IKN #638Premium

The IKN Weekly
Week 638, August 15th 2021
Contents
This Week: In Today’s Edition, Gold moves back toward U$1,800/oz.
Fundamental Analysis: Argonaut Gold (AR.to) 2q21 financials.
Stocks to Follow: Rio2 Ltd (RIO.v), Amarillo Gold (AGC.v).
Copper Basket: Overview.
Producer Basket: Overview, Pretium Resources (PVG).
Tiny Dogs: Overview, Red Pine Exploration (RPX.v), Constantine Metal Resources (CEM.v).
Regional Politics: A briefer Peru this week, Nicaragua: The upcoming election and mining
political risk, “Guatemala is different”.
Market Watching: Tracking the Buy Peru call Alexco Resource Corp (AXU) 2q21 financials
Excelsior Mining Corp (MIN.to) 2q21 financials Harte Gold (HRT.to): An eye on the side bet,
Minera IRL (MIRL.cse): Why Diego Benavides must go, A brief opinion on New Gold (NGD).
I remind subscribers that no part of this newsletter can be copied, reproduced or
given to any third party without the express permission of the author.
This Week
“
In Today’s Edition
 Argonaut Gold (AR.to) is a raging, bang-the-table buy and it’s my job to convince you.
An excellent Q2, look no further for your small to midcap precious metals miner
 The latest corporate misdeeds at Minera IRL (MIRL.cse) allow an opportunity to rid
ourselves of its wastrel of a CEO.
 It’s still a market best held and dog days continue, but the house theory of a stable
dollar, a gold price sticking to U$1,800/oz and a rising copper price all fit the action we
saw last week. Gold’s rebound was uncannily well timed on the chart, in fact.
 Some weeks it’s left unused, this week it’s packed with a whole bunch of Market
Watching thoughts, over and above the sorry tale from MIRL.
Gold moves back toward U$1,800/oz
We open this week with a quote (1):
“The crash in gold was a little
overdone and we’re beginning to
see the reality that economic
stimulus in the U.S. and worldwide is
going to continue,” Jeffrey Sica, CEO
of Circle Squared Alternative
Investments.
That from this Reuters note last Friday
on the rebound in gold, spurred by a low
1

US Consumer Confidence reading. The Fear Trade is back because it never really went away
and MMT, dollar-centric jawbone now gives us the next of adjustment as the USD continues to
revolve around 92. Here’s a chart, the notes save space:
We also take an extra line to highlight the signal now coming from our GLD inventory/price
ratio chart. Here are both our usual suspects…
GLD gold holdings, 2018 to date (metric tonnes)
1400
1300
1200
1100
1000
900
800
700
600
500
…and I’m forced to be bullish about the double-dip rebound pattern, seen many times before at
turn points for the gold price. Ultimately, our chart above is not a great timing mechanism but
spots the change in trends well and the similarity to previous moments is now self-evident.
Fundamental Analysis of Mining Stocks
Argonaut Gold (AR.to) 2q21 financials
It’s always pleasant to report good earnings news for one of our covered stocks, no matter how
the wider market might have treated its share price in the last two weeks. Argonaut Gold
(AR.to) delivered an outstanding second quarter and guided to the satisfaction of all and
sundry, the sole negative the capex hike for Magino, which we’ll deal with below. Good news
tends to be easier to report so to keep things concise, here’s all the links relevant to today’s
note and Argonaut literature: The Earnings NR/Conference Call link is here (2), the financials
are here (3), the presentation accompanying the CC here (4), the useful Seeking Alpha
transcript of the CC is here (5) and here are the four reasons to like the quarter:
 Strong production and sales, healthy margins maintained despite predicted cost creep
 Guidance confirmed, with medium-term operational profitability a lock
 A renewed emphasis on the Magino build-out, with good progress reported
 A balance sheet that covers Magino capex with no further financings. Easily, too.
And the one reason to dislike the quarter:
 Confirmation Magino capex is up. We now add U$100m to our original ticket and
assume capex to production day one at Magino to be U$480m.
However the pros outweighed the contras in this quarter from Argonaut Gold, so before we go
any further the TL:DR is just buy the thing, it beats any other mid-cap precious metals
operator into a cocked hat at the moment and the market is missing the glaringly obvious. This
company is going to do a Wesdome, a reasonable and valid investment thesis is now “Buy AR
and go fishing”, its future price appreciation is that obvious. We begin.
Production results
A strong quarter. AR made play of its “Record Quarterly Production of 63,749 Gold Equivalent
Ounces”, the news making the title line of the NR. Due to its multiple mines, production
numbers, sales numbers, sales reconciliations, funky way of reporting silver sales and other
such niceties, AR isn’t a straightforward company to crunch and there are lots of way to cut and
slice the numbers. Not all of them are useful, so after due consideration this note will K.I.S.S.
2
81/1/1 81/3/1 81/5/1 81/7/1 81/9/1 81/11/1 91/1/1 91/3/1 91/5/1 91/7/1 91/9/1 91/11/1 02/1/1 02/3/1 02/5/1 02/7/1 02/9/1 02/11/1 12/1/1 12/3/1 12/5/1 12/7/1
mt 7.40 GLD: Inventory/Price Ratio, 2018 to date
7.20
7.00
6.80
6.60
6.40
6.20
6.00
5.80
source: SPDR GLD data 5.60
2/1/8102 11/2/8102 32/3/8102 2/5/8102 11/6/8102 12/7/8102 03/8/8102 9/01/8102 81/11/8102 82/21/8102 6/2/9102 81/3/9102 72/4/9102 6/6/9102 61/7/9102 52/8/9102 4/01/9102 31/11/9102 32/21/9102 1/2/0202 21/3/0202 12/4/0202 13/5/0202 01/7/0202 91/8/0202 82/9/0202 7/11/0202 71/21/0202 62/1/1202 7/3/1202 61/4/1202 62/5/1202 5/7/1202
Source: SPDR data, IKN calcs

