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The IKN Weekly
Week 662, January 30th 2022
Contents
This Week: Trade heads-up, Gold drops a bid.
Fundamental Analysis: Altiplano Metals (APN.v): Quietly achieving, A bad week at McEwen
Mining (MUX).
Stocks to Follow: Copper Mountain (CMMC.to), Amerigo Resources (ARG.to), McEwen Mining
(MUX), QC Copper & Gold (QCCU.v), Aldebaran Resources (ALDE.v), Minera Alamos (MAI.v),
Trilogy Metals (TMQ), Discovery Silver (DSV.v), Mene Inc (MENE.v), Minera IRL (MIRL.cse).
Copper Basket: Overview, Meridian Mining (MNO.v), Coast Copper (COCO.v), Kutcho Copper
(KC.v).
Producer Basket: Overview, B2Gold (BTG) (BTO.to).
TinyCaps Basket: Overview, Winshear Gold (WINS.v).
Regional Politics: Argentina: Chubut notably absent from the new national mining plan,
Ecuador: Quito to hold its own mining referendum, Chile: The royalty tax on copper and lithium
is watered down, Chile’s Constitutional Assembly to limit concessions on indigenous lands,
Mexico: The Supreme Court case against Almaden Minerals goes ahead this week.
Market Watching: Two blow-ups, Part 1: Three Valley Copper (TVC.v), Two blow-ups, Part 2:
Gatos Silver (GATO), Palamina Corp (PA.v): Very oversold and buyable in small amounts.
I remind subscribers that no part of this newsletter can be copied, reproduced or
given to any third party without the express permission of the author.
This Week
In Today’s Edition
 We catch up with a couple of smaller covered stocks this week, with Altiplano Metals
(APN.v) part of the main Fundamentals section and Palamina Corp (PA.v) considered in
a new and cheaper light in Market Watching. Call me weird if you want but, despite
their recent price performances, I still like them both.
 The other stock in today’s main Fundies section is McEwen Mining (MUx), as although
we’ve had plenty of coverage on this new trade recently there are grievances to air this
weekend. Holding through on the position and yes I did buy a few in the rebalancing
announced last weekend, but not as many as I planned.
 As for that rebalancing, I managed to sell some CMMC at a decent price and buy MUX
and QCCU badly. Also as planned I added to Amerigo (ARG.to), but that strong trader
just keeps rolling along. See ‘Stocks to Follow’ for notes on those, as well as the red ink
carnage caused by last week’s sector-wide sell-off.
 In Regional Politics, more insight on the importance being placed on mining by the
Fernández government under its new “Renewable Cluster” initiative. Be long copper
projects in Argentina, ladies and gents.
Gold drops a bid
After sounding a note of cautious optimism on gold this time last week in “Gold catches a bid”,
1

this week’s title line tries to play-on-words and talk away this ten-day chart:
Ugh and double ugh. Today’s intro isn’t all undiluted pain and self-hate though, as we did offer
warnings about gold bulls high-fiving each other prematurely two Wednesdays ago (seems a
long time past). I’m also glad about the note on silver that wrapped up last week’s intro:
“…you’ll have to forgive me if I don’t swallow the bullish fanboy chatter at the first
opportunity and play the cynic’s card, at least until next weekend. Unless there’s
serious follow-through on last week’s precious metals purchases, it’s wiser to put it
down to pure market speculation that coincides on the calendar with 2021’s ill-fated
Silversqueeze.”
But let’s not over-play the “toldyaso”, it’s uncool and what’s more, my portfolio was caught in
the downdraught like any other and the losses as seen in today’s “Stocks to Follow” list are real.
Last week was one of those difficult ones that our mining sector has from time to time, they
hurt and it’s no fun to see generalist money leave the way it did. Monday’s market reception to
worsening geopolitics was a bad start (note how GLD went up and the GDX/J lines dropped
sharply), but the pain was compounded by ominous inferences out of the Fed on Wednesday
afternoon. On that occasion, all three squiggly lines you see in the chart above dropped as the
market began to crank up its 2022 Fed rate hike assumptions. However, before we start on “the
I word” let’s step back a moment and consider the difference between the scenario today and
what we’ve seen in recent years, as it may give clues to gold’s future performance in our brave
new world. To broach the subject, here’s a question that came in from reader ‘MF’ last week:
Hi Mark, If you have time and find it interesting I think a lot of your readers (including
me) would appreciate your view in the IKN Weekly on Fed funds rate and gold going
forward.
I just remember the last period they raised rates 2016-2019 and that was no fun time
for PM. Different this time or not?
Will the Fed be able to raise enough to fight inflation? Or is it too late? Or will they have
to stop because of a weakening economy?
Yes, good contextual questions, MF, let’s start with a visual:
2

The above chart of the Fed Funds effective rate since 2015 maps out the period in ancient
financial history, before Covid-19 changed the world. While there was a period in early 2016
when gold did well, once Brexit had brought its system shock to Europe, then Trump’s victory
saw the cash in US bonds liquidated and ploughed into equities, as MF pointed out the precious
metals run was over. After that, the first three years of Trump saw the US economy grow well
and though inflation clicked up gradually to 2.4%, it wasn’t until GDP growth concerns (i.e.
deflation) reared its ugly head that the Fed began cutting.
Context in place, let’s return to the present day and, as that uber-dangerous saying goes,
consider why this time is different. The reason is “the I word”, as inflation rather than GDP
inertia due to any “King Dollar” policy are driving the now-certain swathe of upcoming rate
hikes. To illustrate the change in attitude that saw gold get whacked last week, this Reuters
report (1) notes that back in December, the market’s “… median forecast foresaw three
increases this year of a quarter point each” but, by the time Jerome Powell had finished his
presser “the market went into rate hike overdrive”, with talking heads trying to out-do each
other in their predictions for 2022. Gone is the debate on whether the Fed raises in March, the
argument is now whether March moves by 25 or 50bps. Meanwhile, talking three Fed feels like
ancient history and the debate has moved to five, six or even seven hikes for 2022 alone.
However, let’s move away from the
guesses of the financial masses and
consider what this new world has
done for gold (right). Hey, not much!
And here’s where cooler heads
prevail because, in the same way
this desk didn’t get excited about
gold’s rise toward U$1,850/oz the
week before last, this weekend’s
U$1,785/oz is no a big deal either.
Yes, agreed that the sudden reversal
hurt (I have the juniors portfolio to
prove it), but the way gold picked up
buyers on Friday was not indicative
of a monetary metal about to
devalue against the rest of the
world. Put simply, last week wasn’t a
capitulation in gold, not even close and I don’t see any sudden dive in gold’s relative popularity
in this chart, either:
GLD gold holdings, December and January (metric tonnes)
1020
1015
1010
1005
1000
995
990
985
980
975
970
965
960
3
12/11/03 12/21/2 12/21/4 12/21/6 12/21/8 12/21/01 12/21/21 12/21/41 12/21/61 12/21/81 12/21/02 12/21/22 12/21/42 12/21/62 12/21/82 12/21/03 22/1/1 22/1/3 22/1/5 22/1/7 22/1/9 22/1/11 22/1/31 22/1/51 22/1/71 22/1/91 22/1/12 22/1/32 22/1/52 22/1/72
mt
source: SPDR GLD data
Question: If gold is about to die its death, why has Wall St. decided that after a year of selling
and ignoring the metal now is a good time to stock up on a few bars? Answer: Rhetorical. You
may recall this desk has called gold to remain steady and “revolving around “U$1,800/oz”
starting over a year ago, with the arrival of President Biden and the US policy move to use MMT
as its monetary weapon of choice to fuel the stock market. The faltering S&P500 is of far more
concern to Jay Powell than US GDP or unemployment, so look no further than Wall St for his
2022 lead indicator. As for gold, it’s not even on his wish list of targets and its constancy over

the last year is the clue.
But inflation is now “a thing” and according to conventional wisdom, what the Fed now does to
overcome the inflationary pulse is to “tap the brakes”, but stop a moment and roll that thought
back. This is still our post-Covid “Whatever It Takes” world, 2022 is no different in that respect
and The Fed won’t do anything the stock market doesn’t like. Those who looked past the
headlines from the Fed presser last week may have heard Jay Powell saying how he didn’t yet
know how much brake pedal they’d need. Arming the FOMC with the March raise and adding
the potential for multiple hikes is one thing, but decisions will happen on a month-by-month
basis and, as long as he tries to play Goldilocks, he’s going to be wary of hitting the brakes too
hard and denying Wall St its lifeblood of dollar liquidity. Last week saw the market price in the
Fed’s new armoury of five, six or even seven rate hikes, but it will only take one month of
favourable data for the same Fed to sit back and decide not to raise in a month the market has
now baked one in for the effects to be walked back. In other words, the Fed got ahead of the
curve and now has a powerful jawbone weapon, all they need is to do is talk about perhaps not
raising rates here, or perhaps going 50bps there instead of 25bps and they have their real
objective, the DJIA, under control. Jay Powell, Joe Biden and Janet Yellen may be concerned
about inflation, but they are scared stiff of denying the central pillar of their monetary policy,
i.e. Wall St, the liquidity it needs to keep running higher. So gold is likely to remain volatile, but
only around its current price bracket and anyone predicting its immediate demise must also
assume the Fed is about to use policy of hammering the market, when the reality of 2022 is
more likely to be surgical. Expect gold to continue on its merry way, resolute around the
U$1,800/oz line.
Fundamental Analysis of Mining Stocks
Altiplano Metals (APN.v): Quietly achieving
This is an overdue update on the small trade in Altiplano Metals (APN.v) opened last year, one
that may not have flown high in price so far but has managed to keep tabs on the wider market
for copper juniors, despite garnering very little market attention and flying under the radar of
most. On a personal level, the foothold position taken in the stock and followed to date in the
Stocks to Follow section has suited my needs, keeping my focus on its developments without
adding extra exposure to the vagaries of the tinycap end of the market. However, I’ve failed to
update on developments and APN deserves better, as unlike most fickle juniors and their
mediocre management teams it has been executing well. That deserves kudos, credit and most
importantly, more eyeballs because one of these days in 2022, APN should start impressing
with share price gains.
Concisely put, APN is a producer stock that is starting very small and bootstrapping its way into
cash flow and commercial production. Up to now, APN has mined its main Farellon asset and
sold the product directly to customers in order to fund underground development and a
production mill that will produce higher-value concentrate, as well as adding a new iron circuit
that is set to supplement sales. The low burn bootstrapping of the company into cash along a
clearly defined development path was the original attraction in the stock when we took our
original position, today we update and there are three main moving parts to cover in order to
get up to speed, or four if we include corporate financials:
 Underground development at Farellon, including recent drilling results and the ramp
drive that is due to access the new mineral zone in the near future
 Overground development at Farellon, including the recent addition of the iron ore
circuit
 A production and sales update, which then leads us to APN financials
We begin below ground and our lead-in is the December 7th NR (2) and its news of mine
development at Farellon, with progress on time for the Hugo decline that will access the next
area of mineralization. The NR included photos of the newly installed ventilation equipment
4

which allows the deeper mining (APN includes plenty of photos in its NRs, which is good so
please check those links in the appendix, below) and as you can (just about) see on this
company-supplied map below, as at six weeks ago the decline was progressing toward the
target on schedule (work highlighted in yellow):
Regarding that target, we’ve had two NRs from the company on recent drill results dated
December 13th (3) and January 13th (4), so maybe the next one is due around Valentine’s Day.
Both NRs returned the type of grades and widths expected, so please see the NR for the full
drill assay table, here we hack the info by offering the mine map with overlaid assay results…
...that show the results are coming from the zone targeted by the decline. It’s good to compare
those two maps above and see the decline zeroing in on the drill zone, or in the words of CEO
Alistair McIntyre, “Our positive drill data provides the confidence to continue the underground
expansion of our operations to target these newly confirmed mineralized zones.” Works for me.
We now move above ground and the planned upgrade to add an iron circuit, via the installation
of a magnetic separator that is apparently on schedule. First, the company announced its
permit approval from the Chilean government just before Christmas then, just two weeks later,
a NR with another photo show (5) of the new equipment arriving on-site. Most impressive and
as January has been dedicated to installation, we should get an update on progress soon. As a
re-cap, the magnetic separator adds a new circuit to Farellon to produce an estimate 61% Fe
concentrate (highly marketable) that the company estimates could add up to a third to its top-
line income, all from mineralization that would otherwise be destined for the tailings heap. Our
house estimates assume commissioning happens soon, with full operation by 2q22, at which
5

point APN the company should be at breakeven and no longer depleting cash treasury.
So operationally, the APN corporate plan is
developing well, but all very much under the
radar. The bootstrap approach is to develop
Farellon at low cost and fund progress via
direct ore sales. Turning to that subject, we
have the latest NR from APN dated January
17th (6), which offered production and sales
information for the first two months of 4q21.
This table from the NR (right) shows
significant improvement for November and
on this, an extended quote from the NR is
worth your eyeballs:
During November 2021, a total of approximately 3,965 tonnes of mineralized copper-
gold material was extracted at Farellon, and 2,980 tonnes were sent for processing,
representing a 30% improvement over the 2,285 tonnes processed in October. Grade
in November improved to 1.94% for the month compared to the October grade of
1.44%. Grade improvements are attributed to accessing higher grade material in the
NE sections of the mine in the 376 m and 368 m levels with overall grade control and
waste management also being contributors.
As those factors are expected to continue with access to the new mineralization zone, we could
project a high number for December as well but for the moment, there’s no need to assume the
best possible near-term return when the company is all about building long-term value.
Therefore, in our preliminary estimates for 4q21 we estimate modest improvements to 4q21
production (below) rather than a massive gain:
APN: Farellon tonnages mined and sold
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
6
02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 tse12q4
source: company filings, IKN ests
retrauq/sennot
cirtem
mined tonnes
sold/processed tonnes
This does good things to gross sales, which are best tracked at APN via “exploration recoveries”
line item in its statement of cash flow (no
commercial production declared as yet). Again, APN: Exploration recoveries
(i.e. Farellon revenues proxy), per qtr
the combo of higher copper prices and good
production levels in December may see our
lowball $800k revenues estimate beaten, but
there’s no need to run here before the company
can walk. The objective at APN is to sell more
product at better value addition in 2022 from its
equipment and mining upgrades, not sell as
much ore as possible at lower prices in 2021.
As for the balance sheet, you get the abridged
version (phew) as the assets total is small (APN
expensed until recently, fixed assets were still under C$10m as at end 3q21) and liabilities tiny
(no financial debt), so what really matters is cash and liquidity:
04.0
36.0 18.0 88.0 55.0 55.0 15.0 08.0
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 tse12q4
C$m
source: company filings, IKN ests

