IKN #708Premium

The IKN Weekly
Week 708, December 11th 2022
Contents
This Week: In Today’s Edition, The Christmas period and The IKN Weekly, The Inflationary
Model.
Fundamental Analysis: Running the numbers on Contango Ore (CTGO).
Stocks to Follow: AbraSilver Resource Corp. (ABRA.v), Orefinders (ORX.v), Amerigo
Resources (ARG.to), Western Copper & Gold (WRN.to), Aldebaran Resources (ALDE.v), QC
Copper & Gold (QCCU.v), Rio2 Ltd (RIO.v), Minera IRL (MIRL.cse), Anacortes (XYZ.v), Minera
Alamos (MAI.v).
Copper Basket: Overview, Copper Mountain (CMMC.to), Oroco Resources (OCO.v), Meridian
Mining (MNO.to).
Producer Basket: Overview, Newmont (NEM), Sandstorm (SAND).
TinyCaps Basket: Overview, Latin Metals (LMS.v).
Regional Politics: A week of politics in Peru, Colombia: Alvaro Pardo of ANM speaks,
Colombia: No mining companies in the Páramo de Santurban, Mexican mines pay a 10%
“mining tax” to crime, Chile: Antofagasta fined, Ecuador: The government is trying to invalidate
the Quito mining referendum.
Market Watching: Menē Inc (MENE.v) 3q22 financials, Even more Wesdome Gold (WDO.to)
thoughts.
I remind subscribers that no part of this newsletter can be copied, reproduced or
given to any third party without the express permission of the author.
This Week
In Today’s Edition
 We’ve spoken about the stock for over a year and while I still don’t own any shares, it
was added to the Stocks to Follow Watch List as from last weekend. Today in the main
Fundies section we run the ruler over Contango Ore (CTGO) and explain why it offers
such strong fundamental value compared to its current market cap, we also expand on
why it’s only on the watch list today, rather than in my active portfolio.
 By popular demand, plenty on the Peru political situation this weekend in Regional
Politics. However, please don’t overlook the messaging now starting to come from the
government of Colombia’s new President Gustavo Petro, as the press conference held
by ANM last week was a telling moment.
 Plenty of stock notes in this week’s Stocks To Follow list, including views on the way
our copper picks managed to out-perform a soft market for copper stocks last week,
even as the metal continues to show strength. I particularly like the way Amerigo
(ARG.to) and Western (WRN.to) traded last week.
 Late but not forgotten, we also consider the 3q22 results from our only “non-mining
stock”, Mene Inc (MENE.v) in today’s Market Watching section. While sales were
somewhat disappointing, once the macro context is taken into consideration and after a
closer look at the financials, there’s a lot to like about this solid and growing company
at its current price level.
1

The Christmas period and The IKN Weekly
Around this time every year, this intro note appears along with early thoughts of the turkey, the
stuffing, the presents, the eggnog and children roasting by an open fire. Here at The IKN
Weekly we inform on how the festive period coverage will work with today Sunday December
11th and IKN708 as our start point. Here is what you can expect in the next four editions:
 IKN708 December 18th: Normal edition (if such a thing exists).
 IKN709 December 25th: It just so happens that this year’s central day falls on a
Sunday, but you can still expect delivery of the standard “bare bones” edition for the
Christmas week. It will cover the closing prices for the week along with a few
comments on any interesting events in the marketplace, but it will be a brief one.
 IKN710 January 1st: We close out the 2021 period in this edition, but the main
events is likely to be the presentations of the new 2022 Copper Basket, Producer
Basket and TinyCap Basket. As things stand today I have a short list for each basket,
in three weeks’ time they will be hard choices and presented to you, with rationales
given for the changes and brief overviews of new stocks as required. Other than that,
IKN710 will also be a “bare bones” edition, as all is quiet on New Year’s Day and the
next day, Monday January 2nd is also a Market Holiday.
 IKN711 January 8th: Back to normal service.
As 2022 turned out to be a crazy year and I didn’t take a vacation, so at some point that is
going to happen. Not sure when though, will inform when there’s a plan.
The Inflationary Model
For the second month running, the combo of an FOMC meeting and the monthly US CPI
reading are set to be big events and Santa Rallies, gold’s year-end run and other such market
vehicles are likely dependent on how next week pans out.
 First up is Tuesday December 13th at 8:30am ET and to quote Calculated Risk (1), “The
Consumer Price Index for November from the BLS. The consensus is for a 0.3% increase in
CPI, and a 0.3% increase in core CPI. The consensus is for CPI to be up 7.3% year-over-
year and core CPI to be up 6.1% YoY.” A couple of thoughts on that below.
 Secondly, we have the FOMC, which begins Tuesday but the real moment comes
Wednesday at 2pm, when the Fed is widely expected to raise its Fed Funds rate by 50bps.
That’s now a given, but all eyes will be on the publication of the “Dot Plot”, a.k.a.
“participants' projections of the appropriate target federal funds rate along with the
quarterly economic projections” (thank you again, Calculated Risk). Then on the heels of this
at 2:30pm we have another Jay Powell presser, at which we can expect him to try the same
über-hawk verbal message, no matter what is written in the FOMC Statement.
While Tuesday’s CPI reading is highly unlikely to affect the headline rate rise of the next day, it
may change the wording used by the Fed in its communications on Wednesday and with that in
mind, we note there are now several influential desk “taking the over” on the 7.3% CPI
consensus quoted by Calculated Risk (above). These whispers began on Friday when the
Producer Price Index (PPI) came in slightly
higher than forecast, with the November PPI up
0.3% and 7.4% on the year instead of the
+0.2% consensus. Core PPI, excluding food
and energy, was an even larger beat of +0.4%
(+0.2% consensus). This chart right (from here
(2)) shows the evolution of CPI over the last 12
months and while that last 7.7% column is
likely to go lower, if the drop is only a tenth or
two it will provide plenty of fuel to the Fed to
push its rate rise agenda harder and scare the
current equities rally to a stop.
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Indeed, that seems to be what we saw on Friday afternoon when, after choppy morning
trading, the broad markets suddenly went South and took mining stocks with them. We
therefore move into an important week with a nervous stock market and the CPI and FOMC
together could set the tone for what is left in 2022 as well as the first months of next year. To
underscore the importance of the US macro data, here’s a visual reminder of the effects of the
last FOMC/CPI combo back at the start of November:
First headline CPI came in at +7.7%, at least three points lower thane expected, and the trend
change began. We then know Jay Powell tried hard to be as hawkish as possible and contradict
his Fed’s own messaging on November 10th during the press conference that day, but as soon
as the market had sorted the wheat from the chaff and realized rate rises would slow, the USD
came under renewed pressure and gold consolidated its run (the AntiDollar is alive and well).
And as our regular GLD inventories tracking charts show for the same six month period in the
chart above, gold’s recent rally has come without support from Wall St.:
GLD gold holdings, last six months (metric tonnes)
1100
1080
1060
1040
1020
1000
980
960
940
920
900
880
860
The day large instos decide to move back into bullion will be the day its rally moves into
overdrive.
The bottom line is that there’s a lot in play next week, for markets in general, for gold and for
our focus sub-sector of mining/junior mining companies. We therefore sound the warning; if
CPI “comes in hot” and the Fed Statement implies continued heavy rate increases in 2023, the
“pivot trade” will be off and Jay Powell will get the slowdown in equities he seems to be trying
to manufacture (once more time; the last thing he wants is for people to feel wealthy).
However, if US CPI comes in at or below the apparent 7.3% consensus, the Santa Rally will be
well and truly on.
3
22/6/1 22/6/11 22/6/12 22/7/1 22/7/11 22/7/12 22/7/13 22/8/01 22/8/02 22/8/03 22/9/9 22/9/91 22/9/92 22/01/9 22/01/91 22/01/92 22/11/8 22/11/81 22/11/82 22/21/8
mt 6.50 GLD: Inventory/Price Ratio, last six months
6.40
6.30
6.20
6.10
6.00
5.90
5.80
5.70
5.60
5.50
5.40
source: SPDR GLD data 5.30
1/6/2202 11/6/2202 12/6/2202 1/7/2202 11/7/2202 12/7/2202 13/7/2202 01/8/2202 02/8/2202 03/8/2202 9/9/2202 91/9/2202 92/9/2202 9/01/2202 91/01/2202 92/01/2202 8/11/2202 81/11/2202 82/11/2202 8/21/2202
Source: SPDR data, IKN calcs