and focus on the number of Gold Equivalent Ounces (GEOs) sold by the company (rather than
produced) and here’s the overview chart, sticking to the last eight quarters:
AR.to: GEO sales breakdown, per qtr
70000
65000
60000
55000
50000
45000
40000
35000
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
3q19 4q19 1q20 2q20 3q20 4q20 1q21 2q21
source: company filings
3
zo
OEG
Florida Canyon
La Colorada
San Augustin
El Castillo
My RH column reconciles to within 224oz of the 65,650 GEO sold according to AR.to filings,
which is plenty close enough. Here below are the same data, split into their component mines
for ease of consideration. Please note I have chosen to separate the El Castillo and San
Augustin data even though these days it’s basically the same asset.
AR.to: El Castillo GEO sales, per qtr
While on the subject, let’s cover one of the annoying aspects of AR.to and the way it uses the
US Sec guidelines for its gold/silver ratio “…based on the three-year trailing average silver to
gold ratio.” Over the years AR has used
artificially high ratios to make its Gold
Equivalent Ounces (GEO) number look good,
something we’ve made mention of before, but
these days the AR use of an artificially high
gold/silver ratio may be annoying but it’s not
particularly material. For example, changing
the AR.to 85/1 ratio to a more realistic 75/1
would bring down total GEOs sales by around
120oz AuEq, or perhaps U$220,000 in
imaginary top line revenues. As this company
55951 23141 62631 80011 8139 3689 20631 41621
17500
15000
12500
10000 7500 5000
2500
0
3q19 4q19 1q20 2q20 3q20 4q20 1q21 2q21
source: company filings
zo OEG
AR.to: San Augustin GEO sales, per qtr
77941 92712 52541 18151 19151 94371 28181 43502
25000
22500
20000
17500
15000 12500 10000 7500
5000
2500
0
3q19 4q19 1q20 2q20 3q20 4q20 1q21 2q21
source: company filings
zo OEG
AR.to: La Colorada GEO sales, per qtr
43241 20721 95731
2677
28701 83541 35141 42381
20000
17500
15000
12500
10000 7500
5000
2500
0
3q19 4q19 1q20 2q20 3q20 4q20 1q21 2q21
source: company filings
zo
OEG
AR.to: Florida Canyon GEO sales, per qtr
8799 05511 03921 45931
15000
12500
10000
7500 5000
2500
0
3q19 4q19 1q20 2q20 3q20 4q20 1q21 2q21
source: company filings
zo
OEG
AR.to: Quarterly Revenues
5.44 5.24
7.82
4.93 9.25 2.05 3.14 6.15
9.37
0.65
8.66 1.27 6.66
0.85
4.49
8.001 3.501
2.021
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
71q1 71q2 71q3 71q4 81q1 81q2 81q3 81q4 91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2
$m
source: company filings

