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The IKN Weekly
Week 727, April 23rd 2023
Contents
This Week: In Today’s Edition, It will work until it doesn’t.
Fundamental Analysis: An essay on Chilean lithium.
Stocks to Follow: Western Exploration (WEX.v), Faraday Copper (FDY.to), Minera Alamos
(MAI.v), SolGold Plc (SOLG.to) (SOLG.L), Goldshore Resources (GSHR.v), AbraSilver Resource
Corp (ABRA.v), Rio2 Ltd (RIO.v), QC Copper & Gold (QCCU.v).
Copper Basket: Overview, Kodiak Copper (KDK.v), Oroco Resources (OCO.v), Hot Chili
(HCH.v), Atacama Copper (ACOP.v).
Producer Basket: Overview.
TinyCaps Basket: Overview, Palamina Corp (PA.v), District Metals (DMX.v).
Regional Politics: Chile: Los Bronces gets its permits, Argentina: President Alberto Fernández
steps aside, Mexico rushes its mining law through the lower house, Ecuador: You can’t fire me
cos I quit…if necessary.
Market Watching: Deferred.
I remind subscribers that no part of this newsletter can be copied, reproduced or
given to any third party without the express permission of the author.
This Week
In Today’s Edition
 Today’s edition is not the usual IKN Weekly recipe as I’ve been obsessing and sweating
over a long note on Chile all weekend. I have to admit I’m not happy about the overall
content this week, as the extra time spent on the main event means that other sections
are not as I’d like them.
 That main event note won’t be for everyone, either. However, the subject was
prompted by several subscribers wanting to know more about the Chile lithium situation
and what it all means, then got under my skin as I read the commentaries available
online and saw the amount of bad information and nonsense being passed off as expert
opinion. Then the weekend got long and difficult, but here we are.
It will work until it doesn’t
We had another market week that made this call, from six editions ago (IKN722), look smarter
than its author really is:
Will gold drop some or drift up a little now? I don’t know, both are perfectly possible
and if you put a gun to my head, I’d probably plump for something in between and
call for gold to break U$2,000/oz in the days ahead but not break away from the line,
remaining in a range around the 2-handle. That might come as bitter disappointment
for the average gold bug and if you’re one reading these words, I apologize for raining
on parades. However, I’m only remaining true to form and no matter whether priced
at U$1,600/oz or U$2,200/oz you’ll always hear me using the same reason for
ownership: You don’t own gold to make you rich, you own it to stop yourself from
becoming poor.
That continues to fit with reality:
1

The revolution around U$2,000/oz continues, though sentiment wasn’t the best at the back end
of last week as gold finally settled below the line. Still, we shouldn’t be too surprised as this
continues to be the most unpopular gold rally of all time. While Central Banks around the world
buy up the metal, the financial markets continue to treat gold with disdain and we even saw
GLD lose tonnage from its vaults last week
6.80 GLD: Inventory/Price Ratio, 2022 to date
6.60
6.40
6.20
6.00
5.80
5.60
5.40
5.20
5.00
4.80
The gold price dropped 1.13%, GLD inventories are down to 923.68 metric tonnes and the
inventory/price ratio continues down at the “worse than washout” 5X line (precisely 5.01).
We’re still ten days away from the next FOMC and the coming week is generally light on
potential macro catalysts, so unless gold holder gets bored to death at the new price deck and
sell it down further, there’s no reason to expect any change for another week. We therefore
predict our “gold around $2k” call to continue to work. Until it doesn’t.
Fundamental Analysis of Mining … Countries
An essay on Chilean lithium
Essay (n): 1590s, "trial, attempt, endeavor," also "short, discursive
literary composition" (first attested in writings of Francis Bacon, probably
in imitation of Montaigne), from French essai "trial, attempt, essay"
(in Old French from 12c.), from Late Latin exagium "a weighing, a weight,
"…apparently meaning here "to weigh." The suggestion is of unpolished writing.
This is a long note and from a small thought that begun on Friday afternoon, has ballooned
over the weekend into the essay (word used deliberately) you see below. I’m also going to
make a weak and whining excuse before you dive in and say that I found this difficult to write.
It’s been through several revisions and re-focuses to remain as on-point about our subject as
possible, but by necessity it still has to cover a wide range of subjects that aren’t always directly
related to mining, let alone lithium mining. There are several sections to the essay so to give
you a break, here’s what we’re covering
2
12/21/13 22/1/41 22/1/82 22/2/11 22/2/52 22/3/11 22/3/52 22/4/8 22/4/22 22/5/6 22/5/02 22/6/3 22/6/71 22/7/1 22/7/51 22/7/92 22/8/21 22/8/62 22/9/9 22/9/32 22/01/7 22/01/12 22/11/4 22/11/81 22/21/2 22/21/61 22/21/03 32/1/31 32/1/72 32/2/01 32/2/42 32/3/01 32/3/42 32/4/7 32/4/12
GLD gold holdings, 2022 to date (metric tonnes)
1120
1100
1080
1060
1040
1020
1000
980
960
940
920
900 Source: SPDR data, IKN calcs
880
860
12/21/13 22/1/41 22/1/82 22/2/11 22/2/52 22/3/11 22/3/52 22/4/8 22/4/22 22/5/6 22/5/02 22/6/3 22/6/71 22/7/1 22/7/51 22/7/92 22/8/21 22/8/62 22/9/9 22/9/32 22/01/7 22/01/12 22/11/4 22/11/81 22/21/2 22/21/61 22/21/03 32/1/31 32/1/72 32/2/01 32/2/42 32/3/01 32/3/42 32/4/7 32/4/12
mt
source: SPDR GLD data

 A preamble: to set the scene
 The lithium news: As delivered by President Boric to his country on
Thursday evening
 A brief history of Codelco and Chile’s copper sector: Necessary context
to understand Chile’s lithium policy decision
 “The N Word” (Nationalization): Details on Boric’s plans for the lithium
sector and whether or not it’s right to call this a “Nationalization”
 Deeper lithium politics: With the news out, some of the ramifications of
the new policy and how it may affect Chile in the near, medium and long-term
 The Devil in the Environmental details: A potential stumbling block for a
lithium looking to expand under public control
 Discussion and conclusion: We even venture an opinion on whether SQM
and ALB are buys after last Friday’s market debacle
Preamble: Normally reserved for fundies and numbers on mining companies, by popular, nay
overwhelming, demand this weekend’s main event is dedicated to the political goings on in
Chile, the country with the best reputation as a mining jurisdiction in the LatAm region. It’s also
the country that’s been making anti-mining headlines since the arrival of its current and 37th
President, Gabriel Boric, in March 2022. So far no news and this desk felt the sharp end of the
arrival when the Rio2 Ltd (RIO.v) EIA application was rejected by Chile’s environmental
assessment body (SEA) for reasons that wouldn’t have raised an eyebrow in previous
administrations, but since the early and more militant period of the Boric presidency we’ve also
seen a clear softening of the clear Left wing politics that brought him to power on many
national issues (not just mining). As always in politics reasons are complex; his slide in the
voter approval polls has been one factor, as has the country’s own slide into economic
recession which is affecting Chile’s economy in 2023 (and perhaps beyond), but the main
watershed came in September 2022 and the Constitutional Referendum. We reported on the
event closely at the time but in a nutshell, it was the opportunity to change the country’s entire
Constitution in a process driven by the same Left wing politics that brought Boric to power.
However, when the moment came the Constitutional Reform was soundly rejected by the
Chilean people and left Boric’s government with a hollow agenda. Since then we’ve seen both
his cabinet of ministers and his own stance move toward the political centre and these days,
Chile’s politics is akin to the Bachelet years. We’ve seen the effects of this shift toward the
centre in the mining world as well, with several examples at hand to consider such as the new
mining royalty watered down significantly as it’s made its passage through Congress (it’s now
being levied on large-scale mines only and on EBIT, rather than gross metal value). Most
recently, at the beginning of last week Chile’s Committee of Ministers (Comité de Ministros)
annoyed its Left wing grassroots support by award EIA permit approval to the Anglo American
Los Bronces expansion project on appeal. More on that below, but first…
The Lithium news. Essentially, this extended piece on the state of Chile’s mining exists in
response to the news from Thursday evening, when President Boric addressed Chile on live TV
(screenshot) to announce his
government’s “Lithium For Chile”
(#LitioPorChile) policy (screenshot right)
The news sent shockwaves through the
mining industry and resulted in a whole
swathe of negative headlines hitting the
trade publications on Friday, as well as
sharp losses in the share prices of the two
private capitals companies currently
working the Chilean lithium space, namely
Chile’s Sociedad Quimica y Minera De
Chile S.A. (SQM) and The USA’s
Albemarle Corp (ALB).
We’ll get to the specifics of what went
3

down on Thursday evening presently, so if you’d like to get a step in front and watch 14
minutes of Spanish language speechifying or brush up on your Spanish sign language, here’s
the link (1) to the Boric address, but before that, we take a detour and offer a little history on
Chile’s copper sector, with an emphasis on its State run company, Codelco, as its context is
important to better understand the state of play in Chile today
A brief history of Codelco and Chile’s copper sector: We begin with this chart, showing
Chile’s copper production in thousands of metric tonnes between 1990 and last year, 2022:
Chile: Total copper production per year, 1990 to 2022
4
393
591,1
986
621,1
677651,1 619
931,1
680,1431,1 423,1
561,1
598,1
122,1
161,2
132,1
482,2
304,1
488,2
805,1
680,3
615,1
741,3
295,1
160,3
025,1
243,3
365,1
976,3
337,1
395,3
827,1
586,3
676,1
479,3
385,1
168,3
664,1
296,3
207,1
037,3
986,1
825,3
537,1
787,3
746,1
451,4
226,1
980,4
276,1
040,4
237,1
548,3
807,1
077,3
437,1
451,4
876,1
991,4
885,1
511,4
816,1
500,4
816,1
588,3
644,1
6,500
6,000
5,500
5,000
4,500
4,000 3,500
3,000
2,500 2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
0991 1991 2991 3991 4991 5991 6991 7991 8991 9991 0002 1002 2002 3002 4002 5002 6002 7002 8002 9002 0102 1102 2102 3102 4102 5102 6102 7102 8102 9102 0202 1202 2202
MMT Cu
Total Non-Codelco
Total Codelco
source: Cochilco
To understand lithium going forward, we first need a handle on the long-term history of copper
production in what is today the world’s #1 Cu producer. There were some large private capital
copper operations in Chile before 1990, most notably the Anglo American owned assets, but we
start the ball rolling at 1990 as that was the year the world’s single largest copper operation,
the BHP controlled La Escondida, started production. That took a while to ramp into what we
know its production today (just 89,000 tonnes in 1990 and 298,400 in 1991, these days 1.0-1.2
million tonnes is normal) and then in the mid-
1990s other big mines held by private Chile: Codelco annual share in total copper production
companies such as Collahuasi, Los Pelambres, 80
70
El Abra, Candelaria etc came online, so by the
60
time the new Chilean copper regime was fully 50
established, Codelco’s lion’s share of 40
30
production “Pre Escondida” was down to
20
around 30% of total country output. As this 10
chart shows (right), that share slipped 0
somewhat last year (27.1%) and 2023 isn’t
shaping up as a good one for Codelco either,
but longer term projections from the State-run
corporation have production returning to the 1.7mmt level and back to its approx 30% total
share.
So far, we’ve established that State-owned Codelco is a big copper mining company and until
1990, ran most of the production in the country. Since that time its production has increased,
but the private sector accounts for most of the growth in the last 30 years b ut even so,
Codelco has remained Chile’s largest single copper producer and over the years, has vied with
FreePort as the world’s #1. As a result, it’s a major economic force in Chile and while you can
argue (or not) about its relative efficiency and gross/net margins compared to the private
sector mines, there’s no doubting the amount of money it’s contributed directly to the State
treasury and, therefore, to the development of the country.
And Chileans know that very well, which brings us to the point of our detour to the copper
sector in Chile. I’m the first to concede that GDP is a blunt instrument of gauging the
performance of a country, but if you give the numbers enough time and use the same
yardsticks for all countries, it does give a reasonable comparative and this chart showing World
0991 1991 2991 3991 4991 5991 6991 7991 8991 9991 0002 1002 2002 3002 4002 5002 6002 7002 8002 9002 0102 1102 2102 3102 4102 5102 6102 7102 8102 9102 0202 1202 2202
%
source: Cochilco