Fundamental Analysis of Mining Stocks
Running the numbers on Contango Ore (CTGO)
Today’s main fundamentals section expands on the reasons behind our decision last week to
include Contango Ore (CTGO) in the Stocks to Follow Watch List going forward, but withoutn an
immediate entry into the stock. To do this, we consider three main issues around CTGO the
company:
 Recent trading in CTGO
 Manh Choh development and its economic model
 Lucky Shot and potential upside
This is not a deep dive DD on the company, instead the plan is to elaborate on the strategic
reasons to like what the company is doing as well as explain why I prefer to wait on the
sidelines until we know more about how it plans to fund its end of Manh Choh. So without
further ado we begin with…
Recent trading in CTGO
Aside from the notes added to IKN707 last weekend, the last time CTGO was featured in The
IKN Weekly was in IKN696, dated September 18th 2022 and the Market Watching note
“Contango Ore (CTGO): Why I am still watching without buying.” That’s a prosaic title and on
that day, we mainly focused on why the financing of Manh Choh was important. Previously to
that note, CTGO showed up in IKN684 dated June 26th and the note “Contango Ore (CTGO):
Manh Choh in the spotlight”, as well as getting some passing comments in next weekend in
IKN685 as Kinross reported on its initial resource findings at the project. So before we go any
further and to provide suitable context, here’s a six month price chart of CTGO with those dates
marked:
As you can see, it’s been a bit of a rollercoaster in CTGO in the period with a sharp ramp in the
U$22.685 price seen in IKN684, the U$28.69 of IKN696 which went on top out at just over
U$30, and the price this weekend. Quite a round trip and to elaborate, we begin by getting up
to date with the current structure via one of our standard top-boxes:
Shares out: 6.77m
Options: 0.1m (U$14.50 strike)
Warrants: Zero
Fully diluted: 6.87m
Current share price: U$23.64
Market Cap: U$160.04m
Approx cash per S/O: U$2.00
All prices are in US Dollars unless stated.
This weekend’s U$23.64 share price gives a market cap of U$160m and when considering its
low background burn and the approx U$2.2m it has to spend as its end of the Manh Choh
budget in4q22, we forecast CTGO finishes the year with treasury of U$13m. That’s an eviable
treasury position compared to most explorecos and more than enough to cover its ongoing
exploration budgets for Manh Choh and Lucky Shot, but clearly falls short of the 30% of the
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capex required to build out Manh Choh in 2023 and early 2024, with production slated to begin
in the second half of 2024.
As for the share count, that’s very tight and while it doesn’t include the $20m convertible debt
facility held by Queen’s Road Capital (QRC.to), with just 100k of options and no warrants
there’s very little overhang on the stock price. This is a low share count and what’s more, many
of these shares are tightly held by long-term insiders. This is the baseline reasons behind one of
the weak points of the CTGO, i.e. the way it tends to “trade by appointment” and do very low
market volume, even though it’s now a fully paid-up NYSE ticker, rather than an OTC.
However and as also seen above in that price chart, the month of September saw a marked
improved in traded volume in CTGO and as that coincided with our coverage in IKN696, we’ll
now consider what happened between IKNM684 and IKN696 to shoot that price, as well as why
it has recently come back to its previous level. There were two main ingredients:
 The announcement of Kinross’s Feasibility Study on Manh Choh, on July 27th, with CTGO
adding its own announcement via an NR on July 28th (3).
 On the back of that announcement, CTGO hit the marketing trail and its CEO Rick Van
Nieuwenhuyse (RVN) used his considerable knowledge, experience, strong marketing
abilities and industry contacts to get the word out. Suddenly CTGO and its CEO RVN was
popping up at all the online webinars, getting interviews with trade papers and we also saw
a series of promo notes such as this one, a high traffic newsletter waxing lyrical about the
stock on September 6th (4) in the public sphere (as part of a campaign to sell the letter). As
for standard media, coverage in the trade papers and the webinar/physical conference
circuit boosted the optics of the company and its project at the time, an example of many
being this report from Mining Journal dated September 16th (5). (ASIDE: Honestly ladies
and gents, I really am in the wrong business).
Of course RVN and CTGO is right to get its name out there, particularly when it had solid news
from its 70% partner at Manh Choh, Kinross (K.to) (KGC) that it had approved its feasibility
study for the project and had given it the formal construction decision green light. That meant
the project was going to happen and would be a mine and for what it’s worth to date the
project is apparently on its allotted timeline. That means we get first production in the second
half of 2024. We’re not going to re-run too much on the mine plan, for that please see previous
editions or perhaps the latest corporate presentation found on the CTGO website (6). Suffice
here to say that Manh Choh is a very low risk, low tech proposition that plans to scoop and fill
trucks with high grade mineralization, then take it to the Kinross Fort Knox mine some 50km
away, where it will boost the low grade bulk mine operation at that mine and improve
production and cut costs. As for CTGO, it gets to ride coattail on Kinross’s 70% ownership and
plan with its 30% minority ownership of the project, all CTGO needs to do is provide its pro-rata
of the initial capex and it get to benefit directly from the efforts of the mine operator.
So with this strong positive news in late July, CTGO hit the media circuit in early September and
the ensuing marketing push as well as the glowing coverage from friendly letter writers saw
volume spike and the price run to U$30. It was around then in IKN696 we last featured the
stock and while I lamented at the time having missed a winner, the advice was still to wait on
the sidelines and see what happens. That’s turned out to have been the right path, as once the
marketing push came to an end CTGO shares returned from whence they came. It’s time to
consider why that might be via a closer look at the production plans for Manh Choh, plus a
ballpark look at its economics.
Manh Choh development and its economic model
The Kinross Feasibility Study is one that includes its 70% participation in Manh Choh and is
slated to add 600,000 oz per year to its overall Fort Knox operation. Its plan is to combine the
high grade ore coming from Manh Choh with lower grade from its current operation, so only a
portion of those 600k oz will come from the new mine. Special K needs no third party funding
or approval from outside the company so is not under any obligation to publish its FS under 43-
101 rules in the public realm and is likely to keep details of its project plans internal. So we’re
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not privy to the deeper details of Manh Choh, but we know enough to separate out the 30%
carry of Manh Choh in CTGO’s hands and offer the basic numbers on what the project capex
should cost CTGO, what its 30% may be worth and the potential upside from resource
expansion:
The capex: Kinross originally slated capex for Manh Choh at U$182m, including U$30m
contingency. Since then Kinross has rounded to U$200m in order to give a buffer to the
inflationary pressure in the sector that we’ve all heard about, which means CTGO needs to add
U$5.4m to its 30% of the budget. Therefore needs to raise around U$60m for its share and we
understand it would like to get the entire sum from the market, allow its current treasury to be
dedicated to exploration and development plans at Lucky Shot (and other). As for the method
of the raise, here’s what it says in the 3q22 10-Q:
The Company believes that it is more likely than not that it will raise capital through the
issuance of additional equity and or debt securities in the next six months for purposes
of funding its proportionate share of future Peak Gold JV exploration and for the
Company’s operating costs.
This doesn’t preclude other methods to raise the required U$60m, for example via convertible
debt sale (it has already done a U$20m deal with Queen’s Road Capital (QRC.to) on good
terms) or perhaps even selling its 30% of Manh Choh to majority owner Kinross. However, it
makes most sense for CTGO to assume a standard equity and/or debt funding deal for its end
of the capex at this time.
The projected operations: Stated on a 100% Manh Choh basis (please be clear, CTGO owns
30% of the project but the following numbers assume 100% of the mine) we know something
of average gold grade (7.88g/t in reserve) and gold recoveries (between 90% and 94%
depending on whether sourced from Manh Choh’s “Main” or North” deposit). We also know that
the small silver by-product credit grades at around 14g/t and has lower recovery rates that we
assume at 50%. Meanwhile, the likely mine rate of around 2,500tpd delivered to Fort Know by
truck. However and after all that data, we don’t run a typical Excel model because Kinross is
keeping the precise details in-house. Instead, it’s better and easier to go with the outlines given
by CTGO in its latest corporate literature, as provided by Kinross:
 Kinross estimates 914,000 GEO production over 4½ years, approx 225,000 oz GEO/year
 Kinross estimates an AISC of U$900/oz GEO
As regards CTGO’s 30% of Manh Choh and assuming the above numbers work out perfectly
(they won’t) this would imply it benefits from 274,200 oz GEO (most of that is gold, the silver
by-product is small) over 4.5 years at an AISC of U$900/oz. Therefore the simple math is to use
the current rounded spot price of U$1,800/oz and say:
274,200 GEO x (1800-900) = U$246.78m in mine operating earnings to 2027.
The basic result: From these two basic criteria, we can now get a handle on the baseline
value at CTGO by subtracting the U$60m in upfront capex obligations from the projected mine
operating margin and to add far too many decimal points, that’s U$188.76m, or U$27.48 per
fully diluted share. That compares favourably to this weekend’s share price of U$23.64.
The variables on Manh Choh: It’s therefore fair to say that CTGO’s current share price is largely
supported by its 30% participation in Manh Choh alone. However and strategically speaking
there are several variables that need to be taken into account. Here’s a list:
 A reasonable discount rate: If we assume CTGO exactly clears U$900/oz on its 274,200
GEOs to 2027, we need to apply a discount rate on those future earnings. As the project
seems reasonably set fair, with permits and a strong partner in a low risk jurisdiction, we
wouldn’t need to use a heavy discount but even if with use 5% over five years, it drops NPV
to U$130m, or U$17.98 per fully diluted share.
 Gold price variations. There isn’t a reader of these words that doesn’t understand that when
the gold price changes, so to operating margins. In this simplified case, every U$100/oz
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variance in the price of gold in either direction will change the total revenues for CTGO on its
theoretical 274,200 GEO by U$27.42m, or U$4/share. So if gold suddenly does what a lot of
gold proponents think it’s going to do in the years ahead, CTGO will see a direct benefit to its
bottom line and its equity price.
 AISC variations. For one thing, it’s easy to assume U$900/oz AISC at this point, reality may
turn out to be higher. But in this case there’s even reason to think CTGO may enjoy a lower
AISC. The U$900/oz quoted by Special K includes its own spending at Fort Knox to improve its
facilities and that would not be part of the Peak Gold LLC JV on Manh Choh. In other words,
Kinross’s project AISC may be somewhat higher than the costs eventually paid by CTGO.
 Production variations: We must keep in mind that while the current mine plan includes a life
of just 4.5 years for Manh Choh, there are significant opportunities to grow the resource via
on-strike exploration once operations are underway, as well as near-neighbour exploration of
priority targets around Manh Choh that sit either on JV territory or concessions 100% owned
by CTGO today. By way of just one example this graphic from the latest corporate
presentation shows how the two known
deposits at Manh Choh, Main and North,
indicate the potential for further discovery at
depth. We also note the recently approved
$3m Budget for regional exploration to
conduct early stage geological work on local
targets, with extra eyes and a 2,600m drill
program planned for the “Chief Danny”
target nearby. Finally, a loot back at the
previous 43-101 compliant technical report
on Manh Choh, dated April 2021, shows
there is lower grade material also available at Manh Choh, as well as a smaller inferred
resource. Depending on gold prices, these could also become ore and deliver more ounces as
the current plan matures. All in all, there’s every reason to believe that Kinross and Contango
can extend the life of Manh Choh beyond the current 4 ½ years planned ands if so, every
extra gold ounce that comes out will add to the CTGO treasury over time.
Overall, there are many variables to the current ballpark valuation of Manh Choh and several of
the main ones (gold price, costs, time value, etc) are double-edged swords. It will be up to the
market to finally decide the value of CTGO shares and even while Manh Choh is in operation,
we’re bound to see its share price ebb and flow with the market’s own cycles. However, it’s also
clear there is plenty of opportunity to add value ton CTGO and its baseline valuation on Manh
Choh alone and in a favourable market, these share could go a lot higher without even
considering the other moving part of the company.
Lucky Shot and potential upside
Our final section today considers why CTGO may be worth a lot more than either its current
share price, or the implied price of its 30% participation in Manh Choh. CTGO owns other early-
stage mining concessions and for more on all the names and locations, please see the company
webiste and its own literature. Here we’ll focus on just two aspects:
Current treasury: This is the easy one, as our conservative estimate for year-end means CTGO
is also backed up by around U$2/share in cash.
Lucky Shot: I want to make some mention of Lucky Shot today, because even though it’s a
longer-term project it also has clear potential to add significant value to the CTGO share price.
Indeed, it’s worth remembering that Queen’s Road Capital (QRC.to) invested its U$20m into the
CTGO structure mainly because of its interest in Lucky Shot, rather than Manh Choh. Located
just North of the capital of Alaska, Anchorage, Lucky Shot is a high grade past producing mine
(see photos from the 1920s on the company website) and also has a compliant Measured and
Indicated resource, as seen in this table:
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As you can appreciate, tonnages are low but grades are very high and these numbers are
typical of the grade mined in historic production at the mine before it was closed down. Lucky
Shot is currently being drilled by CTGO and is now going through the first ever modern
exploration program. The team expects to be able to extend the previously mined and current
high grade vein system and if you speak with RVN, you’ll soon find out how confident they are
of improving Lucky Shot to at least half a million ounce of high grade, mineable resource. At
these high grades and a milestone level of 0.5m oz Au even a relatively low capex, low
footprint, low tonnage mining operation would make sense for a company such as CTGO and,
in theory at least, would become a real money spinner. Example basic math:
 200 tonnes per day processed (two hundred, not two thousand)
 ½ oz gold recovered per tonne
 Low quartile opex of U$800/oz AISC
 U$1,800/oz gold price
Assuming 90 days per quarter operations, that would provide 9,000/oz in gold, sales of
U$16.2m and a quarterly operating margin U$9m, or U$1.31/share. At a modest PE of 10X, that
would imply a U$52 share price on an operation with a resource that lasts for around 13 years.
An example to show how grade is king and how even a small operation would become a
winning deal for CTGO holders. Of course, any financial projections on small operation that
wouldn’t happen for several years are pure theory only, which is why our model is the simplest
of possible walk-throughs today (no Excel, no sweat). It’s presented for context only and to lay
out the potential upside that Lucky Shot and the current exploration and drilling could mean to
the share price in the nearer-term.
The bottom line
Today’s overview of CTGO is to give some numerical support to our thesis that Manh Choh
alone justifies its current share price and that there is plenty of upside potential in this stock.
We see that the baseline economics of its development project alone provide plenty of
opportunity for further upside and CTGO is set to benefit from higher gold prices if they come
around, we also get a rough idea of what Lucky Shot could mean to the company if its second
asset starts delivering the way RVN and his team believe it will. However, we wrap up today’s
overview on our new Watch List component by underscoring just why it’s only a member of the
Watch List today, rather than a stock I am looking to buy in the near future. There are tow
main hurdles to eventual ownership:
1) Its trading volume. CTGO needs, and needs desperately, to get its traded volume
moving higher. The tight share structure is understandable considering the number of
long-term tight hand holders, but that doesn’t make the problem insurmountable and
until it trades at least some volume on a daily basis, many potential owners will not
move in for fear of being trapped in a roach motel equity that will not provide the
liquidity if they, or someone else, sell and move on for their own reasons.
2) We don’t know how CTGO will raise its $60m for Manh Choh. This is the big one and
while there will be some of this audience who will sniff and say “U$60m isn’t such a big
number, and this project looks low risk”, it’s another issue when the company looking
to raise the sum only has market cap of $160m itself. We also know that raising capital
in this market has been very difficult for junior developers (and if you don’t know that,
ask a few CEOs) so there may be a dearth of offers, even for a project as apparently
straightforward as this one. As a result, CTGO may be low-balled by opportunistic
financiers who are looking to get in at their own deep bargain price and if so, I for one
wouldn’t blame them; this is capitalism after all and when it’s a buyer’s market, it’s a
8

buyer’s market. However, that also means we won’t know how much Manh Choh is left
on the bone for retail holders (you and I) compared to its share price until the eventual
deal is announced and that, in essence, is why I prefer to wait.
There’s a lot to like about CTGO, but with a small and illiquid share count and a market cap of
U$160m, there’s a lot of equity value that could be dissolved by an expensive deal to finance its
30% of Manh Choh. Therefore and until we know the details of that financing, CTGO will be in
the Watch List though be clear, it’s not on the table below just for fun and as long at Contango
Ore can raise its required capital on good terms, don’t be surprised when your author becomes
an owner of some of these shares in 2023.
Stocks to Follow
Despite the Friday sag, many of the components of our Stocks to Follow list held up well into
the week’s close and once it was all done, we were left with nine week-over-week winners
(ARG.to, WRN.to, RIO.v, NCAU.v, ALDE.v, MIRL.cse, ATC.v, CTGO, MENE.v), eight losers
(MAI.v, ABRA.v, QCCU.v, ORX.v, CKG.v, PA.v, APN.v, XYZ.v) if we include the new ABRA.v
position and just one unchanged on the week (PGM.v). Of the losers, Anacortes (XYZ.v down
12.8%), QC Copper (QCCU.v down 12.5%) and Altiplano (APN.v down 9.4%) were the biggest
percentage losers and Minera Alamos (MAI.v) was the biggest monetary loss, though that was
doing well enough until getting caught in the late week selling. As for the winners, another
cheer for the relief rally in Rio2 Ltd (RIO.v up 20.6%) but perhaps the most pleasing winners of
the week were in Western (WRN.to) and Amerigo (ARG.to), our two main copper plays both
gained ground on Friday selling against the market headwinds and showed relative strength.
With the addition of AbraSilver (ABRA.v) there are a total of 18 stocks in all categories of our
list at present, with six of the lines in green and one unchanged since inception. That leaves
eleven in the red, something to fix in 2023.
company Ticker this week Avg Price Reco date Current PPS Gain/Loss% Notes
TOP PICKS
Minera Alamos MAI.v STR BUY C$0.21 13-Oct-19 C$0.43 104.8% $0.75 first tgt, #1 idea
RECOMMENDED STOCKS
Amerigo Res ARG.to STR BUY C$1.36 12-Dec-21 C$1.39 2.2% CheapCu w/low downside risk
Western Copper WRN.to BUY C$2.02 13-Nov-22 C$2.42 19.8% New trade, watched for months
QC Copper&Gold QCCU.v BUY C$0.275 25-Apr-21 C$0.14 -49.1% Now drilling. Easy hold
Abrasilver Res. ABRA.v BUY C$0.38 4-Dec-22 C$0.365 -3.9% New trade, watched for months
Rio2 Ltd. RIO.v HOLD C$0.83 22-Apr-18 C$0.205 -75.3% Cheap on permit probs, appeal
SPECULATIVE TRADES
Newcore Gold NCAU.v BUY C$0.20 23-Oct-22 C$0.22 10.0% Near-term spec trade
Orefinders ORX.v.v SPEC BUY C$0.04 23-Oct-22 C$0.04 0.0% plan to build position
Chesapeake Gold CKG.v SPEC BUY C$3.07 20-Feb-22 C$2.11 -31.3% Au leverage, small trade so far
Aldebaran Res. ALDE.v BUY C$0.72 16-May-21 C$0.79 9.7% trying patience
Palamina Corp PA.v SPEC BUY C$0.295 21-Nov-21 C$0.085 -71.2% Au expl in S.Peru
Altiplano Metals APN.v HOLD C$0.31 17-Sep-21 C$0.145 -53.2% Cheap entry, plan on track.
Pure Gold PGM.h hold C$0.14 26-Sep-22 C$0.015 -89.3% tiny trade, hit Ch11 wall
Minera IRL MIRL.cse avoid C$0.195 22-Jul-12 C$0.06 -69.2% run into ground by CEO
A WATCHLIST OF POTENTIAL TRADES. NB: I DO NOT OWN
ATAC Res ATC.v WATCH C$0.095 11-Sep-22 C$0.085 -10.5% Cheap Yukon neighbour play
Contango Ore CTGO WATCH U$23.25 2-Dec-22 U$23.64 1.7% Dropping from watch list
Anacortes Mining XYZ.v WATCH C$0.49 22-Jul-22 C$0.41 -16.3% potential gold exploreco trade
9