is now moving U$120m of metal per quarter that’s a rounding error as far as third-party
financial analysis goes.
With the precious metal sold, we move to the financials and the evolution of quarterly
revenues. Record production plus sustained gold prices gives a record top line of U$120.2m
(above). Profitable operations too, as seen in the main overview chart:
$m AR.to: Operations overview
130
120 revenues
110 prod costs
100 dd&a/inventory adjust
90 gross profit
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
-10
-20
1q19 2q19 3q19 4q19 1q20 2q20 3q20 4q20 1q21 2q21
Source: company filings
There are several alternative metrics to gauge AR operational profits, such as cash flow from
operations (excl working capital) of U$39.3m, or the GAAP compliant gross profit (above) of
U$39.84m, as seen above. But thanks to the clean nature of the financials they indicate the
same thing, a company now producing profitably at its operations and, with gold sticking
around U$1,800/oz, able to report operational margins of around U$30m per quarter while
Magino is built out to 2023.
AR.to: Op. Earnings
4
6.7 7.5
7.01
1.02-
6.9
2.6
9.82 0.82
5.22
1.63
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
-15
-20
-25
91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2
source: company filings
srallod
fo
snoillim
The AR operating earnings of U$36.1m represents 11.6c per share. This makes AR cheap even
if you forget all about Magino (!!) and once again, your author is reminded of the early stages
of the WDO move, when Eagle UG started to deliver enough cash flow to justify the equity price
without a thought of Kiena. At U$0.116 and this weekend’s CAD$2.83 share price, that’s a 5X
operating earnings per share when peers are trading at 8X and 10X. After that, you add
Magino! We can also expect the operating earnings to continue, as AR confirmed guidance for
the year. Costs are clearly trending somewhat higher, but there’s more than enough margin to
see this company cover most of its capex activities from cash flow.

Equally AR is not hanging around on its investment plans, with $12m sunk into Florida Canyon
this quarter and $8m of those showing as fixed assets. This overview chart of mining property
asset values again underscores the diminishing importance of El Castillo, La Colorada and the
whole Mexico arm to the company:
AR.to: Mine Prop asset value
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
5
71q4 81q1 81q2 81q3 81q4 91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2
U$m
El Castillo La Colorada Florida Canyon
Magino San Antonio Other
source: company filings, IKN ests
However, the future of AR.to and reason to own Argonaut Gold shares today is Magino, now is
the period before the market wakes up to the value being created and for that, we now spend
most of the rest of our note on the subject. We begin with the negative from last week,
conformation in company literature and the Conference Call that Magino’s capex estimate is up.
We’re now being guided toward C$600m as the total ticket and while CEO Dougherty and his
team were naturally cautious about putting a hard number on the new projected total, it’s now
there on the horizon, but “general cost creep” and inflation is the driver and AR at Magino is not
immune to the wave of price increases we all know about. Here are three quotes from the CC:
“Now to Magino, our initial capital outlay was projected to be between
CAD$480 million and CAD$500 million. We anticipate that we felt this could be
in jeopardy this year due to impacts of COVID foreign currency exchange
rates, contingencies and potential adjustments to the development plans and
cost inflations that have hit us just like everybody else in this sector.”
“We now believe we are likely to exceed the 15% overage that we disclosed
during our Q1 press release on May 4.”
“..knowing what others are experiencing in their build costs right now, I
believe our 15% overrun is in jeopardy…”
That’s not a difficult guidance to understand and slating Magino at C$600m is now the sensible
option. It so happens this weekend, real world forex coincides with the IKN house assumption
of USD0.8/CAD1 which brings our revised assumption on the Magino build-out to U$480m. With
that in mind, here’s how much is already sunk into Magino:
AR.to: Magino min prop value
360.852 80.252 656.742 296.252 21.142 822.742 86.352 441.252 796.952 753.142 83.452 998.262 730.003
841.643 885.914 064 505
550
500
450
400
350
300
250
200 150
100
50
0
71q4 81q1 81q2 81q3 81q4 91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2 tse12q3 tse12q4
U$m
source: company filings, IKN ests
Taking 3q20 as our baseline, AR has already invested U$157m capex in Magino and following
the rise in mining property value is the easy hack on following execution: With guidance in
mind, we now assume AR has around U$240m of its total Magino spend embedded into the
project, which puts a different light on the near-confirmed cost overruns. In so many words,