Bank nominal GDP per capita (2) for six South American countries over the long-term shows
how Chile has beaten out its perrs in the money race. For the comparative, we choose Brazil
and Argentina because it’s impossible to ignore the continent’s two largest countries (and for
what it’s worth one is a lot bigger than another; e.g. the GDP of the Brazilian State of Sao Paulo
is bigger than that of Argentina). We than choose Peru, Ecuador and Colombia as the large
Andean countries most comparable to our focus country, ignoring the more impoverished
Bolivia, Paraguay or the politically devastated Venezuela. As you can see, Chile leads the pack
(and Chileans know that well):
Chile’s 2021 GDP per capita reading of U$16,265 is more impressive compared to its South
America peers than the raw squiggly lines suggest. A small country with difficult natutal
geography, it does not enjoy the scale advantages of Brazil. Meanwhile, the raw data for
Argentina as used in the above World Bank chart assumes the Argentina Peso at the official
rate to the dollar, rather than the “Dolar Blue” which gives a more accurate reading of living
standards and would drop the level into the pack.
In so many words and aside from small and “bank rich” Uruguay (to put it as diplomatically as
possible) Chile sits apart from the rest of South America in relative wealth but, as you can
probably see from this long-term chart, it wasn’t always that way. And while Codelco isn’t the
only factor in to reiterate, Chileans are well aware of what Codelco has done for the country
and there’s a tremendous amount of national pride around the company. Created under the left
wing government of Salvador Allende, encouraged by the very right wing Pinochet government
that took over from Allende in the famous 1972 coup and subsequently boosted by democratic
governments from the left and right post-Pinochet, the positive vibes toward Codelco cut across
political boundaries. Indeed, when the two Sebastian Piñera administrations in the 2010s/2020s
floated the idea of privatizing even one small portion of Codelco it was met with consistent
pushback from rank and file Chileans. This is the context in which to understand last week’s
announcement on lithium by Gabriel Boric. Though clearly a left-wing playbook move, both he
and his political opposition know that it’s a policy that won’t get rejected out of hand by his
natural political opposition. They, and Chile in general, look upon Codelco as a national crown
jewel and, in emulating this model for the “new white gold” of lithium, he’ll get acceptance from
a populace that understands the benefits of having a profitable, State-run mining company and
not merely reaping taxation from the mining sector. Like it or not, this is going to go down with
Chileans a lot better than the lefty wheeze about changing the country’s Constitution last year.
The background on copper and Codelco frames what happened in the lithium space last week.
In fact, last week was only one stage of the process and it’s not as if it should have come as a
total surprise to us on the outside. For example, while campaigning in 2021 Gabriel Boric made
his case for State ownership of lithium assets clear to all who would listen and the proposal was
gauged a net vote winner by political analysts. Then as President-Elect, his team blocked
outgoing President Piñera’s attempts to sell five lithium concessions by tender during the final
days of his government, accusing the government of committing the “historic error of
privatizing natural resources.” Later in his inaugural speech to Congress as President he
announced the formation of the ‘National Lithium Company’ which, along with Codelco, will
form the backbone of the forward policy. Finally, in the weeks leading up to last Thursday’s
5

announcement it was common knowledge in Chile that the country would soon launch its
“National Lithium Policy” (Estrategia Nacional del Litio) and that it would be based around a
public-private association with final executive control held by the State entity, due to “the
strategic nature of the metal” (quote/unquote). Here we are today and while some of the
Thursday announcement may have surprised its audience, for example the way in which Boric
wants to use Codelco to negotiate with SQM and ALB before the National Lithium Company gets
off the ground, the only people truly shocked by Thursday were people not watching closely.
“The N Word” (Nationalization): That’s enough background (I think), now for details on last
week’s announcement, we then chew over what the market doesn’t like about the news, be
there concerns justified or not. First we consider the "National Lithium Strategy" as announced
by Gabriel Boric on Thursday and, while you can dismiss the point as semantics if you want, it’s
notable that at no point did Boric use "The N Word" (i.e. Nationalization). Quite the contrary in
fact, he went out of his way to avoid using it, all while stating Chile was "a serious country" and
that it would respect any and all contract signed with third party private capitals, including
those with SQM and Albemarle. Those two companies currently work concessions at the only
locality with lithium production in Chile today, the Atacama Salt Flat (Salar de Atacama).
President Boric made mention of these contracts and said that while the State will respect the
agreements, they would still enter into negotiations with SQM (contract good until 2030) and
ALB (contract good to 2043) in order to go into a JV on production before the time on the
contract is up and the concessions revert to the State. In the words of Boric during the TV
address (quote translated), "Chile will respect the current established contracts totally. That is
to say, a prior participation of the State in production at the Atacama Salt Flats would be the
fruit of an agreement with those companies that currently own the rights to lithium production."
For sure, there's going to be pressure exerted on the two companies (and SQM in particular,
with just seven years to run on the contract) but it's not as if SQM/ALB bring nothing to the
table either. For one, just the seven years to run on SQM's contract represents a lot of
production and revenue but more importantly, the State has made it clear that it wants to JV
with the private sector and grow lithium production across the country, not merely rest on its
Atacama Salar laurels. We don't know exactly what percentage make-up these JVs would be,
the Boric government has limited itself to a brief mention of "at least 51%" but will insist on the
State having the majority share and therefore operational control of any JV. However and
clearly, Chile is not about to nationalize in the strict sense of the word, let alone start
expropriating or forcing asset sales at whatever price.
That did not stop the world from reacting in the way it wanted to, however. Boric didn’t say The
N Word but nearly every copy I’ve read in the English language (and most of the Spanish
language op-eds as well) had no problem going there and many went a lot further. I’ve chosen
the following report published by The Motley Fool on Friday (3) because a) it’s typical of the
fayre out there today (and stops short of some of the really angry stuff, e.g. influencer ranters
on social media followed by millions who take their word as gospel), it’s from a business media
service (that should know better, quite frankly) and it’s a high traffic website itself, getting
plenty of eyeballs from people looking for good advice. Please consider its contents, particularly
the “So What” section:
Why Sociedad Quimica y Minera de Chile Stock Crashed Today
Key Points
 On Thursday night, Chilean President Gabriel Boric announced plans to
nationalize Chile's lithium industry.
 Sociedad Quimica y Minera de Chile is a big part of the Chilean lithium
industry.
 Investors are worried that SQM may not receive a fair price for the assets
Chile is seizing.
How bad could this news get for SQM?
What happened
Friday dawned bleak for investors in Sociedad Quimica y Minera de Chile (SQM -
18.57%). Shares of the Chilean lithium miner tumbled by 14.8% through 12:57 p.m. ET
in the wake of the Thursday evening announcement from Chilean President Gabriel
6

Boric that he intends to nationalize the Chilean lithium industry -- which may or may not
include SQM itself.
So what
What does it mean for a country to nationalize an industry -- and more particularly, the
companies that operate within that industry? At the most basic level, nationalization
involves a forced transfer of ownership, with present owners of the property in question
required to sell or simply surrender that property to the government.
Nationalization may -- or may not -- include the government compensating the present
owners for their property. But even if the government pays for the property it takes,
because this is a forced sale, the government sets the price, which may be a fair price
-- or may not.
This is the situation in which SQM shareholders now find themselves.
Now what
A couple of things need to be understood at this early hour: First, just because a
government says it is going to do something doesn't mean it will follow through.
Nationalization has been threatened, but it may not actually happen (or a future
administration may reverse the policy).
Second, at present, it appears that Chile's plan is to nationalize its lithium resources --
not necessarily the companies (such as SQM) that are mining those resources. It's
likely that even after nationalization, Chile will want to contract with SQM, Albemarle,
and other lithium companies to do the work of mining the lithium, and to have those
miners share the profits from its sale with the state.
Still, it's clear that this is bad news for SQM, which has 79% of its assets in Chile
(according to data from S&P Global Market Intelligence). It's worse news for SQM than
it is for Albemarle, which has only 26% exposure to the country. If all or even most of
SQM's assets end up being nationalized at anything less than a fair price, it's likely that
SQM's share price will fall much further.
That’s quite the write-up. Quite awful, in fact. No matter that Chile’s President didn’t say
nationalization, that he said all current contracts would be honoured and that the strategy
would be to go into majority control JVs with private sector mining companies; In the space of
just a few lines The Motley Fool raised the
spectre of forced sales, expropriation and
deals made under price duress so let us be
clear, when The Motley Fool states, “This is
the situation in which SQM shareholders now
find themselves” they were at best
exaggerating, more likely outright lying.
Anyway, with that and many other example
of copy ringing in the ears of a spooked
market on Friday, here’s how the SQM and
ALB share price finished after the North had
finished panicking over their worst-case
scenarios (right). This ten-day chart
documents the 18.5% lost by SQM and the
10.0% by ALB on Friday, with SQM volume
shown below. Staying with SQM, this five-
year chart shows how the recent visits of the
share price to U$110 are now a thing of the
past and the Friday dumpage on 17.5m
share volume wiped out nearly all gains seen
in the stock last year.
Now for sure most of those 2022 gains were
on the back of the near-parabolic move
made by lithium market prices last year, this
five-year chart of Lithium Carbonate in Yuan
a also shows how prices have fallen back off
the cliff in 2023.
7

