does, it’s around U$130m in budget.
San Gabriel (Buenaventura): This is indeed under construction and has been since
2022, so the 2024 budget is near guaranteed but it's not much of that U$5Bn headline.
To be generous, we could add the U$1.3m or so expected to go into Teck’s Zafranal project as
from 2025, but for 2024 there’s obviously far less than U$2Bn going into mining capex in Peru
this year. Anyway, I hope those going to Peru Day or its Psico Sour evening reception at PDAC
2024 enjoy the occasion. Just don’t swallow the hype from an extremely unpopular
administration and a country that’s still on the road toward serious social upheaval.
Market Watching
Gold Fields (GFI) at Laguna Salada: Rodent Solutions
Last Thursday also saw Gold Fields (GFI) report its quarter and while the stock reacted
negatively (down around 5% on the day with GDX down around 2%), that was very much the
norm for any company that had the temerity to report its 2023 annuals last week. In fact and
overall, GFI had an upbeat message and good guidance for 2024, thanks largely to its new and
finally operational Salares Norte mine in Chile. Here’s Reuters (24):
Feb 22 (Reuters) - South Africa's Gold Fields (GFIJ.J) on Thursday raised its 2024 gold output
forecast to between 2.33 million and 2.4 million ounces, saying it expects a rapid production
ramp-up at its new Salares Norte mine in Chile, which comes online in April.
The Johannesburg-based miner is racing to start production at Salares Norte after several delays,
and after its output last year dipped due to production decreases at its operations in Ghana and
South Africa.
Construction of the $1 billion mine in Chile started in 2020 with production initially expected early
in 2023. However, the mine has missed several targets due to delays caused by COVID-19 and
bad weather.
30

Salares Norte, which is key to Gold Fields' long-term goal of raising output to about 2.8 million
ounces annually, is expected to produce 250,000 ounces of gold this year, before ramping up to
580,000 ounces in 2025.
Gold Fields CEO Mike Fraser, who took up the post to head the company in January, told Reuters
there was "a high degree of confidence" the Chilean mine would rapidly ramp up output.
"We're well positioned because we've already got about 520,000 ounces of gold sitting on
stockpile. The mining operations have worked really well, we're just now closing out the pre-
commissioning and commissioning of the processing plant," Fraser said.
That’s of interest to these pages because we know that Rio2 Ltd (RIO.v), one of the long-term
house positions, sits nearby and will benefit from the new acceptance of mining in the Boric
government. It’s also directly related in other ways, as the “COVID-19 and bad weather”
reasons offered by Reuters in that report are only half the story. For more, we dial up the
quality independent voice on mining that covers the South Africa bear, Ed Stoddard of The Daily
Maverick (25) and here are two excerpts from his note last week “Chinchilla Op is a Go! Gold
Fields’ million-dollar rodent relocation to restart next week”:
“To recap, the initial operation was launched in August 2020 to relocate two dozen
highly endangered chinchillas, a species that was almost hunted to extinction for its
highly coveted fur. Relocating the animals was a requirement of the company’s
environmental permit.”
And…
“But the carefully concocted script was not followed, resulting in two of the first four
chinchillas that were caught, dying in captivity before their release. That triggered an
outcry from animal welfare organisations, so Chilean regulators stopped the project in
its tracks. Gold Fields went back to the drawing board, and eventually came up with a
new plan that the regulators have slowly been approving since last year. It is an 18-
month programme that will start next week…”
Check out the entire note at this link, it’s both entertaining and informative. While the
chinchilla issues at Rio2’s Fenix Gold project are slightly different, with its local
population not in the direct mine area and requiring close monitoring rather than any
new habitat, the cases are obviously related to a certain extent so what Salares Norte
shows is that a mining company can indeed fulfill the requirements of Chile’s
environmental and fauna protection agencies and get on with the job of mining rock
and producing metal in this locality.
All in all, it shows the pesky roden….sorry, the wild and endangered chinchilla species issue in
Chile’s high altitude zones is manageable and that with proper planning (and a few million
dollars) the local fauna does not pose an existential threat to the mining industry. Good for the
future of RIO.v at Fenix.