come end 2021 AR will have 50% of Magino bought and paid-for, leaving an approximate
U$240m to cover before the mine begins production in 2023.
Now for more good news and importantly, it’s now a virtual certainty that Magino gets built
with organically, no further financings or dilutions required. Indeed, AR.to is still on course to
“Do a Wesdome”, as we entitled one segment of our note that opened coverage on the
company in IKN631, dated June 27th. With capex now adjusted closer to reality for the next two
years, the simple terms AR has U$240m to find in order to build out Magino organically without
requiring further funding. Overall the asset sheet is developing well:
AR.to: Assets
1300
1200
1100
1000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
6
31q4 41q1 41q2 41q3 41q4 51q1 51q2 51q3 51q4 61q1 61q2 61q3 61q4 71q1 71q2 71q3 71q4 81q1 81q2 81q3 81q4 91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2
fixed
$m other current
cash
source: company filings
What matters is liquidity. As at end 2q21, working cap stands at U$226.17m, with U$219m of
that in cash ready for deployment (and while here, anyone worried about the way cash and
working cap dropped in the quarter needs their head examined; we need to be worried if AR
doesn’t spend that cash, not the other way around).
AR.to: Working cap breakdown
300
280
260
240
220
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
81q1 81q2 81q3 81q4 91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2
$m
other working cap
cash
source: company filings
The simple math: AR will make $30m per quarter for the next eight quarters, money it can
spend on its Magino build out. It also has U$220m in cash on hand. It needs to cover around
$300m. It’s doing a Wesdome, all right.
As for a valuation to this development we remind readers, a comparative and reasonable target
valuation for Magino isn’t difficult to imagine, with the Alamos Gold (AGI) Island Gold mine
quite literally next door. Now in mature production phase, but also promising better to come
from recently discovered high grade mineralization at depth, Island has an asset value of over
U$1Bn and is carried at over U$730m (once corp segments its liabilities book). At Magino, AR is
building a similar mine on a similar deposit with similar exploration potential.
But that’s not all, as calling AR to “do a Wesdome” also means the company becomes more
highly valued. Things have improved over the last year and today, AR already trades above
1.0X PE, with 1.25X seemingly the new value assigned to share by the market. This provides
the second part of the expected leverage growth of the AR share price, as along with organic

fixed asset value growth as Magino is built out, the company should also benefit in the re-rating
from its new circumstance:
 Before: Mexico-based, maturing assets, permitting issues in BCS
 After: North America focus, new long-life flagship asset, political risk improvement
However, a chart from the WDO suite says it best, its price/book ratio 2015 to 2020:
Wesdome Gold (WDO.to): Price/Book ratio, 2015 to 2020
8.0
7.0
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
7
51q1 51q2 51q3 51q4 61q1 61q2 61q3 61q4 71q1 71q2 71q3 71q4 81q1 81q2 81q3 81q4 91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4
source: WDO, TSX
This is what can happen to AR. We can argue that WDO sprang from a baseline of perhaps 2X
Price/Book, thanks to its generally better quality assets before Kiena came along, whereas the
starting point of AR is lower and its upside potential accordingly reduced a little. However it’s
splitting hairs and just getting AR.to a very-reachable 2.5X implies a double on its asset value
even while it expands its balance sheet. The multiplier effect of better P/Bv and larger company
is the type that propels equity prices much higher.
AR’s progress reminds this desk of Wesdome Gold (WDO.to), the transformation we’re
beginning to see in AR is set to match the way WDO has been re-rated on multiple occasions.
Incremental growth and improvement at its operating assets, then slowly but surely the market
will wake up to what Magino will do to the company in the same way Kiena transformed WDO.
A confident statement perhaps, but backed up by the way AR is approaching its balance sheet
improvement and asset development in uncannily similar ways.
The bottom line: As well as a sparkling quarter of production, AR guided positively and its
Magino build-out has got off to a quick start. With the set-up now uncannily similar to the one
that provided this desk with a substantial win at Wesdome a few years ago, we underscore our
bullish position on AR after an excellent set of financials. Own some, it’s going higher.
Stocks to Follow
Worse if not for Friday. It was still another drudgefest of a week, mind you, and Jackson Hole
cannot come soon enough as just two of our 17 open positions managed to register a week-
over-week win (QCCU.v, ECR.v) while two others were unchanged (CMMC.to, SMD.v). This
leaves a full 13 losers but a measure of the apathy is how even they couldn’t muster a big seller
between them, no stock broke 10% to the downside on the week.
We remain at 17 open positions and two over our self-imposed limit until next month, when
things will change. Just five open positions in the green, that is not good.