It is, therefore, fair to say that the medium-term weakness we see in both SQM and ALB is
more about market forces than Chilean laws, but Friday still came as a large bucket of ice-cold
water for both stocks and particularly for SQM, what with most of its production base in Chile.
So, winners and losers? Obviously there are going to be those when a country moves its
goalposts and changes the rules for companies operating inside its borders, that’s what
happens. SQM took one on the chin Friday and it doesn’t matter if you call it a “revised policy”
or nationalization, that’s the way things go for stocks sometimes. But just because ALB and
SQM had bad days doesn’t necessarily meant he sky is about to fall in on their businesses or
even the Chilean lithium sector. Therefore, to sum up so far:
 Is this “nationalization” or not? That’s up for debate. My opinion? Personally, I would
indeed call the Boric government plan for lithium in Chile nationalization, but one that
comes with a whole bunch of qualifiers. It’s certainly not the bugaboo scenario sketched
out for casual readers or screamed about on social media on Friday and a long way from
the Hugo Chávez or Fidel Castro method of direct expropriation for little or no payment.
It’s nationalization, Jim, but not as we know it.
 Instead, Chile’s nationalization is about taking majority State control (house best guess
60/40) on all lithium production in the country over the long-term and become a major
player in the metal, with the model that of Codelco in the copper space. This gives lie to
the “First it’s lithium but what next? They won’t stop there!” voices so prevalent last
week, as in fact Chile has already come for copper! It’s called Codelco, they “came for it”
in 1971 and since then the Chilean State owned entity has lived peacefully and happily
alongside private sector capital and executed on a successful, long-term business model.
Chile as a country has benefited greatly from its State copper mining entity (unlike many
other nationalized industry players in other places) and now, under Boric, its government
wants to repeat the success in the new and suddenly popular lithium space. All this
implies there will always be space, and plenty of it, for private sector mining companies
as long as they are happy about the terms of the deal as laid out last week and being
minority JV partners with the State (pace the Codelco model at several of its mines).
 Chile will honour all existing contracts (a point conveniently missed by that Motley Fool
report). That said, it clearly plans to use its bargaining position (i.e. as the holder of all
exploration stage concessions and the owner of the SQM Atacama Salar concession as
from 2030) as leverage to try and close a deal on the current operations and get part of
the operations revenue out of the Atacama Salar as from now, Boric doesn’t want to wait
until 2030. That will necessarily involve some horse trading and SQM’s position is hardly
one of abject weakness, as with the right deal and a long-term view it can close on a
win-win with the State.
 Whatever title you give last week’s move, President Boric has made a political decision
and it’s one that’s true to form for his Left wing party base and basic ideology. It’s also
him making good on a campaign promise he made in 2021 while winning first his party
nomination, then the election and eventual run-off against his hard-Right opponent
8

Antonio Kast. However and to make sure you see this is a key point it’s in bold type,
this ostensibly Left wing move is one that will get plenty of cross party support in Chile,
particularly among the rank and file Chilean people who have witnessed the benefits
brought from Codelco and will like the concept of “doing it all again with Lithium.” Equally
and to the benefit of private capitals, the same rational Chilean also knows Codelco
shouldn’t go it alone and be the sole copper production entity in the country, therefore
the plan to go 60/40 (guess) with private capital on lithium would also make sense to the
country.
Deeper lithium politics: Now for some political ramifications of last week’s announcement on
lithium, in which we take half a step away from SQM, ALB etc and instead focus on the Chilean
lithium space. There are also obvious political angles for this new plan to take into consideration
and here are three obvious examples, one near-term, one medium-term and one a long-term
factor.
 Near-term: Boric needs to get this initiative through Congress. In order to set up the "National
Lithium Company" (Empresa Nacional de Litio) his administration needs to present a bill to
parliament that is then debated and voted upon and there's no guarantee that anything gets
through, even though his alliance has a small nominal majority. Getting any bill past the lower
house will require a 4/7 majority and after that comes the potentially more hostile Senate
second reading. It will take green lights from both chambers just to get the National Lithium
Company off the ground, at which point the Boric government cna enter into formal
negotiations with Chile's other lithium players.
 Medium-Term: In fact connected to the near-term, as so far we don't have many details on
the structure of the National Lithium Company or what it would look like. We know Codelco
and the other State mining company, Enami, will have a role in the new entity, we also know
that the government wants to have executive control over any lithium asset, be that 51/49 JV,
60/40 or 100% for the State. The creation moment of the State company will therefore be the
obvious time to lay down the ground rules and decide on what and how it participates with
private capitals. What we don't know for sure but can deduce with a high level of confidence
us that the State is keen on working with the private sector and the most likely deal would be
a 60/40 split on operations and concessions, or perhaps 51/49, with either side investing pro
rata. Via its ministry of mining, the government has stated it wants to work with the private
sector as it recognizes that innovation and development is not the State's strength, while on
the other hand the State can bring better levels of CSR risk management and permitting fast
track to new lithium developments. Utopian perhaps, but that in general terms is how Chile
sees the lithium sector moving forward and President Boric was clear in his speech on
Thursday that the goal was the make Chile the world's largest producer of lithium and to
contribute to the energy transition of the planet at the right time with the right product. It is
currently number two, behind Australia, and will have to watch its back as Argentina's lithium
sector is now getting into gear.
 Long-Term: Chile certainly has the lithium raw materials available to it, which brings in the
longview of its new lithium policy. The Atacama Salar is the largest in the country and so far
at least, the only one in production but it's only one of 45 Salares with known lithium
resources. Of the 45, 15 are under active exploration and aside from SQM and ALB at
Atacama, two other Salares are concessioned with active contracts (Maricunga and
Pedernales), both with Codelco. so it's true that the current, highly profitable and highly
scalable operations at the Atacama Salar under SQM and ALB are considered the "jewel in the
crown" and Chile is keen to get its slice of the action there, but the operators are also in
position to improve their long-term development pipeline. Any deal with the State (be it
Codelco, the new National Lithium Company or whoever else) to allow Chile a controlling
piece of the current operation could come with long-term JV agreements that benefit both
sides and to repeat, Boric on Thursday was clearly not after simple expropriation of current
operations or taking what was available today, the narrative is much more about building a
"Lithium Codelco" that is a source of revenues for the country over the same type of decades-
long period as the copper Codelco, with according benefits for the country. Boric is a Socialist
(large S) at heart, after all.
9

 Another long-term issue is more straightforward; between now and 2030 (when things might
start happening) we’re going to have at least two national Presidential elections in Chile. As
SQM is under no obligation to cut a deal with the State, they may decide that history is not
going with the present government and hold out for the next election, or even the one after
that, and get a different decision from a different government. Once again, this simple
political factor gives more equity and bargaining chips to SQM, ALB or any other company that
decides to enter negotiations with Chile over a lithium JV.
The Devil in the Environmental detail: If all the above sounds too good to be true, then
you might of course be right. Painting last Thursday’s announcement as “nationalization-but-
not” is one thing, but blithely assuming a perfect and seamless relationship at a public/private
JV on one of the world’s hottest and most profitable metal commodities right now is another
kettle of fish. To wit, some of the more perceptive critics of this proposal have seen that
environmental concerns and the Chilean government’s new push for a more sustainable and
ecologically friendly mining sector could turn out to be a critical stumbling block for the future
of Chile’s lithium sector. We know the Boric government is pushing for greener, environmentally
friendlier and less resource intensive mining and the current method for lithium production in
Chile’s Atacama Salar is not that, in fact it’s not even close. The standard evaporation technique
used by both SQM and ALB is very (and we mean VERY) water intensive as the mineral is
brought to the surface in natural solution and then literally left to evaporate, leaving lithium-rich
salts which are then processed. The Boric government via its ministries of environment and of
mining have made several critical references to this method of lithium mining in the year since
taking office, but as “contracts are contracts” they will not interfere and current operations
methods will almost certainly continue, no matter who is in JV in the years to come. However,
the government does not want evaporation to become the standard extraction technology and
has been pushing hard to develop direct extraction methods that are far less a drain (again,
literally drain) on water table of localities. In fact, Boric made mention of this subject during his
Thursday address to the nation when stating that the policy includes the creation of an
“National Lithium and Salt Flats Institute” with the objective to (quote translated) (4), “…create
investigation capabilities in ecology, geology and social sciences regarding the salt flats, their
biodiversity and the communities that live around them.”
This could be a problem, because while the current evaporation method is simple technology
and while wasteful of water, is cheap to do. Conversely, the direct extraction methods planned
for salt flat lithium deposits are as yet unproven technology, are mostly still in the experimental
lab stages and their costs (or set up and of operation) are as-yet unknown. Here lies the rub, as
if the Chilean salt flats up and down the country (not just Atacama) were left to the private
sector to develop, there wouldn’t be such a moral or environmental issue about using the
“proven technology” (i.e. evaporation) until such time as the direct extraction method were
perfected but, with a government keen on pushing its green agenda in control of development
and production, we may see a bottleneck in production appear as Chile tries and fails to
increase production because its government refuses to green light old and water wasteful
methods of production, even on a temporary basis.
There may of course be other roadblocks and bottlenecks caused by the decision to put Chile’s
lithium section into JV but with government executive control (we all know what, “I’m from the
government and I’m here to help you” really means, after all), the above is one that comes to
mind even at this early stage. The bottom line is that the public sector tends to be clumsier,
slower, less innovative and less agile than the private sector and that could be a problem for
Boric’s initiative. However we should also recognize that such issues won’t show up in the first
months or even years of the plan and as long as the legislation required to inaugurate the
National Lithium Company passes Chile’s Congress, the country will then want to see its “New
Codelco” progress as quickly as possible, no matter what stripe of government is in power in
2026 or 2030.
Discussion and conclusion: The first thing to say in the summing-up section of this note is
that the market simply did not understand what went down last Thursday evening in Chile.
10

However, we need to pick apart the issues because while I agree the news was a net negative
for the companies currently producing lithium in Chile, i.e. SQM and ALB, it’s not necessarily a
bad thing for the lithium market in general and certainly doesn’t imply there will be a sudden
drop in lithium production from the Atacama Flats, a zone that currently supplies around 25%
of the world’s lithium to a quickly growing market.
The second thing to say is that the drops in those stocks, particularly in my opinion ALB, have
been way overcooked. Now, that does not mean, I repeat THAT DOES NOT MEAN I AM
CALLING BUY ON SQM OR ALB and I’m well aware that the type of shockwaves that hit the
market on Friday can continue to reverberate for a while. That means lower prices are possible
so anyone with the inkling to trade or “buy the dip” on SQM or ALB should bear that in mind.
However, as a fundies analyst at heart I am confident in stating that the movements in the
price of lithium are far more important to the future of the SQM (and ALB) stock price than last
week’s announcement or even the ongoing political decisions Chile will make regarding lithium.
That’s also true for its wider metals and mining sector (we consider the Los Bronces case below
in Regional Politics and how it may affect Rio2 Ltd. I also expect the “We All Gonna Die”
sentiment that was so prevalent on Friday to get rolled back as the reality of this
“nationalization that isn’t really a nationalization” comes to light. After all, if the State has juicy
and profitable contracts to award to the private sector, there’s a deal to be cut somewhere or
other and if SQM says no, there are plenty of other lithium companies that would like to get
their slice of the world’s largest reserve country for the metal. However, those of you looking at
SQM for a trade need to be clear; the moves in lithium carbonate prices will dictate its share
price performance more than the next public statement by President Boric of Chile will.
As for what’s next, in my opinion SQM will do right for itself by sitting down at the negotiation
table and finding a deal with the State of Chile on its current Atacama Salar operations. We may
even see Albemarle (ALB) cut a deal too, even though its contract has two decades left to run.
But the case of SQM is the most pertinent, being as it is a Chilean private capitals company with
nearly all its revenues (around 90%) from operations inside the country and with a solid, long-
term vision for its business. It won’t be able to play hardball with the State but it’s not without
its own positions of strength either, as Chile wants the brains trust that comes with the private
operators and their potential for innovation as much as their pro rata cash for any eventual JV.
In return for “letting Chile in early” on the Atacama operations SQM could benefit from judicial
security, easier permitting tracks, access to more development projects among the 45 or so
locations ready for lithium processing development. That’s not a bad long-term package.
Regarding the Chile State’s position, after the reversal in the Constitutional referendum and the
way in which he has been semi-forced to move to the political centre in subsequent months,
President Boric “needs a win” and in this policy, he’s likely to get one. However, the passage
from televised announcement to active law is a long one and will probably involve negotiations
and concessions in several areas. Even so, the plan for a majority/minority public/private JV on
lithium in Chile is likely to be a vote winner and over the long-term, gives him a “legacy policy”
potential on which he’ll always be able to fall back on when his political going gets tough. He
won’t push for outright nationalization because he knows he won’t get it, but a “Codelco For
Lithium” which provides treasury revenue and development over the long-term fits in well with
his worldview.
And with that, I wrap up this over-long essay on Chile and its lithium sector in light of the
country’s policy decision last Thursday. If you have any further questions, please feel free to
fire them at me via mailbox, Twitter or WhatsApp though for best results, make them specific.
I’ll close with a bottom line statement, saying that while I understand and agree with the
market’s concern over Chile’s move last week, the reality of the situation quickly got lost in the
hype and screaming. That may or may not continue for another day or two this week (I’ll be
watching the tape along with the rest of you) but I have no plans to buy the SQM/ALB dip
because, ultimately, the vagaries of the lithium spot price will determine the big share price
movements of those two stocks and frankly, I don’t have a clue what lithium will do next.
11