LONG-TERM NON-MINING HOLD
Mene Inc. MENE.v adding C$0.66 6-Dec-20 C$0.445 -32.6% LT bet, adding slowly
CLOSED TRADES IN 2022 date closed close price
Great Bear Res GBR.v Jan'22 C$15.83 26-Aug-20 C$28.58 80.5% Bought out by Kinross, print
Copper Mountain CMMC.to Jan'22 C$3.40 18-Jun-21 C$3.78 15.9% Sold 1/2 position in rebalance
Copper Mountain CMMC.to Feb'22 C$3.40 18-Jun-21 C$3.70 8.8% Sold rest on FY22 guidance
Trilogy Metals TMQ Mar'22 U$1.84 15-Sep-19 U$1.04 -41.3% killed by US permit reversal
McEwen Mining MUX Apr'22 U$0.89 2-Jan-22 U$0.82 -7.9% No 2022 turnaround, cut loss
Abrasilver Res. ABRA.v May'22 C$0.42 24-Apr-22 C$0.33 -21.4% sold to reduce Ag exposure
Strategic Metals SMD.v May'22 C$0.42 31-Jan-21 C$0.30 -28.6% trade flatlined 1.5 years
Discovery Silver DSV.v Jun'22 C$1.77 24-Oct-21 C$1.39 -21.5% Cutting Ag exp.& raising cash
Element 29 ECU.v Jul'22 C$0.58 6-Mar-22 C$0.30 -48.3% sold to cut Cu exposure
Superior Gold SGI.v Oct'22 C$0.95 3-Apr-22 C$0.24 -74.7% Q3 prod fail was last straw
Goldshore Res GSHR.v Nov'22 C$0.18 23-Oct-22 C$0.34 88.9% Quick profit taken
2015 to 2021 annual closed positions in appendices below, 2009 to 2014 closed positions in editions IKN553 or earlier
Now for a few notes on some of the covered companies:
AbraSilver Resource Corp. (ABRA.v): POSITION OPENED. I got all the ABRA I wanted on
Monday at 38c and the company then duly delivered the expected news the next day, that it
had closed its bought deal financing with the over-allotment facility fully taken and bringing
gross proceeds of C$10m. So all good and this trade is now set fair. As for trading, ABRA went
like many others at the end of the week and we start its weekly coverage on the wrong side of
the price line. But it’s 1.5c and now looks oversold, so I’ll live with that.
Orefinders (ORX.v): I got a very small
amount and technically, don’t need to whine
and make excuses any longer but, even with
the weakness seen in ORX holdings of its fellow
“Ore Group” companies last week, it was
difficult to buy at 4c so I’m looking to get a few
more in the days to come.
As for those holdings, back when this trade was
first pitched I ran this table and at that time,
the totals for AE, QCCU, MIS and cash came to
C$8.43m, these days and due mostly to the
drop in American Eagle (AE.v) after its latest,
good-not-great drill hole, the total is down to C$7.7m though to be honest, I may be
underestimating its cash position by a coupole of hundred thousand:
AE.v: Marketable Secs, Investments in Assocs, Cash
ticker shares owned(m) PPS value
AE.v 5.20 0.17 0.88
QCCU.v 5.06 0.14 0.71
subtotal 1.59
MIS.cse 24.71 0.045 1.11
subtotal 2.70
Est cash 5.00
Total 7.70
Here’s the valuation table with current shares out (247.1m):
ORX mkt cap at various prices
PPS Mkt Cap
0.02 4.94
0.025 6.18
10

0.03 7.41
0.035 8.65
0.04 9.88
0.045 11.12
0.05 12.36
0.055 13.59
0.06 14.83
0.065 16.06
0.07 17.30
source: IKN calcs, ORX data
In so many words, at 4c and current holdings I’m paying just over C $2m for the brains trust at
ORX and even with the drop seen in Ore Group companies in December, that’s excellent
risk/reward at these tinycap levels. ORX bring multiple opportunities to hit a home run and it
would only need one for the leverage to kick in and make this a springer. It’s not going to carry
a lot of my money for the time being.
Amerigo Resources (ARG.to): We now run notes
on all four of our copper trades and, considering that
most copper stocks sold off last week (COPX ended
negative 1.8% week-over-week), having three of the
four in the green over the week was a pleasant
surprise. They were led by the biggest of our trades,
Amerigo (ARG.to), which did roughly the same as the
week before and traded from weaker to stronger and
printed its highest prices on the Friday (ten day
chart, right).
We know the U$3.80/lb copper price matters to ARG
and the way it held last week was probably the
reason for the late-week rally, against the grain of peers.
Western Copper & Gold (WRN.to): This three
month chart plotting WRN.to against the copper ETF
(COPX) highlights the way it has rallied in recent
weeks, as well as that rather odd selling anomaly
when the company, along with RTZ, announced the
expected extension of its strategic agreement.
That looks good and so far at least, out C$2.00-ish
entry point is working out well. We reiterate the
tendency WRN has shown over the years to suddenly
spike higher. If it does, I wouldn’t be averse to
flipping these shares back into the market.
Aldebaran Resources (ALDE.v): The third of our
four featured copper stocks also ended in the green
last week, but in this case trading was thin and the
79c only held because of a lack of volume Friday.
However…
…we note that ALDE put in a sharp rally at the end of
last year, the run beginning in mid-December.
History may not repeat, but it sometimes rhymes and
if the same spurt shows up in the weeks to come, I
may even get that exit.
11

QC Copper & Gold (QCCU.v): The fourth of the four dedicated copper plays in your author’s
portfolio was the only loser on the week, down 1.5c (12.5%). It may be an easy and trite
excuse to say “ahhh, tax loss selling” and move on but in this case the tape did show all the
symptoms and though it doesn’t show up on the hourlies chart (right), that Wednesday volume
dump took QCCU down briefly to 13c. these things happens in December, but it won’t detract
from the fundamentals strength of Opemiska and therefore, heavily underwater at 14.5c or 16c,
I shall shrug shoulders and continue to hold through until that delayed MRE is available in 1q23.
Rio2 Ltd (RIO.v): Two weekends ago in IKN706, dated November 27th, and the note
“Catching up with Rio2 Ltd (RIO.v)”, we did as
the title implied on internal and external factors
around our distressed investment. It was an
overdue update and covered three main aspects,
namely 1) The 3q22 financials, 2) the recently
announced news on the royalty sale and 3)
Political developments in Chile. That update
turned out to be well timed (right). The day after
IKN706 RIO.v published its own update (7), in
which it gave its own take on the improved
political situation in Chile as well as announcing
the internal management moves that have put
Andrew Cox as CEO and seen Alex Black move to
Executive Chair. The price chart above shows
that any market worries about seeing Alex Black move to one side and letting the erstwhile
COO take over as CEO have been unfounded. Two weeks ago, the IKN706 note ended this
way:
Rio2’s share price remains firmly in the penalty box, however. I’m the first to admit
we’re unlikely see any big rebound and re-rate until the permit is granted for Fenix,
but there has been enough going on in the background to make a speculation in Rio2
at these levels reasonably attractive. It’s not the first time I’ve floated the idea that
even in its present state, Rio2 is worth up to 25c for those willing to roll the dice on a
result (that they’re increasingly likely to get) and this weekend, I’m sticking with that
number.
We the run in the price since then, that’s looking evermore likely. In fact, the only thing I got
totally wrong two weeks ago was to assume RIO.v might become a target for Tax Loss Sellers.
There are still a couple of weeks to transverse on that topical influence to prices, but with
momentum now with the price and an equity showing clear signs of life as Chile’s image for
mining improves, it’s fair to say I’m not worried about that over the medium-term. Don’t give
up on RIO.v, there’s life, a permit and a mine in this company yet.
Minera IRL (MIRL.cse): MIRL announced its production figures for November 2022 and the
2.213oz shipped is an improvement on recent months and the best calendar month since May:
12

MIRL: 2020/22 Corihuarmi gold shipments, per month
4500
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
13
02naj bef ram rpa yam nuj luj gua pes tco von ced 12naj bef ram rpa yam nuj luj gua pes tco von ced 22naj bef ram rpa yam nuj luj gua pes tco von
Oz Au
source: MIRL filings
It also announced stacked ounces on pad of 4,053oz,
which is the normal cycle for the mine as it enters the
Peruvian summer vacation period (just before
Christmas to February) when staffing levels typically
drop on mine sites. In other news, the AGM came and
went as expected, opaque and with no consideration
for shareholders as this company is run into the
ground. In trading, it moved up to 6c on continued
very light trading after the recent waterfall drop. The
dead cat bounced pattern.
Anacortes (XYZ.v): The market came to roughly the same conclusion that we voice in last
week’s edition and decided Boroo is trying to lowball an Anacortes that finds itself negotiating
from a position of weakness. The price action signals the low likelihood of a deal being agreed
upon and that means XYZ needs to get back to doing what it should have been doing in the
second half of this year, i.e. drilling and developing its resource.
Minera Alamos (MAI.v): Out Top Pick almost held onto all of its gains of the previous week,
but thin trading and braod market weakness did for the price on Friday afternoon and it ended
at the low end of its trading range. So be it, we await the declaration of commercial production,
scheduled for next month.
The Copper Basket
After forty-nine weeks of 2022, The Copper Basket shows a loss of 45.86% to level stakes:

company ticker price 1/1/22 Shares out Market Cap current pps gain/loss%
1 Copper Mtn CMMC.to 3.42 210.166 369.89 1.76 -48.5%
2 Western Copper WRN.to 2.00 151.597 366.86 2.42 21.0%
3 Marimaca Cop MARI.to 3.77 88.118 269.64 3.06 -18.8%
4 Oroco Res OCO.v 2.04 207.033 186.33 0.90 -55.9%
5 Nevada Copper NCU.to 0.71 658.638 184.42 0.28 -60.6%
6 Aldebaran Res. ALDE.v 0.84 138.579 109.48 0.79 -6.0%
7 Hot Chili HCH.v 1.53 109.223 91.75 0.84 -45.1%
8 Regulus Res. REG.v 1.06 101.85 69.26 0.68 -35.8%
9 Meridian Min MNO.to 1.18 153.735 61.49 0.40 -66.1%
10 C3 Metals CCCM.v 0.16 645.379 45.18 0.07 -56.3%
11 Doré Copper DCMC.v 0.79 84.1 33.64 0.40 -49.4%
12 Kutcho Copper KC.v 0.88 103.94 22.87 0.22 -75.0%
13 QC Copper QCCU.v 0.34 129.06 18.07 0.14 -58.8%
14 Element 29 Res ECU.v 0.58 79.24 15.06 0.19 -67.2%
15 Coast Copper COCO.v 0.13 41.335 1.86 0.045 -65.4%
NB: All stocks in CAD$ Portfolio avg -45.86%
After a week which saw seven losers (CMMC.to, The Copper Basket 2022, weekly evolution
10%
OCO.v, MARI.to, NCU.to, HCH.v, KC.v, QCCU.v),
0%
four unchanged stocks (REG.v, CCCM.v, ECU.v,
-10%
COCO.v) and just four winners (WRN.to, MNO.to,
-20%
ALDE.v, DCMC.v) from out 15 basket
-30%
components, the basket average lost less than
-40%
half a percentage point and things remain largely
unchanged. There was one double figure -50%
percentage winner in Dore Copper (DCMC.v up -60%
11.1%) and three losers over that line in QC
Copper (QCCU.v down 12.5%), Kutcho (KC.v
down 10.2%) and Oroco (OCO.v
down 10.0%), though Nevada
(NCU.to down 9.7%) and Copper
Mountain (CMMC.to down 8.8%) were
also hit hard considering their larger
market caps and more liquid trading.
And all it took was a weak Friday
afternoon for mining stocks, as
trading for copper-the-metal was the
way you see in this ten day chart,
“good but not great” as prices did well
to hold and eventually consolidate
above the U$3.80/lb line. However,
the sag in broad markets on Friday
saw traders of all types going to cash
for the weekend and the copper junior
sub-sector was no exception to that rule, hence the drops in the more liquid traded stocks in
our list such as CMMC and OCO.
In macro news, Nicolas Snowden of Goldman Sachs is back! The man who brought you the
extreme bull call in 2021 and U$15,000/t copper, then the “stock out” call for Chinese copper
inventories early this year, saw his latest bullish call move the market on Thursday, here’s
Reuters (8) on the gig:
LONDON, Dec 8 (Reuters) - Copper rose on Thursday on hopes that an easing of
14
ts1naJ ht9naJ ht61 dr32 ht03 ht6bef ht31 ht02 ht72 ht6raM ht31 ht02 ht72 dr3rpA ht01 ht71 ht42 s1yam ht8 ht51 dn22 ht92 ht5nuj ht21 ht91 ht62 dr3yluj ht01 ht71 ht42 ts13 ht7gua ht41 ts12 ht82 ht4pes ht11 ht81 ht52 dn2tco ht9 ht61 dr32 ht03 ht6von ht31 ht02 ht72 ht4ced ht11
source: IKN calcs

coronavirus controls in top consumer China will increase demand, with Goldman
Sachs predicting prices could reach a record high of $11,000 in a year.
And:
“…copper is up 3.5% this month after rising 10.6% in November as expectations began
to build that China will retreat from its zero-COVID policies.
On Wednesday, the country dropped key parts of those rules.
That’s precisely the point this desk has been making in recent weeks, one reiterated on the
open blog, early Wednesday morning (9) in the brief post “China relaxing Covid restrictions is
more reason to like copper”. So tooty-toot-toot to me and all that, but Snowden at the Vampire
Squid took the argument a lot further and for that, Australia’s Financial Review covered the
issue well (10). Here’s an excerpt:
While some traders had been anticipating that a burst of new supply would temporarily
weaken market fundamentals near-term, Goldman Sachs believes this soft patch is
failing to materialise.
The broker now forecasts that the copper market faces a
178,000 tonne deficit next year, compared to its previous
forecast for a 169,000 tonne surplus.
“The sequential increase in policy targets and
commitments to green transition, alongside a minimal
supply response so far... have resulted in earlier and larger
open-ended deficit conditions that essentially are already
here, not beginning at some point in the future,” said
Nicholas Snowdon, metals strategist at Goldman Sachs.
The AFR note also comes with graphics and here right is one
of them, with a little red ink added by this desk. The GS
forecast for the copper market in 2023 has moved by 347kmt
and is now predicted for a deficit, but that’s still the thin end
of the deficit wedge as the 2024 and 2025 forecasts show.
We now move to our regular weekly update on the world
copper inventory scene, data from the people who best track
the metal in the world’s largest producer country, Chile’s
Cochilco:
 Tonnage was added to the three official world copper inventory systems last week, up
11,083 metric tonnes (mt) to close at 196,188mt, the 200k line continues to be a
magnet.
 The main change happened in Shanghai, as SHFE stocks added 11,083mt to reach
78,546mt. This is again against the normal run of play for the time of year and as the
dedicated SHFE charts below show, there’s now a clear improvement in stocks levels
from this time last year.
 At the LME, inventories dropped LME: Cu tonnage under cancelled warrant
by a modest 1,300mt to close at
85,425mt, while cancelled
warrants continued to rise and
finished the week at 26,800mt, which is a bullish signal for prices.
 The Comex inventory did its small
thing again and dropped by
937mt of copper, closing at
32,217mt. No biggie.
The first of the dedicated SHFE charts tell us that the current copper stocks situation has been
treading water for several weeks. The second below shows us that stocks are notably higher
now than they were this time last year, even while that was an exception situation.
15
00142 52074 57334 00714 52045 05205 52027 52418 52926 05694 57332 52271 05761 52511 57471 52581 52862 00642 00743 57924 00914 52975 05174 05803 04441 0588 0018 5786 00864 05386 57077 05064 05883
05891
52531 52891 00862
100000
90000
80000
70000
60000
50000 40000 30000
20000
10000
0
dr3rpa ht01 ht71 ht42 1.yam ht8 ht51 dn22 ht92 ht5nuj ht21 ht91 ht62 dr3yluj ht01 ht71 ht42 ts13 ht7gua ht41 ts12 ht82 ht4pes ht11 ht81 ht52 dn2tco ht9 ht61 dr32 ht03 ht6von ht31 ht02 ht72 ht4ced ht11
mt Cu
source: Cochilco