Goldshore Resources (GSHR.v): The CEO moves on at last
Regular readers may remember the mirth created by Goldshore Resources last year, as covered
by this desk in IKN739 dated July 16th 2023 and the Market Watching note “Goldshore
Resources (GSHR.v) scores an own-goal.” At the time I called it “…one of the most egregious
own-goals I’ve seen from a junior mining company in recent times”, as instead of filing the
clean copy of its 43-101 Mineral Resource Estimate (MRE) for its Moss Lake Project, now called
“Moss Gold” (because they don’t want you to think about the lake they’d need to drain) they
mistakenly filed the Template version, with plenty of compiler’s notes mistakenly left in the
margin for all to see and enjoy. Those included several embarrassing revelations about how the
“independent” 43-101 compilers were apparently working closely with their client in order to
deliver what the people writing the cheques wanted to read, as well as notes in between the
compiling team such as, “...the inadequacy of the HG modelling process forced on us by the
client. The geological model is poor - how many more times do I need to say this!!" Honestly,
you could have made this one up so after featuring several of the cringe-worthy examples and
noting how this basic level failure had whacked the GSHR share price once again (down to 15c
that weekend, at the time a new low) we summarized in IKN739 in this way:
A final comment: This isn’t the first strategic error made by GSHR and while the gold
price and sub-sector action has certainly been a drag, its current C-suite is to blame
for the current woeful state of its share price. Not only that, but this team of officers
and management are handsomely remunerated for their mediocrity, as anyone looking
at the corporate G&A and the background treasury burn rate quickly realizes. Junior
31

mining, and particularly the exploreco stage when there’s no revenue coming in, it all
about the confidence in any given project or story and in this case, there’s simply no
reason to trust these people any longer. If the GSHR board of directors wants to turn
this project around there is going to have to be some changes at the top of an
executive decision-making hierarchy that not only lacks strategic vision, but has now
also demonstrated a singular lack of oversight and control of its structure. Things such
as the embarrassing PDF filed on SEDAR are symptoms rather than causes, easily
avoided by reasonable and competent management teams that don’t play it fast and
loose. In this case, all that was required was for one experienced set of eyeballs to
review the proposed filing to see that the wrong document was about to be sent to
SEDAR, but apparently all those high-paid execs had better things to do than watch
over the work of underlings.
Bottom line: GSHR isn’t going to get my money until the CEO “is retired” and a new
broom is taken to the company that sharpens up its act, gets its overly expensive G&A
under control and makes a better job of getting the money raised into the ground,
rather than the pockets of those who have tried and failed to deliver an interesting
project to date.
IKN771 back: That was the right call as the selling didn’t stop and this weekend GSHR sits at
just 8.5c. However, the latest drop we saw last week came because after nearly a year of
putting off what should have been done at the time, the company and made changes at the top
(26):
Goldshore Resources Inc. …announces that Brett A. Richards, the Company’s
President, Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) and Director, is transitioning to Interim CEO
and Director.”
According to the NR, this proves GSHR’s board and management team can make “difficult
decisions, whereas for me it just shows they’re capable of making the easiest calls possible,
This news wasn’t without its irony either, as at the same time the news Brett Richards was
made “Interim CEO” instead of “CEO” (whatever that title change means) another junior called
Radisson Metals (RDS.v) announced (27) that as from April 1st (the jokes write themselves) the
very same Brett Richards was to become its new CEO, with a NR including purple prose such
as…
“With his capital markets and operational management experience in the mining and
metals industry, he brings a wealth of expertise and a proven-track record of success”
…and if you can point to anything aside a proven track record of failure you’ll be doing better
than me, so let us be clear: Goldshore under Richards was an unmitigated disaster even before
the foot-in-mouth moment with that 43-101 and since then has just given us more of the same,
as the share price chart amply demonstrates. I was sniffing around the stock at the time, it was
on the Watch List and if things had been better both in the company and the wider market,
there might have been a trade. So now the CEO has to all intents and purposes “been retired”
from the company and they can truly turn over a new leaf, cut costs and put together a wiser
plan to add value to shares, its 6m oz of now cheap in-situ gold in its good jurisdiction may be
worth a revisit. On the other hand, as stock stories go this one has been broken into a
thousand little pieces and they’ll have to do surgery on its share base and refinance the
structure before there’s any real improvement, so with sentiment for large, bulk mining projects
in the veritable dumpster it’s unlikely to make an immediate move on Richards’ deserved
departure. So, not going back on the Watch List for the moment pending what we expect will
be some sort of share structure and/or corporate level improvement.