Stocks to Follow
Eight of the 18 names currently featured on our Stocks to Follow list returned week-over-week
gains (QCCU.v, FDY.to, WEX.v,NCAU.v, RIO.v, CKG.v, MIRL.cse, GSHR.v), two were unchanged
(ORX.v, ATC.v) and the other eight were losers (MAI.v, ARG.to, SOLG.to, ABRA.v, ALDE.v,
RUG.v, CTGO, MENE.v), which makes the raw headcount a tie and that’s not a bad haul for a
down week in the mining world. However, you’ve probably noticved already that my personal
largest positions were (nearly) all losers and what’s more, two of the drops registered were
precipitous in the shape of SolGold in Canadian trading (SOLG.to down 19.5%, though in
mitigation its main London listing “only” dropped 10.4%) and AbraSilver (ABRA.v down 11.8%).
The leaven to those painful losers came from Rio2 Ltd (RIO.v up 13.2%). Minera IRL also
returned a 25% percentage gain but that’s just half a cent and the company is ruined anyway,
it hardly matters.
We currently have 18 open positions, two below the self-imposed maximum. Nine are in the
green, two are unchanged, seven are in the red and Newcore is still underwater.
company Ticker this week Avg Price Reco date Current PPS Gain/Loss% Notes
TOP PICKS
Minera Alamos MAI.v STR BUY C$0.21 13-Oct-19 C$0.405 92.9% $0.75 first tgt, #1 idea
RECOMMENDED STOCKS
Amerigo Res ARG.to STR BUY C$1.36 12-Dec-21 C$1.72 26.5% Main Cu trade, top fundies
SolGold SOLG.to STR BUY C$0.265 19-Feb-23 C$0.31 20.8% Cu in Ecuador, M&A tgt
QC Copper&Gold QCCU.v SPEC BUY C$0.265 25-Apr-21 C$0.17 -35.8% MRE now due 2q23, annoying
Faraday Copper FDY.to BUY C$0.79 26-Mar-23 C$1.09 38.0% Latest Cu exploreco, IKN723
AbraSilver Res. ABRA.v BUY C$0.36 4-Dec-22 C$0.375 4.2% added for last time Mar'23
Western Explor. WEX.v BUY C$1.88 9-Apr-23 C$1.84 -2.1% new trade, Au spec in NV USA
Newcore Gold NCAU.v BUY C$0.205 23-Oct-22 C$0.19 -7.3% MRE better than it looked.
Rio2 Ltd. RIO.v SPEC BUY C$0.83 22-Apr-18 C$0.215 -74.1% Cheap on permit probs, appeal
SPECULATIVE TRADES
Orefinders ORX.v.v SPEC BUY C$0.04 20-Nov-22 C$0.04 0.0% build position at 4c
Chesapeake Gold CKG.v SPEC BUY C$3.07 20-Feb-22 C$2.73 -11.1% Au leverage, small trade so far
Aldebaran Res. ALDE.v BUY C$0.72 16-May-21 C$0.87 20.8% drill assays now coming
Minera IRL MIRL.cse avoid C$0.195 22-Jul-12 C$0.025 -87.2% run into ground byCEO, AVOID
A WATCHLIST OF POTENTIAL TRADES. NB: I DO NOT OWN
ATAC Res ATC.v WATCH C$0.095 11-Se-22 C$0.16 68.4% Cheap Yukon neighbour play
Rugby Resources RUG.v WATCH C$0.06 26-Mar-23 C$0.06 0.0% new on watchlist, Cu in Col
Goldshore Res GSHR.v WATCH C$0.165 26-Mar-23 C$0.215 30.3% return to list, possible flip
Contango Ore CTGO WATCH U$23.25 2-Dec-22 U$30.16 29.7% Manh Choh finance happening
LONG-TERM NON-MINING HOLD
Mene Inc. MENE.v adding C$0.63 6-Dec-20 C$0.31 -50.8% LT bet, adding slowly
CLOSED TRADES IN 2023 date closed close price
Altiplano Metals APN.v jan'23 C$0.31 17-Sep-21 C$0.17 -45.2% delayed and will dilute soon
Western Copper WRN.to mar'23 C$2.02 13-Nov-22 C$2.32 14.9% sold on reduced M&A prob.
2015 to 2022 annual closed positions in appendices below, 2009 to 2014 closed positions in editions IKN553 or earlier
Now for notes on some of the covered companies:
Western Exploration (WEX.v): ADDED. Still in very small amounts, though. It was slightly
easier to buy WEX last week, though still very thinly traded and you could still drive a truck
between the bid and ask. The placement will roll out soon and I’m going to try to get a few
more at the right price in the meantime. The promo will begin once the placement is done and
dusted, you have until then to position (or sign up for the deal, of course).
12

Faraday Copper (FDY.to): I wish they all started like this one, up 38% in four weeks and all
this before the true catalysts are rolled out, i.e. the next drill results and the resource update,
both expected in May. Do I own enough? Of course
not, when they go down you own too many and when
they go up you’re position is light.
Minera Alamos (MAI.v): On Thursday, somebody
decides they wanted to own some MAI shares and we
got a reminder of the tight handed nature of the stock
ownership. It only takes a medium-sized buyer to
make a difference to the price action.
In fundies news, I checked in with company President
Doug Ramshaw this weekend and found out that the
company’s YE financials will likely drop on May 1st i.e.
one week from now and the limit date for TSXV
annuals for company’s with a December 31st financial year-end. After that we should soon get
the 1q23 financials out around the end of May and those will probably be more informative than
the annual numbers. We’ll se on both but I’ll probably hold back on a full fundies update until
the 1q23 numbers are in-hand. Saves repetition.
SolGold Plc (SOLG.to) (SOLG.L): The CFO got
some incentive options and the stock got a
hammering as buyers backed off, mostly in London
trading. Our Dot Tee Oh visual shows how the big
drop came on Monday (hindsight says Canadian
trading to a 38.5c close the previous week was too
much too soon) and then on Friday, when low
volume did for the price into the close. I am totally
relaxed about holding through until the buyout fun
begins and, as noted last weekend, that will
probably need some clarity on the future of the
national political scene before the Chinese start the
ball rolling.
Goldshore Resources (GSHR.v): GSHR was popular early week and seems to have gained
back some of the retail momentum it lot in 4q22
and 1q23. We got a new drill assay NR on
Thursday which “Includes Intersects 2.17 g/t Au
over 50.35m and 6.96 g/t Au over 15.05m” along
strike/at depth in the main Southwest zone of
Moss Lake, which were good returns but fairly
standard for the deposit and not market-moving
material. More interesting was the confirmation
in the NR that the current drill program is now
complete and the update mineral resource is on
track for next month, May 2023. The NR noted
that, “The updated resource will use data from
an additional 72 holes compared to the
November 2022 resource.” All good.
It’s on the Watch List, it’s made progress since then but I don’t own any myself. Does that
mean I’ve personally missed the boat on GSHR? Yes it’s possible, but I don’t have much desire
to chase the stock with the 25c warrant overhang now in-play and the potential that the stock
retrace on either news or a gold retreat. If I miss the boat, so be it.
13

AbraSilver Resource Corp (ABRA.v): We ran a five-day chart of ABRA versus the silver
miners’ ETF (SIL) last week and called it an average market performer. This week we run the
ten-day chart that saw ABRA doing much the same right up until Friday, when for its own sweet
reasons the stock hit heavy selling into the open and dumped harder than most.
Rio2 Ltd (RIO.v): The news of the Los Bronces permit
approval did good things for RIO.v last week, though
volumes didn’t go crazy. We do more on the Chilean
mining situation in this weekend’s Regional Politics
below, including the direct consequences of the Comite
de Ministros decision on the mining world and what it
all might mean for Rio2 at Fenix.
QC Copper & Gold (QCCU.v): News and movement.
First the news and QCCU closed the final tranche of
placement successfully, raising a total of C$1.68m gross
proceeds when the target was C$1.6m. Presumably a couple of extra late takers were found a
place and everyone is happy. More interestingly for somebody who is happy to hold but not
buying any more for the time being (e.g. me) the stock did quite well, with the ask taken quite
regularly over the week and buyers showing appetite. The chartists will tell you about the need
to break 18c and then a more important ceiling at 20c, I’m okay about 17c this weekend as a
decent place to start momentum as we move to May/June and the anticipated release of the
resource update (MRE).
The Copper Basket
After sixteen weeks of 2023, The Copper Basket shows a gain of 10.42% to level stakes:
14

company ticker price 1/1/23 Shares out Market Cap current pps gain/loss%
1 Solaris Res SLS.to 6.44 114.56 819.10 7.15 11.0%
2 Marimaca Cop MARI.to 3.22 88.028 360.91 4.10 27.3%
3 Western Copper WRN.to 2.41 151.597 351.71 2.32 -3.7%
4 Arizona Sonoran ASCU.to 1.92 105.96 205.56 1.94 1.0%
5 Oroco Res OCO.v 0.91 207.034 196.68 0.95 4.4%
6 Faraday Copper FDY.to 0.54 175.2 190.97 1.09 101.9%
7 Hot Chili HCH.v 0.78 119.455 132.60 1.11 42.3%
8 Aldebaran Res. ALDE.v 0.78 139.007 120.94 0.87 11.5%
9 Regulus Res. REG.v 1.10 124.509 103.34 0.83 -24.5%
10 Pan Global Res PGZ.v 0.46 212.145 80.62 0.38 -17.4%
11 Kodiak Copper KDK.v 1.12 56.2 43.27 0.77 -31.3%
12 QC Copper QCCU.v 0.165 162.815 27.68 0.17 3.0%
13 Element 29 Res ECU.v 0.16 86.966 19.57 0.225 40.6%
14 Libero Copper LBC.v 0.155 93.869 12.20 0.13 -16.1%
15 Atacama Copper ACOP.v 0.16 34.373 5.84 0.17 6.3%
NB: All stocks in CAD$ Portfolio avg 10.42%
Our Copper Basket last week saw six winners
(MARI.to, ASCU.to, HCH.v, PGZ.v, FDY.to, The Copper Basket 2023, weekly evolution
14%
QCCU.v), just one unchanged stock (OCO.v) and 12%
eight losers (SLS.to, WRN.to, ALDE.v, REG.v, 10%
KDK.v, ECU.v, LBC.v, ACOP.v) but despite the 8%
6%
adverse headcount, the basket average managed
4%
to improve on the week and break the +10%
2%
barrier for the first time this year. The basket 0%
average was supported by the big percentage -2%
-4%
moves in Hot Chili (HCH.v up 20.7%), soon to get
re-named, and then QC Copper & gold (QCCU.v
up 9.7%). Biggest loser was Western Copper &
Gold (WRN.to down 11.5%).
We dial up a longer-term gold chart this
weekend, as a reminder that even in April last
year with the Ukraine war still fresh in the public
conscience, copper was holding on to its 4-
handle easily and it wasn’t until the Fed hikes
began to cut into economic forecasts that it
dropped off its cliff. It was also this time last
year that I was somewhat leery about copper’s
potential upside, but made the big mistake of
assuming that if selling began it wouldn’t be too
heavy and that the metal should find strong
support around the U$3.80/lb level. That
prediction lasted about a week and a half and, as
the chart shows, the bears had their field day right down to U$3.15/lb on the spot market
before a rebound kicked in.
At that point China’s demand was under question as its Covid-Zero lockdown dragged on, these
days the world expects more from the world’s biggest copper consumer. Macro numbers are up
and its recent +4.5% GDP reading isn’t merely the best for over a year, but it beat the
consensus forecast by a full 0.5%. Meanwhile on the demand side, the news from Chile’s
CESCO conference last week saw Codelco putting on a brave face and looking to the long term,
but near-term supply woes are set to continue. Codelco’s chair, Maximo Pacheco, told the
conference during his official speech (5) that the State copper miner would be able to boost
15
ts1naJ ht8naJ ht51 dn22 ht92 ht5bef ht21 ht91 ht62 ht5raM ht21 ht91 ht62 dn2rpA ht9 ht61 dr32
source: IKN calcs