Shanghai Futures Exchange Warehouse Stocks, 2014 to date
400000
350000
300000
250000
200000
150000
100000
50000
0
16
31'13ceD dr32 ht02 ht51 ht01 ht5tco ht03 ht52 dn22 ht71 ht21 ht6pes ts1von 102ht72ced ts12 ht71 ht21 ht7guA dn2tcO ht4ceD ht92 ht62 ts12 ht61 ht01 ht5von ts13 ht52 dn22 ht42 ht91 ht41 ht9 9102
dr3bef
ts13 ht62 ts12 ht51 ht01 0202ht5naj 0202ts1ram ht62 ts12 ht61 ht11 0202ht6ced ts13 ht82 dr32 ht81 ht21 ht7 2202dn2naj ht72 ht42 ht91 ht41 ht9 ht4ced
Mt Cu
|
source: Cochilco
SHFE copper inventory levels, 2018 to 2022
400000
350000
300000
250000
200000
150000
100000
50000
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 01 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 02 12 22 32 42 52 62 72 82 92 03 13 23 33 43 53 63 73 83 93 04 14 24 34 44 54 64 74 84 94 05 15 25
MT Cu 2022
2021
2020
2019
2018
source: Cochilco data
As Christmas normally marks the bottom (or as close as) to SHFE stock levels in the calendar
year, it’s fair to say that 2022 stocks levels have taken an unusual turn. Whether coincidence or
not, the normal pattern broke in week 43 of the year which was also the time the LME got more
stringent about Russian copper stocks entering its European warehouses. This desk’s best
guess is, therefore, a change in logistics for copper coming out of Russia that is now being sold
to Chinese end users, instead of travelling via one of its established Baltic routes into
Rotterdam. Now a few notes on basket component stocks:
Copper Mountain (CMMC.to): On Friday afternoon in a regulatory filing (RegF) to SEDAR,
we learned that Zeta Resources, via its discretionary investment manager ICM, announced it
had been selling more shares of Copper Mountain:
As at 9 December 2022, ICM, on behalf of the Fund, exercised control and direction over an
aggregate of 28,704,745 shares, representing approximately 13.43% of the issued and
outstanding shares of the Issuer.
Zeta has been busy selling into the market all through 4q22 and here’s a rough idea, via a
snapshot of its end-month share positions
 End September: 35.9m shares
 End October: 33.9m shares
 End November: 29.4m shares
 Today: 28.7m shares
We can see the effect of Zeta’s constant selling
by mapping CMMC against the same COPX
benchmark in the same three month period used
in the Western Copper (WRN.to) comment
above. Bottom line: CMMC has a problem and
with a large and determined seller on its books,
that problem isn’t about to go away.

Oroco Resources (OCO.v): Down another 10% on no news, last week bore all the hallmarks
of Tax Loss Selling in OCO. Here’s a chart to remind readers how I didn’t buy the sharp upmove
in OCO that came on the back of a renewal of its pumpy social media promo. By equal
measure, there’s no real reason to suddenly assume OCO is worse than the median in this
sector.
We also remind readers that OCO has done decent trading volume for most of the year and is
also over 50% down YTD, that’s the right recipe for people looking to sell for tax purposes.
Meridian Mining (MNO.to): There’s appetite for MNO’s placement, as seen in its December
7th NR:
LONDON, United Kingdom, December 7, 2022, Meridian Mining UK S (TSX:MNO)
(Frankfurt/Tradegate:2MM) (OTCQB:MRRDF) (“Meridian” or the “Company”),
announces that it expects to close on approximately C$5.9 million (the “Offering”) of
common shares (the “Common Shares”) at $0.35 per Common Share (the “Issue
Price”), an increase from the previously announced minimum size of C$3.25 million
(see the Company’s previous press release dated November 28, 2022). The Offering
may be further increased to the maximum permitted under the Listed Issuer Financing
Exemption (as defined below) as originally announced.
That’s a fair upsize in a difficult market and we also note insiders and officers are taking 3m
(just over C$1m) of the offering. As for context, that cash plus current treasury would be
enough to get the company through most of 2023 at the current burn rate, or all of it if 2023
isn’t as active. MNO improved on the week on this news.
The Producer Basket
After 49 weeks of 2022, the Producer Basket shows a loss of 8.02% to level stakes:
company ticker price 1/1/22 Shares out MktCap(U$Bn) current pps gain/loss%
1 Newmont NEM 62.02 797.44 37.00 46.40 -25.2%
2 Barrick GOLD 19.00 1779 29.50 16.58 -12.7%
3 Franco-Nevada FNV 138.29 191.66 26.99 140.81 1.8%
4 Agnico Eagle AEM 53.14 454.904 23.16 50.92 -4.2%
5 Wheaton PM WPM 42.93 450.3 17.56 38.99 -7.6%
6 Gold Fields GFI 10.99 887.72 9.62 10.84 -1.4%
7 Kinross Gold KGC 5.81 1296.5 5.46 4.21 -27.4%
8 Alamos Gold AGI 7.69 392.503 3.86 9.84 28.0%
9 B2Gold BTG 3.93 1055.6 3.55 3.36 -14.5%
10 Sandstorm SAND 6.20 223.79 1.17 5.25 -15.3%
All prices and stock quotes in U$ Port. avg -8.02%
Even though gold held up reasonably well on Friday afternoon, gold and PM stocks took their
17

cue from the broad markets on a very weak close and headed South in the last hour of trading,
as seen in this five day comparative chart. As you
can probably make out, the sharpest reversal was
for GDX and that means the biggest PM stocks
took it hardest and the drop in market leader NEM
was particularly brutal.
An unfortunate end to the week (perhaps the
stock market was upset with Brazil losing) and as
a result, all ten of our basket stocks finished in the
red. What’s more, we sharply under-performed
the GDX and our recent small lead is now a small
deficit to the benchmark, with just three weeks
left in this year’s race.
The reason for the weakness? With some major macro data due in the days ahead, including
the key inflation report of US CPI Tuesday and the FOMC reporting on Wednesday, you got the
distinct feeling that players didn’t want to hold into the weekend after seeing the PPI number
come in slightly hotter than expected. A nervous market is to blame, expect it to stay that way
no matter which way it breaks next week.
The 2022 Producer Basket: Percentage difference
5.0% between GDX benchmark & basket (negative = IKN ahead)
4.0%
3.0%
2.0%
1.0%
0.0%
-1.0%
-2.0%
-3.0%
-4.0%
Newmont (NEM): NEM led the Friday losses and its sharp
drop on Friday afternoon also broke through the week’s line in
the sand, as seen in this ten-day chart (right).
As the sentiment for the drop was more about the broad
market than gold (see above), this now look near-term
oversold. However, with the US CPI number of Tuesday and
the FOMC statement Wednesday, we’ll probably have to wait
until Thursday or even Friday to know if it stays that way.
Sandstorm (SAND): Sandstorm has under-performed for the
last three month, continued to do so last week and what’s more…
18
ts1naJ ht9naJ ht61 dr32 ht03 ht6bef ht31 ht02 ht72 ht6ram ht31 ht02 ht72 dr3rpa ht01 ht71 ht42 s1yam ht8 ht51 dn22 ht92 ht5nuj ht21 ht91 ht62 dr3luj ht01 ht71 ht42 ts13 ht7 ht41 ts12 ht82 ht4pes ht11 ht81 ht52 dn2tco ht9 ht61 dr32 ht03 ht6von ht31 ht02 ht72 ht4ced ht11
The 2022 Producer Basket: Weekly performance and
35% comparative to GDX control
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
-5%
-10%
-15%
-20%
-25% source: IKN calcs, NYSE data
-30%
ts1naJ ht9naJ ht61 dr32 ht03 ht6bef ht31 ht02 ht72 ht6ram ht31 ht02 ht72 dr3rpa ht01 ht71 ht42 s1yam ht8 ht51 dn22 ht92 ht5nuj ht21 ht91 ht62 dr3luj ht01 ht71 ht42 ts13 ht7 ht41 ts12 ht82 ht4pes ht11 ht81 ht52 dn2tco ht9 ht61 dr32 ht03 ht6von ht31 ht02 ht72 ht4ced ht11
ikn
gdx control
source: NYSE, IKN Calcs

…the reasons are its financial fundamentals. This chart shows the two moments its stock price
most decoupled from its peers in the last three months, they are the day when SAND
announced that (nasty) surprise U$80m bot deal after over-extending its balance sheet on
deals, then the 3q22 financials that failed to impress the number crunchers who now lead
sentiment in this stock price. Your author’s opinion back on the day SAND ran its bought deal
with the intention of working down some of its welter burden of debt was that it would not be
the last share dilution, the market seems to agree.
The TinyCaps List
After forty-nine weeks of 2022, the TinyCaps show a loss of 36.27% to level stakes:
company ticker price 1/1/22 Shares out Mkt Cap current pps gain/loss%
Aurelius Min AUL.v 0.24 45.836 3.44 0.075 -68.8%
Golden Pursuit GDP.v 0.13 34.638 6.41 0.185 42.3%
Infield Min INFD.v 0.06 48.445 1.21 0.025 -58.3%
Kingfisher Met KFR.v 0.30 103.06 9.79 0.095 -56.7%
Latin Metals LMS.v 0.12 57.686 7.79 0.135 16.7%
Manitou Gold MTU.v 0.06 344.57 6.89 0.02 -66.7%
Melkior Res MKR.v 0.295 24.011 5.52 0.23 -28.8%
Precipitate Gold PRG.v 0.105 129.322 9.70 0.075 -23.8%
Signature Res SGU.v 0.35 55.14 4.41 0.080 -77.1%
Winshear Gold WINS.v 0.08 72.44 3.62 0.05 -37.5%
Prices in CAD$, data from TSXV basket avg -36.27%
This section attempts to track the tinycap mining sub-sector of the market, our ten companies
chosen under the following criteria to put together a list representing the state of play in the
sub-sector of tinycap exploration company stocks. At least, that’s the plan.
 Market capitalization of under $20m. They have to be tiny. In two cases I’ve stretched the window a
little and allowed sub-U$20m market capper in that are just over the C$20m level, but the spirit is unaltered.
 A “non broken” stock price and project story. There are literally hundreds of tinycap juniors of the right
size, but it was a particularly depressing exercise to trawl through the whole of the TSXV and find companies
that are small enough, but with life in them. The vast majority of sub-$20m stocks are broken stocks, either
traded to death on the exchange or with projects that are a bust or with entrenched management more
interested in their monthly paycheck than anything else.
 Likelihood of meaningful newsflow in 2022. This connects to the company’s “unbroken” status, as we
want news and potential catalysts from companies with projects that can work.
 Decent management if possible. When you are down among the little guys it doesn’t pay to be too
choosy, but still I preferred companies that have teams or people with good peer reputations.
Our list of ten stocks finished the week with three losers (AUL.v, INFD.v, MKR.v), two
unchanged (MTU.v, WINS.v) and five winners (GDP.v, KFR.v, LMS.v, PRG.v, SGU.v) and the
movers include a big downer (INFD.v down 28.6%) and a big
winner (KFR.v up 36.8%) and once the dust had settled, the
basket average had improved by just 0.03%. Much ado about
nothing.
Latin Metals (LMS.v): The issue continues to be volume. We got
more newsflow from LMA last Thursday when the company
updated (11) on the progress made by Barrick (GOLD) on its Carro
Bayo project in the Deseado Massif region of Patagonia/South
Argentina. Barrick is optioning in on the LMS property and LMS
reported on the end of a large mapping and chip sample program
run on the extended property. According to the maps provided (we
feature one of three, right) there are plenty of silver and gold
bearing structures identified at surface so presumably, the next
stage will be to take a drill rig to the most promising and see if
19