APN.v: Cash treasury per qtr
5
4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
7
02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 tse12q4 tse22q1
source: company filings/IKN ests
srallod
fo
snoillim
The improved 4q21 sales should slow down the cash drain in the next two quarters as the
company moves towards is milestone of full mill
upgrade done by the end of 2q22. However, APN is 5 APN.v: Working Capital per qtr
still drilling and as the drills have now moved to the 4.5
Maria Julia target next to Farellon, those will need 4
3.5
funding and, assuming the plan stays on schedule, 3
as the company expands in FY22 it will likely need 2.5
2
more treasury depth. That’s a long-winded way of
1.5
saying that a placement in the next couple of 1
0.5
months to add treasury wouldn’t be at all
0
surprising, as long as market conditions are -0.5
-1
reasonable. Our final visual today is the 12 month
price chart of the stock, as it’s all well and good to
sponsor a good team going about their work
diligently, but our true objective as retail
shareholders is to buy low and sell high:
With 113.4m shares out and this weekend’s somewhat depressed share price of 27c, APN has a
market cap of just C$30.6m and for that price, you are getting a lot of company. This phase of
its corporate life sees relatively small amounts of money moving in and out of the company, but
once the mill, new circuit and better access to mineral underground are achieved, production
should double from current levels as from the second half of 2022, at which point Farellon
becomes the cash flow generator that allows APN to add value via its other suite of projects.
The incremental approach to development makes a lot of sense and to date, the team has hit
its milestones well. As for my personal position, for the moment I’m happy enough to stay with
the current and small foothold position in the stock, watch with interest as the company
executes in the next quarter (or so) with a view to taking a larger position, if and when
momentum begins to build. To date, APN hasn’t been an eye-catching or sexy trade and my
own lack of coverage is testament to how low it flies under radars (if a shareholder and letter
writer doesn’t talk it up, who else will?) but that’s okay. As for an entry point for anyone
interested in joining me as a small holder of APN, the chart above suggests that right now and
27c is a good price. Happy holder of a small position, let’s see how 2022 goes.
81q4 91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 tse12q4 tse22q1
source company filings/IKN ests
srallod
fo
snoillim

A bad week at McEwen Mining (MUX)
Even at the best of times, particularly when a stock in question is a personal holding, The IKN
Weekly is rarely guilty of applying lipstick to pigs. Such is the case this weekend with McEwen
Mining (MUX), identified by this publication as the “turnaround stock of 2022” due to the
convergence of issues that pulled its price down to its present sub-U$1 levels during 2021. The
reason to go long today is on the expectation that things improve, but so far in 2022 at least
that hasn’t happened. Today we consider why and, to pre-empt the argument a little, here’s a
list of four factors that, for my taste, explain its mediocre January performance:
1) The weakness in precious metals mining stocks since Christmas.
2) The lacklustre 4q21 production
3) The latest information on funding for Los Azules
4) The NR from MUX on Wednesday evening regarding its PEA and plans for “Fox
Complex”
We’ve covered MUX quite closely in the last few weeks, so I’m not about to launch into yet
another 15-page McEwen Monster today, brevity will attempt to be the soul of wit. However,
there are four items to cover and that may require some glossing over of details. If so, guilty as
charged and feel free to complain to the author, I’ll be happy to expand on any matter in mail
correspondence (or via WhatsApp text on +51 933978857, subscribers only and no phone calls,
please). Enough chatter, time to cover the four negatives on MUX this month:
1) The weakness in precious metals mining stocks since the Santa Rally ended hasn’t
been a negative influence only at MUX, but this chart…
…shows MUX has failed to rally into the New Year like the rest of them. Gold was supportive
enough, and MUX tried to move up once its NYSE listing requirement news had hit, but that
doesn’t show the type of post-Christmas rally that normally sets a year running. And yes, of
course last week was a bummer for all issues outside of the USD but, as mentioned in today’s
intro, the selling on the Fed news looks either premature or overdone for both base and
precious metals stocks.
2) The lacklustre 4q21 production at MUX is the easiest and quickest to handle in today’s
update, as I simply refer you to the anal ysis note last week that, at the time, called the
relatively calm reaction to the lacklustre MUX 4q21 production “a bullet dodged.” Some other
snippets from last week:
MSC/San José: “…slightly lower than expected”
Fox Complex: “MUX stated the 9,460 oz GEO for 4q21 were “in-line with our expectations”,
which can only mean expectations were low.”
Gold Bar: “…this quarter is nobody’s idea of a blowout.”
We also wrote last week the “market gave MUX a pass on its 4q21 production numbers” as
there was no sell-off on the news, however the results failed to give MUX any backbone when
two other negative influences were dropped on the market last week. We turn to those now.
3) The latest information on funding for Los Azules was also a negative for the company,
8

revealed last Wednesday in a Q&A with (ugh) “McEwen Mining chair and chief owner Rob
McEwen” in Mining Journal (7). Between the sycophantic language and the endless puffery from
his own mouth, it tends to be heavy going to read an interview with Rob McEwen in the trade
papers but, every so often, nuggets of real information show up and here’s one. We quote:
“Rob McEwen had already invested US$165 million in McEwen Mining when he
poured in another US$40 million of his own money to launch McEwen Copper in 2021.
He aims to close on another $20 million-$30 million in the near future to provide its
initial funds. The minimum investment is a quarter of a million dollars.”
That is not good news. To re-cap and see the problem, we return to our main 2022 anal ysis of
the company as seen in IKN 659 dated January 9th, “Why McEwen Mining (MUX)” and follow
the timeline presented that day:
 On August 23rd, when MUX announced the intention to spin out McEwen Copper and
Rob McEwen funded the first U$40m tranche, according to the NR that day the second
part of the offering was. “…expected to close on or before September 30th, 2021.”
 Then on November 3rd and the 3q21 financial results, we learned that “financing
remains open on terms previously disclosed. The minimal order is $250,000.”
 Then on December 22nd in the “McEwen Copper: Los Azules Progress Report” NR, we
learned that “…the balance of the financing is expected to close in January 2022.”
At that time on January 9th we expressed confidence that MUX would be as good as its word
and manage to close on the remaining U$40m of the initial placement by the end of January.
Even last week in the MUX update, we wrote “…while we can allow leeway” on the closure of
the seed round of funding for McEwen Copper, however today’s update is several steps away
from reasonable “leeway”. At the last minute and after delays to a funding round that was
framed in confident terms, we learn the U$40m target price is dropped to between U$20m and
U$30m and a firm “end January” goalpost is now an indistinct “in the near future.”
For the time being, the U$40m from the original investment by Rob McEwen will fund progress
at Los Azules, however there comes a moment when the other U$40m is required to keep
momentum up, allow the budget and development program to remain on schedule and pay for
the 53,000m of drilling planned to bring the resource up to the M+I standard required for the
PFS, not to mention that list of highly qualified and expensive consultants brought on board to
give gravitas to the project, its engineering, metallurgy and all the rest. While McEwen is
correct in his changed attitude toward Los Azules and the need to “get serious” about the
project, last week saw the moment when the confident talk about nailing down the cash
required to develop Los Azules to PFS level fell apart and when the barrier is set at U$20m to
U$30m, that means U$20m until further notice.
Bottom line: Unlike the metals market that’s out of MUX’s control, or the lacklustre 4q21
production numbers that got a pass, the snippet signalling lower funding and cold feet from
backers to follow McEwen in on his McEwen Copper spinout is a clear negative for the stock
price. When your original budget was supposed to be U$80m and secured by 3q21, moving into
the second month of 2022 with U$40m in and perhaps U$20m on the way “in the near future”
is a significant shortfall, something MUX needs to address before this project gets any further.
After all, this spin-out and the promise it holds to add value to the MUX mothership is the main
reason I consider MUX the turnaround opportunity of 2022, it’s why I bought the stock. Without
definition on McEwen Copper, I’d prefer to step away sooner rather than later.
This five-day chart of MUX from last week (below) shows the moment when the McEwen
Copper news began to affect the stock price, the split from the benchmark GDXJ is visual.
However, the selling accelerated the day after when the last negative from MUX in January hit
the wires and that’s our last segment.
9

4) The NR from MUX on Wednesday evening regarding its PEA and plans for “Fox
Complex” is our last item on MUX in this edition and refers to the NR on this link (8). It may
have been unfortunately timed (a theme picked up in the note on Palamina Corp (PA.v),
below), coinciding as it did with the sell-off in gold. It’s a long NR and required reading for
anyone interested in this stock, but instead of covering all details I want to convey my
generalized impression of a strange and weirdly timed NR. Let’s begin here:
The above chart considers cumulative cash flow for the expansion plans at Fox Complex. While
long-term MUX bull may appreciated what happens to the visual in year 6 and onward, most of
us would be drawn to the way the company expects to have a couple of years of minor positive
free cash flow from what it regards as its flagship precious metals asset, then move into an
extended period of negative free cash flow while the mine expansion is built out. For a
company just coming out of series of production shortfalls and cost overruns at both Gold Bar
and Black Fox, the above does not inspire confidence. In this next chart, we see the reason for
the negative financial period:
While the next couple of years’ worth of production are as expected, with Froome set to
average over 12,000oz per quarter (a number that fits with house projections), we’re then
offered a scenario of two years of meagre production before things pick up again, with
100koz/annum as the long-term goal. The final visual aid chosen from the NR is below and lays
10

out the estimated capex required for the Fox Complex expansion project, with figures offered
for the capital shortfall for each year, depending on the average price of gold.
We’re shown in black and white that MUX doesn’t have the money it requires to build its new
mine, even if gold continues to average U$1,800/oz. Our final exhibit is a section of text from
the NR, which is presented with no previous comment (highlights as per MUX):
While the PEA shows encouraging results for expansion at Fox, it is not McEwen
Mining’s intention to finance or construct the Expansion Project based on this
PEA. The execution strategy is to seek further opportunities to reduce the funding
requirements and improve the payback period concurrent with additional drilling and
studies.
In sum, after telling the viewer that once the newly commissioned Froome deposit is depleted,
Fox Complex will go back to having two years of poor production and burn cash that MUX
doesn’t have before finally breaking out of the trough and only becoming a net positive cash
flow project six years from now. This information is presented to the world in the very month
that its much-vaunted improvement in production from Froome begins to make a difference to
its production schedule and just days after the NYSE warned the company that if its share price
didn’t improve in the near future, it would be de-listed. Then to cap it all, the same NR says the
PEA as presented isn’t one that the company plans on using!
The NR is bizarre on more than one level and the more times I read it, the more it came across
as some kind of share price suicide note. In terms of timing and content, it’s the antithesis of
what a company should do in order to improve its shareholder or public image. Plus the basic
fact that they didn’t really need to publish this, let alone at such a weak moment for the
company and its stock price. Add in the fact that Rob McEwen may not be everyone’s cup of
tea, but he’s certainly one of the great (self) promoters out there and knows what the public
want from him and I’m left scratching my head. Why should this company publish this NR at
this time? After a weekend of thought, three options:
 It was done naively, unaware of the impression it would give. This is least likely, in my
view. Anybody who can read numbers would know these PEA criteria aren’t particularly
sparkling, but to force the show with charts and visuals that underscore the near-term
weakness this PEA would invite to the stock price turns naiveté into plain stupidity.
 MUX is “kitchen-sinking” the bad news, getting everything negative out of the way in
one go, so that from here the only way is up. This is possible and, after all, my trade is
not predicated on MUX suddenly becoming a paragon amongst mining companies. With
its share price under U$1 and its poor track record pre and post Covid-19, all it needs
to do is perform adequately in order to attract turnaround talk and attention.
 Rob McEwen wanted the stock to sell off in the near-term. Perhaps this is a sly move,
some “crazy like a fox” strategy that allows certain people with better information to
buy into MUX at cheap, sold-off levels while removing long-suffering holders who finally
throw in the towel. While more Machiavellian in nature, it is possible and I wouldn’t put
it past the Chief Owner.
When something in the world of mining looks too good to be true, your author has learned (the
hard way) that it normally is. In the same vein, this NR that was not required by the market,
filled with mediocre-looking numbers that the company itself says it won’t use as a baseline for
its projects, then published at an inopportune moment for the stock price, looks “too bad to be
11