production by 17% come 2030 and the get production back to the 1.7 million tonnes (Mt) per
annum level.
According to Pacheco, the company had to face several issues including declining ore
grades and other operational challenges during recent years. The company is pushing
hard to tackle these challenges amid a surge in global copper demand. The strong
pipeline of structural projects will help the company counter the drop in ore grades and
sustain production levels. It must be noted that the company’s production had dipped
to 1.45 million tonnes in 2022. Codelco expects further drop in output in 2023 as well.
The company expects to reach a production level of 1.7 million tonnes before the end
of the decade.
However, the rose-tinted spectacles over long-term growth at Codelco could not hide the
conference buzz about more near-term production losses, as reported here by BMO in its report
to clients on the conference (link here (6)
“…the Chuquicamata underground mine looks to have major issues that may take both
time and capital to solve. While industry consultant forecasts had a small rebound in
Codelco output this year, it now seems that we are headed for a 1.2Mt year.
Furthermore, should any Codelco rebound now be delayed to later this decade, the
medium-term copper balance would naturally tighten.
That’s another miss to normal Codelco production levels that, until 2022, would average
between 1.5Mt and 1.7Mt per year. Add to this the lowered guidance out of BHP for the La
Escondida mine, the world’s largest copper operation, which was previously between 1.08Mt
and 1.15Mt for 2023 but has been cut to between 1.05Mt and 1.08Mt. In other words, that may
be another 100,000Mt erased from world supply, on top of the 250kmt shortfall we now expect
from Codelco.
On the subject of tight supplies, we move our regular weekly look at the world inventories for
copper, data from Cochilco:
 It was a quieter week in the copper space and the aggregate total held in the three
official world systems dropped by a mere 456 17,809 metric tonnes (mt) on the week.
The total stands at 220,808mt so make no mistake, that’s still extremely tight but it’s
no worse than this time last week.
 The SHFE continues to do something it tends to do in a normal year, i.e. stick
at/around 150kmt for a while. Unlike normal years, this flatlining is happening in April
rather than June or July. See the dedicated chart below for the visual of the black line
starting to flatten out, here we give the exact numbers and the inventory total is down
3,467mt to stand at 146,016mt this weekend. A small move compared to the big
chunks that were coming out in March.
 There was a small net addition to LME stocks, up 325mt to close at 51,875mt. That also
happened while cancelled warrants dropped 8,700mt to just 3,800mt, which is as close
to zero as LME tends to get. Thin action.
 For the third week running we got a significant inflow at Comex, with copper
inventories up 2,686mt to close at 22,917mt.
No need to bulk up the sect9ion with both dedicated SHFE charts while the action is quiet,
here’s just one of them to show the way the 2023 line (thick black) has changed course since
its fast dip in March.
SHFE copper inventory levels, 2018 to 2023
400000
350000
300000
250000
200000
150000
16 100000
50000
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 01 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 02 12 22 32 42 52 62 72 82 92 03 13 23 33 43 53 63 73 83 93 04 14 24 34 44 54 64 74 84 94 05 15 25
MT Cu 2023
2022
2021
2020
2019
2018
source: Cochilco data

If history is our guide we’ll see inventories begin to drain further in a couple of weeks’ time, you
will note however how far we are from the 2022 numbers.
Now for some notes on some of our basket component stocks:
Kodiak Copper (KDK.v): The final tranche of $6.5m placement announced on April 4th, that
was expanded to $7.5m closed on Friday, gross proceeds of $8.4m duly raised. So a good
result that was helped along by Teck, who may be in the news for other reasons at the moment
but used its maintenance right to top up and retain its 9.9% position by buying 592.5k of the
units. Here’s the CEO comment (7):
Claudia Tornquist, President and CEO of Kodiak said, “There was considerable
demand for this financing and I am pleased to welcome some strong new investors as
Kodiak shareholders. I wish to thank our largest shareholder Teck for their ongoing
support, as well as all our insiders and shareholders who participated in this financing.
With a treasury of over $13 million Kodiak is now fully funded for what will be an
exciting 2023 exploration program at our
MPD project. Our field season has already
kicked off and with a suite of compelling drill
targets and a world-class team we are well
placed to make 2023 a rewarding year for our
shareholders.”
The painful price action in KDK recently got some
relief on this news and rallied by a few pennies
on Friday afternoon to close at 77c. This still
looks mightily cheap compared to peers and it’s
worth remembering one of the easiest flip ratios
out there, 80c to $1 is a 25% profit.
Oroco Resources (OCO.v): The NR out
Thursday 20th (8) from OCO included some
painfully florid language in the CEO comment, who “stated emphatically” that the news has
“hyper-charged the enthusiasm levels” of his team at Santo Tomas. He even managed to
confuse a drilling term (auger) for the soothsayer’s “augur”. So linguistic nitpicking aside, what
was all the fuss about:
Oroco Drills 353 M of 0.93% Cu Equivalent at Santo Tomas
That headline was based on the assay returned for hole NO44 and is the best intercept ever at
Santo Tomas. It’s undoubtedly good, but context is required this weekend and it was also
required by those who bought into the hype on Thursday morning (while others used it as a
liquidity event) because the hype soon faded into financial reality.
Unchanged on the week. We haven’t done many visuals on the OCO Santo Tomas project here
in the weekly, so let’s run with two today because between them, they give a good feel for the
assay published last week and the overall project zone. First the section including NO44 (and
17

the other hole published last week, the more discreet NO45) and as you can probably make
out, it was drilled into the heart of the best mineralization zone at the project.
This second map shows the bird’s eye view of the project and if you go to this page (9)
, you also get to click on a bunch of links that will show that the zone into which NO44 went is
18

the highest grading sweet spot of the deposit and that, generally speaking, grades drop the
further up the visual (note, this map does not align to North) we go, i.e. toward the Rio Fuerte.
Now that’s fine by us and the high grade cut with help cement this zone as the likely place to
start the open pit and make for the classic “starter pit” zone that helps with early stage cash
flow and capital payback of the eventual mine. All good, but a small zone of bonus copper is
not something that should tip the balance of a project with tonnage and grade that’s already
largely understood and is still waiting for a 43-101 economic report first pass PEA. So I’m going
to reiterate the same call as last week (and other editions) that …“OCO at its new Loonie-or-so
makes more sense in a buoyant copper sector market” and give coverage a rest for a while
after today. I still see no reason to own for the time
being.
Hot Chili (HCH.v): Perhaps due to the company’s
plan to change its name to “Costa Copper” from its
current crass and tone-deaf corporate name at the
upcoming AGM (May 10th) but something got into the
share price of HCH last week and as the Australian
market closed before Friday weakness showed up in
Canada, our second-string issue managed to hold on
to all of its gains.
I will be glad to see the back of the name “Hot Chili”
though.
Atacama Copper (ACOP.v): Our strangely quiet tinycap representative in this year’s basket
filed its 2022 year-end financials on Friday evening, which may be the catalyst for news flow to
begin. Also, a brief look at its books suggests they’re going to have to raise money sooner
rather than later. Here’s the YE balance sheet…
…and while C$0.816m is enough to get it to April, ACOP burned a total of just over C$2m in
2022 on standard exploration-type activities and will need to top up cash at some point. So my
best guess is that CEO Warman will use his undoubtedly good network to raise a modest
amount (he made people a lot of money at Fiore) and we’ll then get some real newsflow.
The Producer Basket
After 15 weeks of 2023, the Producer Basket shows a gain of 21.40% to level stakes:
19

company ticker price 1/1/23 Shares out MktCap(U$Bn) current pps gain/loss%
1 Newmont NEM 47.20 799 38.05 47.62 0.9%
2 Barrick GOLD 17.18 1761.54 33.59 19.07 11.0%
3 Agnico Eagle AEM 51.99 488.9 27.51 56.27 8.2%
4 Wheaton PM WPM 39.08 451.963 22.20 49.11 25.7%
5 Kinross Gold KGC 4.09 1256.1 6.23 4.96 21.3%
6 Alamos Gold AGI 10.11 393.1 5.01 12.74 26.0%
7 B2Gold BTG 3.57 1074.567 4.41 4.10 14.8%
8 Hecla Mining GFI 5.56 603.86 3.69 6.11 9.9%
9 Eldorado Gold EGO 8.36 185.73 1.98 10.68 27.8%
10 Wesdome Gold WDOFF 5.53 142.287 0.88 6.15 11.2%
All prices and stock quotes in U$ Port. avg 15.68%
After five winning weeks on the trot, the Producer Basket finally snaps its run with a week-over-
week loss of 5.2% and it probably goes without saying how nobody remembers the preceding
five weeks and investor sentiment is back in the dumpster again. This is the PM sector, after all.
All ten of our Producer Basket stocks lost ground, from the least worst Wesdome (WDOFF down
0.5%) to the three larger drops registered in Hecla (HL down 7.6%), Eldorado (EGO down
7.5%) and Kinross (KGC down 7.1%). Meanwhile, Newmont (NEM) is now back flirting with
negative territory for 2023 and that won’t help its cause as it chases Newcrest (NCM).
The 2023 Producer Basket: Weekly performance and
comparative to GDX control
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
-5%
-10%
The TinyCaps List
After 16 weeks of 2023, the TinyCaps show a gain of 31.46% to level stakes:
company ticker price 1/1/23 Shares out Mkt Cap current pps gain/loss%
Aurelius Min AUL.v 0.07 49.787 2.99 0.06 -14.3%
Coast Copper COCO.v 0.045 64.001 3.20 0.05 11.1%
District Metals DMX.v 0.075 86.891 7.82 0.09 20.0%
Latin Metals LMS.v 0.13 69.962 12.24 0.175 34.6%
Manitou Gold MTU.v 0.02 344.568 18.95 0.055 175.0%
Nine Mile Metals NINE.cse 0.29 57.025 15.40 0.27 -6.9%
Palamina Corp PA.v 0.08 65.285 9.79 0.15 87.5%
Precipitate Gold PRG.v 0.075 130.367 9.13 0.07 -6.7%
South Star STS.v 0.55 32.755 17.36 0.53 -3.6%
Viva Gold VAU.v 0.14 91.608 15.12 0.165 17.9%
Prices in CAD$, data from TSXV basket avg 31.46%
This section attempts to track the tinycap mining sub-sector of the market, our ten companies
chosen under the following criteria to put together a list representing the state of play in the
20
ts1naJ ht8naJ ht51 dn22 ht92 ht5bef ht21 ht91 ht62 ht5raM ht21 ht91 ht62 dn2rpA ht9 ht61 dr32
The 2023 Producer Basket: Percentage difference
between GDX benchmark & basket (negative = IKN ahead)
4.0%
3.5%
ikn 3.0%
gdx control 2.5%
2.0%
1.5%
1.0%
0.5%
0.0%
source: NYSE, IKN calcs ts1naJ ht8naJ ht51 dn22 ht92 ht5bef ht21 ht91 ht62 ht5raM ht21 ht91 ht62 dn2rpA ht9 ht61 dr32
source: IKN calcs, NYSE data