there’s something to interest a major. That NR saw LMS
shares pop to 14c on Thursday morning, but the lack of
follow-through on volume means these prices are easy to
make stick. Early-stage geological work is always necessary
and the game at this time is to generate drill targets, which
is just what GOLD has done. But they don’t tend to move
the markets, for that we need results from the Truth
Machine and that’s the aim for 2023, we suppose. Let’s see
how Barrick’s exploration budget works for next year.
NB: Please be clear that The Tiny Dogs is NOT a list of recommended tinycap stocks. It is a list of companies with
market caps of under $20m offering a reasonable representation of the wider tinycaps market. It’s possible in the future
I may buy shares in one or several of these stocks, at the moment both my opinion and wallet are strictly neutral.
Regional politics
A week of politics in Peru
“A week is a long time in politics.”
Harold Wilson
“Overnight is a long time in politics; a week is forever.”
Dan Rather
“Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it whether it exists or not,
diagnosing it incorrectly, and applying the wrong remedy.”
Groucho Marx
Three quotes and there are many others to choose from. Today’s main Regional Politics note
has two main objectives:
 Explain what on Earth happened in Peru politics last week and how we got from the
entrenched impasse noted just seven days ago in IKN707 to the fall of Pedro Castillo
and the installation of his deputy, Dina Boluarte, as the new President of Peru (the
country’s first ever female Head of State) after his failed attempt to close Congress and
rule by decree.
 Give an outline of what to expect from the Boluarte government and how this might
affect Peru’s image in the eyes of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and specifically for
our purposes, the mining industry.
The second part is the most important, so I’m going to try and do the first part as succinctly as
possible. So without further ado…
Part One, The fall of Castillo: On Tuesday December 6th, then President Pedro Castillo
made a TV address to the nation in which he gave his take on the debate scheduled in
Congress the next day, that body’s third attempt to “vacate” (i.e. impeach and remove from
office) him from the Presidency as the first two debates had failed to see the eventual vote
reach the 2/3rds majority of 87 votes from 130 Congresspeople and said his political enemies
were responsible for the political instability in the country. Here’s a translated quote (12):
“Tomorrow, I face a third motion to vacate based on statements made by third parties
who, in order to reduce their sentences for presumed criminal acts committed and
abusing my trust, have tried to involve me without any proof. I reiterate that I have
never stolen a single Sol (Peru’s currency) from my country.”
He went on to frame himself as a “man from the countryside who is paying a price for his
inexperience” and also stated that he was a democrat who “respected the Constitution, State
institutions, due process, the rule of law and the balance of power.”
So far so good and the next morning Wednesday 7th, Congress gathered to begin the debate
that was being framed as a marathon session that may have carried through over two days on
20

the only motion tabled (and I went to get a haircut). Then came news that the highest ranking
General in the Peru armed forces had suddenly resigned “for strictly personal reason. Then a
little after 11am, Castillo appeared again in a live TV address to Peru and ordered the
immediate dissolving of Congress, the setting up of an Emergency Government that would rule
by executive decree, new Congressional elections and a full reform of the judicial structure,
presumably aimed at the public prosecutors investigating his cases. He also ordered a national
curfew for that evening.
To call the move bizarre is an understatement. He may have thought he would get the support
of his own cabinet of ministers and the reason for the sudden resignation of the #1 ranked
General in the country became clear. This fact was enough to make people wonder whether
Castillo had managed to install an ally at the top of the military, but as documented on the
open blog that morning (13) (14) (15) nothing that happened from the moment Castillo
stopped speaking went his way and the resignations of key ministers and supporters to that
point began almost immediately. His move was opposed by all sides in Peru, including his own
Prime Minister (who promptly resigned), his Vice-President (Dina Boluarte, now President), the
Armed Forces and Police Force (leaving zero support for his curfew or to be able to close
Congress), the judiciary (who called him a coup plotter immediately) and nearly all common
public opinion, even among most of his supporters to that point. Once it was clear his move
had failed, Congress brought forward the proposed vote on the motion and by 2pm he was out,
the votes going 101 in favour of the motion, 6 against, 10 abstentions and 3 absent from the
chamber. Less then two hours later, Dina Boluarte had been sworn in as Peru’s newest
President and in her first address from the floor of Congress, called for a “truce” between the
executive powers of government and Congress and said she would form a “Government of
National Unity” in order to bring stability and progress back to the country. Meanwhile, Pedro
Castillo had literally slipped out the back door of the Presidential Palace with his family
members and confidante, the ex-PM Anibal Torres (who was almost certainly the person who
advised him to attempt the usurpation of power on Wednesday morning) and after getting
caught in traffic on his way to the Mexican Embassy in Lima and fearing that angry citizens
might eventually corral his motorcade, entered a Lima government building and waited there
before being officially arrested by police officers. And that will do for the blow-by-blow of
Wednesday’s crazy events, we’ll also ignore most of the peripheral issues that sprang up in the
days that followed for the sake of brevity and move to part two of today’s note, but before
moving on it’s worth underscoring the sheer stupidity of Castillo’s move on Wednesday morning
and his attempt to close Congress. With 20/20 hindsight he was obviously scared of what was
going to happen during debate and vote, but in all likelihood Congress would not have found all
the 87 votes needed to “vacate” him last week whatever was said or done (checking the vote
results (16) indicates his opposition could have got to 85 as an absolute maximum). His was
political suicide, a combination of losing his nerve and at some point being given some really
but REALLY bad advice to close down Congress from his inner circle (almost certainly
originating from Anibal Torres, who lives in his own dream world and somehow thought that
Castillo and his government retained popular support of the masses). The bottom line is that if
Castillo had roughed out last week and said/did nothing during the Congress debate, he’d
almost certainly still be President today. But he did what he did and that’s politics for you.
Part Two: What to expect from the new Boluarte government. So far so politically
dramatic, we now get to the likely effects of last week’s events and it’s from here that things
start to get better for Peru. It remains to be seen whether things go well for President Dina
Boluarte, for the incarcerated ex-President and his advisors or even Peru’s current Congress,
but what we do know is that from here, Peru should see its image improve and its government
make a clear move away form Left wing politics.
In political terms and in much the same way as ex-President Castillo, new President Dina
Boluarte came from nowhere to her current post. A resident of Lima for nearly all her life, she
ran for the post of mayor of one of the capital’s 23 districts for the hard left Peru Libre party in
2018 and finished in ninth place, garnering just over 2,000 votes, before being chosen as the
Castillo’s Veep ticket to connect the party to the capital. Since that time she has drifted away
21

from the hard Left and was expelled by her PL party last year, but she owes her rise to the
same wild luck as Castillo and now has precious little political capital with which to impose any
preferred agenda. On the other hand, Peru’s Congress may be as hated and unpopular as ever
with rank and file Peruvians, but there’s no doubt at all that it has won out and the people who
run Congress, i.e. the Lima establishment, can now demand the type of government they prefer
from President Boluarte because if not, her tenure is likely to be even shorter than that of
Castillo’s. And as Boluarte is fully aware of this (and not a dummy by any means), she is faced
with a simple choice:
 Toe the line of Congress
 Get kicked out
For what it’s worth she will govern without a Vice-President, so if she leaves office the job of
Head of State would automatically be given to the current president of Congress, who would
almost certainly call new Presidential elections almost immediately if handed the role.
Therefore, Boluarte knows that if she wants to remain in power even for a limited period, her
decisions must appease Congress and if only for that, we can expect her “Government of
National Unity” to move to the political right and include ministers with the type of outlook and
CV approved by those who really run the country. Boluarte will have won herself some time by
first doing and saying all the right things on the dramatic Wednesday, she also said in her
opening remarks that she would need some time “to rescue the country from the corruption
and bad-governance” it had seen in the Castillo period, but the clock has started ticking and all
eyes are on her choices for Prime Minister and cabinet of ministers.
The list appeared on Saturday (see below) and as long as they receive due from Congress,
which seems likely, the key issue facing Boluarte’s government will be whether to call or to
resist calls for the next Presidential election. There is no logical way she could survive the full
period of the current presidency and she has neither mandate or approval for her preferred
brand of Left wing politics, so the likely outcome is to be an interim President who first brings
some calm to the scene, then shows she is willing to step aside and call a new election. The
major issues will be 1) when that happens and 2) whether the election is only for the
Presidency, or whether Congress is also dissolved and new members elected. By now, it
probably goes without saying that the current Congress doesn’t want to lose its cushy number
or potential for influence and, as they are also hated by the general public and know it, most of
them are under no illusions about their chances of retaining seats in any new vote. Therefore,
the two likely scenarios are 1) a President Boluarte who grapples for a while with Congress but
eventually (best guess at some point in 2023) Peru sees an election for its next President, while
Congress remains firmly installed, or 2) general public discontent continues in the same style
we’ve seen in recent days in provincial protests and causes Congress to be dissolved at the
same time, with new members elected at the same time as a new President.
The eventual next election is when the political games will begin once again and, somewhere
on the horizon, is Antauro Humala. He’s the hard line populist who has made no secret of his
designs on the top job. He’s recently been freed from jail after a near 20 year term for leading
a violent insurrection in the 2000’s, he is charismatic and his popularity is rising in many rural
provinces, he’s also the older brother of ex-President Ollanta Humala, though the family has
been split asunder by political fighting and those two don’t’ talk any more. All in all, Antauro
Humala is a dangerous piece of work and if he made it to President the Perdro Castillo period
would seem like a cakewalk compared the havoc he could wreak, however he’s a problem for
another day and for our purposes, this time around we should expect Peru to choose a
candidate from the right wing who ushers in a more orthodox set of policies that suit FDI. But
crucially and even before then, as long as Dina Boluarte and her consensus cabinet delivers on
her pledge to calm the waters, Peru should have cleaned up its image with the business
community and the rest of the world. Even though Boluarte is from the Left, she knows her
only opportunity to be effective and leave a positive legacy as President is to govern by
consensus, keep Congress happy and as we’ve seen in her first moves, picking orthodox,
centrist or right-wing, capitalist-friendly people as ministers is the order of the day. These
better qualified new set of ministers should also oo about the job of cleaning ministries of the
22

left wingers placed in the public servant roles by the Castillo government and get them back to
something approaching normal working order). The lurch to the centre by the incoming cabinet
will also please financial observers, from the Central Bank chief Julio Velarde (who will be feted
as a national hero for carrying the country through the Castillo days), to banks, their analysts,
the ratings agencies and foreign markets for debt and equity in general. Indeed, while the
World Cup quarterfinals were being played on Saturday new President Boluarte took advantage
of the relative calm to announce and swear in her new Prime Minister and cabinet. Her
consensus cabinet has plenty of good choices and is designed to 1) please Congress 2) keep
opposition dissent to a minimum and 3) place qualified, serious people into the key jobs. Some
bullet points on the main takeaways:
 Prime Minister and Cabinet Chief is Pedro Angulo Arana, who was last in government as
Martin Vizcarra’s Press Secretary. He’s a lawyer and comes from the public prosecution
(fiscal) sector.
 FinMin is Alex Contreras, who was briefly Vice-FinMin in the first Castillo cabinet in August
2021, but more importantly worked at Peru’s Central Bank under Julio Velarde from 2007 to
2019. He will work well with the Central Bank and is a good pick for financial optics
 Interior Minister is César Augusto Cervantes Cárdenas, who is from the high ranks of Peru’s
Police Force, had the same role in the Sagasti interim government and is another good
choice. His is the job of calming the protests currently underway in several provincial zones
of Peru. Those protests are coming equally from the extreme right populists and extreme
left Castillo support, both sides want Congress dissolved and new elections for President and
Congress. It will be important for President Boluarte to get these protests under control as
soon as possible, therefore this ministry will be important in the days to come.
 Minister of Energy and Mining is Óscar Vera Gargurevich, who comes from the hydrocarbons
side of the equation. This desk doesn’t know much about him and the eventual pick as Vice-
Minister of Mines will make a difference.
 The other positive is that Boluarte has chosen eight women for ministerial posts, which is a
wholly good idea. Finally, at time of writing there were still two ministers left to be chosen.
Overall, this is indeed the “Consensus Cabinet” desired by Peru’s Congress so, with the dose of
secondary-level moans and complaints, she’s highly like to get the support she needs from “The
Lima People” at this early stage. President Boluartes first moves fit her talk of wanting to bring
a truce between warring political factions (and the media), she now needs to calm the current
round of provincial protests and roadblocks in provincial zones. These protests have turned
violent this weekend with one serious incident at a provincial airport having claimed the lives of
two of the protesters. They seem to be coming from both the extreme left and right and
potentially with ties to populist Antauro (see above). However, be in no doubt that no matter
what the protesting provinces demand, Congress’s endgame is to insist on new Presidential
elections and remove Boluarte from power without Congress going up for election as well. We
will probably get a brief honeymoon period before the early election battle begins.
Back in 2022’s early editions of The IKN Weekly we made plenty of calls on the likely short shelf
life of Pedro Castillo as President, for example the note “President Castillo’s days are numbered”
in IKN664, dated February 13th 2022. On that day we also said that if Castillo lost his Prime
Minister Anibal Torres Castillo would fall and he managed to last until November. An excerpt
from that edition:
The upshot is that at some point soon Castillo will throw in the towel and, most
probably this year, Peru gets new Presidential elections. In that case, it may seem to
the outsider viewer looking in that Peru is back to square one but this time, Peruvians
will be highly unlikely to reach toward the Left wing for their protest vote.
In the end he lasted longer than this desk expected and instead of elections, the job is passed
to his Veep, but the manner of his downfall was as naïve as the ex-President and current
prisoner himself (who now faces up to 20 years in jail on conspiracy and rebellion charges)
Castillo’s decision to close Congress was simply stupid and for whatever reason, he chose the
23