Greatland Gold (GGP.L): Another potential beneficiary of Newmont dealflow
Another angle on Newmont’s announcement and
dispersal plans for Telfer and Havieron is to consider
the 30% minority owner of Havieron, the London UK
quoted Greatland Gold (GGP.L). If we assume that
whoever buys this pair of “non-core” Newmont assets
makes them a core holding and develops one on top of
the other using prepared capex (e.g. the new Elliott
Investment Management vehicle Hyperion), it wouldn’t
32

be a massive extra logical leap to assume the new owners would want 100% of its new game
and strike a deal with GGP for the 30% not owned. Therefore and on a strategic level, buying
GGP may eventually give the big money a nice print but equally, smaller speculative cash
moving in now could also benefit from the rumour mill and offer a win, no matter how Havieron
eventually goes down. At 6.75p, it’s a cheap entry point for those willing to risk the trade.
Conclusion
IKN771 is done, we end with bullet points:
 This turned into a long edition, with over 20,000 words, but it was one of those that
seemed to write itself.
 It’s speculative, risky, and not my normal modus operandi, but the news flow out of
WRN can only mean one thing and if Casino is about to be sold, it will surely go for a
much higher price than this weekend’s level. Start the bidding at C$2.00. I’m a buyer
who will happily sell for a quick turnaround profit if offered one.
 Newmont is a shame on the whole industry. And Barrick isn’t that far behind, as noted
last weekend. These are your heroes, mining sector.
 Get copper exposure before it’s too late, avoid Bolivia, avoid Colombia. That’s all I really
have for you these days.
I thank you in advance for any feedback. Our Top Pick stock is Minera Alamos (MAI.v). Flash
updates will be sent if required by events.
I wish you good trading fortune, ladies and gentlemen.
Best wishes, Mark
Footnotes, appendices, references, disclaimer
(1) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fvGhc57_o90
(2) https://www.westerncopperandgold.com/news-and-resources/news-release/wrn-recent-and-upcoming-events-14/
(3) https://www.westerncopperandgold.com/news-and-resources/news-release/western-copper-and-gold-appoints-
sandeep-singh-as-ceo/
(4) https://www.equinoxgold.com/news/equinox-gold-reports-q4-and-fiscal-2023-financial-and-operating-results-
provides-2024-production-guidance-of-660000-to-750000-ounces-of-gold/
(5) https://www.equinoxgold.com/news/equinox-gold-announces-groundbreaking-for-full-scale-construction-of-
greenstone-mine-in-ontario-canada/
(6) https://erocopper.com/news/ero-copper-announces-2023-production-results-and-provides-2024-guidance/
(7) https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/silvercrest-provides-2024-guidance-302066585.html
(8) https://mineraalamos.com/news/2024/santana-operations-2024-outlook/
(9) https://open.spotify.com/episode/1uTQuU2lLVc7jjaP3lQz19?si=f5JiYQB3QR2vdeebvVmskA
(10) https://www.wheatonpm.com/news/pressreleases/News-Releases-Details/2024/Wheaton-Precious-Metals-
Announces-2023-Production-and-Sales-Results-and-Forecasts-40-Growth-in-the-Next-Five-Years/default.aspx
(11) https://www.adventusmining.com/news/122627
33

(12) https://think.ing.com/articles/uncertain-global-economic-recovery-looms-over-copper/
(13) https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/copper-gold-see-largest-price-boost-fed-easing-goldman-says-2024-
02-21/
(14) https://arizonasonoran.com/news-releases/arizona-sonoran-announces-a-positive-pre-feasibility-study-for-the-
cactus-mine-project-with-a-us-509m-post-tax-npv-and-55-kstpa/
(15) https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/ngex-drills-23-0-metres-at-23-02-copper-equivalent-within-71-9-metres-at-
9-63-copper-equivalent-at-lunahuasi-841752242.html
(16) https://www.miningweekly.com/article/eldorado-lifts-capex-estimate-for-greece-mining-project-2024-02-23