sub-sector of tinycap exploration company stocks. At least, that’s the plan.
 Market capitalization of under $20m. They have to be tiny. In two cases I’ve stretched the window a
little and allowed sub-U$20m market capper in that are just over the C$20m level, but the spirit is unaltered.
 A “non broken” stock price and project story. There are literally hundreds of tinycap juniors of the right
size, but it was a particularly depressing exercise to trawl through the whole of the TSXV and find companies
that are small enough, but with life in them. The vast majority of sub-$20m stocks are broken stocks, either
traded to death on the exchange or with projects that are a bust or with entrenched management more
interested in their monthly paycheck than anything else.
 Likelihood of meaningful newsflow in 2023. This connects to the company’s “unbroken” status, as we
want news and potential catalysts from companies with projects that can work.
 Decent management if possible. When you are down among the little guys it doesn’t pay to be too
choosy, but still I preferred companies that have teams or people with good peer reputations.
The tinycaps took a hard chop down and our basket TinyCaps, 2023 weekly tracker
50%
average dropped over 8%, with just two winners (PA.v 45%
up 20.0%, STS.v up a penny) and two unchanged 40%
35%
stocks (COCO.v, PRG.v) unable to staunch the losses
30%
taken from the six losers (AUL.v, DMX.v, LMS.v, MTU.v, 25%
NINE.cse, VAU.v). The biggest drop was in District 20%
15%
Metals (DMX.v down 25.0%). 10%
5%
0%
Palamina Corp (PA.v): The rebound in this stock
continues to catch the eye and after closing March at 9c,
it’s a 15 stock this weekend and was 17c for a
while last week, all on reasonable volume (for a
small fry, at least).
I’m on record as liking the company, its team
headed up by the highly experienced Andrew
Thomson and most importantly, its flagship
“Orogenic Belt” project(s) in the Puno district of
South Peru, an under-explored and highly
prospective corner of the country. Though I gave
up the ghost on my ill-timed trade, that doesn’t
stop it from holding the same promise as before
and if the drills hit something nice this year,
there’s plenty of potential upside.
District Metals (DMX.v): We scratched our heads about the way DMX popped two weeks
ago on news of the receipt of the Viken exploration permits, the same location with the
uranium that Sweden won’t allow mined. The market put two and two together last week and
left a new set of people holding bags.
NB: Please be clear that The Tiny Dogs is NOT a list of recommended tinycap stocks. It is a list of companies with
market caps of under $20m offering a reasonable representation of the wider tinycaps market. It’s possible in the future
I may buy shares in one or several of these stocks, at the moment both my opinion and wallet are strictly neutral.
Regional politics
Chile: Los Bronces gets its permits
Monday April 17th brought good news to the mining space in Chile and right in time for the start
of the CESCO copper conference in town, too. There are a whole bunch of reports to quote on
this development, I’m going to stick with one Spanish language (10) nd one English language
(10a) for headline quote purposes (10a):
SANTIAGO, April 17 (Reuters) - Chile's ministry of environment on Monday said that a
committee of government ministers approved an environmental permit for a $3 billion
extension of Anglo American's Los Bronces project in Chile.
21
ts1naJ ht8naJ ht51 dn22 ht92 ht5bef ht21 ht91 ht62 ht5raM ht21 ht91 ht62 dn2rpA ht9 ht61 dr32
source: IKN calcs, TSX data

To say that “reactions were mixed” in Chile would be an understatement, with glowing words
coming from all the business and mining chambers of commerce imaginable. Here., for example
is the translation of what the President of the Chilean Chamber of Mining, one Miguel
Zauschkevich Domeyko, had for the press:
“It’s very good news as much for Anglo American at Los Bronces as for the country
and the world. As demand for mineral products rises, this Ministerial Committee
resolution allows us to think about increasing the production of copper under the
highest environmental standards.”
In fact the unanimous 5 to zero vote by the Ministerial Committee (Comité de Ministros) chaired
by Environment Minister Maisa Rojas (one of Gabriel Boric’s inner circle and also close to the
head of the SEA environmental agency, Valentina Durán) was not a simple approval. The
committee has three choices at its disposal, either to a) approve as stands, b) reject as stands
or c) approve with conditions. The Ministerial Committee took the third option and awarded the
permit on condition that several environmental efforts and factors were undertaken by the
company. They include noise and dust mitigation programs and a policy to clean the air to
150% its current state, in other words the air quality will be better than if the expansion project
were rejected.
That sounds like a reasonable compromise, but it’s notable that all the “conditions demanded”
by the Ministerial Committee were in fact ideas and initiatives proposed in a voluntary manner
by the company. What this shows is the type of dance that’s been going on behind the scenes
to get this permit approved. One can imagine the conversations and negotiations between
representatives for Anglo and for the government, where one side gives an idea of what they
consider acceptable as a compromise and then the other suddenly decides to “voluntarily”
propose such a project.
However, the news didn’t go down so well with the rank and file of the Boric left wing, mostly
from his base “Frente Amplio” party full of left wing reactionaries and environmental warriors.
This includes plenty of academia representatives who now feel betrayed by the decision of the
committee to green light the environmental permits and all talk of the “technical nature” of the
decision and how the committee was satisfied that environmental impact was minimized and
fully compensated cuts no ice at all. This is something future appeals to the Committee of
Ministers need to be aware of and by that, we point directly at our still-open trade in Rio2 Ltd
(RIO.v). Once the news had settled on the market and prices were suitably adjusted, I got in
touch and exchanged with RIO.v chair Alex Black and we swapped notes. He agreed with me
that while the small boost in the share price was welcome, it was also good that traded volume
hasn’t gone through the roof and that overall, reactions have been subdued. He told me that
the company was moving along with its appeals process and was currently in a document
exchange process with the Environmental Agency (the SEA), showing what they have done to
improve its case and getting reaction from the environment people on the initiatives. In other
words, they are along the way in the same process that Anglo obviously went through in the
back-and-forth that, in the case of Anglo, found the technical common ground that allowed the
project to get its green light on appeal. The next question was to ask when the company
expected its case to be heard and while there’s no guarantees either way, its legal team
currently estimate July or so. That’s a reasonable lapse and potentially allows the advantage of
lefty enviro warrior tempers to cool before the next appeal comes up.
Finally, another thing I agreed upon with Chair Black is that the RIO.v appeals process is not a
foregone conclusion. They are happy that Agnlo got its green light for Los Bronces but the
cases are different in several ways, for example Los Bronces was all about appeasing irate
communities around the mine while at Fenix, all communities are already onside and want the
project to go ahead. We know the issue at Fenix is the potential effects of operation on fauna
(i.e. camelids and those cute little Chinchillas) so the ways in which the issues are remedied
must also be different than the Los Bronces appeal. Finally, the company is somewhat
concerned that Chile may find it easier to block a $200m project than a $3Bn project like Los
Bronces and they end up being the sacrificial lamb for the eco warriors. That would make is a
22

purely political decision and while I do understand the company’s concern (and like the way
they are trying to combat it), there’s reason to be optimistic about the way the Committee
apparently took all politicking out of its decision on Los Bronces and based the vote on purely
technical criteria. In other words, as the Anglo remedial work and projects complied with the
law as stands, they got the permit. Assuming Rio2 can do the same and “keep politics out” of
the equation, there’s plenty of reason to suppose a positive outcome to Rio2 and its overlong
permitting story at Fenix come July.
Argentina: President Alberto Fernández steps aside
In another week this might have been a top regional politics story, in IKN727 it feels like a
sidebar issue. After a week of swirling rumours and counter-rumours in Argentina (if you want
the deep-politik feel free to mail and ask) the big news came that sitting President Alberto
Fernández has decided to step aside and will not go for re-election or contest the upcoming
Argentine version of primaries (PASO) in August or the eventual Presidential election later. This
decision leaves the government side of the equation clearer and we now have this scenario:
 Government: Current “Superminister” of Finance Sergio Massa is now red-hot favourite to
get the government nomination as candidate. We’re still likely to get several candidates for
the PASO primaries in August but assuming Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner doesn’t put her
name forward (and it would be a shock if she did, as she’s made it plain she’s not interesting
in running again) this side of the primary vote is unlikely to be contested hard. Massa is
already modelling his image as “the consensus candidate” for the government side.
 Traditional opposition: With ex-President Mauricio Macri deciding not to run, the field is now
between frontrunners Patricia Bullrich (the Macri dauphine) and Horacio Larreta (current
mayor of Buenos Aires City), both of whom appeared and spoke to an audience of business
people at a large business conference in the South Artentina provincial resort town of Llau
Llau last week (and apparently Bullrich won the straw poll among those present).
 The Libertarian; The rise of independent, right-wing libertarian Javier Milei continues to
cause consternation among the other two political groups. He’s gaining traction and as a
result, the others are beginning to throw rather simplistic “he’s mad” or “he’s dangerous”
brickbats his way. He’s now being pigeonholed as Argentina’s Mini Trump and only time will
tell if that nickname becomes a help or a hindrance.
So with two of the three main candidates likely settled and the other between two possible
candidates set to decide in August, the field is beginning to define for the big vote. What we do
know is that the first round is unlikely to give us a winner and the eventual election will
probably go to a second-round run-off between the top two candidates. It’s going to be a street
fight to get to the run-off and even then, it’s tough to call which two are more likely. Milei at
this stage is a wild card, Larreta/Bullrich are open to lose more votes to Milei than the left
leaning current government and Massa, while Massa now has runaway inflation to contend with
and has six months or so to show he’s capable of getting the country’s finances under control
and convincing the public.
Mexico rushes its mining law through the lower house
This one caught many people by surprise and this desk was one of them. When we last
mentioned the Mexico mining law reform in IKN725 (dated April 9th) we also offered q rough
timeline for its likely passage through Mexico’s parliament and while admitting the fast-track
option was possible, best-guessed we’d see slower progress through committee and its passage
to a first floor vote during 2023’s second legislative period, September onward.
Wrong. On Monday in a late session its committee, controlled by President AMLO’s Morena
party, pushed the bill onto the fast track option (despite the howls from opposition groups and
by Friday it was voted on and approved by the lower house of deputies, the vote going 290 to
186 in favour (11). The only significant change to its contents was to change the new
concession holding period from the original proposal of 15 years with the right to another 15, to
an approved 30 year period with the right to another 25 years on application. That’s better
news for the mining companies, but the other clauses that include the need for prior
23