true” to this author. Time will tell, but as I’ve also missed trading MUX profitably on several
occasions simply by ignoring price lows and not believing it could rebound again, only to watch
the stock rally hard at the drop of a hat, last week’s and its double dose of bad news from first
Los Azules and then Fox Complex isn’t enough to scare me away. However, I will say that I
didn’t add as many shares as planned in IKN661 and, for the moment, prefer to sit back and
stay with the amount of MUX already bought, rather than add further at these new low levels.
Stocks to Follow
Fortunately it doesn’t happen very often, but when it does the message is always about macro
selling, rather than anything wrong in the portfolio selections as such. But no matter the
reason, it was a painful week in which all 14 of our open trades lost ground. Ugh. Not only was
it zero winners, zero UNCH and 14 losers, but most were hit hard percentage-wise and of those
that escaped the worst, I’d highlight Amerigo (ARG.to down 1.2%) and perhaps Rio2 Ltd (RIO.v
down 6.1% and unlucky at the close). But silver linings are few and far between this weekend
and I for one am feeling a lot poorer. As for the list of biggest losers, they are headed by
Palamina Corp (PA.v down 21.2%), then come Altiplano Metals (APN.v down 18.2%), McEwen
Mining (MUX down 14.7%), QC Copper & Gold (QCCU.v down 14.5%) and Top Pick Minera
Alamos (MAI.v down 10.0% and the biggest hole in my back pocket). But there was no escape
anywhere and most others were down by 6% and 8%.
The result of the carnage also shows up in the colour changes on this week’s Stocks to Follow
table, with just four of the 14 stocks now showing green since inception.
company Ticker this week Avg Price Reco date Current PPS Gain/Loss% Notes
TOP PICKS
Minera Alamos MAI.v STR BUY C$0.21 13-Oct-19 C$0.495 135.7% $1.14 tgt Aug'20, #1 idea
Rio2 Ltd. RIO.v STR BUY C$0.83 22-Apr-18 C$0.62 -25.3% $1.30 1st tgt, building now
Recommended stocks (In order of preference)
Amerigo Res ARG.to STR BUY C$1.36 12-Dec-21 C$1.60 17.6% 2022 Cu bet, mgmt change?
McEwen Mining MUX BUY U$0.89 2-Jan-22 U$0.81 -9.0% 1q22 trade, turnaround story
Copper Mountain CMMC.to hold C$3.40 18-Jun-21 C$3.61 6.2% Sold 1/2 Jan'22 port rebalance
Discovery Silver DSV.v STR BUY C$1.77 24-Oct-21 C$1.75 -1.1% Serious Ag play, 1st tgt $2.75
QC Copper&Gold QCCU.v STR BUY C$0.275 25-Apr-21 C$0.265 -3.6% Now drilling. Easy hold
Aldebaran Res. ALDE.v SPEC BUY C$0.68 16-May-21 C$1.02 50.0% Waiting on drill assays
Trilogy Metals TMQ BUY U$1.84 15-Sep-19 U$1.44 -21.7% S32 suitor, stalled
Strategic Metals SMD.v BUY C$0.42 31-Jan-21 C$0.33 -21.4% Canada land bet+Zn in FY22
Altiplano Metals APN.v SPEC BUY C$0.31 17-Sep-21 C$0.27 -12.9% Cheap entry, 1q22 re-rate
Palamina Corp PA.v SPEC BUY C$0.295 21-Nov-21 C$0.13 -55.9% Au expl in S.Peru, early dusters
Minera IRL MIRL.cse hold C$0.195 22-Jul-12 C$0.075 -63.2% CEO change will move stock
Long-term non-mining hold
Mene Inc. MENE.v adding C$0.67 6-Dec-20 C$0.57 -14.9% LT bet, adding slowly
Closed in 2022 closed close price
Great Bear Res GBR.v Jan'22 C$15.83 26-Aug-20 C$28.58 80.5% Bought out by Kinross, print
Copper Mountain CMMC.to Jan'22 C$3.40 18-Jun-21 C$3.78 15.9% Sold 1/2 position in rebalance
2015 to 2021 annual closed positions in appendices below, 2009 to 2014 closed positions in editions IKN553 or earlier
Now for notes on a few of our covered stocks, with the first four (or five including the ALDE
non-trade) concerning the actions taken after personal portfolio re-balancing call last weekend:
12

Copper Mountain (CMMC.to): SOLD HALF. A quick blow-by-blow and as early week trading
in CMMC was nuts, I ignored it. The first sales came on Wednesday and by luck at a decent
price, I then sold a little more on Thursday for the average selling price of C$3.78 as seen
above, a little under a half of my previous position gone. You get those details because I feel a
little sheepish about getting almost the best prices of the week and feel the need to explain.
There was no need to sell into the dumb sell-off early week, once the rebound came the prices
became reasonable again (though nowhere near the C4.00 level) but yes, I feel plain lucky
about being out before Friday’s new dump.
Amerigo Resources (ARG.to): ADDED. Unlike many other copper stocks, ARG didn’t offer
cheap shares at any time during the week. That’s okay, its clear accumulation pattern wasn’t
about to conveniently stop just to allow me on board for a little more and I took the offer. The
cost average is up quite sharply, but that’s okay and I got all I wanted here
McEwen Mining (MUX): ADDED but, after the way it traded on Friday I don’t mind admitting
mixed feelings about the “bargain shares” I picked up and didn’t follow through with a second
purchase later. The cost average is down by a penny and I could have done a lot better by
waiting another day. Please see above and today’s main Fundies section for more on MUX, as
even though Friday afternoon saw truly cheap shares on offer and they may knock on into the
week to come, I’m not adding any more.
QC Copper & Gold (QCCU.v): ADDED. This share add wasn’t my best timed either. If I’d had
waited until Friday I could have got my cost
average down a little, instead it’s up a penny to
27.5c (and the position is in the red) after paying
over 30c. Twice.
So be it, 30c is still very cheap for this stock.
Enough, and rather than bore you with more
blow-by-blow “Stock Trades What We Has Did”,
let’s move on to significant fundamental
background and a highly recommended corporate
presentation video on QCCU this weekend. Fellow
longs and QC-Curious should check out the latest
overview video from the company (9) posted to
YouTube last Wednesday. Called a “Technical
Webinar Presentation”, VP Ex Charles Beaudry walks us through the current state of affairs at
Opemiska, what the company plans to achieve with its ongoing drill program and the objectives
for the rest of 2022. The aim is to upgrade the mineral resource as the company moves toward
getting a formal PEA published during the first half of 2023 and while there will be some limited
exploration outside the main targets, ACCU is rightly going for the low-hanging fruit that should
quickly add tonnage and/or grade to the current resource.
It’s rather unfair to highlight just one aspect of the presentation as Beaudry touches on many
matters and, but this still from around
the five-minute point of the video comes
when the subject is on the current drill
program. Here we see a section from the
old Springer mine area of Opemiska and
the pink(ish) ovals represent areas of
resource that aren’t in the current
resource, simply because they haven’t
had a drill put into them yet. This gives
an idea of what QCCU can add just by
targeting high-probability zones with
quasi-infill holes, as the major success
has been from the so-called halo areas
13

around the high-grading vein systems that were previously mined out from old workings.
There are plenty of other subjects covered, including plenty on the local support for the mine
plan and the way its mine footprint is not the issue it has been made out to be by badly-
informed detractors of the project. It was even easier to add to my QCCU position after
watching this presentation last week and the Friday close at the week’s low is of minor
consequence.
Aldebaran Resources (ALDE.v): Unlike the successful forays to add ARG. MUX and QCCU, I
didn’t get any ALDE last week. It wasn’t a big surprise (and TBH, I didn’t try much on Friday),
the bid/ask gap made it too trappy. In fact, I didn’t even put I a lowball bid (and avoided
getting sucked into the silly mind games these thinly traded stocks can subject one to). If there
are shares available around $1.00 in the days ahead I would still be interested, but it’s not the
most important thing on my agenda. ALDE is all about the upcoming first drill assays from Altar,
which should be with us soon. If I can add a few more at a good price before then, all good.
However, even a purchase in the immediate term doesn’t preclude selling the whole position for
a decent profit if the stock reacts strongly to any newsflow. This is a speculation, after all.
Minera Alamos (MAI.v): You want evidence Friday was oversold? Look no further, because
49.5c is the lowest close in MAI since June 2020:
It’s surprising to see MAI this low after the end of the tiresome ODEV selling period, but it’s
certainly no reflection of the reality on the company. The only reason I’m not a buyer of MAI
(last week’s personal rebalancing has left a little spare cash in the treasury) at this drop dead
bargain price is my position size, but the thought of flipping a few in and then out as a sude-bet
and scalping a quick 10% or 15% has crossed my mind this weekend. Overall, seeing MAI
under 50c is more amusing than it is worrying, the market does crazy things sometimes.
Trilogy Metals (TMQ): Two charts: First, seeing TMQ break under U$1.50 was not good, as
(Covid-dump aside) it fractured the long-term floor price for the stock:
14

The silver lining is here, in the near-term comparative to sector benchmark ETF COPX, as to be
fair TMQ didn’t do anything other than drop in the way of other copper stocks:
The lack of momentum is the issue, TMQ isn’t providing the investor or speculator any reason
to climb aboard and get (back) in, even though the fundamentals of the company scream
value. Even the next likely milestone at the company, the official filing for its EIA permit
application, is an event that is obviously important to those inside the company but not likely to
make waves with outsiders looking in.
Discovery Silver (DSV.v): It’s at this point your author points out that DSV is the only silver
company on the ‘Stocks to Follow’ list and that the house entry price was reasonable, one that
allows is desk to take the rough with the smooth. Because last week was rough.
Mene Inc (MENE.v): I heard back from MENE CEO Roy Sebag last Monday, who said they
planned to release a 4q21 sales NR within two the three weeks, which would slate it for mid-
February. Although rather late, it’s better than never.
Minera IRL (MIRL.cse): Even by the standards of the double-dealing management at MIRL,
the news last week that Michael Iannacone had resigned as a director (8) was sickening to
read. He’s obviously afraid of what his connection to MIRL will do for his professional
reputation, but that didn’t stop him from ignoring his fiduciary duty to shareholders and doing
the right thing in 2021 when it could have made a difference. Instead, he cared about himself
and nobody else, said nothing in 2021 and slips out the back door in 2022 less than two months
after the AGM. Quite disgusting behaviour.
However, this resignation tells us all we need to know about the MIRL plans to do a deal with a
third party on Ollachea. Firstly, no director in their right mind would leave a company just
before a payout on a successful deal. Second and more importantly, I fail to see how any third-
party company could ignore this red flag and go through on a deal. Up to last week, Iannacone
was the only Canadian on the board of a company that trades on the Canadian markets, in
2021 he was its sole independent director and representative outside of Diego Benavides’ clique
of Lima-based lawyers. His departure, just weeks after a contested AGM that saw many
wrongdoings at the company uncovered (and then summarily ignored by an “independent
audit” performed by a firm of Lima lawyers headed up by another of Diego Benavides’ “close
personal friends), is a massive red flag for any third party considering a deal with MIRL. It’s
extremely difficult to believe that a third party enter into a contract with MIRL and expose itself
after watching the only independent director at the company walk away in this manner.
After the trials and tribulations of last year, which include showing clear proof of corporate
malfeasance, uncovering illegal payments to members of Diego Benavides’ family that went on
for years and were kept from view, the incredible lack of fiduciary duty shown by the board of
directors (who are obviously in cahoots with the thief at the top) and then having these liars
and thieves open a legal action against my person as a bullyboy tactic to stop the truth from
15