worst possible way to stop Congress from debating his vacancy (because, strangely, he may
well have survived the debate last week if he hadn’t lost his nerve). From here, new President
Boluarte must recognize that she has no type of mandate and the way forward has to include
new elections in 2023, else Peru will remain politically unstable. She has some time and leeway
and assuming we get to Christmas, Peru will calm for its annual summer vacation period and
the country will have until February, perhaps March, to work out a roadmap to stability. But for
the time being, the news out of Peru is that the ouster of Castillo has finally happened, the
near-term instability could have been a lot worse and with this cauterization now in progress,
the country is now on the road to recovery. As a key first step, Boluarte has chosen her cabinet
well and that should bring a temporary truce between executive and Congress. Much needed,
too. It’s going to look unstable and somewhat hairy for observers on the outside for a while,
but with the vacation season almost upon us we’re likely to see the current protests from the
“throw em all out” wings calm down and let’s face it, anytime a Presidency ends as abruptly as
Castillo’s did last week there’s going to be shockwaves for a while. However, Peru is now on the
right path again and with a modicum of good fortune between now and the New Year, calmer
heads should prevail.
Colombia: Alvaro Pardo of ANM speaks
Wednesday saw the newly installed president of Colombia’s National Mining Agency (Agencia
Nacional de Minería, normally known as ANM), Álvaro Pardo, make his initial report on the
findings and audit he has been carrying out at the government agency, via a widely reported
press conference in Bogotá. He touched on several matters, such as the way some 40
functionaries have resigned (been resigned?) due to potential cases of corruption during their
tenure, several aspects of government bureau inefficiencies and the way some regional
directors are assigned almost exactly the same tasks as others, while in other areas nobody is
doing essential work. Things of that ilk and the presser went on for an extended period of time,
but there were four main issues picked up on by the press in their reports (17) (18) (19) that
most matter to us:
 No more open pit (coal) mines. One of the headline grabbers was when he said that going
forward “…no more contracts for large-scale open pit mining will be awarded and we are
going to comply (with that campaign promise).” He said this while commenting on the large-
scale open pit coal mining sector in Colombia and there were no follow-up questions to ask
whether his comment only covers coal or applies to all types of open pit projects, but as
Alvaro Pardo is a staunch anti-miners with a history of campaigning against big metals
projects such as Anglo’s La Colosa gold project (he was one of the main opponent figures)
and the Quebradona copper project (he advised the opponents of that project until being
called up to lead ANM), it’s a fair bet that his comment catches them all. Indeed, on the
campaign trail for President, Gustavo Petro pushed the “no new open pit mines” message to
all, no matter what was the target commodity.
 A new government entity will be set up to buy gold from producers. Aimed at small
scale producers who do not use cyanide, mercury or other highly toxic substances in their
production process, Colombia via the ANM plans to set up two quasi-national companies from
two entities that currently handle confiscated funds from illegal activities in the country (e.g.
seized nacro money) that will buy gold from small-scale miners, then market the product as
“Green Gold” in Europe and other locations. “These two international trading companies are
passing over to the mining authority and the idea is to embed them in the national mining
company,” Pardo said. The plan is to combat the illegal gold trade and improve the prices
obtained by small-scale miners (often from toll-millers).
 No concessions in environmentally sensitive zones. Pardo said in the current
administration “mining titles will never again be awarded in an area where there are
environmental restrictions.” On top of that, he said that of the 7,200 approx concessions
currently on the books in Colombia, some 1,816 (20) that are wholly or partly in protected
areas will be carefully revised and of those, 77% do not have their baseline work done, 48%
do not already have an environmental license or permit of any type and of the total, just 9%
have all their papers in order. According to Pardo, the ANM will respect the due process on all
24

revisions but in real terms, he was clear that mining would not be allowed in protected areas
and that in all probability, the concessions awarded will eventually lapse with no work allowed
on them.
 The mining law reform will happen by mid 2023. As mentioned in a recent edition, the
plans to table a new mining law project in the first 100 days of the Petro government fell by
the wayside and Alvaro Pardo addressed this issue during the presser. He called the reform of
the current 20 year old mining law one of the most important issues on the ANM’s agenda and
they will present a law project to the executive and Congress that will be ready “before the
first six month of 2023 is over” (translated quote). He offered very little about the contents of
the new law project, however. So now you know.
There were other issues covered, such as the way the Cerro Matoso mine has been giving a
license extension to 2044 (because it has complied with the terms of its original 20 year
permit), or how royalties in 2022 have tripled compared to 2021, or how coal made up around
90% of all mining royalties paid to the country (the Colombia coal game dwarfs that of hard
rock metal, people). But overall, the points above are the key ones for our sub-sector and there
was a clear anti-mine, anti-big company, pro-environment message delivered to those present.
Colombia: No mining companies in the Páramo de Santurban
Add this to Señor Ardo’s comments on Wednesday (above). The “Páramo de Santurban” area is
the high country wetland that serves as the main water source for that region of Colombia,
including the large regional capital city Bucaramanga. The Páramo is also the location of the
MINESA/Aris Mining (ARIS.to) “Soto Norte” project, mentioned on these pages many times as
being under threat by the new Petro government.
Yesterday Saturday, while visiting a local town, Colombia’s Environment Minister Susana
Muhamad made several direct references (21) (22) to mining in the Páramo de Santurban, with
nothing good to say about the large-scale mining companies with projects in the zone.
“The presence of mining companies or any new exploration projects in the Páramo de
Santurban will not be permitted.”
“We want a State level decision that there will not be any large-scale mining in
Paramos.”
“…we have to bring order to this páramo and define where small-scale mining by the
communities can take place. Definitively, large-scale mining in the páramo and sub-
páramo must not go ahead because it will multiply the contamination.”
The messaging now coming from multiple branches of the Petro government is clearly anti-
mining and directed squarely against the large-scale foreign capitals mining companies in the
country. In other words, exactly what this desk has forecast for the last few months.
Mexican mines pay a 10% “mining tax” to crime
An interesting press conference was called by Mexico’s chamber of mining Camimex last week,
at which its president José Jaime Gutiérrez put forward the concept that Mexico’s mining sector
was losing around 10% of its revenue due to the country’s rather infamous criminal activity,
referring to organized crime, narco gangs and so forth (23). Between theft of finished metal
(e.g. raids on mine sites to steal bullion doré), concentrate thefts (e.g. truck hijacking),
protection money payments as well as other shakedown methods, along with the cost of
security details needed to protect their produce, Gutiérrez claimed that mining companies had
to add between 10% and 20% to their direct costs of production on average. In his words,
“Yes, it’s a minimum of up to 10% in direct costs of the company. This is only the thefts, with
taking into account the personnel trained as guards, etc etc.”
Chile: Antofagasta fined
The complaints of the large mining companies in Chile toward the new government are valid, as
mentioned on many occasions on these pages. However, the big miners do not help their cause
when they have a poor track record of environmental control. Along with Lundin Mining
(LUN.to) and its quiet over-mining that caused the recent sinkhole, or Barrick (GOLD) and the
self-inflicted Pascua Lama mess that put paid to the project and saw some of the heaviest
25

environmental fines ever levied on a mining company in South America, we now have
Antofagasta PLC (ANTO.L) and its Centinela mine (24):
SEATTLE (Scrap Monster): Antofagasta plc’s Chilean copper mine has been charged
foer serious environmental breaches. The Chilean-based copper mining group was
charged by the country’s Superintendency of the Environment (SMA), citing
environmental damage caused by its Centinela copper mine.
The agency had carried out audits at the copper mine site during the period from June
2019 to January 2020, following repeated complaints by the surrounding community
about damages on account of their operations. They alleged that the use of water by
the mine had threatened the very existence of Loa frog- a critically endangered species
that is found only in that particular region, as per studies conducted by the International
Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN).
The SMA audits revealed that the company was largely responsible for the sharp drop
in water levels in the area. In a statement, Emmanuel Ibarra, the acting superintendent
of the environment, alleged that the company not only failed to report the impacts on
Loa frog, but also took no preventive action towards preservation of the species.
Antofagasta has 10 business days to come up with a compliance program in
rectification the deficiencies and 15 days to submit its response to charges levelled by
the environmental agency.
So yes, it is worth recalling that Chile has reasonable grounds not to take the international
large-scale mining companies at their word.
Ecuador: The government is trying to invalidate the Quito mining referendum
As noted in previous editions, anti-mining activists managed to officially sanction a referendum
on whether to allow mining in the region that includes Ecuador’s capital city this year, their task
was to collect just under 200k signatures in 180 days and as things turned out, they managed
to collect a total of 452k (we noted just under 400k a few weeks ago). These signatures would
then have to be ratified by Ecuador’s electoral authority and this is where things stand today, as
news from the CNE is that they have allowed just 175,000 of the signatures (25). The result has
yet to be officially announced and the anti-mining activists are up in arms about the apparent
result, as they accuse the government of various dirty tricks to try and invalidate as many of
the signatures as possible. These include claiming a signature must be exactly the same as the
one on the person’s national ID card (even though the petition was typically gathered by hand
in the streets) and using out of date records for voters, meaning that newly accepted young
adults are not on the CNE official list. Overall, it does seem as if the Lasso government is trying
hard to keep this referendum from happening, which was slated as an extra question to be
added to the national referendum, happening in February.
Market Watching
Menē Inc 3q22 financials (in Canadian Dollars)
I was too lazy to get this done last week, but better late than never so this weekend’s main
Market Watching segment updates on our only non-mining stock trade, but still very much in
the world of precious metals. We follow and I own the online 24k retail gold (and platinum)
jewellery company Menē Inc. (MENE.v), a position I consider as a long-term investment and
one to which I add slowly but surely. On November 28th it reported its 3q22 financials and with
the scene set, we move to the tracking charts and commentary.
The pivot point to any retailer is its sales numbers and Q3 was disappointing:
MENE: Revenues per qtr
26
751.5
934.3
324.5
11.7 302.7
457.5 813.5
894.8
643.7
158.5 50.5
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3
C$m
source: company filings

Sales of $5.05 (N.B. Canadian Dollars unless otherwise stated) were the lowest quarter since
the Covid-affected 2q22. In mitigation, MENE’s business is highly seasonal and its Q3 is typically
the softest in the annual cycle, therefore the fairest comparative is Year-over-Year (YoY) but
even then, the quarter compares unfavourably to the $5.318m in 3q21 or the $5.423m in 3q20.
The company called this a “slight decrease in revenue” in its literature and blamed “…the
current economic environment which realized higher interest rates, higher recessionary risk and
decreased consumer spending.” That’s fair enough and we have seen a slowdown in
discretionary spending on luxury goods this year (as anyone who follows the luxury wristwatch
market will know).
Nearly all its sales are in 24k gold and a look at its headline sales figures (above) show a drop
in kilos sold in Q3 to 56kg compared to 62kg in 3q21. Notably, we cannot blame the raw price
of gold for the drop in sales, as according to the London Fix averages, bullion in 3q21 averaged
U$1,789/oz while in 3q22, the average price was U$1,728/oz. However, customer orders
increased very slightly to 4,175 in Q3, that’s 22 more than 3q21. This suggests customers were
going for slightly smaller items in weight terms on average and that’s not such a bad thing, as
MENE typically charges a slightly higher gross margin on its smaller trinket items.
The lower gold price compared to 3q21 shows in the MENE costs breakdown, as COGS were
slightly lower YoY at $3.927m. However, operating expenses increased by $0.38m to $1.454m.
MENE.v: Costs breakdown
27
441.4
125.2
548.3 914.5 664.5 422.4 270.4
984.6
393.5 123.4 729.3
10
9
8
1.842
7
6 1.913 1.53 1.656
5 1.721 1.331 1.43 1.416 1.692 1.454
4
3 1.285
2
1
0
02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3
MENE: Precious metals sales in Kg, per qtr
$m
COGS operating exp
source: company filings,IKN ests
To remind readers, the company splits its costs into the raw metal cost of COGS, then
Operating Expenses are essentially “the things it does to the metal”. Regarding the latter and
over the year, MENE has seen costs rise in line items such as personnel, shipping costs,
distribution centre costs, processing costs, etc. In other words, the same effects affecting the
majority of businesses in the industrialized nations in 2022, be they online or physical retailers.
That’s fair enough and understandable and the model works well enough. As a company, it also
relies on word of mouth recommendations, high-end
endorsements and a targeted social media/influencer
model aimed at HNW individuals via luxury-oriented
publications. This is an effective method and the
progression of advertising costs show that since
moving away from a more traditional pay-for model
96
93
65 67 97 66 26 89 08 66 65
110
100
90
80
70
60
50 40 30
20
10
0
02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3
source: MENE filings
)tP
ronim
htiw( uA
gK
MENE: Customer orders, per qtr
7514 0972 4643 4745 7605 7734 3514 4856 7045 7493 5714
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000 2000
1000
0
02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3
source: MENE filings
MENE.v: Advertising expenses, per qtr
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
81q3 81q4 91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3
C$m
source: company filings

in its early years, MENE has grown its brand without spending much. It also points to a
potential method of expansion for the brand and if the company makes a new and focused
effort in brand awareness in the new 2022/2023 world of marketing, its efforts may pay off.
However and returning to 3q22, the drop in sales revenue and slight rise in costs means that
gross margins (sales vs COGS only) as seen below left dropped to 28.6% in 3q22, the lowest on
record. When the operating expenses are factored in, MENE returned an operating loss of
$0.331m in 3q22, which is arguably “breakeven-ish” but that’s about as generous as one can
be. The net loss of $0.248m is less consequential, the best method to measure this company is
on its operational returns.
% MENE: Gross Margin percentage 1 MENE.v: Operating income, per qtr
50
0.8
45 41.0 0.6
0.4
40 36.2 36.2 35.4 0.2
35 31.2 31.8 30.6 31.0 0
28.6
-0.2
30
-0.4
25 -0.6
-0.8
20 -1
3q20 4q20 1q21 2q21 3q21 4q21 1q22 2q22 3q22
source: company filings, IKN calcs
Summing up, MENE returned a small loss on its traditionally weakest quarter for sale of the
calendar year, with a disappointing sales number affected by the downturn in world economies
and costs slightly higher through inflation. However, it was nobody’s idea of a bad quarter and
my main takeaway is to consider that MENE has been through a stress-test of a quarter and
come out well. This is a strong business model based on solid financials and if a sum of
negative factors in a near worst-case quarter for luxury retail adds up to a very small overall
loss compared to the corporate financials behind it, it’s not doing at all badly.
We are now coming up to the two strongest quarters of its financial year, namely the Q4
Holiday Season and the Q1 period which includes Valentine’s Day. With Q4 vital for annual
overall sales, we’ll be looking for good numbers in its next report and to consider what we could
see, we move to balance sheet items. The two overview charts show that, in 3q22, MENE
revved up for the key Q4 period by increasing inventories by spending its cash (below left).
Meanwhile, its liabilities position remains admirably light with just the $10m-or-so long-term
loan facility from related company Goldmoney that provides useful liquidity on favourable terms
and is normally rolled over with no fuss or problems.
This chart (right) gives a closer look at the
dynamic between cash and inventory in any given
quarter. As you may expect, MENE’s cash position
typically increases after the Q4 and Q1 heavy
28
02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3
C$m
source: company filings
MENE.v: Assets, per qtr
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3
MENE.v: Liabilities Breakdown per qtr
$m 35
cash inventories ST Inv other
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
source: company filings, IKN ests
02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3
source: company filings/IKN ests
srallod
fo
snoillim
note payable
other liab
borrowings
MENE.v: Cash & inventory
17.5
10.312.013.0 8.7 9.1 7.5 11.6 8.8
2.1 4.3 5.1 3.0 3.3 3.6 4.4
7.31
3.21
9.41 6.51 6.21
5.9
2.01
3.41
0.71
9.71 4.71 7.12
5.81 3.41
3.21 6.71
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
81q4 91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3
$m inventories
cash
source: MENE filings, IKN ests