consultancy before an exploration permit is approved, the potential to lose the concession for
violating environmental laws and the requirement to spend 10% of profits on local CSR all
remain in the bill. It now gets moved to the upper house Senate, where Morena also controls a
majority and will probably get the bill voted up quickly.
Ecuador: You can’t fire me cos I quit…if necessary
In “The trials of Guillermo Lasso” in IKN725, two weekends ago, we considered the scenario of
President Guillermo Lasso using the so-called “Crossfire Death” mechanism to dissolve
parliament and call new elections, even though he’d just been on TV in Ecuador and stated he
wouldn’t do that. Here’s an excerpt from IKN725:
“…(he said) he would appear before the CC to defend his position because
(translated), “…it is my obligation to show my face to the population.” In the
same interview he also said he wouldn’t use the so-called “Muerte Cruzada”
mechanism to avoid the process. We’ve translated this previously on these
pages as “Crossfire Death” and as explained in IKN722 three weeks ago, the
Constitution… “…gives the President to right to dissolve Congress and rule by
decree for six months, as long as the President then also resigns by a fixed
date and new national elections are held within 12 months.” If he triggers
“Muerte Cruzada” he’d therefore avoid the final part of the impeachment
process, that of the Congressional debate and vote, so there’s plenty of
speculation in Ecuador on the subject and here’s what Lasso said on Sunday
(translated):
“I couldn’t enact the “muerte cruzada” and leave doubts about what truly
might have happened in this political trial because I am a democrat, because I
expose my chest to the bullets in all aspects of my life.”
All rather florid. However, his position may “adjust” if things don’t go as well
as he imagines at the CC…”
So much for that vow. Last week in conversation with the London FT (12), President Lasso
surprised nobody by saying that if the impeachment process against him proceeded he would
indeed use Muerte Cruzada. Your quote from the piece:
“Nobody has done more than me to fight corruption,” Lasso said in an interview at the
Carondelet government palace in Quito. “Embezzlement is defined as a crime where
someone takes advantage of public funds for their own benefit. I haven’t used public
funds for my own benefit.”
Lasso said he was “not ruling out” winning over enough legislators but in “the most
probable scenario”, where he could not muster enough support, he would trigger early
elections before congress could oust him.
“The other scenario which I will avoid, because it is not correct . . . is the censure of the
president”, he said.
Asked if that meant he would invoke a constitutional clause known as “mutual death” to
force elections for both his own job and a new congress, Lasso replied: “Correct,
correct. That’s what I declare.”
He went on to say that once he’d done so he would put himself forward as candidate for
President in the election he called by cutting his mandate short. All this caused inevitable uproar
and now has all his opposition baying for blood, led by the Rafael Correa “Revolución
Ciudadana” party main opposition who, in a communiqué on Wednesday, demanded that Lasso
didn’t wait a moment longer and triggered Muerte Cruzada immediately (13). That won’t
happen of course, instead Lasso will wait to see if he can get a favourable decision from the
Constitutional Court (CC) and if so, continue in power (even though his staying would almost
certainly trigger massive social protests across the country and scenes similar to those in 2022.
We therefore wait for a judgement from the CC, which is due in the first week of May.
24

Market Watching
Deferred
Enough
Conclusion
IKN727 is done, we end with bullet points:
 Not my best edition. The Chile lithium note ended up at 6,200 words and what with re-
writes and focus adjustments, I must have written double that amount on the subject
in the last 48 hours. I make no apology for being OCD, then again I’m not proud of it,
either. It just is.
 We ‘ll get back to normal service next weekend. Pretty promise.
 Junior copper stocks did well in an adverse metals scenario, maybe the world is
beginning to catch on. Hope so, I have plenty of them.
I thank you in advance for any feedback. Our Top Pick stock is Minera Alamos (MAI.v). Flash
updates will be sent if required by events.
I wish you good trading fortune, ladies and gentlemen.
Best wishes, Mark
Footnotes, appendices, references, disclaimer
(1) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0yaldIhwj_8
(2)
https://datacommons.org/tools/timeline#place=country%2FCHL%2Ccountry%2FPER%2Ccountry%2FECU%2Ccountry
%2FCOL%2Ccountry%2FARG%2Ccountry%2FBRA&statsVar=Amount_EconomicActivity_GrossDomesticProduction_
Nominal_PerCapita&chart=%7B%22amount%22%3A%7B%22pc%22%3Atrue%7D%7D
(3) https://www.fool.com/investing/2023/04/21/sociedad-quimica-y-minera-de-chile-stock-crasheded/
(4) https://elpais.com/chile/2023-04-21/gabriel-boric-lanza-su-nueva-politica-del-litio-con-una-apuesta-por-el-control-
estatal-no-mas-una-mineria-para-unos-pocos.html
(5) https://www.barchart.com/story/news/16190641/codelco-aims-notable-output-boost-by-the-end-of-decade
(6) https://bmo.bluematrix.com/sellside/EmailDocViewer?encrypt=c69346d7-e6e9-460c-bded-
63eac1e7026c&mime=pdf&co=bmo&id=replaceme@bluematrix.com&source=mail
(7) https://kodiakcoppercorp.com/news/news-releases/kodiak-closes-oversubscribed-upsized-private-placement/
(8) https://orocoresourcecorp.com/news/oroco-drills-353-m-of-093-cu-equivalent-at-santo-tomas
(9) https://orocoresourcecorp.com/projects/santo-tomas/
(10) https://portalinnova.cl/la-camara-minera-de-chile-destaca-aprobacion-del-proyecto-los-bronces-integrado/
(10a) https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/anglo-americans-los-bronces-project-granted-environmental-permit-
2023-04-18/
(11) https://aristeguinoticias.com/2104/mexico/diputados-aprueban-ley-minera-concesiones-pasan-de-50-a-30-anos/
(12) https://www.ft.com/content/e19489a1-a63f-4d70-abaf-379dc63c18e2
(13) https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/politica/pedido-de-correistas-de-implementar-la-muerte-cruzada-provoca-
discrepancias-en-la-asamblea-nacional-nota/
25

Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2022
Closed in 2022 date closed close price
Great Bear Res GBR.v Jan'22 C$15.83 26-Aug-20 C$28.58 80.5% Bought out by Kinross, print
Copper Mountain CMMC.to Jan'22 C$3.40 18-Jun-21 C$3.78 15.9% Sold 1/2 position in rebalance
Copper Mountain CMMC.to Feb'22 C$3.40 18-Jun-21 C$3.70 8.8% Sold rest on FY22 guidance
Trilogy Metals TMQ Mar'22 U$1.84 15-Sep-19 U$1.04 -41.3% killed by US permit reversal
McEwen Mining MUX Apr'22 U$0.89 2-Jan-22 U$0.82 -7.9% No 2022 turnaround, cut loss
Abrasilver Res. ABRA.v May'22 C$0.42 24-Apr-22 C$0.33 -21.4% sold to reduce Ag exposure
Strategic Metals SMD.v May'22 C$0.42 31-Jan-21 C$0.30 -28.6% trade flatlined 1.5 years
Discovery Silver DSV.v Jun'22 C$1.77 24-Oct-21 C$1.39 -21.5% Cutting Ag exp.& raising cash
Element 29 ECU.v Jul'22 C$0.58 6-Mar-22 C$0.30 -48.3% sold to cut Cu exposure
Superior Gold SGI.v Oct'22 C$0.95 3-Apr-22 C$0.24 -74.7% Q3 prod fail was last straw
Goldshore Res GSHR.v Nov'22 C$0.18 23-Oct-22 C$0.34 88.9% Quick profit taken
Palamina Corp PA.v Dec'22 C$0.295 21-Nov-21 C$0.08 -72.9% Clear-out of underperformer
Pure Gold PGM.h Dec'22 C$0.14 26-Sep-22 C$0.015 -89.3% tiny trade on vh risk, went Ch11
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2021
Closed in 2021 closed close price
Fiore Gold F.v jan'21 C$0.98 21-May-20 C$1.17 19.4% closed as part of rebalance
Norsemont Min NOM.cse feb'21 C$1.55 6-Set-20 C$0.70 -54.8% Cut loser to reduce Au exp.
Element 29 Res ECU.v feb'21 C$0.49 7-Feb-21 C$0.54 10.2% Cut Peru exposure
Kuya Silver KUYA.cse feb'21 C$1.66 8-Nov-20 C$2.51 51.2% Cut Peru exposure
Pucara Gold TORO.v apr'21 C$0.65 4-Oct-20 C$0.26 -60.0% Cut loser, Peru risk call
Copper Mountain CMMC.to apr'21 C$1.40 22-Nov-20 C$4.18 198.6% tgt hit, profit taken
New Gold NGD may'21 U$0.76 9-Feb-20 U$2.14 181.6% Sold to buy AGC, nice win
Orezone Gold ORE.v jun'21 C$0.79 21-Jun-20 C$1.61 103.8% sold on pop, leaky boat
Wolfden Res. WLF.v sep'21 C$0.30 11-Apr-21 C$0.19 -36.7% Failed spec trade, cut loss
Cartier Res ECR.v sep'21 C$0.32 21-Mar-21 C$0.235 -26.6% Failed spec trade, cut loss
Amarillo Gold AGC.v sep'21 C$0.31 30-May-21 C$0.30 -3.2% Capex story changed: Out
Excelsior Mining MIN.to oct'21 C$0.93 10-Mar-19 C$0.53 -43.0% May return in 2022
Royal Road Min. RYR.v nov'21 C$0.155 17-Mar-19 C$0.275 77.4% Closed on Nica pol risk
Aurelius Min. AUL.v dec'21 C$0.75 28-Jun-20 0.24 -68.0% cut end 2021, failed trade
Argonaut Gold AR.to dec'21 C$2.95 25-Jun-21 C$2.15 -27.1% cut on capex blowout
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2020
Closed in 2020 closed close price
TMAC Resources TMR.to Jan'20 C$3.41 20-Dec-19 C$3.61 5.9% TLS flip play, sold new year
Regulus Res REG.v Jan'20 C$1.10 20-Dec-19 C$1.30 18.2% TLS flip play, profit taken
Bonterra Res BTR.v Jan'20 C$1.90 9-Dec-19 C$1.66 -12.6% TLS flip play, loss taken
McEwen Mining MUX Jan'20 U$1.12 2-Dec-19 U$1.18 5.4% TLS flip play, profit taken
Core Gold CGLD.v Jan'20 C$0.255 7-Apr-19 C$0.305 19.6% arb trade, profit taken
HudBay Min HBM Jan'20 U$3.56 9-Dec-19 U$3.36 -5.6% TLS flip play, loss taken
Midas Gold MAX.to Feb'20 C$0.71 5-Jan-20 C$0.57 -19.7% sm & silly trade
Warrior Gold WAR.v Feb'20 C$0.08 3-Aug-18 C$0.05 -31.3% clean out non-perf sm stocks
Contact Gold C.v Feb'20 C$0.40 19-Aug-18 C$0.18 -55.0% clean out non-perf sm stocks
Sandstorm Gold SAND Feb'20 U$3.73 17-Apr-16 U$7.21 93.3% Sold during port rebalance
NexGen Energy NXE Feb'20 U$1.20 2-Dec-19 U$1.06 -11.7% TLS flip play, loss taken
MAG Silver MAG Apr'20 U$8.95 1-Mar-20 U$10.07 12.5% Sold to cut silver exposure
Alexco Res AXU Apr'20 U$1.69 7-Sep-17 U$1.69 0.0% sold to close Ag exp. in FY20
Bonterra Res BTR.v Jun'20 C$1.62 2-Feb-20 C$1.10 -32.1% under-performer cash moved
Regulus Res REG.v Jun'20 C$0.64 6-Apr-15 C$0.79 23.4% moved $ TMQ/MIN & Au stocks
Great Panther GPR.to Aug'20 C$0.60 21-Jun-20 C$1.10 83.3% Profit taken, good trade
Jaguar Mining JAG.v Aug'20 C$0.42 21-Jun-20 C$0.65 54.8% Profit taken, good trade
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Sandstorm Gold SAND Aug'20 U$7.76 10-May-20 U$9.37 20.7% Profit taken, good trade
Integra Resources ITR.v Aug'20 C$2.23 13-Aug-18 C$5.40 142.2% Profit taken, good trade
Wesdome Gold WDO.to Aug'20 C$2.37 14-Oct-17 C$14.82 525.3% last 1/2 of big win closed
INV Metals INV.to Sep'20 C$0.40 17-May-20 C$0.45 12.5% Cut all Ecuador exposure
Cartier Resources ECR.v Nov'20 C$0.155 3-Aug-18 C$0.25 67.7% Exact close price TBA
Tinka Res TK.v Dec'20 C$0.195 19-Apr-16 C$0.195 0.0% Closed on a round trip fail
2015 to 2019 annual closed positions in appendices below, 2009 to 2014 closed positions in editions IKN553 or earlier
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2019
Closed in 2019 closed close price
Atico Mining ATY.v jan'19 C$0.55 24-Jul-16 C$0.32 41.8% patience ran out, made room
Candente Copper DNT.to jan'19 C$0.075 3-Aug-18 C$0.05 -33.3% tiny trade, made room for new
B2Gold BTO.to feb'19 C$2.11 12-Sep-14 C$4.05 91.9% Took 1/2 profits, reduce size
Western Copper WRN.to mar'19 C$0.80 20-Jan-19 C$0.81 1.3% Spec trade that didn't work
B2Gold BTO.to mar'19 C$2.11 12-Sep-14 C$4.15 96.7% Took rest of profit.
GT Gold GTT.v mar'19 C$1.17 10-Oct-18 C$0.90 -23.1% Took loss. Story changed
NovaGold NG apr'19 U$3.84 13-Jan-19 U$4.15 -8.1% Short that didn't work, sm loss
Zinc One Z.v jun'19 C$0.47 14-Sep-17 C$0.025 -94.7% clearing out dead trade
Amarillo Gold AGC.v jun'19 C$0.24 22-Aug-18 C$0.20 -16.7% clearing out dead trade
New Gold NGD aug'19 U$1.44 31-Jul-19 U$1.23 14.6% ST short win thru Q2 earnings
IMPACT Silver IPT.v aug'19 C$0.39 21-Jul-19 C$0.46 18.0% took a quick profit
Fiore Gold F.v aug'19 C$0.34 26-May-19 C$0.56 64.7% Took profit, 2q19 avg
Chakana Copper PERU.v oct'19 C$0.84 22-Mar-18 C$0.16 -81.0% Exploreco trade fail. Want space
Wesdome Gold WDO.to oct'19 C$2.37 14-Oct-17 C$7.57 219.4% Sold half, profit taking
Superior Gold SGI.v oct'19 C$1.46 8-Apr-18 C$0.47 -67.8% Failed sm spec on Au. Moved on
Amerigo Res ARG.to nov'19 C$0.91 23-Sep-18 C$0.50 -45.1% worst trade of year, hefty loss
Guyana Goldfields GUY.to dec'19 C$0.94 14-Apr-19 C$0.56 -40.4% taking the loss, financials weak
Tethyan Res TETH.v dec'19 C$0.30 8-Sep-19 C$0.16 -46.7% tiny trade, word of probs in co
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2018
Closed in 2018 closed close price
Amarillo Gold AGC.v jan'18 C$0.38 24-Mar-17 C$0.31 -18.4% Cut away losing trade
Riverside Res RRI.v jan'18 C$0.39 27-Jun-16 C$0.31 -20.5% Cut away losing trade
Eros Res ERC.v jan'18 C$0.175 1-Mar-17 C$0.16 -8.6% CEO sudden exit, not good
Excellon Res EXN.to jan'18 C$1.54 9-Oct-16 C$1.66 7.8% 4q17 poor, one too many bad qtrs
Wesdome Gold WDO.to jan'18 C$1.68 15-Dec-17 C$2.06 22.6% Near-term trade block, took profit
Sabina G&S SBB.to apr'18 C$2.06 17-Dec-17 C$1.77 -14.1% Near-term trade, bad timing, small
B2Gold BTO.to May'18 C$2.11 12-Sep-14 C$3.67 73.9% sold 25% to reduce exposure
Lara Expl. LRA.v May'18 C$0.65 11-Feb-18 C$0.58 -13.8% Spec on Brazil didn't work
Solitario XPL June'18 U$0.72 19-Mar-17 U$0.41 -43.1% Failed trade, may return in 4q18
SolGold plc SOLG.to July'18 C$0.475 19-Nov-17 C$0.415 -12.6% cut, trade didn't perform
Pan American PAAS July'18 U$17.90 1-Jun-18 U$16.30 8.9% modest win on short position
NGEx Res NGQ.to Sep'18 C$1.01 22-Oct-17 C$1.00 -1.0% Closed to reduce Argentina exp
Sandstorm Gold SAND Oct'18 U$3.73 17-Apr-16 U$4.13 10.7% partial sale to raise cash for GTT
Aldebaran Res ALDE.v Nov'18 n/a n/a n/a n/a liquidate spin out of REG
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2017
Closed in 2017 closed close price
Continental Gold CNL.to Jan'17 C$2.68 22-May-16 C$4.17 55.6% trade closed, profit taken
Focus Ventures FCV.v Jan'17 C$0.23 1-Jul-12 C$0.05 -78.3% Give up, a disaster trade
Wesdome Gold WDO.to Feb'17 C$1.72 28-Aug-16 C$3.00 74.4% Target hit, sold, good trade
Belo Sun BSX.to Mar'17 C$0.90 30-Jan-17 C$0.90 0.0% failed near-term flip trade
Lara Expl. LRA.v Mar'17 C$1.15 8-Apr-12 C$1.05 -8.7% cut to make room for new trade
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Rye Patch Gold RPM.v Apr'17 C$0.31 2-Sep-16 C$0.32 3.2% cut for doubts & new stock
Cordoba Min. CDB.v Jun'17 C$0.75 15-Sep-16 C$0.63 -16.0% closed
Constantine Metal CEM.v Aug'17 C$0.135 9-Apr-17 C$0.28 107.4% spec trade closed, good win
Red Eagle Min. R.to Sep'17 C$0.67 13-Dec-16 C$0.27 -59.7% IKN's biggest failure in years
Starcore Intl SAM.to Sep'17 C$0.61 10-Jan-15 C$0.31 -49.2% Patience ran out
B2Gold BTO.to Dec'17 C$2.11 12-Sep-14 C$3.39 60.7% sold small portion for liquidity
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2016
Closed in 2016 closed close price
Phoscan Chem FOS.to jan16 C$0.28 29-mar-15 C$0.265 -5.4% Buyout trade, bot but poor deal
True Gold TGM.v jan16 C$0.18 23-aug-15 C$0.25 38.9% okay trade, sold on pol risk
McEwen Mining MUX jan16 U$1.09 25-jan-15 U$1.20 10.1% sold due to lack of value
Lake Shore Gold LSG.to feb-16 C$1.10 07-apr-15 C$1.69 53.6% bot out, sold early in process
Atacama Pacific ATM.v feb-16 C$0.19 26-apr-15 C$0.40 110.5% sold for a double on big pop
New Gold NGD feb-16 U$2.06 24-jan-16 U$2.96 43.7% closed good near-term trade
Sandspring Res SSP.v mar-16 C$0.195 18-oct-15 C$0.32 64.1% Hit tgt, took profit
Teranga Gold TGZ.to mar-16 C$0.54 15-feb-15 C$0.60 11.1% disappointing trade
B2Gold BTG mar-16 U$0.85 13-jan-16 U$1.30 52.9% Separate trade on B2, hit tgt
Dalradian Res DNA.to mar-16 C$0.67 27-oct-13 C$1.00 49.3% Hit target, sold, good win
HudBay Min. HBM may-16 U$4.10 03-apr-16 U$4.36 -6.3% Short trade, poor timing
Nevada Sunrise NEV.v may-16 C$0.185 28-feb-16 C$0.23 24.3% V. small, no big deal either way
Richmont RIC jun-16 U$7.60 01-may-16 U$9.30 22.4% near-term trade, profit taken
INV Metals INV.to jul-16 C$0.25 03-apr-16 C$0.95 280.0% Trade closed on time
HudBay Min. HBM aug16 U$4.98 09-jun-16 U$4.80 3.6% short trade covered, no big deal
Miranda Gold MAD.v oct-16 C$0.125 03-jul-16 C$0.10 -20.0% tiny spec trade, didn't work
Avino G & S ASM nov-16 U$2.00 21-oct-16 U$1.40 -30.0% Abandon trade on bad bot deal
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2015
Closed in 2015 closed close price
Argonaut Gold AR.to jan'15 C$1.47 14-dec-14 C$2.53 72.1% Big gain small time, profit taken
Amerigo Res ARG.to jan'15 C$0.405 20-jul-14 C$0.285 -29.6% Given up on weak Cu prices
Reservoir Min. RMC.v jan'15 C$6.05 18-jun-14 C$4.12 -31.9% sold on Cu downturn
Coro Mining COP.to jan'15 C$0.075 26-jan-14 C$0.035 -53.3% sm, sold on Cu downturn
Fortuna Silver FSM mar'15 U$4.12 10-nov-14 U$3.75 9.0% Short used as hedge
GoldQuest Min. GQC.v mar'15 C$0.26 27-oct-13 C$0.085 -67.3% given up ghost
Rio Alto Mining RIO.to apr'15 C$2.30 07-apr-11 C$3.57 55.2% Top pick, bot out, big win
Timmins Gold TGD jun'15 U$0.60 19-apr-15 U$0.62 3.3% near-term trade, out of time
First Majestic AG jul'15 U$10.51 10-aug-14 U$4.55 56.7% horrible failed trade
NovaCopper NCQ.to jul'15 C$1.05 09-apr-14 C$0.50 -52.4% no more Cu exposure, sm sell
McEwen Mining MUX aug'15 U$0.695 21-jul-15 U$0.92 32.4% Closed nearterm flip for win
Midas Gold MAX.to sep'15 C$0.39 21-sep-15 C$0.35 -10.3% Sm. trade idea that didn't work
New Gold NGD oct'15 U$2.18 23-aug-15 U$3.05 39.9% trade closed, profit taken
Legend Gold LGN.v nov'15 C$0.085 01-mar-15 C$0.035 -58.8% tiny "land grab" idea, failed
Timmins Gold TGD nov'15 U$0.245 20-sep-15 U$0.15 -38.8% small near-term loser
Please note that due to space considerations closed positions 2009 to 2014 are now
available on request, or were published in any edition to IKN553 (end 2019).
Important Disclosure
The information and opinions contained within this report reflect the personal views of the author and therefore all
material within should not be construed as accurate or reliable or be utilized as advice for investment or business
purposes. Independent due diligence and discussions with ones own investment and business advisor is strongly
recommended. Accordingly, nothing in this report should be construed as offering a guarantee of the accuracy or
completeness of the information contained herein, as an offer or solicitation with respect to the purchase or sale of any
security or as an endorsement of any product or service. All opinions and estimates included in this report are subject to
change without notice. It is prohibited to copy or redistribute this report to any type of third party without the express
permission of the author.
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