being revealed (no laughing matter when you live in Peru and are up against rich and
connected Peruvian lawyers), watching Michael Iannacone resign and walk away from the mess
he refused to clean up is another slap in the face. MIRL spent all its time and effort getting its
thief of a CEO past the AGM last year, with part of its jam tomorrow scheming to promise a
deal on Ollachea in the first quarter of this year. The departure of Iannacone shows that for
what it is, another tissue of lies and they can “invite” as many companies as they want on site
visits to the project, the deep-set corporate corruption will scupper any potential deal. Where
that leaves us, the retail shareholders of MIRL, is with another year of wasted time and money
ahead of us. Something has to be done about the crimes being committed at MIRL.
The Copper Basket
After four weeks of 2022, The Copper Basket shows a loss of 7.15% to level stakes:
company ticker price 1/1/22 Shares out Market Cap current pps gain/loss%
1 Copper Mtn CMMC.to 3.42 210.166 758.70 3.61 5.6%
2 Oroco Res OCO.v 2.04 192.689 381.52 1.98 -2.9%
3 Marimaca Cop MARI.to 3.77 88.028 308.10 3.50 -7.2%
4 Nevada Copper NCU.to 0.71 448.437 304.94 0.68 -4.2%
5 Western Copper WRN.to 2.00 151.426 281.65 1.86 -7.0%
6 Hot Chili HCH.v 1.53 109.223 162.74 1.49 -2.6%
7 Meridian Min MNO.v 1.18 153.735 147.59 0.96 -18.6%
8 Aldebaran Res. ALDE.v 0.84 114.495 116.78 1.02 21.4%
9 Regulus Res. REG.v 1.06 101.845 100.83 0.99 -6.6%
10 Kutcho Copper KC.v 0.88 103.94 95.62 0.92 4.5%
11 C3 Metals CCCM.v 0.16 645.379 80.67 0.125 -21.9%
12 Doré Copper DCMC.v 0.79 66.123 44.96 0.68 -13.9%
13 Element 29 Res ECU.v 0.58 79.24 42.00 0.53 -8.6%
14 QC Copper QCCU.v 0.34 129.06 34.20 0.265 -22.1%
15 Coast Copper COCO.v 0.13 41.335 4.13 0.10 -23.1%
NB: All stocks in CAD$ Portfolio avg -7.15%
A cheer and a round of applause for Kutcho Copper (KC.v), which managed to return a modest
3.4% week-over-week win. That’s because all 14 of the other stocks featured on our list were
losers so you’re definitely not getting the long list this weekend. Instead, we note the four
biggest losers that all moved by double figure percentages, starting with Coast Copper (COCO.v
down 23.1%) and followed by QC Copper & Gold (QCCU.v down 14.5%), Meridian Mining
(MNO.v down 13.5%) and C3 Metals (CCCM.v). However, that doesn’t mean the others only
took modest damage, as most of the losers dropped by between 5.5% and 8.5%. A horrid
week for The Copper Basket and the average suddenly deeply negative.
The driver of the dump is here:
16

Copper was whacked with the rest of them, but this time the Comex futures contract broke
under the recent floor at U$4.40/lb and touched the $4.30 line before making a late rebound.
The market reaction was to dump any company
stupid enough to have the word “copper” in its
corporate title, though if we step out and
consider the 12-month price chart for the near-
dated contract (right) it’s not as if a whole bunch
of technical levels had been broken. I’m the first
to agree it was disappointing to see copper fail at
U$4.40/lb instead of busting clear of the
U$4.60/lb line on its way to $5, but the above
chart is hardly the end of the world. There’s also
the mitigation of timing, as we’re now beginning
the rollover from the March contract (HGH22) to
May (HGK22) which even managed to close a
shade higher than the near-dated. Along with the
pressure caused by market-wide selling, it was the right time for bears to launch another
assault in order to keep the copper price under control.
Putting it all together, we repeat the same theme of the likelihood of over-reaction and
overselling of mining shares last week. However,
it’s not a position to get dogmatic about and I’ll be
willing to take a step (or two) back and become
more defensive if the next five days show
continued selling in copper and the bears in
control. Weight of money is a deciding factor, no
matter how “right” or “wrong” you believe its
opinion so if the market remains illogical, it would
be financially safer to take John Maynard Keynes
at his word and remember that it can stay that
way longer than I can remain solvent.
Meanwhile and on the bullish side of the equation,
all pointers from copper inventory data show the
continued extreme tightness of the metal at market. Here are the long-term monthly tracker
charts with January now in the bag (minus one day) and while there has been a slight
improvement in overall world stocks, inventory levels in the three official systems remain at
near-historic lows for a third successive month:
Key Cu inventory aggregate, 2012 to date
1000000
900000
800000
700000
600000
500000
400000
300000
200000
100000
0
17
21.naJ ram yam luj pes von 31.naJ ram yam luj pes von 41.naj ram yam luj pes von 51.naj ram yam luj pes von 61.naj ram yam luj pes von 71.naj ram yam luj pes von 81
naj
ram yam luj pes von 91
naj
ram yam luj pes von 02
naj
ram yam luj pes von 12
naj
ram yam luj pes von 22
naj
Mt Cu
Comex
Shanghai
LME
source: Cochilco
Under normal circumstances, copper would now be flowing back to Shanghai’s SHFE
warehouses as the de-stocking period for end-users rolls out, from now until after the end of
the Chinese New Year celebrations. As we noted a couple of editions ago, there have been
years when SHFE’s sharp inventory build stated as late as February, but when we combine the
record lows with the lateness of 2022’s cycle, the signal of a lack of copper at market in China
is as obvious as it is ominous for end-users.

Copper inventories: percentage held per exchange
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
18
21.naJ ram yam luj pes von 31.naJ ram yam luj pes von 41.naj ram yam luj pes von 51.naj ram yam luj pes von 61.naj ram yam luj pes von 71.naj ram yam luj pes von 81
naj
ram yam luj pes von 91
naj
ram yam luj pes von 02
naj
ram yam luj pes von 12
naj
ram yam luj pes von 22
naj
LME Shanghai Comex source: Cochilco
Meanwhile, the percentage breakdown chart shows how Comex has become a major holder of
world copper stocks. As those tonnages are usually held in The USA and well away from the
normal customers for “least resort” copper (i.e. China and mainland Europe), it gives another
hint that the true availability of copper stocks is less than the raw numbers suggest.
The long-term data say copper supply is tight as a duck’s sphincter, the weekly data too:
 This weekend, the total for three official world systems actually managed to drop, when
by all accounts it should be rising now (and fast). Instead, the aggregate lost 3,335
metric tonnes (mt) to total 204,693mt. That’s remarkable for a week in late January.
 The Shanghai SHFE warehouses saw 5,257mt added to stocks. A modest rise on any
week, it does little to alleviate the chronic shortage of available tonnages in copper’s
major market and as the SHFE-dedicated chart below shows, we’re still wheeling round
the same ultra-low numbers of the last three months.
 The surprise came from the LME, which immediately lost 9.650mt of the near 14k
delivered the week before to close the week with a total of 90,125mt in stock. Not only
that, but cancelled warrants are also on the rise again and in the last four weeks have
crept up by over 20,000mt to stand at 25,850mt this weekend. That number represents
tonnages set for delivery to end-users and (as long as it’s not the LME treading pits
playing games, means those amounts are about to disappear from LME warehouses.
 Meanwhile the Comex put in another add of 1,058mt to close the week at 74,209mt. In
any other market that wouldn’t be an influential amount of copper, but in this one it’s
beginning to look as a price driver in the making. Along with the 20k+mt in LME
warehouses in New Orleans, it now means nearly half the world’s reserve valve copper
is housed in The USA
Here’s the dedicated SHFE inventory chart and it’s the same old story, levels have been under
50kmt for so long it’s beginning to feel normal:
Shanghai Futures Exchange Warehouse Stocks, 2014 to date
400000
350000
300000
250000
200000
150000
100000
50000
0
31'13ceD ht9 ht81 ht72 ht5tco ht41 dn22 dr3yam ht21 ht02 ht92 ht7bef ht71 ht62 ht4peS ht31 ht92 ht9 ht81 ht72 ht5von ht41 ht52 ht01 ht91 ht82 ht6naJ ht71 ht62 ht4gua ht31 dn22 202ts1ram ht01 ht91 ht72 0202ht6ced ht41 ht52 1202ht4luj ht21 ts12 ht03
Mt Cu
|
source: Cochilco

It’s not normal, not in the slightest. Meanwhile, we update a chart recently offers and note that
while SHFE can’t hold tonnages delivered, Comex warehouses continue to build inventory.
12 months of Comex copper stocks
80000
70000
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
19
12
naj
bef ram rpa yam nuj luj gua pes tco von ced 22
naj
source: LME data
reppoc
sennot
cirtem
There are too many reasons to throw in the towel on copper just because it succumbed to
another market whack on Friday and touched U$4.30/lb. After all, any copper company worthy
of the name makes serious coin at these prices. Now for notes on a couple of basket stocks:
Meridian Mining (MNO.v): Some heavy selling preceded the news out of MNO last week (10)
that the company had amended its optioning-in agreement with the vendors of its Cabaçal
property in Mato Grosso (thick undergrowth, if you must) in Brazil, the vendors being two
private Brazilian business concerns. The
change sees the next payment, the biggest
cash obligation so far at $1.75m, pushed back
from its scheduled 4q22 date to August 2023
(see previous schedule, right) thereby allowing
MNO more money to develop the property
without the need to go to market. A minor
change, but the market seemed to take the
news as a signal of weakness whereas, in
reality, MNO would still be obliged to forward
the option payment if it raised cash in a
placement. The net effect is to give MNO
maybe a quarter or two of extra flexibility
before deciding on timing for its next raise
(which will certainly happen at some point). The bottom line is that when the market wants an
excuse to liquidate it will find one, those of you who like this trade idea more than I do have a
reasonably good entry point at these sub-$1 levels.
Coast Copper (COCO.v): This sizzle faded on Monday when COCO announced it first set of
drill results, as all the expert promotional backing that the world or that Vancouver can muster
can’t do much when faced with the truth machine. They put their best foot forward in the title
line with “Coast Copper Drills 4.1 m of 5.66% CuEq Near Surface from Merry Widow Zone on
Empire Mine Property” (11) but the overall results were patchy, with widths that don’t impress.

The result is as seen in this six month chart, the stock back to the default 10c position it had
before it first waved at the world in early November (and we started soft coverage):
So overall, a swing and a miss on its first set of
holes, but that’s nobody’s idea of a lost cause. It’s
now a lot low market cap and it wouldn’t take much
to see it revalue from here. I’m not an owner, but if I
were this first reverse wouldn’t be enough to see me
selling.
Kutcho Copper (KC.v): For no apparent reason, our only winner on the week managed to
pick up consistent bids. The company did hand officers and insiders some 2.2m incentive
options, but to its credit the strike price of 90c means they are designed for their true intent.
The Producer Basket
After four weeks of 2022, the Producer Basket shows a loss of 8.39% to level stakes:
company ticker price 1/1/22 Shares out MktCap(U$Bn) current pps gain/loss%
1 Newmont NEM 62.02 797.44 47.73 59.86 -3.5%
2 Barrick GOLD 19.00 1779 33.02 18.56 -2.3%
3 Franco-Nevada FNV 138.29 191.192 24.54 128.34 -7.2%
4 Agnico Eagle AEM 53.14 453.5 20.98 46.26 -12.9%
5 Wheaton PM WPM 42.93 450.3 17.57 39.01 -9.1%
6 Gold Fields GFI 10.99 887.72 8.88 10.00 -9.0%
7 Kinross Gold KGC 5.81 1320 6.93 5.25 -9.6%
8 B2Gold BTG 3.93 1055.6 3.66 3.47 -11.7%
9 Alamos Gold AGI 7.69 392.503 2.64 6.73 -12.5%
10 Sandstorm SAND 6.20 191.4 1.12 5.83 -6.0%
All prices and stock quotes in U$ Port. avg -8.39%
Pure red on the table above as all ten of the Producer Basket stocks lost ground last week,
which is its own commentary. Instead, we note that our basket gained 2% on the nasty 7.4%
hit taken by our benchmark GDX last week and on due consideration, I think there are two
dynamics at work: First, our defensively oriented Producer Basket benefited from having the big
streamers FNV (down 1.8%) and WPM (down 4.4%) which performed “less worse” than the
20