sales periods, then draws down as they purchase more precious metal and turn it into jewellery
later in the year.
As for those inventories, the breakdown in items also shows how MENE cut back on its Work in
Progress for the previous two quarters, but is now busy readying for the heavy sales period.
MENE: Inventories per qtr
2.704.023.15 5.29 2.43 3.94
1.360.29
29
294.7
186.01
939.21 814.11
165.11
981.8
533.7
709.01 708.21
754.21
990.31
489.41
8.41 273.21
531.11
606.11
24
22
20
18
16
14
12 10
8
6
4 2
0
81q4 91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3
C$m
Raw Mat. Work in Prog
Finished Goods Supplies
source: company filings
However, the balance sheet also tells us more about the strengthening financial backbone of
the company, important to the longer-term, as corporate equity managed to increase during Q3
despite the small operational loss.
MENE.v: Equity per qtr
123.41
188.21 791.21 913.01
279.51 201.71 310.61 526.51 189.61 659.51 831.81
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3
source company filings/IKN ests
srallod
fo
snoillim
This is the equivalent measure to working capital and subtracts assets from liabilities, so at
$18.1m as at 3q22 it indicates MENE has been investing in its business model. This is a strong
positive to take away from the quarter and it comes as no surprise to read this in its MD&A:
The Company believes its net working capital balance is sufficient to continue funding
operational activities such as purchasing precious metals inventories, incurring
manufacturing and operating expenses and investing in capital assets such as
production machinery and equipment for the next few years.
Note, not the “next 12 months” as normally stated in a junior exploreco, but “the next few
years”. This is a very solid financial model. And indeed, the investment continued after quarter
end as MENE also reported the closing of the deal to expand its manufacturing facilities in North
America. On October 26th and to quote the RegFs, “…the Company completed its acquisition of
a manufacturing facility in the United States. The Company paid US$500,000 in cash and issued
1,206,583 Class B shares to complete the transaction.” MENE reports that the new facility is
already consolidated into its structure and in his CEO notes, company head Roy Sebag stated,
“This new operation will allow us to scale our productive capacity and manufacture
approximately 20-30% more units of jewelry per year.” That’s important for a business model
which relies on low overhead and thinner margins than traditional jewellery companies to make
its way, volume and sales growth are the key to steady profits at MENE and to date, its major
bottleneck has been the lack of manufacturing capacity. We hope they hit this bottleneck again
soon as the new 30% is used quickly and it finds it needs to expand again, as the company
now plans to ramp up its European sales arm and add distribution infrastructure in Europe to
improve dispatch times to customers lower costs per unit shipped. All good.
With a total of 249.71m shares out (110.34m Class A and 149.37m Class B) and a share price

of C$0.445 this weekend, MENE runs a market cap of C$111.12m, of U$81.1m at this
weekend’s forex and for the promise this company offers along with its rock solid financial base,
that is great value for its sector. This two-year chart shows that its share price has had a tough
time of it in 2022 and there’s no sugar-coating that reality, but on the other hand I’ve also been
following an online retailer of luxury goods that
has made it to financial stability in a very short
period of time and now shows it can weather an
adverse macro background very successfully,
which augurs very well for the company’s longer-
term future. It needs to work more on its brand
recognition, but if it starts to get momentum on
that (and among its HNW target audience), the
sky is still the limit for this company. As for the
quarters to come, the place to judge its
performance will be on top-line sales and we
need to watch its gross margin too, but as far as
this investment goes, anyone buying into MENE
today is getting deep value compared to its
potential. Obviously, the threat of a deeper recession in 2023 will put the casual observer off
the idea of investing in start-up focusing on high-ticket discretionary purchases but those who
scratch the surface will recognize a company that is doing well in adverse macro circumstances,
those are the businesses that come flying out of the blocks once headwinds become tailwinds.
These shares look particularly good value at the moment and, with its strongest sales quarters
about to go into the books, MENE is a buy for those looking for a long-term play on luxury
retail. I will continue to add slowly and prudently to my position.
Even more Wesdome Gold (WDO.to) thoughts
I got into trouble with you last week, after deliberately leaving out any mention Wesdome Gold
Mines Ltd (WDO.to) (WDOFF) last weekend in IKN707, even though it had just published two
more piece of news. Considering that 1) it’s not a current open position or current watch list 2)
I’ve done a bunch of commentaries on this one stock in recent editions and 3) the plan is to
include it in next year’s Producer Basket anyway, I thought it was getting too much air time for
one company and the Market Watching section too repetitive. No so, said my mailbag early last
week as several of you wrote in asking for comments on the two pieces of news:
 On December 1st, WDO declared commercial production at Kiena (26).
 On December 2nd, WDO announced it was establishing an At-The-Market (ATM) equity
program that would allow it to sell up to C$100m in new shares into the market and
raise treasury cash (27).
On due consideration, the two are related. As this ten day price chart shows, WDO got a small
positive reaction for the first NR when the market might normally expect from such an eagerly
awaited piece of news. On reflection, that’s probably due to this part of the CEO comments
from Duncan Middlemiss:
Although capital spending at Kiena is expected to decline next year, due to
development delays we now expect to have the development in place to access the
bulk of the high-grade Kiena Deep A Zone in 2024, which will allow us to achieve
positive free cash flow and an annual production run rate consistent with the 2021
Kiena Mine Complex Pre-Feasibility study (see press release dated May 26, 2021).
The Company will release its 2023 production and cost guidance, which reflects this
progressive ramp up of tonnes and grade in January.
Along with the messaging earlier in the NR that as the paste fill plant was now operational we
can declare commercial production (even though things aren’t close to full tilt yet), the above
excerpt strongly suggests Kiena is going to be a cash drain on the company for at least a
couple more quarters, perhaps even all 2023. Then 24 hours later comes word that along with
its upsized $150m revolving credit facility, WDO was looking to raise up to $100m in extra
capital. It so happens that we noted the temporary lack of cash and liquid assets in WDO in our
30

recent analyses on the company (here are two of the charts as a reminder), so if Kiena is going
to take longer to get to full speed than our original forecast it’s not a big surprise to see WDO
make this move.
The market’s reaction was to mark down WDO and it closed this weekend at C$8.33, which
builds in the assumption of dilution to its share base for the first time in a long time (we may
see 10m to 12 shares added if the entire facility is used). As for the reasons behind the move,
it’s almost certainly due to the way CEO Middlemiss prefers to err to the side of caution and
make decisions that are best for the long-term health of his companies. I highly doubt he had
(or has) M&A on his mind when making these moves, his job is to do what’s best for the
company given its circumstances and, with money getting tight and the Kiena timeline
stretching out uncomfortably, WDO is right to tap some of its equity in order to safeguard its
2023, no matter how the share price reacts or we retailers in the peanut gallery might grip.
WDO.to: Shares Out
31
75.231 68.331 98.331 98.331 12.431 13.431 57.431 20.531 3.631 97.631 22.731 99.731 54.831 54.831 80.931 13.931 76.931 30.041 88.041 36.141 24.241 94.241
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
71q1 71q2 71q3 71q4 81q1 81q2 81q3 81q4 91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2
source: company filings/IKN ests
serahs
fo
snoillim
WDO.to: Cash treasury per qtr
I still plan to include WDO in the 2023 producer basket and in that way, I won’t feel as reticent
about keeping a close eye on its development. There may even be a trade here at some point,
something under C$8 would make its 2023 guidance NR interesting reading.
Conclusion
IKN708 is done, we end with bullet points:
 The AbraSilver (ABRA.v) trade started with a whimper rather than a bang, but I was
still happy to use to window provided by the tail end of the bought deal and buy in at
my sub-40c price. It’s up to silver to rally now.
 Today’s note on Contango Ore (CTGO) is more of the strategic variety than a close
numbercrunch. The devil will be in the details of its cash raise, so until then this
analysis will serve as my placeholder on the potential trade.
 It’s strange to have gone through the week of political upheaval in Peru and to have
watched it from such close range, only to come to write up the IKN Weekly and prefer
Peru’s near-term future for mining over that of Colombia.
893.94 337.66 315.37 84.36 488.36 997.76 374.96 467.65 274.25
615.32 147.42
82
80
70
60
50
40 30
20
10
0
02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3 tse22q4
source: company filings
DAC
fo snoillim
80 WDO.to: Working Capital per qtr
70
60
50
40
30
20 10 0
-10
-20
-30
-40
-50
02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 12q4 22q1 22q2 22q3 tse22q4
source company filings
srallod
fo snoillim

 We’re in for a busy week of macro data out of The USA so be careful with those bets,
fliptraders. As for me, I’ll be content with the week ahead if copper comes out still
trading above U$3.80/lb. I’m not so difficult to please at moments like this.
I thank you in advance for any feedback. Our Top Pick stock is Minera Alamos (MAI.v). Flash
updates will be sent if required by events.
I wish you good trading fortune, ladies and gentlemen.
Best wishes, Mark
Footnotes, appendices, references, disclaimer
(1) https://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2022/12/schedule-for-week-of-december-11-2021.html
(2) https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/inflation-cpi
(3) https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20220727006231/en/Contango-ORE-Announces-Feasibility-Study-
Results-and-Construction-Decision-on-Manh-Choh
(4) https://www.moneyshow.com/articles/dailyguru-59416/compelling-buys-among-junior-miners/
(5) https://www.mining-journal.com/project-finance/news/1439760/contango-ready-to-raise-ususd60m-for-manh-choh
(6) https://ucarecdn.com/00ce201e-387c-4f20-956d-a05af3c58126/ContangoPreciousMetalsZurichNov2022.pdf
(7) https://www.rio2.com/post/rio2-provides-fenix-gold-and-corporate-update
(8) https://www.reuters.com/article/global-metals/metals-copper-rises-as-goldman-predicts-run-to-record-highs-
idINL1N32Y0QV
(9) https://iknnews.com/china-relaxing-covid-restrictions-is-more-reason-to-like-copper/
(10) https://www.afr.com/markets/commodities/extremely-tight-market-to-fuel-record-copper-prices-next-year-20221207-
p5c4au
(11) https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2022/12/08/2570268/0/en/Latin-Metals-Provides-Update-on-
Barrick-Gold-Exploration-Activities-Argentina.html
(12) https://rpp.pe/politica/actualidad/pedro-castillo-paso-de-autodenominarse-democrata-a-intentar-perpetrar-un-golpe-
de-estado-en-menos-de-un-dia-noticia-1452240
(13) https://iknnews.com/breaking-news-perus-president-has-dissolved-congress-and-called-for-an-immediate-national-
curfew/
(14) https://iknnews.com/todays-discount-window-for-peru-will-not-last-long/
(15) https://iknnews.com/ex-president-castillo-of-peru-has-been-arrested/
(16) https://www.rumbominero.com/peru/noticias/economia/congreso-aprueba-vacancia-pedro-castillo/
(17) https://www.reuters.com/article/colombia-mining-idUSKBN2SR1ZN
(18) https://caracol.com.co/2022/12/07/explotacion-de-mineria-de-carbon-a-cielo-abierto-se-acabara-en-el-pais/
(19) https://juanpaz.net/el-sector-minero-quedo-de-cama-con-el-nombramiento-de-alvaro-pardo-en-la-agencia-minera/
(20) https://www.elespectador.com/ambiente/en-colombia-hay-1816-titulos-mineros-en-areas-donde-no-se-deberia-
hacer-mineria/
(21) https://www.bluradio.com/blu360/santanderes/no-se-permitira-mineria-a-gran-escala-en-santurban-susana-
muhamad-ministra-de-ambiente-rg10
(22) https://caracol.com.co/2022/12/10/alcaldia-de-cucuta-inauguro-el-parque-playa-para-el-deleite-de-los-habitantes/
(23) https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2022/12/06/robos-suponen-un-10-de-impuesto-adicional-a-la-industria-
minera-mexicana-camimex/
32