(17) https://www.newmont.com/investors/news-release/news-details/2024/Newmont-Reports-Fourth-Quarter-and-Full-
Year-2023-Results-Provides-2024-Outlook-for-Integrated-Company/default.aspx
(18) https://www.mining-technology.com/news/newmont-2-47bn-loss-2023/?cf-view
(19) https://bnnbreaking.com/finance-nav/newmonts-bold-move-a-strategic-shift-towards-tier-1-assets-and-dividend-
adjustment
(20) https://www.newmont.com/investors/news-release/news-details/2023/Newmont-Achieves-2022-Guidance-
Provides-Stable-2023-and-Improving-Longer-Term-Outlook-Declares-0.40-Fourth-Quarter-Dividend/default.aspx
(21) https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/elliott-management-plans-spend-over-1-bln-mining-assets-ft-reports-
2024-02-23/
(22) https://www.newsfilecorp.com/release/199027
(23) https://www.tiempodesanjuan.com/politica/alivio-la-mineria-el-gobierno-volvera-la-carga-la-reforma-la-ley-glaciares-
que-se-cayo-el-congreso-n369353
(24) https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/gold-fields-raises-output-forecast-ahead-start-chile-mine-2024-02-
22/
(25) https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2024-02-22-chinchilla-op-is-a-go-gold-fields-million-dollar-rodent-relocation-
to-restart-next-week
(26) https://goldshoreresources.com/goldshore-announces-president-ceo-and-director-transitioning-to-interim-ceo-and-
director/
(27) https://www.radissonmining.com/press-releases/appoint-brett-a-richards-as-ceo/
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2023
CLOSED TRADES IN 2023 date closed close price
Altiplano Metals APN.v jan'23 C$0.31 17-Set-21 C$0.17 -45.2% delayed and will dilute soon
Western Copper WRN.to mar'23 C$2.02 13-Nov-22 C$2.32 14.9% sold on reduced M&A prob.
Chesapeake Gold CKG.v may'23 C$3.07 20-Feb-22 C$1.75 -43.0% Closing on legal action news
Amerigo Res ARG.to may'23 C$1.36 12-Dic-21 C$1.48 8.8% sold 20% to raise cash
Amerigo Res ARG.to oct'23 C$1.36 12-Dic-21 C$1.21 -11.0% sold 10% raise to cash
QC Copper&Gold QCCU.v oct'23 C$0.265 25-Abr-21 C$0.12 -54.7% sold raise to cash
Faraday Copper FDY.to oct'23 C$0.79 26-Mar-23 C$0.68 -11.4% sold raise to cash
AbraSilver Res. ABRA.v oct'23 C$0.36 4-Dic-22 C$0.28 -22.2% sold raise to cash
Orecap inv OCI.v oct'23 C$0.04 20-Nov-22 C$0.03 -25.0% sold raise to cash
Western Explor. WEX.v nov'23 C$1.87 9-Abr-23 C$0.60 -67.9% poor trade, cutting loss
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2022
Closed in 2022 date closed close price
Great Bear Res GBR.v Jan'22 C$15.83 26-Aug-20 C$28.58 80.5% Bought out by Kinross, print
Copper Mountain CMMC.to Jan'22 C$3.40 18-Jun-21 C$3.78 15.9% Sold 1/2 position in rebalance
Copper Mountain CMMC.to Feb'22 C$3.40 18-Jun-21 C$3.70 8.8% Sold rest on FY22 guidance
Trilogy Metals TMQ Mar'22 U$1.84 15-Sep-19 U$1.04 -41.3% killed by US permit reversal
McEwen Mining MUX Apr'22 U$0.89 2-Jan-22 U$0.82 -7.9% No 2022 turnaround, cut loss
Abrasilver Res. ABRA.v May'22 C$0.42 24-Apr-22 C$0.33 -21.4% sold to reduce Ag exposure
Strategic Metals SMD.v May'22 C$0.42 31-Jan-21 C$0.30 -28.6% trade flatlined 1.5 years
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Discovery Silver DSV.v Jun'22 C$1.77 24-Oct-21 C$1.39 -21.5% Cutting Ag exp.& raising cash
Element 29 ECU.v Jul'22 C$0.58 6-Mar-22 C$0.30 -48.3% sold to cut Cu exposure
Superior Gold SGI.v Oct'22 C$0.95 3-Apr-22 C$0.24 -74.7% Q3 prod fail was last straw
Goldshore Res GSHR.v Nov'22 C$0.18 23-Oct-22 C$0.34 88.9% Quick profit taken
Palamina Corp PA.v Dec'22 C$0.295 21-Nov-21 C$0.08 -72.9% Clear-out of underperformer
Pure Gold PGM.h Dec'22 C$0.14 26-Sep-22 C$0.015 -89.3% tiny trade on vh risk, went Ch11
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2021
Closed in 2021 closed close price
Fiore Gold F.v jan'21 C$0.98 21-May-20 C$1.17 19.4% closed as part of rebalance
Norsemont Min NOM.cse feb'21 C$1.55 6-Set-20 C$0.70 -54.8% Cut loser to reduce Au exp.