norm. Second, the companies currently in transactions such as AEM (down 9.1%) and KGC
(down 7.1%) were hit harder than those not doing deals.
Does all this mean Mark Bristow is right and that walking away from the table on Kirkland Lake
and Great Bear was the right move? Well maybe, if you’re a gold bear and you want to take the
last week as an indicator for the rest of 2022. However, in the same way I wasn’t jumping to
conclusions after the PM price pop of the week before, last week’s drop is as likely to be an
overreaction than a new trend change.
B2Gold (BTG) (BTO.to): Though dropping by 2.0% doesn’t sound great, BTG was one of the
better performers from last week and the working theory at this desk is its bad news is already
baked in. The current hot topic is costs of production and, with 2021 AISC projected at a top
end of U$900/oz as at end 3q21, BTG got the negative news out of the way on January 19th
when forecasting 2022 AISC at “between $1,010 - $1,050 per ounce” with the reason given the
now classic theme of “...higher budgeted prices for fuel, labour and other key consumables”. As
a result, while other Tier 2 stocks had a rough time (chart right vs GDX and GDXJ), B2Gold
showed there were still buyers out there, willing to mop up liquidity.
The BTG chart is what a lead-indicator for the sector should look like.
The TinyCaps List
After four weeks of 2022, the TinyCaps show a gain of 5.18% to level stakes:
company ticker price 1/1/22 Shares out Mkt Cap current pps gain/loss%
Aurelius Min AUL.v 0.24 37.134 12.63 0.34 41.7%
Golden Pursuit GDP.v 0.13 34.638 4.50 0.13 0.0%
Infield Min INFD.v 0.06 48.276 2.90 0.06 0.0%
Kingfisher Met KFR.v 0.30 84.57 18.61 0.22 -26.7%
Latin Metals LMS.v 0.12 57.296 6.30 0.11 -8.3%
Manitou Gold MTU.v 0.06 344.47 20.67 0.06 0.0%
Melkior Res MKR.v 0.295 24.011 7.56 0.315 6.8%
Precipitate Gold PRG.v 0.105 129.322 16.17 0.125 19.0%
Signature Res SGU.v 0.07 238.4 16.69 0.07 0.0%
Winshear Gold WINS.v 0.08 61.585 5.85 0.095 18.8%
Prices in CAD$, data from TSXV basket avg 5.18%
This section attempts to track the tinycap mining sub-sector of the market, our ten companies
chosen under the following criteria to put together a list representing the state of play in the
sub-sector of tinycap exploration company stocks. At least, that’s the plan.
 Market capitalization of under $20m. They have to be tiny. In two cases I’ve stretched the window a
little and allowed sub-U$20m market capper in that are just over the C$20m level, but the spirit is unaltered.
 A “non broken” stock price and project story. There are literally hundreds of tinycap juniors of the right
21

size, but it was a particularly depressing exercise to trawl through the whole of the TSXV and find companies
that are small enough, but with life in them. The vast majority of sub-$20m stocks are broken stocks, either
traded to death on the exchange or with projects that are a bust or with entrenched management more
interested in their monthly paycheck than anything else.
 Likelihood of meaningful newsflow in 2020. This connects to the company’s “unbroken” status, as we
want news and potential catalysts from companies with projects that can work.
 Decent management if possible. When you are down among the little guys it doesn’t pay to be too
choosy, but still I preferred companies that have teams or people with good peer reputations.
The tinycaps were also hit by the selling of last week, but ,maybe not as much as their larger
brethren. Our representative list saw just one winner (WINS.v) and two unchanged stocks
(INFD.v, MTU.v) which means seven losers, but only two of those losses were double figure
percentage hits (KFR.v down 13.7% and MKR.v down 11.3%), which isn’t what you’d expect
from this sector when the plug gets pulled wholesale.
Winshear Gold (WINS.v): You’ll have to forgive me for featuring the only winner on the
TinyCaps list this weekend and I’m not trying to use
rose-tinted specs on a bad week for the sector,
instead WINS sticks out as bizarre considering
what’s happened to its larger sibling stock and small
personal holding Palamina Corp (PA.v) in the last
couple of weeks. Admittedly volume is thin, but you
wouldn’t expect this stock to have rallied on the
week or to display the 12 month chart you see here
(right) if the whole of the Puno Orogenic belt theory
that PA.v bases its program upon to be total junk.
The juxtaposition of the hammering taken by PA.v
recently and the WINS share price, effectively
unchanged for a year, tells us that either the whole
plan is wrong, or PA.v has been hit by serious overselling. I bet the latter and it’s good to have
WINS here in the TinyCaps for reference purposes.
NB: Please be clear that The Tiny Dogs is NOT a list of recommended tinycap stocks. It is a list of companies with
market caps of under $20m offering a reasonable representation of the wider tinycaps market. It’s possible in the future
I may buy shares in one or several of these stocks, at the moment both my opinion and wallet aretrictly neutral.
Regional politics
Argentina: Chubut notably absent from the new national mining plan
Last week’s main Regional Politics segment, “Argentina announces a major
new policy for renewable energy”, reported on the full pomp and ceremony
behind the Alberto Fernández national executive’s plan to create the “National
Renewable Cluster” of the week before, the initiative funded by public and
private sector money planned for the combined provinces of San Juan,
Catamarca, La Rioja, Mendoza, Neuquén and Río Negro. These provinces are
all located along the Andean West and border Chile and concentrate much of
the energy and mining activities in the country. The exceptions are Salta/Jujuy
to the North and Santa Cruz to the South (too far away for the “cluster” plans
and with its own mining promotion laws and benefits) but a little knowledge of
the country, plus a glance at the map (right) indicates the missing piece in the
new “Renewable Cluster” plan. Step forward, Chubut.
The problems caused by the heavy-handed way governor Arcioni of Chubut
tried to ram through his “Zonification” law in Chubut, that would have allowed
the Pan American Silver (POAAS) Navidad mine to go ahead but instead
caused near-rioting and violent protests before the law was rescinded, have
caused repercussions. At the time, Arcioni said that the province would hold a
22

referendum on whether to allow the zonification of the province, but even that is now frowned
upon by the national government, who don’t want Chubut to risk setting a national precedent
that other anti-mining groups in other provinces could use. Instead, Chubut is now excluded
from plans and Arcioni ostracized, excluded from the major national initiative and reduced to
telling a local radio program last Monday that (translated)(12)
“Today, mining isn’t a subject under (economic) analysis. At the moment, we need to
support the productive base we have (e.g. hydrocarbons production) and improving its
growth, and we will see whether (mining) becomes the future of the province. It will be
considered eventually, but not at the moment. He also put paid to the referendum idea
by adding, “The mining referendum isn’t a dead issue, but it is something that isn’t
going to be on the table for the time being.”
That’s the sound of a governor with his wings well and truly clipped. It was left to a minor
government lackey in Chubut to respond to questions as to why Chubut hadn’t been included in
the National Renewable Cluster initiative. Señor Emanuel Coliñir who is (full job title, breathe in)
“The Municipal Coordinator for the Patagonia Region for the National Ministry of the Interior”
(breathe out), was asked the obvious question by reporters in Chubut; Why, when Chubut was
one of the major producers of wind-power energy in Argentina, was it being left out of a State-
sponsored cluster of industries to promote that exact activity? His answer was long-winded
(pardon the pun) and included (translated) (13):
“The cluster has only just begun, with the participation of five or six provinces. We will
try to add Chubut because we understand that the province is in the vanguard of many
investments concerning sustainable energy production and wind power electricity
production.”
…
“The province has shown it has a separate agenda, while five or six provinces have
been working closely with each other to create this cluster of sustainable energy.”
The cold-shoulder shown to Chubut is not a minor matter and should not go unrecorded; it
provides clear insight into the true agenda being pushed forward by by the national
government, as if this “Renewable Energy Cluster” plan had renewable energy as its main
concern it could not leave Chubut out of the plan. Instead and as posited last week, the
strategy to leverage large-scale mining projects into Argentina on the back of a “green energy
future” ticket, thereby providing the Fernández government with desperately needed hard
dollars is the reason for all this (the IMF negotiations continue and there are big bills to pay
soon). It’s also notable to see how the government is already spending the money it believes
will arrive from mining, with this glowing report from the State news service (14) picked up by
several pro-government news sites in Argentina recently. It talks of the U$9.314Bn in mining
investment since Alberto Fernández mandate began, but a little extra reading shows it is talking
about pledged dollars, such as Lundin Mining (LUN.to) which (quote translated) “…announced
an investment of U$4.2Bn in the Josemaria copper project.”
Be in no doubt, Argentina wants mining to happen in the country, it wants it to happen as soon
as possible and it wants to bank the dollars that come from FDI, or at least show its creditor
the IMF that new funds are on the way. It’s the real reason behind the all the new “renewable
energy” initiative, it’s why Chubut isn’t invited to the party and, most important of all, it’s why
betting on large-scale copper projects in Argentina is a winning strategy.
Ecuador: Quito to hold its own mining referendum
This may become interesting. On Friday, Ecuador’s Constitutional Court voted (15) by a 6 to 3
majority to allow a “popular consultation” (i.e. legally binding local referendum vote) to go
ahead on whether to allow metals mining in six rural localities in the Quito region of Ecuador.
The areas in question cover the sparsely populated rural municipalities of Nono, Calacalí,
Nanegal, Nanegalito, Gualea and Pacto, whose combined population is under 20,000 people.
However, there’s a big twist in this tale because the CC also ruled that the capital city Quito as
inside the catchment area for the referendum. That means a cool 1.6m people are added to the
zone and now, anti-mine protesters have six months to collect around 200,000 signatures in
23

order to get to the 10% minimum barrier and force the vote to happen. While the specific
region of Ecuador isn’t one that directly affects the main mining investments for FDI capital or
any of the companies we normally cover via capital markets in Ecuador, the referendum
decision by the CC will throw a major spotlight on the mining industry, assuming that the
organizers can overcome that large barrier to entry and collect enough signatures inside the
time limit. For an industry that much prefers to fly under the radar, this CC decision is a hatful
of bad news and will get even worse assuming the vote goes ahead, as it’s just as likely to
become a de facto vote against the increasingly unpopular President Guillermo Lasso in the
main urban area as it is about the long-term future of the rural zones around the capital. There
are many other petitions for similar referendum votes waiting for admission and approval and
the precedent of allowing them to take place is a clear negative for the industry, as previous
votes of this nature and of non-binding local polls have always gone against permitting mining.
Watch this space, the Mini Basket Case country may have just thrown another spanner in the
works of its mining industry.
Chile: The royalty tax on copper and lithium is watered down
Last week, Chile Senate mining commission approved (16) contents of the so-called “royalty
law” which, as we supposed on a couple of occasions in 2021, has been watered down to the
point where mining companies seem ready to accept its passage. The new law project covers
new lithium concessions (i.e. excludes the major lithium operations owned by Albemarle and
SQM under tax stability agreements) and will charge 3% of gross sales of lithium. For copper
operations, mines producing under 50,000 tonnes per year are now exonerated, those
producing between 50,000 tonnes and 200,000 tonnes copper per year will pay 1% of gross
sales, while the large-scale mines producing over 200,000 tonnes per year will depending on a
sliding scale depending on the copper price (with the exact figures undecided).
While the burdens for lithium operations are unchanged from the original proposals, the
outlined copper royalty at 1% for the typical operator is lower than the original plan and fruit of
considerable lobbying on the part of the mining industry, which seems to have convinced Chile’s
Senate that 3% would have crippled the industry. However, the law project still has to make
passage through the government executive (the finance ministry) and only then will it see a
vote at Senate. If it passes, it then goes back to the lower house for a final vote (due to its
substantial changes) and if then passed, can be signed into law by the President. By that time,
the signature is likely to be that of Gabriel Boric, rather than Sebastian Piñera.
Chile’s Constitutional Assembly to limit concessions on indigenous lands
The text of the watered-down “royalty tax” was better than the mining industry anticipated in
May last year when the draft proposal to tax copper sales by 3% was passed by the lower
house of deputies. However, the Chilean mining world was handed a new headache last week
by the decision of one of the commissions for the Constitutional Assembly to allow a project to
limit mining concessions on indigenous lands in the country to go for debate and full vote by
the 155 seat assembly (17). A decision big enough to wake up the international press corps,
here’s how Bloomberg reported on its passage (18):
Members of the committee voted 13 in favor and four against on a plan to annul
concessions granted without prior consent of indigenous groups, according to a
document posted on the constitutional assembly’s website.
The proposal -- which still requires a final vote by the committee and approval by two
thirds of the 155-member constitutional assembly -- would allow permits to be
reinstated within two years with community consent. If the proposal makes its way into
the constitution, it could trigger a technically difficult inventory of native territories.
The committee decision mostly affects lands in the South of the country and also covers
forestry concessions (which tend to be more used), but would severely curtail the amount of
mining concession lands available for exploration. The decision to allow debate and vote by the
main assembly was called “very radical” by Chile’s National Mining Society (with “radical” the
code word for “Commie” in the country), its spokesperson suspecting some sort of shakedown.
24