(24) https://www.barchart.com/story/news/12329328/antofagasta-copper-mine-cited-for-serious-environmental-breaches
(25) https://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/politica/quito-sin-mineria-tce-validacion-firmas-anuladas-consulta-
popular.html
(26) https://www.wesdome.com/English/investors/latest-news/news-details/2022/Wesdome-Declares-Commercial-
Production-at-the-Kiena-Mine/default.aspx
(27) https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2022/12/02/2566691/0/en/Wesdome-Establishes-At-The-Market-
Equity-Program.html
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2021
Closed in 2021 closed close price
Fiore Gold F.v jan'21 C$0.98 21-May-20 C$1.17 19.4% closed as part of rebalance
Norsemont Min NOM.cse feb'21 C$1.55 6-Set-20 C$0.70 -54.8% Cut loser to reduce Au exp.
Element 29 Res ECU.v feb'21 C$0.49 7-Feb-21 C$0.54 10.2% Cut Peru exposure
Kuya Silver KUYA.cse feb'21 C$1.66 8-Nov-20 C$2.51 51.2% Cut Peru exposure
Pucara Gold TORO.v apr'21 C$0.65 4-Oct-20 C$0.26 -60.0% Cut loser, Peru risk call
Copper Mountain CMMC.to apr'21 C$1.40 22-Nov-20 C$4.18 198.6% tgt hit, profit taken
New Gold NGD may'21 U$0.76 9-Feb-20 U$2.14 181.6% Sold to buy AGC, nice win
Orezone Gold ORE.v jun'21 C$0.79 21-Jun-20 C$1.61 103.8% sold on pop, leaky boat
Wolfden Res. WLF.v sep'21 C$0.30 11-Apr-21 C$0.19 -36.7% Failed spec trade, cut loss
Cartier Res ECR.v sep'21 C$0.32 21-Mar-21 C$0.235 -26.6% Failed spec trade, cut loss
Amarillo Gold AGC.v sep'21 C$0.31 30-May-21 C$0.30 -3.2% Capex story changed: Out
Excelsior Mining MIN.to oct'21 C$0.93 10-Mar-19 C$0.53 -43.0% May return in 2022
Royal Road Min. RYR.v nov'21 C$0.155 17-Mar-19 C$0.275 77.4% Closed on Nica pol risk
Aurelius Min. AUL.v dec'21 C$0.75 28-Jun-20 0.24 -68.0% cut end 2021, failed trade
Argonaut Gold AR.to dec'21 C$2.95 25-Jun-21 C$2.15 -27.1% cut on capex blowout
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2020
Closed in 2020 closed close price
TMAC Resources TMR.to Jan'20 C$3.41 20-Dec-19 C$3.61 5.9% TLS flip play, sold new year
Regulus Res REG.v Jan'20 C$1.10 20-Dec-19 C$1.30 18.2% TLS flip play, profit taken
Bonterra Res BTR.v Jan'20 C$1.90 9-Dec-19 C$1.66 -12.6% TLS flip play, loss taken
McEwen Mining MUX Jan'20 U$1.12 2-Dec-19 U$1.18 5.4% TLS flip play, profit taken
Core Gold CGLD.v Jan'20 C$0.255 7-Apr-19 C$0.305 19.6% arb trade, profit taken
HudBay Min HBM Jan'20 U$3.56 9-Dec-19 U$3.36 -5.6% TLS flip play, loss taken
Midas Gold MAX.to Feb'20 C$0.71 5-Jan-20 C$0.57 -19.7% sm & silly trade
Warrior Gold WAR.v Feb'20 C$0.08 3-Aug-18 C$0.05 -31.3% clean out non-perf sm stocks
Contact Gold C.v Feb'20 C$0.40 19-Aug-18 C$0.18 -55.0% clean out non-perf sm stocks
Sandstorm Gold SAND Feb'20 U$3.73 17-Apr-16 U$7.21 93.3% Sold during port rebalance
NexGen Energy NXE Feb'20 U$1.20 2-Dec-19 U$1.06 -11.7% TLS flip play, loss taken
MAG Silver MAG Apr'20 U$8.95 1-Mar-20 U$10.07 12.5% Sold to cut silver exposure
Alexco Res AXU Apr'20 U$1.69 7-Sep-17 U$1.69 0.0% sold to close Ag exp. in FY20
Bonterra Res BTR.v Jun'20 C$1.62 2-Feb-20 C$1.10 -32.1% under-performer cash moved
Regulus Res REG.v Jun'20 C$0.64 6-Apr-15 C$0.79 23.4% moved $ TMQ/MIN & Au stocks
Great Panther GPR.to Aug'20 C$0.60 21-Jun-20 C$1.10 83.3% Profit taken, good trade
Jaguar Mining JAG.v Aug'20 C$0.42 21-Jun-20 C$0.65 54.8% Profit taken, good trade
Sandstorm Gold SAND Aug'20 U$7.76 10-May-20 U$9.37 20.7% Profit taken, good trade
Integra Resources ITR.v Aug'20 C$2.23 13-Aug-18 C$5.40 142.2% Profit taken, good trade
Wesdome Gold WDO.to Aug'20 C$2.37 14-Oct-17 C$14.82 525.3% last 1/2 of big win closed
INV Metals INV.to Sep'20 C$0.40 17-May-20 C$0.45 12.5% Cut all Ecuador exposure
Cartier Resources ECR.v Nov'20 C$0.155 3-Aug-18 C$0.25 67.7% Exact close price TBA
Tinka Res TK.v Dec'20 C$0.195 19-Apr-16 C$0.195 0.0% Closed on a round trip fail
2015 to 2019 annual closed positions in appendices below, 2009 to 2014 closed positions in editions IKN553 or earlier
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Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2019
Closed in 2019 closed close price
Atico Mining ATY.v jan'19 C$0.55 24-Jul-16 C$0.32 41.8% patience ran out, made room
Candente Copper DNT.to jan'19 C$0.075 3-Aug-18 C$0.05 -33.3% tiny trade, made room for new
B2Gold BTO.to feb'19 C$2.11 12-Sep-14 C$4.05 91.9% Took 1/2 profits, reduce size
Western Copper WRN.to mar'19 C$0.80 20-Jan-19 C$0.81 1.3% Spec trade that didn't work
B2Gold BTO.to mar'19 C$2.11 12-Sep-14 C$4.15 96.7% Took rest of profit.
GT Gold GTT.v mar'19 C$1.17 10-Oct-18 C$0.90 -23.1% Took loss. Story changed
NovaGold NG apr'19 U$3.84 13-Jan-19 U$4.15 -8.1% Short that didn't work, sm loss
Zinc One Z.v jun'19 C$0.47 14-Sep-17 C$0.025 -94.7% clearing out dead trade
Amarillo Gold AGC.v jun'19 C$0.24 22-Aug-18 C$0.20 -16.7% clearing out dead trade
New Gold NGD aug'19 U$1.44 31-Jul-19 U$1.23 14.6% ST short win thru Q2 earnings
IMPACT Silver IPT.v aug'19 C$0.39 21-Jul-19 C$0.46 18.0% took a quick profit
Fiore Gold F.v aug'19 C$0.34 26-May-19 C$0.56 64.7% Took profit, 2q19 avg
Chakana Copper PERU.v oct'19 C$0.84 22-Mar-18 C$0.16 -81.0% Exploreco trade fail. Want space
Wesdome Gold WDO.to oct'19 C$2.37 14-Oct-17 C$7.57 219.4% Sold half, profit taking
Superior Gold SGI.v oct'19 C$1.46 8-Apr-18 C$0.47 -67.8% Failed sm spec on Au. Moved on
Amerigo Res ARG.to nov'19 C$0.91 23-Sep-18 C$0.50 -45.1% worst trade of year, hefty loss
Guyana Goldfields GUY.to dec'19 C$0.94 14-Apr-19 C$0.56 -40.4% taking the loss, financials weak
Tethyan Res TETH.v dec'19 C$0.30 8-Sep-19 C$0.16 -46.7% tiny trade, word of probs in co
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2018
Closed in 2018 closed close price
Amarillo Gold AGC.v jan'18 C$0.38 24-Mar-17 C$0.31 -18.4% Cut away losing trade
Riverside Res RRI.v jan'18 C$0.39 27-Jun-16 C$0.31 -20.5% Cut away losing trade
Eros Res ERC.v jan'18 C$0.175 1-Mar-17 C$0.16 -8.6% CEO sudden exit, not good
Excellon Res EXN.to jan'18 C$1.54 9-Oct-16 C$1.66 7.8% 4q17 poor, one too many bad qtrs
Wesdome Gold WDO.to jan'18 C$1.68 15-Dec-17 C$2.06 22.6% Near-term trade block, took profit
Sabina G&S SBB.to apr'18 C$2.06 17-Dec-17 C$1.77 -14.1% Near-term trade, bad timing, small
B2Gold BTO.to May'18 C$2.11 12-Sep-14 C$3.67 73.9% sold 25% to reduce exposure
Lara Expl. LRA.v May'18 C$0.65 11-Feb-18 C$0.58 -13.8% Spec on Brazil didn't work
Solitario XPL June'18 U$0.72 19-Mar-17 U$0.41 -43.1% Failed trade, may return in 4q18
SolGold plc SOLG.to July'18 C$0.475 19-Nov-17 C$0.415 -12.6% cut, trade didn't perform
Pan American PAAS July'18 U$17.90 1-Jun-18 U$16.30 8.9% modest win on short position
NGEx Res NGQ.to Sep'18 C$1.01 22-Oct-17 C$1.00 -1.0% Closed to reduce Argentina exp
Sandstorm Gold SAND Oct'18 U$3.73 17-Apr-16 U$4.13 10.7% partial sale to raise cash for GTT
Aldebaran Res ALDE.v Nov'18 n/a n/a n/a n/a liquidate spin out of REG
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2017
Closed in 2017 closed close price
Continental Gold CNL.to Jan'17 C$2.68 22-May-16 C$4.17 55.6% trade closed, profit taken
Focus Ventures FCV.v Jan'17 C$0.23 1-Jul-12 C$0.05 -78.3% Give up, a disaster trade
Wesdome Gold WDO.to Feb'17 C$1.72 28-Aug-16 C$3.00 74.4% Target hit, sold, good trade
Belo Sun BSX.to Mar'17 C$0.90 30-Jan-17 C$0.90 0.0% failed near-term flip trade
Lara Expl. LRA.v Mar'17 C$1.15 8-Apr-12 C$1.05 -8.7% cut to make room for new trade
Rye Patch Gold RPM.v Apr'17 C$0.31 2-Sep-16 C$0.32 3.2% cut for doubts & new stock
Cordoba Min. CDB.v Jun'17 C$0.75 15-Sep-16 C$0.63 -16.0% closed
Constantine Metal CEM.v Aug'17 C$0.135 9-Apr-17 C$0.28 107.4% spec trade closed, good win
Red Eagle Min. R.to Sep'17 C$0.67 13-Dec-16 C$0.27 -59.7% IKN's biggest failure in years
Starcore Intl SAM.to Sep'17 C$0.61 10-Jan-15 C$0.31 -49.2% Patience ran out
B2Gold BTO.to Dec'17 C$2.11 12-Sep-14 C$3.39 60.7% sold small portion for liquidity
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Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2016
Closed in 2016 closed close price
Phoscan Chem FOS.to jan16 C$0.28 29-mar-15 C$0.265 -5.4% Buyout trade, bot but poor deal
True Gold TGM.v jan16 C$0.18 23-aug-15 C$0.25 38.9% okay trade, sold on pol risk
McEwen Mining MUX jan16 U$1.09 25-jan-15 U$1.20 10.1% sold due to lack of value
Lake Shore Gold LSG.to feb-16 C$1.10 07-apr-15 C$1.69 53.6% bot out, sold early in process
Atacama Pacific ATM.v feb-16 C$0.19 26-apr-15 C$0.40 110.5% sold for a double on big pop
New Gold NGD feb-16 U$2.06 24-jan-16 U$2.96 43.7% closed good near-term trade
Sandspring Res SSP.v mar-16 C$0.195 18-oct-15 C$0.32 64.1% Hit tgt, took profit
Teranga Gold TGZ.to mar-16 C$0.54 15-feb-15 C$0.60 11.1% disappointing trade
B2Gold BTG mar-16 U$0.85 13-jan-16 U$1.30 52.9% Separate trade on B2, hit tgt
Dalradian Res DNA.to mar-16 C$0.67 27-oct-13 C$1.00 49.3% Hit target, sold, good win
HudBay Min. HBM may-16 U$4.10 03-apr-16 U$4.36 -6.3% Short trade, poor timing
Nevada Sunrise NEV.v may-16 C$0.185 28-feb-16 C$0.23 24.3% V. small, no big deal either way
Richmont RIC jun-16 U$7.60 01-may-16 U$9.30 22.4% near-term trade, profit taken
INV Metals INV.to jul-16 C$0.25 03-apr-16 C$0.95 280.0% Trade closed on time
HudBay Min. HBM aug16 U$4.98 09-jun-16 U$4.80 3.6% short trade covered, no big deal
Miranda Gold MAD.v oct-16 C$0.125 03-jul-16 C$0.10 -20.0% tiny spec trade, didn't work
Avino G & S ASM nov-16 U$2.00 21-oct-16 U$1.40 -30.0% Abandon trade on bad bot deal
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2015
Closed in 2015 closed close price
Argonaut Gold AR.to jan'15 C$1.47 14-dec-14 C$2.53 72.1% Big gain small time, profit taken
Amerigo Res ARG.to jan'15 C$0.405 20-jul-14 C$0.285 -29.6% Given up on weak Cu prices
Reservoir Min. RMC.v jan'15 C$6.05 18-jun-14 C$4.12 -31.9% sold on Cu downturn
Coro Mining COP.to jan'15 C$0.075 26-jan-14 C$0.035 -53.3% sm, sold on Cu downturn
Fortuna Silver FSM mar'15 U$4.12 10-nov-14 U$3.75 9.0% Short used as hedge
GoldQuest Min. GQC.v mar'15 C$0.26 27-oct-13 C$0.085 -67.3% given up ghost
Rio Alto Mining RIO.to apr'15 C$2.30 07-apr-11 C$3.57 55.2% Top pick, bot out, big win
Timmins Gold TGD jun'15 U$0.60 19-apr-15 U$0.62 3.3% near-term trade, out of time
First Majestic AG jul'15 U$10.51 10-aug-14 U$4.55 56.7% horrible failed trade
NovaCopper NCQ.to jul'15 C$1.05 09-apr-14 C$0.50 -52.4% no more Cu exposure, sm sell
McEwen Mining MUX aug'15 U$0.695 21-jul-15 U$0.92 32.4% Closed nearterm flip for win
Midas Gold MAX.to sep'15 C$0.39 21-sep-15 C$0.35 -10.3% Sm. trade idea that didn't work
New Gold NGD oct'15 U$2.18 23-aug-15 U$3.05 39.9% trade closed, profit taken
Legend Gold LGN.v nov'15 C$0.085 01-mar-15 C$0.035 -58.8% tiny "land grab" idea, failed
Timmins Gold TGD nov'15 U$0.245 20-sep-15 U$0.15 -38.8% small near-term loser
Please note that due to space considerations closed positions 2009 to 2014 are now
available on request, or were published in any edition to IKN553 (end 2019).
Important Disclosure
The information and opinions contained within this report reflect the personal views of the author and therefore all
material within should not be construed as accurate or reliable or be utilized as advice for investment or business
purposes. Independent due diligence and discussions with ones own investment and business advisor is strongly
recommended. Accordingly, nothing in this report should be construed as offering a guarantee of the accuracy or
completeness of the information contained herein, as an offer or solicitation with respect to the purchase or sale of any
security or as an endorsement of any product or service. All opinions and estimates included in this report are subject to
change without notice. It is prohibited to copy or redistribute this report to any type of third party without the express
permission of the author.
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