Element 29 Res ECU.v feb'21 C$0.49 7-Feb-21 C$0.54 10.2% Cut Peru exposure
Kuya Silver KUYA.cse feb'21 C$1.66 8-Nov-20 C$2.51 51.2% Cut Peru exposure
Pucara Gold TORO.v apr'21 C$0.65 4-Oct-20 C$0.26 -60.0% Cut loser, Peru risk call
Copper Mountain CMMC.to apr'21 C$1.40 22-Nov-20 C$4.18 198.6% tgt hit, profit taken
New Gold NGD may'21 U$0.76 9-Feb-20 U$2.14 181.6% Sold to buy AGC, nice win
Orezone Gold ORE.v jun'21 C$0.79 21-Jun-20 C$1.61 103.8% sold on pop, leaky boat
Wolfden Res. WLF.v sep'21 C$0.30 11-Apr-21 C$0.19 -36.7% Failed spec trade, cut loss
Cartier Res ECR.v sep'21 C$0.32 21-Mar-21 C$0.235 -26.6% Failed spec trade, cut loss
Amarillo Gold AGC.v sep'21 C$0.31 30-May-21 C$0.30 -3.2% Capex story changed: Out
Excelsior Mining MIN.to oct'21 C$0.93 10-Mar-19 C$0.53 -43.0% May return in 2022
Royal Road Min. RYR.v nov'21 C$0.155 17-Mar-19 C$0.275 77.4% Closed on Nica pol risk
Aurelius Min. AUL.v dec'21 C$0.75 28-Jun-20 0.24 -68.0% cut end 2021, failed trade
Argonaut Gold AR.to dec'21 C$2.95 25-Jun-21 C$2.15 -27.1% cut on capex blowout
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2020
Closed in 2020 closed close price
TMAC Resources TMR.to Jan'20 C$3.41 20-Dec-19 C$3.61 5.9% TLS flip play, sold new year
Regulus Res REG.v Jan'20 C$1.10 20-Dec-19 C$1.30 18.2% TLS flip play, profit taken
Bonterra Res BTR.v Jan'20 C$1.90 9-Dec-19 C$1.66 -12.6% TLS flip play, loss taken
McEwen Mining MUX Jan'20 U$1.12 2-Dec-19 U$1.18 5.4% TLS flip play, profit taken
Core Gold CGLD.v Jan'20 C$0.255 7-Apr-19 C$0.305 19.6% arb trade, profit taken
HudBay Min HBM Jan'20 U$3.56 9-Dec-19 U$3.36 -5.6% TLS flip play, loss taken
Midas Gold MAX.to Feb'20 C$0.71 5-Jan-20 C$0.57 -19.7% sm & silly trade
Warrior Gold WAR.v Feb'20 C$0.08 3-Aug-18 C$0.05 -31.3% clean out non-perf sm stocks
Contact Gold C.v Feb'20 C$0.40 19-Aug-18 C$0.18 -55.0% clean out non-perf sm stocks
Sandstorm Gold SAND Feb'20 U$3.73 17-Apr-16 U$7.21 93.3% Sold during port rebalance
NexGen Energy NXE Feb'20 U$1.20 2-Dec-19 U$1.06 -11.7% TLS flip play, loss taken
MAG Silver MAG Apr'20 U$8.95 1-Mar-20 U$10.07 12.5% Sold to cut silver exposure
Alexco Res AXU Apr'20 U$1.69 7-Sep-17 U$1.69 0.0% sold to close Ag exp. in FY20
Bonterra Res BTR.v Jun'20 C$1.62 2-Feb-20 C$1.10 -32.1% under-performer cash moved
Regulus Res REG.v Jun'20 C$0.64 6-Apr-15 C$0.79 23.4% moved $ TMQ/MIN & Au stocks
Great Panther GPR.to Aug'20 C$0.60 21-Jun-20 C$1.10 83.3% Profit taken, good trade
Jaguar Mining JAG.v Aug'20 C$0.42 21-Jun-20 C$0.65 54.8% Profit taken, good trade
Sandstorm Gold SAND Aug'20 U$7.76 10-May-20 U$9.37 20.7% Profit taken, good trade
Integra Resources ITR.v Aug'20 C$2.23 13-Aug-18 C$5.40 142.2% Profit taken, good trade