He posited an extreme position and believes local indigenous would expect some sort of
payment before allowing mining to continue or go ahead after a prior consultancy process. For
the record, Rio Alto at Fenix in the North of Chile is completely unaffected by this draft ruling.
Mexico: The Supreme Court case against Almaden Minerals goes ahead this week
After being suspended twice, the Mexico Supreme Court hearing to decide what to do about the
Almaden Mineral’s (AAU) (AMM.to) Ixtaca project is now scheduled to happen on February 2nd
and this time, we should expect the court to argue the case and hand down a ruling. That’s
because the judge in charge of the matter has apparently found a way to thread the legal
needle and provide locals against the project with the right result without ruling against the
country’s current Mining Law that would then provide a strong legal precedent for other anti-
mine protests and dissenting communities in other parts of the country. If things go as
rumoured, the Supreme Court will rule that while the project concession awards did not
contravene the mining law, Mexico’s government was wrong in awarding the concessions
without first providing notice to locals and giving them opportunity for prior consultancy. In
light of this, the Supreme Court is likely to decide that the Ixtaca concession awards be
annulled, then re-emitted during which process the locals will have the right to stop the permits
from being awarded. In other words, instead of changing the law, the Supreme Court is looking
to blame the government and if so, leaves the State open to law suits from Almaden.
All the above is rumour and the case may turn out a different way (or the hearing suspended
once again), but if so it would mean the bad actor AMM is booted from Mexico, but would then
be able to take its case to international arbitration (e.g. ICSID/CIADI).
Market Watching
Two blow-ups, Part 1: Three Valley Copper (TVC.v)
If memory serves, Three Valley Copper (TVC.v) is a company I’ve only mentioned in print twice.
The first time was on the open blog in late October last year (19), on news TVC was upsizing a
bought deal placement it was running at the time to $16m, selling 50m units at 32c apiece (unit
= share + full warrant at 45c). The post that day
was brief and disparaging of the company (in,
errr…that blog way). The second was last week, after
the company published the January 24th NR entitled,
“Three Valley Copper Suspends Mining Operations
and Provides Strategic Review Update” (20) which
did this to the stock price (right).
We can safely assume those 45c warrants are set to
expire without being exercised and, in passing,
please note the share price pop that happened in
mid-October just before the bought deal was
announced. The events of last week were surprising
but not particularly shocking and there’s nuance in understanding the difference. The surprise
comes from watching new and unforeseen events happen that cave the stock price, those
cannot be predicted by people outside the company. However, there was little shock because
that brief post in October only came after checking out the placement “opportunity” (speech
marks most definitely required) and running in the opposite direction.
Most DD in companies doesn’t get them past first base and, as a result, the notes don’t get
published anywhere. This company is an example, but the disaster area news this week saw me
re-open the basic numbers done on Three Valley Copper (TVC.v), renamed this year after being
called Sprott Resource Holdings (SRHI) for several years. Here are a couple of the charts
generated from the balance sheet data (updated with Q3 numbers) as illustration, starting with
overview assets and liabilities:
25

TVC.v: Assets, per qtr
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
For sure, TVC made it clear in October that it was raising cash for working cap purposes and
that’s fair enough, so the dwindling cash pile was only to be expected. What caught my eye at
the time (and was reaffirmed in the 3q21 numbers) was how “other current” was growing
rapidly, this due to an apparent inventory build. That was odd, because a mining company that
needs cash quickly doesn’t need to sell shares when it can liquidate its inventory. Meanwhile,
the yellow flag on the liabilities side was both the size and the direction of debt (on which we
expand below). The combination was to see cash (below left) insufficient to cover its near-term
liabilities even after the $16m of placement proceeds had been added after the end of the 3q21
period, plus a working capital figure that also remained stubbornly low (not the thing you want
when ramping up a mine)
However, it was the quality of the balance sheet items that made those yellow flags turn red.
Walking away from TVC was with the 3q21 balance sheet on show, as inventory build continued
(and please note the “non-current inventory” of $18.204m, a balance sheet prop) while
accounts payable continued to expand and an expensive looking loan was beginning to come
due.
26
02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3
$m fixed TVC.v: Liabilities, per qtr
other current 110
cash 100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
source: company filings
02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3
source: company filings
srallod
fo
snoillim
LT liabs
current liabs
APN.v: Cash treasury per qtr
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3
source: company filings
srallod
fo
snoillim
20 TVC.v: Working Capital per qtr
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3
source company filings
srallod
fo
snoillim

It doesn’t take long after checking the balance sheet and realizing that aside from its working
capital requirements, TVC needed to execute perfectly on a previously difficult asset that had
already failed to live up to expectations under its new management just to escape from that
financial debt. Under the light of its financial burden, the October placement looked less about
providing liquidity to operations, more about providing debt servicing to backers already in and
badly underwater. In short, it was easy to walk away and make no mention of the company
here at The IKN Weekly and the reason why the spectacular failure at TVC as announced last
week came as a surprise, but not as a shock.
Bottom line: Financial DD matters. The IKN Weekly strategy toward uncovering potential trades
means trying to filter out the mediocre (or plain bad) projects and offers as soon as possible
and the best way is to consider the management and financials of any given company. It means
that sometimes a good project will slip through the net, but by filtering out those prospects that
don’t measure up on their financials means most mediocre companies don’t “get to first base”.
At that point we can begin to consider the other variables such as project, location, metal to be
mined, geology, engineering, cost hurdles, etc and a hundred others. However, it pays to focus
on the “serious juniors” and they show at balance sheet level, which is why TVC never made it
to the pages of The IKN Weekly as a potential trade. Instead, it’s first (and likely only)
appearance this week is as a salutary tale, one to keep in mind when considering other mining
stocks.
Two blow-ups, Part 2: Gatos Silver (GATO)
However, the Gatos Silver (GATO) news of last week was a real, live shock and I sympathize
with anyone caught in a long position. We featured the news (21) on the blog (22) the evening
it dropped and something akin to the MUX NR on Wednesday, it was something I had to read
more than once, as after the first quick scan it seemed I must have read it badly. After sitting
down and reading it carefully I still thought I must have missed something. But no, it really was
as bad as it looked and sure enough, next day the stock price was unsurprisingly torn to pieces.
The NR from GATO last week is nothing short of scandalous and strikes at the very heart of the
mining industry and the faltering 43-101 compliance system. Before getting to the point
however, the brass neck displayed by management when announcing this news is worthy of
some comment:
“While we are disappointed by the preliminary results of the reconciliation work, we are
encouraged by ongoing excellent performance at the Cerro Los Gatos operation,
particularly in the challenging environment of the global pandemic,” said Dale Andres,
President of Gatos Silver. “We continue to achieve record production while maintaining
strong performance in the areas of safety, environmental stewardship, social
engagement and continuing to shift our exploration focus to the Los Gatos District.
Going forward, our primary objective is to stay the course in all aspects of operating
excellence while strengthening our technical capability and updating the Life of Mine
plan for Cerro Los Gatos.”
Don’t these idiots see that glowing over the “disappointing part of today’s news” and
immediately segueing into adjective-laden corporate puffery makes them look even worse, even
more like criminals? Quite incredible, but ultimately a side-issue when compared to the real
news, as seen in this section below (author highlights):
On a preliminary basis, the Company estimates a potential reduction of the
metal content of CLG’s mineral reserve ranging from 30% to 50% of the metal
content remaining after depletion. Since the 2020 Technical Report, depletion
is 1.3 million tonnes grading 284 g/t silver, 3.9% zinc, 2.3% lead and 0.3 g/t
gold that has been processed from July 1, 2020 to December 31, 2021. At this
time, the Company cannot accurately quantify the exact magnitude of the
reduction, and the mineral resource and reserve estimates in the 2020
Technical Report should not be relied upon.
As it happens, the Cerro Los Gatos (CLG, or “Cat Hill” if you must) resource as at the 43-101
Technical Report dated July 2020 came to around 14 million metric tonnes (mmt), with 9.6mmt
27

of that was in the reserve category (mostly proven reserve, too). We also know that since
beginning mining operations, GATO had shown difficulty in mining at the reserve grades with
silver, gold and lead (Pb) lower by around 10% and zinc (the main by-product) lower by around
15%.
When the expected Proven and Probable Reserve grades of 306 g/t silver, 0.35 g/t gold, 2.76%
lead and 5.65% zinc are stacked against most recent results from 2021…
…compared to the reported three quarters of last year, silver has a negative reconciliation of
7.8%, gold of 8.6%, lead of 16.7% and, most worryingly of all, the main by-product zinc is
lower by 30.1%. The issue with the base metals discrepancy is a tell on how the underground
vein tracking seems to have been more difficult than expected, as most of the precious metals
will typically come from the sweetest spot and base metals are contained in the halo and easier
to assure makes the muckpile. All the same, with all four payable metals grading lower than
reserve, something was clearly amiss for more than a couple of months. As the news last week
comes on the back of a slow decline in the share price and the company’s IPO and fund-raising
in 2020 squarely based on the mine plan generated by the 43-101 reserve tonnages, there’s
more than meets the eye in last week’s announcement and only the naïve would think GATO
has “recently discovered” its major reserve tonnage issues.
Perhaps that’s why this disclaimer appears in the 3q21 Forward Looking Statements…
…which compares to this, the CIMM definition of mineral reserve:
The term "Mineral Reserve" refers to the economically mineable part of a Measured or Indicated
Mineral Resource demonstrated by at least a preliminary feasibility study. The study must include
adequate information on mining, processing, metallurgical, economic, and other relevant factors
that demonstrate, at the time of reporting, that economic extraction can be justified. A Mineral
Reserve includes diluting materials and allowances for losses that may occur when the material is
mined.
The difference between “resource” and “reserve” is well-understood in miming, therefore seeing
GATO lump both together in a disclaimer line caught the eye. In the case of this company,
reserves are (better said “were”) the majority of the overall resource and, as noted on the blog
28

on the evening of the news, this 43-101 was the reason GATO could go to market with a
business plan, raise U$150m cash and IPO. The trust given to the mining company was on the
back of its economic outlook, which in turn laid squarely on the shoulders of its geological
endowment as calculated by the third-party professionals, in this case Tetra Tech. But just a
year and a half later, GATO calmly announces its business plan was built on a that may not
even have half its expected production life. As capital payback for the project was calculated
(by the same 43-101) at a little over four years for a nine year project, that leaves virtually
nothing for the equity of the company. Hence the price drop of around 70% last week and why
there are so many ambulance-chaser legal firms mounting class action suits against GATO.
That’s the background to this sordid tale but the point (or rant) I want o make is slightly
different. The baseline issue at GATO is Garbage In, Garbage Out, the input of supposedly
reliable sources has been found wanting. However and quite seriously, how much of a shock is
this to the seasoned mining executive or industry watcher?
This enormous fail, a third party compiler mis-calculating an economic reserve by up to 50%, is
fruit of the decadence we’ve all witnessed in a 43-101 system that has been corrupted and
abused by the sector, the very same people expected to self-govern its use.
 We all know that one Third party compiler company is better than another
 We all know that a PEA is the best economics you’ll ever see from a project
 We all know that Team A inside one of the big firms is higher quality than Team B
 We all know the company will “help with the data” required by the supposed third part
compiler
 We all know there are professional geologists, engineers, metallurgists, etc who will
give the company that owns a project the numbers they want to read.
The GATO scandal of last week exposes the truth, something that mining people have known
for a while and that money people have just found out the hard way; you cannot rely on a third
party company to give reliable results when their business model requires them to maximize
capital returns and add as much business as possible. There’s no secret about there being “A-
Teams” and “B-Teams” at companies such as Tetra Tech, SRK, MICON, Mining Plus, Coffey to
name but a few, and let’s not start on the plethora of independent geologists who have found
an easy way to feather their nests.
In a field ripe for exaggeration, the 43-101 system is no more reliable than the one it replaced,
back when after the Bre-X scandal Canada decided it needed to clean its house. Pre Bre-X,
economic studies were either “serious” as the plan was to get a large bank to finance it, or one
of the sketchier names was brought in and the results used to promote your stock. Twenty-five
years later and we’ve come full-circle, with third-party companies that need to please their
paymasters or run the risk of getting a reputation of being “too strict” and not hired by others.
Or at other moments when the market is running hot and everyone wants a 43-101, the lesser
companies and projects get sent the “B-Team” from the big third-party entity, relying on the
corporate size to demand respect from the market and cash from financiers. Only later, at times
like last week, do we find out how shoddy was the original work. The greed and malfeasance is
shared, by the third party consultant and the client mining company. One tries to maximize
returns, the other makes sure they get the best numbers. One wants to be hired again, the
other gets to hear what they paid to hear and as a result 43-101 has degenerated into a self-
governing mess where nobody is responsible. GATO last week is fruit of the way 43-101 is
systematically abused by an industry and this desk predicts with confidence that it won’t be the
last example of what is nothing more or less than white collar crime before 43-101 is thrown
out by the people who’d like to finance your project, but no longer trust the baseline data
enough to risk their cash.
Palamina Corp (PA.v): Very oversold and buyable in small amounts
This ongoing coverage note was held over from last week due to your author running out of
time and as it turns out, it’s better for it. We begin with a reflection on market, as veterans
among this audience know only too well how many ways there are to lose money on a trade:
29