Wesdome Gold WDO.to Aug'20 C$2.37 14-Oct-17 C$14.82 525.3% last 1/2 of big win closed
INV Metals INV.to Sep'20 C$0.40 17-May-20 C$0.45 12.5% Cut all Ecuador exposure
Cartier Resources ECR.v Nov'20 C$0.155 3-Aug-18 C$0.25 67.7% Exact close price TBA
Tinka Res TK.v Dec'20 C$0.195 19-Apr-16 C$0.195 0.0% Closed on a round trip fail
2015 to 2019 annual closed positions in appendices below, 2009 to 2014 closed positions in editions IKN553 or earlier
35

Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2019
Closed in 2019 closed close price
Atico Mining ATY.v jan'19 C$0.55 24-Jul-16 C$0.32 41.8% patience ran out, made room
Candente Copper DNT.to jan'19 C$0.075 3-Aug-18 C$0.05 -33.3% tiny trade, made room for new
B2Gold BTO.to feb'19 C$2.11 12-Sep-14 C$4.05 91.9% Took 1/2 profits, reduce size
Western Copper WRN.to mar'19 C$0.80 20-Jan-19 C$0.81 1.3% Spec trade that didn't work
B2Gold BTO.to mar'19 C$2.11 12-Sep-14 C$4.15 96.7% Took rest of profit.
GT Gold GTT.v mar'19 C$1.17 10-Oct-18 C$0.90 -23.1% Took loss. Story changed
NovaGold NG apr'19 U$3.84 13-Jan-19 U$4.15 -8.1% Short that didn't work, sm loss
Zinc One Z.v jun'19 C$0.47 14-Sep-17 C$0.025 -94.7% clearing out dead trade
Amarillo Gold AGC.v jun'19 C$0.24 22-Aug-18 C$0.20 -16.7% clearing out dead trade
New Gold NGD aug'19 U$1.44 31-Jul-19 U$1.23 14.6% ST short win thru Q2 earnings
IMPACT Silver IPT.v aug'19 C$0.39 21-Jul-19 C$0.46 18.0% took a quick profit
Fiore Gold F.v aug'19 C$0.34 26-May-19 C$0.56 64.7% Took profit, 2q19 avg
Chakana Copper PERU.v oct'19 C$0.84 22-Mar-18 C$0.16 -81.0% Exploreco trade fail. Want space
Wesdome Gold WDO.to oct'19 C$2.37 14-Oct-17 C$7.57 219.4% Sold half, profit taking
Superior Gold SGI.v oct'19 C$1.46 8-Apr-18 C$0.47 -67.8% Failed sm spec on Au. Moved on
Amerigo Res ARG.to nov'19 C$0.91 23-Sep-18 C$0.50 -45.1% worst trade of year, hefty loss
Guyana Goldfields GUY.to dec'19 C$0.94 14-Apr-19 C$0.56 -40.4% taking the loss, financials weak
Tethyan Res TETH.v dec'19 C$0.30 8-Sep-19 C$0.16 -46.7% tiny trade, word of probs in co
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2018
Closed in 2018 closed close price
Amarillo Gold AGC.v jan'18 C$0.38 24-Mar-17 C$0.31 -18.4% Cut away losing trade
Riverside Res RRI.v jan'18 C$0.39 27-Jun-16 C$0.31 -20.5% Cut away losing trade
Eros Res ERC.v jan'18 C$0.175 1-Mar-17 C$0.16 -8.6% CEO sudden exit, not good
Excellon Res EXN.to jan'18 C$1.54 9-Oct-16 C$1.66 7.8% 4q17 poor, one too many bad qtrs
Wesdome Gold WDO.to jan'18 C$1.68 15-Dec-17 C$2.06 22.6% Near-term trade block, took profit
Sabina G&S SBB.to apr'18 C$2.06 17-Dec-17 C$1.77 -14.1% Near-term trade, bad timing, small
B2Gold BTO.to May'18 C$2.11 12-Sep-14 C$3.67 73.9% sold 25% to reduce exposure
Lara Expl. LRA.v May'18 C$0.65 11-Feb-18 C$0.58 -13.8% Spec on Brazil didn't work
Solitario XPL June'18 U$0.72 19-Mar-17 U$0.41 -43.1% Failed trade, may return in 4q18
SolGold plc SOLG.to July'18 C$0.475 19-Nov-17 C$0.415 -12.6% cut, trade didn't perform
Pan American PAAS July'18 U$17.90 1-Jun-18 U$16.30 8.9% modest win on short position
NGEx Res NGQ.to Sep'18 C$1.01 22-Oct-17 C$1.00 -1.0% Closed to reduce Argentina exp
Sandstorm Gold SAND Oct'18 U$3.73 17-Apr-16 U$4.13 10.7% partial sale to raise cash for GTT
Aldebaran Res ALDE.v Nov'18 n/a n/a n/a n/a liquidate spin out of REG
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2017
Closed in 2017 closed close price
Continental Gold CNL.to Jan'17 C$2.68 22-May-16 C$4.17 55.6% trade closed, profit taken
Focus Ventures FCV.v Jan'17 C$0.23 1-Jul-12 C$0.05 -78.3% Give up, a disaster trade
Wesdome Gold WDO.to Feb'17 C$1.72 28-Aug-16 C$3.00 74.4% Target hit, sold, good trade
Belo Sun BSX.to Mar'17 C$0.90 30-Jan-17 C$0.90 0.0% failed near-term flip trade
Lara Expl. LRA.v Mar'17 C$1.15 8-Apr-12 C$1.05 -8.7% cut to make room for new trade
Rye Patch Gold RPM.v Apr'17 C$0.31 2-Sep-16 C$0.32 3.2% cut for doubts & new stock
Cordoba Min. CDB.v Jun'17 C$0.75 15-Sep-16 C$0.63 -16.0% closed
Constantine Metal CEM.v Aug'17 C$0.135 9-Apr-17 C$0.28 107.4% spec trade closed, good win
Red Eagle Min. R.to Sep'17 C$0.67 13-Dec-16 C$0.27 -59.7% IKN's biggest failure in years
Starcore Intl SAM.to Sep'17 C$0.61 10-Jan-15 C$0.31 -49.2% Patience ran out
B2Gold BTO.to Dec'17 C$2.11 12-Sep-14 C$3.39 60.7% sold small portion for liquidity
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Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2016
Closed in 2016 closed close price
Phoscan Chem FOS.to jan16 C$0.28 29-mar-15 C$0.265 -5.4% Buyout trade, bot but poor deal
True Gold TGM.v jan16 C$0.18 23-aug-15 C$0.25 38.9% okay trade, sold on pol risk
McEwen Mining MUX jan16 U$1.09 25-jan-15 U$1.20 10.1% sold due to lack of value
Lake Shore Gold LSG.to feb-16 C$1.10 07-apr-15 C$1.69 53.6% bot out, sold early in process
Atacama Pacific ATM.v feb-16 C$0.19 26-apr-15 C$0.40 110.5% sold for a double on big pop
New Gold NGD feb-16 U$2.06 24-jan-16 U$2.96 43.7% closed good near-term trade
Sandspring Res SSP.v mar-16 C$0.195 18-oct-15 C$0.32 64.1% Hit tgt, took profit
Teranga Gold TGZ.to mar-16 C$0.54 15-feb-15 C$0.60 11.1% disappointing trade
B2Gold BTG mar-16 U$0.85 13-jan-16 U$1.30 52.9% Separate trade on B2, hit tgt
Dalradian Res DNA.to mar-16 C$0.67 27-oct-13 C$1.00 49.3% Hit target, sold, good win
HudBay Min. HBM may-16 U$4.10 03-apr-16 U$4.36 -6.3% Short trade, poor timing
Nevada Sunrise NEV.v may-16 C$0.185 28-feb-16 C$0.23 24.3% V. small, no big deal either way
Richmont RIC jun-16 U$7.60 01-may-16 U$9.30 22.4% near-term trade, profit taken