 Sometimes the company will announced bad news (in NR language, “sub-optimal”)
 Sometimes the company’s treasury position will begin to look thin (in NR language, a
“quiet period of activity” or “resource optimization”) and larger players sell, knowing
they can re-enter at a lower price (and with a bonus half-warrant for their efforts)
 Sometimes the broad market will go against you (in NR language, “challenging
environment”)
 Sometimes a dynamic company developing its project in fine style and supported by a
buoyant S&P will suddenly see world prices for its target metal dump hard (“in NR
language, “standard industry roadbumps”)
More besides, but those above are particularly true in the high volatility world on the tinycap
junior exploreco, which is where the last
couple of weeks of Palamina Corp (PA.v) come
in and here’s the three-month chart for
context (right). At the recent 27c and 28c my
position was already slightly underwater, but
the action since its last NR was published has
cut the stock price in half. We now run
through the sequence of events, with strike
one happening January 17th in the NR
“Palamina Releases Drill Results from Its
Maiden Drill Program at the Usicayos Gold
Project” (23). We can be sum up the NR in the
phrase “they drilled four dusters”, maybe a
little harsh, as the drills did cut a couple of
interesting zones of over 3g/t gold over a metre, but the depth of the intersects and the
general sub-gram returns from the anomalous zone means there’s nothing of economic} worth.
As a result, the stock dumped that day and the next day January 18th, I caught up with PA.v
CEO Andrew Thomson, who put on the brave face and made his best pitch on the results. They
were still dusters when he’d finished talking about them, but more on-point was the corporate
plans for the next few months. As noted in the NR that days, PA.v “…has kept the drill at site
with a view to resuming drilling after the rainy season in late April”, but that’s more about
keeping options open than the likelihood of drilling in the same exact location. Instead, PA
would like if possible to move the man-portable rig to a different location on its large land
package and scout drill its most promising next target, however the problem is permitting as it
would require a new water license to drill in the zone (being away from the first Usicayos hill
area) and the Peru ANA Water Authority has shut up shop in the zone for the next few weeks.
They don’t have any hard information as yet, but rumour is that ANA wouldn’t open for new
permits until June which leaves PA in a quandary. Either it can a) drill another hole at Usicayos,
where its drill is currently located and with valid permits, b) see if it can expedite a new water
permit in the next few weeks and move the rig to its next target or c), shut down the drill
campaign and save money. So as soon as they have better information on the potential to get
permits for a new drill target, PA will be in a position to decide what to do (but for me, they are
most likely to shut down the campaign and save money.
On that subject and when asked about treasury, CEO Thomson estimated PA had over C$2m at
bank but with a couple of lease bills to pay, which puts “clear” cash on-hand at perhaps
$1.85m. That’s not bad, considering the spend on those unsuccessful drill holes during 4q21
and one project earmarked for this year is to build a better access road into its concession area,
which will improve future logistics for exploration and eventual drilling, also go down well with
local communities as part of the company CSR effort. That isn’t a heavy budget item and could
be managed in the next couple of months, perhaps while waiting out the next drill permit.
As for company financials here are the charts that matter, suitably updated with the latest data.
Assets are small and mostly its cash treasury, we assume PA.v goes back to a low cash burn in
30

the next couple of quarters. Liabilities are tiny, which couldn’t be better:
PA.v: Assets
5.5
5
4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
That leaves working capital estimated at C$1.8m at the end of our current quarter (to March
31st). As for how the cash is spent, this
expenses visual shows PA has just booked a
relatively expensive 3q21 and that will continue
into Q4 when we know the numbers, what with
the drillers to pay. However, we also see that
the company is good at battening down the
hatches when required, capable of making that
small cash pile last well into 2023. In the
meantime CEO Thomson and his team have
time to decide what to do next, options that
include the opportunity to drill, or to work on
road upgrading and access into this sparse
corner of highland Peru, or other matters more
corporate. To that end, CEIO Thomson
mentioned that he may have the opportunity of putting together a “non-dilutive transaction”
with potential third parties on one (or more) of PA.v’s non-core assets. The company does hold
concessions in other parts of South Peru and a couple of them are adjacent to juniors currently
active and drilling (e.g. Aftermath Silver), so while nobody should hold their breath on such a
deal, there is at least substance behind the talk.
C$m PA.v: Costs breakdown
1.6
Exp&Eval salaries/mgmt fees
1.4
IR share-based paym
1.2 prof. fees other
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
1q182q183q184q181q192q193q194q191q202q203q204q201q212q213q21
source: company filings
Which brings us to the reason why we this company is not a lost cause by any means. This
long-term chart demonstrates that the share price is now at a floor level worthy of
consideration and, with the current 65.3m shares out, Palamina has a market cap of C$8.5m.
That’s very cheap, almost as lot as the sister company recently funded by PA.v from its own
treasury (Winshear (WINS.v, see the TinyCaps basket above) and while an IKN-estimated
C$1.7m of market cap is covered by cash at the end of the current quarter, we should also
assume that cash will eventually be burned down.
What we’re left with is an tinycap exploreco, now trading at a considerable discount because it
was unlucky enough to return unimpressive drill results at the wrong time in the market cycle.
31
81q4 91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 tse12q4 tse22q1
C$m
PA.v: Liabilities Breakdown per qtr
1
fixed 0.9
other current 0.8
cash & eq 0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
source: Company filings
02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 tse12q4 tse22q1
C$m
source: company filings
PA.v: Working Capital per qtr
5
4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
-0.5
-1
02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 12q3 tse12q4 tse22q1
source company filings
srallod
fo
snoillim

The selling began, then the board markets topped out, then the metals markets reversed and
those with small-scale spec capital in PA.v didn’t think much about the price they were offered
last week, they just took it. Those dusters aren’t going to impress anyone (and I certainly hope
PA doesn’t waste time and money on a 5th hole in the same location), but its land package
covers a large swathe of rich hunting ground for gold in Peru, the thesis has always been about
gaining a first-mover advantage on formal mining in a zone where artisan mines have
proliferated for decades. That hasn’t changed and while PA swung and missed on its first
attempt, it has a lot to play for in the area. The cash position, while modest, is enough to see it
through the current period without having to go to the market in a weak position and get
severely diluted. Also, even while it may be later and not sooner, a new drill project on a
different target will happen eventually and that, after all, is why we are here.
I am tempted to buy a few shares to ad to my tiny position in PA, average down and play the
percentages. While “averaging down your losers” is normally a sucker’s game, the relative low
price, corporate stability and dominant land position in a highly prospective corner of Peru
makes this current price the right one to use correctly. Please believe me that if I decide to buy
some of these cheap shares the cash involved would be minor, caused as much by the way
that coincidentally, I find the portfolio with some spare cash. It’s also the type of very high risk
trade that you go in with eyes wide open, the money you have to be prepared to lose 100%
and not bear grudges about afterward. Ultimately, a good team with a good business plan got a
bad result at a bad time, those things happen but they don’t kill explorecos, either. I’m certainly
willing to give Palamina Corp (PA.v) its fair chance to improve as 2022 continues and if it does,
a few cheap shares bought while was totally out of fashion would also help the cause.
The final advantage is time, as after a reversal of this sort a company share price normally
needs to lick its wounds before rebounding. That means there’s no need to wade in and buy at
the first opportunity but personally speaking don’t be too surprised if the cost average of my
PA.v trade drops at some point in the next few weeks.
Conclusion
IKN662 is done, we end with bullet points:
 A rotten week at the market behind us, one that I trust will not repeat over the next
five days. After all, what could possibly go wrong.
 I’m glad to have caught up on Altiplano Metals (APN.v) at last, also Palamina (PA.v).
 Be long copper. I’m off to bed.
I thank you in advance for any feedback. Our Top Pick stocks are Minera Alamos (MAI.v) and
Rio2 Ltd (RIO.v). Flash updates will be sent if required by events. And be long copper.
I wish you good trading fortune, ladies and gentlemen.
Best, Mark
32

Footnotes, appendices, references, disclaimer
(1) https://www.reuters.com/business/fed-guidance-rates-following-liftoff-may-remain-foggy-2022-01-28/
(2) http://www.apnmetals.com/news/altiplano-begins-advance-to-the-352-m-level-at-farellon-and-completes-ventilation-
upgrades
(3) http://www.apnmetals.com/news/altiplano-reports-318--cu-over-367-metres-in-recent-drilling-confirming-continuation-
of-high-grade-copper-results-at-farellon
(4) http://www.apnmetals.com/news/altiplano-reports-297-cu-over-486-metres-in-recent-drilling-at-farellon
(5) http://www.apnmetals.com/news/magenetic-separator-and-dewatering-equipment-arrive-at-the-el-pen-processing-
facilty
(6) http://www.apnmetals.com/news/altiplano-reports-november-2021-results-with-improved-grade-and-record-income
(7) https://www.mining-journal.com/resourcestocks-company-profiles/resourcestocks/1425281/mcewen-ready-to-spin-
out-los-azules-to-copper-hungry-market
(8) https://www.mcewenmining.com/investor-relations/press-releases/press-release-details/2022/McEwen-Mining-Fox-
PEA--Higher-Production-Longer-Life/default.aspx
(9) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sNO5cukDNHY
(10) https://meridianmining.co/wp-content/uploads/MNO_Program_Corp_Update_20220128.pdf
(11) https://coastcoppercorp.com/news-releases/coast-copper-drills-4.1-m-of-5.66-cueq-near-surface-from-merry-
widow-zone-on-empire-mine-property/
(12) https://www.minutoneuquen.com/energia/2022/1/25/mariano-arcioni-hoy-la-mineria-es-un-tema-que-no-esta-bajo-
analisis-305517.html
(13) https://www.tiemposur.com.ar/politica/emanuel-colinir-pretendemos-sumar-a-chubut-al-cluster
(14) https://www.argentina.gob.ar/noticias/las-inversiones-productivas-anunciadas-en-el-sector-minero-sumaron-mas-
de-us9300-millones
(15) https://www.expreso.ec/actualidad/toma-forma-consulta-mineria-distrito-metropolitano-quito-120446.html
(16) https://www.latercera.com/pulso/noticia/comision-de-mineria-del-senado-aprueba-y-despacha-a-hacienda-
proyecto-de-royalty-minero/DXAK2W3TIBF5DBSEO3A7YDFT2Y/
(17) https://www.pauta.cl/economia/sonami-nulidad-proyectos-territorios-indigenas-minas-paran-pauta-final.
(18) https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/chile-s-constitution-drafters-want-to-annul-mining-concessions-in-indigenous-lands-
1.1713548
(19) https://iknnews.com/confirmed-rick-rule-could-sell-sand-to-saudi-arabia/
(20) https://pressroom.threevalleycopper.com/news-releases/news-release-details/three-valley-copper-suspends-
mining-operations-and-provides
(21)
https://investor.gatossilver.com/news/news-details/2022/Gatos-Silver-Provides-Update-on-Mineral-Resources-and-
Reserves-at-Cerro-Los-Gatos-and-2022-Performance-Guidance/default.aspx
(22) https://iknnews.com/gatos-silver-gato-run-away-like-a-scalded-cat/
(23) https://finance.yahoo.com/news/palamina-releases-drill-results-maiden-142900893.html
33

Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2021
Closed in 2021 closed close price
Fiore Gold F.v jan'21 C$0.98 21-May-20 C$1.17 19.4% closed as part of rebalance
Norsemont Min NOM.cse feb'21 C$1.55 6-Set-20 C$0.70 -54.8% Cut loser to reduce Au exp.
Element 29 Res ECU.v feb'21 C$0.49 7-Feb-21 C$0.54 10.2% Cut Peru exposure
Kuya Silver KUYA.cse feb'21 C$1.66 8-Nov-20 C$2.51 51.2% Cut Peru exposure
Pucara Gold TORO.v apr'21 C$0.65 4-Oct-20 C$0.26 -60.0% Cut loser, Peru risk call
Copper Mountain CMMC.to apr'21 C$1.40 22-Nov-20 C$4.18 198.6% tgt hit, profit taken
New Gold NGD may'21 U$0.76 9-Feb-20 U$2.14 181.6% Sold to buy AGC, nice win
Orezone Gold ORE.v jun'21 C$0.79 21-Jun-20 C$1.61 103.8% sold on pop, leaky boat
Wolfden Res. WLF.v sep'21 C$0.30 11-Abr-21 C$0.19 -36.7% Failed spec trade, cut loss
Cartier Res ECR.v sep'21 C$0.32 21-Mar-21 C$0.235 -26.6% Failed spec trade, cut loss
Amarillo Gold AGC.v sep'21 C$0.31 30-May-21 C$0.30 -3.2% Capex story changed: Out
Excelsior Mining MIN.to oct'21 C$0.93 10-Mar-19 C$0.53 -43.0% May return in 2022
Royal Road Min. RYR.v nov'21 C$0.155 17-Mar-19 C$0.275 77.4% Closed on Nica pol risk
Aurelius Min. AUL.v dec'21 C$0.75 28-Jun-20 0.24 -68.0% cut end 2021, failed trade
Argonaut Gold AR.to dec'21 C$2.95 25-Jun-21 C$2.15 -27.1% cut on capex blowout
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2020
Closed in 2020 closed close price
TMAC Resources TMR.to Jan'20 C$3.41 20-Dec-19 C$3.61 5.9% TLS flip play, sold new year
Regulus Res REG.v Jan'20 C$1.10 20-Dec-19 C$1.30 18.2% TLS flip play, profit taken
Bonterra Res BTR.v Jan'20 C$1.90 9-Dec-19 C$1.66 -12.6% TLS flip play, loss taken
McEwen Mining MUX Jan'20 U$1.12 2-Dec-19 U$1.18 5.4% TLS flip play, profit taken
Core Gold CGLD.v Jan'20 C$0.255 7-Apr-19 C$0.305 19.6% arb trade, profit taken
HudBay Min HBM Jan'20 U$3.56 9-Dec-19 U$3.36 -5.6% TLS flip play, loss taken
Midas Gold MAX.to Feb'20 C$0.71 5-Jan-20 C$0.57 -19.7% sm & silly trade
Warrior Gold WAR.v Feb'20 C$0.08 3-Aug-18 C$0.05 -31.3% clean out non-perf sm stocks
Contact Gold C.v Feb'20 C$0.40 19-Aug-18 C$0.18 -55.0% clean out non-perf sm stocks
Sandstorm Gold SAND Feb'20 U$3.73 17-Apr-16 U$7.21 93.3% Sold during port rebalance
NexGen Energy NXE Feb'20 U$1.20 2-Dec-19 U$1.06 -11.7% TLS flip play, loss taken
MAG Silver MAG Apr'20 U$8.95 1-Mar-20 U$10.07 12.5% Sold to cut silver exposure
Alexco Res AXU Apr'20 U$1.69 7-Sep-17 U$1.69 0.0% sold to close Ag exp. in FY20
Bonterra Res BTR.v Jun'20 C$1.62 2-Feb-20 C$1.10 -32.1% under-performer cash moved
Regulus Res REG.v Jun'20 C$0.64 6-Apr-15 C$0.79 23.4% moved $ TMQ/MIN & Au stocks
Great Panther GPR.to Aug'20 C$0.60 21-Jun-20 C$1.10 83.3% Profit taken, good trade
Jaguar Mining JAG.v Aug'20 C$0.42 21-Jun-20 C$0.65 54.8% Profit taken, good trade
Sandstorm Gold SAND Aug'20 U$7.76 10-May-20 U$9.37 20.7% Profit taken, good trade
Integra Resources ITR.v Aug'20 C$2.23 13-Aug-18 C$5.40 142.2% Profit taken, good trade
Wesdome Gold WDO.to Aug'20 C$2.37 14-Oct-17 C$14.82 525.3% last 1/2 of big win closed
INV Metals INV.to Sep'20 C$0.40 17-May-20 C$0.45 12.5% Cut all Ecuador exposure
Cartier Resources ECR.v Nov'20 C$0.155 3-Aug-18 C$0.25 67.7% Exact close price TBA
Tinka Res TK.v Dec'20 C$0.195 19-Apr-16 C$0.195 0.0% Closed on a round trip fail
2015 to 2019 annual closed positions in appendices below, 2009 to 2014 closed positions in editions IKN553 or earlier
34

Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2019
Closed in 2019 closed close price
Atico Mining ATY.v jan'19 C$0.55 24-Jul-16 C$0.32 41.8% patience ran out, made room
Candente Copper DNT.to jan'19 C$0.075 3-Ago-18 C$0.05 -33.3% tiny trade, made room for new
B2Gold BTO.to feb'19 C$2.11 12-Set-14 C$4.05 91.9% Took 1/2 profits, reduce size
Western Copper WRN.to mar'19 C$0.80 20-Ene-19 C$0.81 1.3% Spec trade that didn't work
B2Gold BTO.to mar'19 C$2.11 12-Set-14 C$4.15 96.7% Took rest of profit.
GT Gold GTT.v mar'19 C$1.17 10-Oct-18 C$0.90 -23.1% Took loss. Story changed
NovaGold NG apr'19 U$3.84 13-Ene-19 U$4.15 -8.1% Short that didn't work, sm loss
Zinc One Z.v jun'19 C$0.47 14-Set-17 C$0.025 -94.7% clearing out dead trade
Amarillo Gold AGC.v jun'19 C$0.24 22-Ago-18 C$0.20 -16.7% clearing out dead trade
New Gold NGD aug'19 U$1.44 31-Jul-19 U$1.23 14.6% ST short win thru Q2 earnings
IMPACT Silver IPT.v aug'19 C$0.39 21-Jul-19 C$0.46 18.0% took a quick profit
Fiore Gold F.v aug'19 C$0.34 26-May-19 C$0.56 64.7% Took profit, 2q19 avg
Chakana Copper PERU.v oct'19 C$0.84 22-Mar-18 C$0.16 -81.0% Exploreco trade fail. Want space
Wesdome Gold WDO.to oct'19 C$2.37 14-Oct-17 C$7.57 219.4% Sold half, profit taking
Superior Gold SGI.v oct'19 C$1.46 8-Abr-18 C$0.47 -67.8% Failed sm spec on Au. Moved on
Amerigo Res ARG.to nov'19 C$0.91 23-Set-18 C$0.50 -45.1% worst trade of year, hefty loss
Guyana Goldfields GUY.to dec'19 C$0.94 14-Abr-19 C$0.56 -40.4% taking the loss, financials weak
Tethyan Res TETH.v dec'19 C$0.30 8-Set-19 C$0.16 -46.7% tiny trade, word of probs in co
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2018
Closed in 2018 closed close price
Amarillo Gold AGC.v jan'18 C$0.38 24-Mar-17 C$0.31 -18.4% Cut away losing trade
Riverside Res RRI.v jan'18 C$0.39 27-Jun-16 C$0.31 -20.5% Cut away losing trade
Eros Res ERC.v jan'18 C$0.175 1-Mar-17 C$0.16 -8.6% CEO sudden exit, not good
Excellon Res EXN.to jan'18 C$1.54 9-Oct-16 C$1.66 7.8% 4q17 poor, one too many bad qtrs
Wesdome Gold WDO.to jan'18 C$1.68 15-Dec-17 C$2.06 22.6% Near-term trade block, took profit
Sabina G&S SBB.to apr'18 C$2.06 17-Dec-17 C$1.77 -14.1% Near-term trade, bad timing, small
B2Gold BTO.to May'18 C$2.11 12-Sep-14 C$3.67 73.9% sold 25% to reduce exposure
Lara Expl. LRA.v May'18 C$0.65 11-Feb-18 C$0.58 -13.8% Spec on Brazil didn't work
Solitario XPL June'18 U$0.72 19-Mar-17 U$0.41 -43.1% Failed trade, may return in 4q18
SolGold plc SOLG.to July'18 C$0.475 19-Nov-17 C$0.415 -12.6% cut, trade didn't perform
Pan American PAAS July'18 U$17.90 1-Jun-18 U$16.30 8.9% modest win on short position
NGEx Res NGQ.to Sep'18 C$1.01 22-Oct-17 C$1.00 -1.0% Closed to reduce Argentina exp
Sandstorm Gold SAND Oct'18 U$3.73 17-Apr-16 U$4.13 10.7% partial sale to raise cash for GTT
Aldebaran Res ALDE.v Nov'18 n/a n/a n/a n/a liquidate spin out of REG
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2017
Closed in 2017 closed close price
Continental Gold CNL.to Jan'17 C$2.68 22-May-16 C$4.17 55.6% trade closed, profit taken
Focus Ventures FCV.v Jan'17 C$0.23 1-Jul-12 C$0.05 -78.3% Give up, a disaster trade
Wesdome Gold WDO.to Feb'17 C$1.72 28-Aug-16 C$3.00 74.4% Target hit, sold, good trade
Belo Sun BSX.to Mar'17 C$0.90 30-Jan-17 C$0.90 0.0% failed near-term flip trade
Lara Expl. LRA.v Mar'17 C$1.15 8-Apr-12 C$1.05 -8.7% cut to make room for new trade
Rye Patch Gold RPM.v Apr'17 C$0.31 2-Sep-16 C$0.32 3.2% cut for doubts & new stock
Cordoba Min. CDB.v Jun'17 C$0.75 15-Sep-16 C$0.63 -16.0% closed
Constantine Metal CEM.v Aug'17 C$0.135 9-Apr-17 C$0.28 107.4% spec trade closed, good win
Red Eagle Min. R.to Sep'17 C$0.67 13-Dec-16 C$0.27 -59.7% IKN's biggest failure in years
Starcore Intl SAM.to Sep'17 C$0.61 10-Jan-15 C$0.31 -49.2% Patience ran out
B2Gold BTO.to Dec'17 C$2.11 12-Sep-14 C$3.39 60.7% sold small portion for liquidity
35

Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2016
Closed in 2016 closed close price
Phoscan Chem FOS.to jan16 C$0.28 29-mar-15 C$0.265 -5.4% Buyout trade, bot but poor deal
True Gold TGM.v jan16 C$0.18 23-ago-15 C$0.25 38.9% okay trade, sold on pol risk
McEwen Mining MUX jan16 U$1.09 25-ene-15 U$1.20 10.1% sold due to lack of value
Lake Shore Gold LSG.to feb-16 C$1.10 07-abr-15 C$1.69 53.6% bot out, sold early in process
Atacama Pacific ATM.v feb-16 C$0.19 26-abr-15 C$0.40 110.5% sold for a double on big pop
New Gold NGD feb-16 U$2.06 24-ene-16 U$2.96 43.7% closed good near-term trade
Sandspring Res SSP.v mar-16 C$0.195 18-oct-15 C$0.32 64.1% Hit tgt, took profit
Teranga Gold TGZ.to mar-16 C$0.54 15-feb-15 C$0.60 11.1% disappointing trade
B2Gold BTG mar-16 U$0.85 13-ene-16 U$1.30 52.9% Separate trade on B2, hit tgt
Dalradian Res DNA.to mar-16 C$0.67 27-oct-13 C$1.00 49.3% Hit target, sold, good win
HudBay Min. HBM may-16 U$4.10 03-abr-16 U$4.36 -6.3% Short trade, poor timing
Nevada Sunrise NEV.v may-16 C$0.185 28-feb-16 C$0.23 24.3% V. small, no big deal either way
Richmont RIC jun-16 U$7.60 01-may-16 U$9.30 22.4% near-term trade, profit taken
INV Metals INV.to jul-16 C$0.25 03-abr-16 C$0.95 280.0% Trade closed on time
HudBay Min. HBM aug16 U$4.98 09-jun-16 U$4.80 3.6% short trade covered, no big deal
Miranda Gold MAD.v oct-16 C$0.125 03-jul-16 C$0.10 -20.0% tiny spec trade, didn't work
Avino G & S ASM nov-16 U$2.00 21-oct-16 U$1.40 -30.0% Abandon trade on bad bot deal
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2015
Closed in 2015 closed close price
Argonaut Gold AR.to jan'15 C$1.47 14-dec-14 C$2.53 72.1% Big gain small time, profit taken
Amerigo Res ARG.to jan'15 C$0.405 20-jul-14 C$0.285 -29.6% Given up on weak Cu prices
Reservoir Min. RMC.v jan'15 C$6.05 18-jun-14 C$4.12 -31.9% sold on Cu downturn
Coro Mining COP.to jan'15 C$0.075 26-jan-14 C$0.035 -53.3% sm, sold on Cu downturn
Fortuna Silver FSM mar'15 U$4.12 10-nov-14 U$3.75 9.0% Short used as hedge
GoldQuest Min. GQC.v mar'15 C$0.26 27-oct-13 C$0.085 -67.3% given up ghost
Rio Alto Mining RIO.to apr'15 C$2.30 07-apr-11 C$3.57 55.2% Top pick, bot out, big win
Timmins Gold TGD jun'15 U$0.60 19-apr-15 U$0.62 3.3% near-term trade, out of time
First Majestic AG jul'15 U$10.51 10-aug-14 U$4.55 56.7% horrible failed trade
NovaCopper NCQ.to jul'15 C$1.05 09-apr-14 C$0.50 -52.4% no more Cu exposure, sm sell
McEwen Mining MUX aug'15 U$0.695 21-jul-15 U$0.92 32.4% Closed nearterm flip for win
Midas Gold MAX.to sep'15 C$0.39 21-sep-15 C$0.35 -10.3% Sm. trade idea that didn't work
New Gold NGD oct'15 U$2.18 23-aug-15 U$3.05 39.9% trade closed, profit taken
Legend Gold LGN.v nov'15 C$0.085 01-mar-15 C$0.035 -58.8% tiny "land grab" idea, failed
Timmins Gold TGD nov'15 U$0.245 20-sep-15 U$0.15 -38.8% small near-term loser
Please note that due to space considerations closed positions 2009 to 2014 are now
available on request, or were published in any edition to IKN553 (end 2019).
Important Disclosure
The information and opinions contained within this report reflect the personal views of the author and therefore all
material within should not be construed as accurate or reliable or be utilized as advice for investment or business
purposes. Independent due diligence and discussions with ones own investment and business advisor is strongly
recommended. Accordingly, nothing in this report should be construed as offering a guarantee of the accuracy or
completeness of the information contained herein, as an offer or solicitation with respect to the purchase or sale of any
security or as an endorsement of any product or service. All opinions and estimates included in this report are subject to
change without notice. It is prohibited to copy or redistribute this report to any type of third party without the express
permission of the author.
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