INV Metals INV.to jul-16 C$0.25 03-apr-16 C$0.95 280.0% Trade closed on time
HudBay Min. HBM aug16 U$4.98 09-jun-16 U$4.80 3.6% short trade covered, no big deal
Miranda Gold MAD.v oct-16 C$0.125 03-jul-16 C$0.10 -20.0% tiny spec trade, didn't work
Avino G & S ASM nov-16 U$2.00 21-oct-16 U$1.40 -30.0% Abandon trade on bad bot deal
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2015
Closed in 2015 closed close price
Argonaut Gold AR.to jan'15 C$1.47 14-dec-14 C$2.53 72.1% Big gain small time, profit taken
Amerigo Res ARG.to jan'15 C$0.405 20-jul-14 C$0.285 -29.6% Given up on weak Cu prices
Reservoir Min. RMC.v jan'15 C$6.05 18-jun-14 C$4.12 -31.9% sold on Cu downturn
Coro Mining COP.to jan'15 C$0.075 26-jan-14 C$0.035 -53.3% sm, sold on Cu downturn
Fortuna Silver FSM mar'15 U$4.12 10-nov-14 U$3.75 9.0% Short used as hedge
GoldQuest Min. GQC.v mar'15 C$0.26 27-oct-13 C$0.085 -67.3% given up ghost
Rio Alto Mining RIO.to apr'15 C$2.30 07-apr-11 C$3.57 55.2% Top pick, bot out, big win
Timmins Gold TGD jun'15 U$0.60 19-apr-15 U$0.62 3.3% near-term trade, out of time
First Majestic AG jul'15 U$10.51 10-aug-14 U$4.55 56.7% horrible failed trade
NovaCopper NCQ.to jul'15 C$1.05 09-apr-14 C$0.50 -52.4% no more Cu exposure, sm sell
McEwen Mining MUX aug'15 U$0.695 21-jul-15 U$0.92 32.4% Closed nearterm flip for win
Midas Gold MAX.to sep'15 C$0.39 21-sep-15 C$0.35 -10.3% Sm. trade idea that didn't work
New Gold NGD oct'15 U$2.18 23-aug-15 U$3.05 39.9% trade closed, profit taken
Legend Gold LGN.v nov'15 C$0.085 01-mar-15 C$0.035 -58.8% tiny "land grab" idea, failed
Timmins Gold TGD nov'15 U$0.245 20-sep-15 U$0.15 -38.8% small near-term loser
Please note that due to space considerations closed positions 2009 to 2014 are now
available on request, or were published in any edition to IKN553 (end 2019).
Important Disclosure
The information and opinions contained within this report reflect the personal views of the author and therefore all
material within should not be construed as accurate or reliable or be utilized as advice for investment or business
purposes. Independent due diligence and discussions with ones own investment and business advisor is strongly
recommended. Accordingly, nothing in this report should be construed as offering a guarantee of the accuracy or
completeness of the information contained herein, as an offer or solicitation with respect to the purchase or sale of any
security or as an endorsement of any product or service. All opinions and estimates included in this report are subject to
change without notice. It is prohibited to copy or redistribute this report to any type of third party without the express
permission of the author.
37