company Ticker this week Avg Price Reco date Current PPS Gain/Loss% Notes
TOP PICKS
Minera Alamos MAI.v STR BUY C$0.21 13-Oct-19 C$0.57 171.4% $1.14 tgt Aug'20, #1 idea
Rio2 Ltd. RIO.v STR BUY C$0.83 22-Apr-18 C$0.62 -25.3% $1.30 tgt on capex raise, Jul21
Recommended stocks (In order of preference)
Copper Mountain CMMC.to STR BUY C$3.51 18-Jun-21 C$3.52 0.3% reaffirmed buy on strong Q2
Argonaut Gold AR.to STR BUY C$2.92 25-Jun-21 C$2.83 -3.1% All right signs, avging up
Trilogy Metals TMQ BUY U$1.84 15-Sep-19 U$2.01 9.2% Cu for 2021, going well
Amarillo Gold AGC.v BUY C$0.31 30-May-21 C$0.28 -9.7% add at 30c/32c, capex NR soon
Strategic Metals SMD.v hold C$0.42 31-Jan-21 C$0.32 -23.8% Canadian land bet/Value trap?
Excelsior Mining MIN.to STR BUY C$0.93 10-Mar-19 C$0.58 -37.6% Delayed, but still great value
Aldebaran Res. ALDE.v STR BUY C$0.68 16-May-21 C$0.58 14.7% Bet on big copper, pol risk ok
QC Copper &Gold QCCU.v BUY C$0.205 25-Apr-21 C$0.18 -12.2% Cu Jr, fast-tracking resource
Royal Road Min. RYR.v BUY C$0.155 17-Mar-19 0.275 77.4% Model paying off in Nica
Wolfden Res. WLF.v spec buy C$0.30 11-Apr-21 C$0.22 -26.7% Zn trade needs to move soon
Great Bear Res GBR.v BUY C$15.83 26-Aug-20 C$14.00 -11.6% Binary M&A trade, wait for print
Cartier Resources ECR.v hold/sell? C$0.32 21-Mar-21 C$0.25 -21.9% Thinking of selling
Aurelius Min. AUL.v hold/sell? C$0.75 28-Jun-20 C$0.35 -53.3% has until its 43-101 to improve
Minera IRL MIRL.cse hold C$0.195 22-Jul-12 C$0.08 -59.0% CEO change will move stock
Long-term non-mining hold
Mene Inc. MENE.v LT Hold C$0.68 6-Dec-20 C$0.78 14.7% LT bet, added again July'21
Closed in 2021 closed close price
Fiore Gold F.v jan'21 C$0.98 21-May-20 C$1.17 19.4% closed as part of rebalance
Norsemont Mining NOM.cse feb'21 C$1.55 6-Sep-20 C$0.70 -54.8% Cut loser to reduce Au exp.
Element 29 Res ECU.v feb'21 C$0.49 7-Feb-21 C$0.54 10.2% Cut Peru exposure
Kuya Silver KUYA.cse feb'21 C$1.66 8-Nov-20 C$2.51 51.2% Cut Peru exposure
Pucara Gold TORO.v apr'21 C$0.65 4-Oct-20 C$0.26 -60.0% Cut loser, Peru risk call
Copper Mountain CMMC.to apr'21 C$1.40 22-Nov-20 C$4.18 198.6% tgt hit, profit taken
New Gold NGD may'21 U$0.76 9-Feb-20 U$2.14 181.6% Sold to buy AGC, nice win
Orezone Gold ORE.v jun'21 C$0.79 21-Jun-20 C$1.61 103.8% sold on pop, leaky boat
2015 to 2020 annual closed positions in appendices below, 2009 to 2014 closed positions in editions IKN553 or earlier
Now for notes on just one or two of our covered stocks. Newsflow will improve with
momentum, as it always does:
Rio2 Ltd (RIO.v): We understand there’s a NR out of RIO.to this coming week on a minor
matter, however announcement of successful
closing of its financing (6) is the news that counts.
Both this desk and others (mailbag always
welcome) have noticed the RIO.v share price
didn’t spring back post-financing:
Market timing and circumstances haven’t helped
the share price, there’s slack to be taken up.
However, it’s hardly an existential crisis for the
company now it is fully financed to production (on
good terms for shareholders) and it’s August
2021. I’ve booked time with a busy CEO Alex
Black some time in the next few days, once that
happens you will have more information.
8

Amarillo Gold (AGC.v): I’m a little concerned about the way AGC is now trading, as according
to the company’s own timeline we’re closing in on the financing window (to end October) and
share price weakness implies a more dilutive deal. But only a little, as on the other hand it’s still
August and light volume can explain this temporary dip under 30c. To misquote Green Day,
wake me up when September starts.
The Copper Basket
After thirty-two weeks of 2021, The Copper Basket shows a gain of 29.19% to level stakes.
company ticker price 1/1/21 Shares out Market Cap current pps gain/loss%
1 Solaris Res SLS.to 6.08 107.53 1439.83 13.39 120.2%
2 Copper Mtn CMMC.to 1.81 207.5 730.40 3.52 94.5%
3 Oroco Res OCO.v 1.85 186.96 529.10 2.83 53.0%
4 Marimaca Cop MARI.to 3.25 87.737 350.95 4.00 23.1%
5 Western Copper WRN.to 1.57 135.798 296.04 2.18 38.9%
6 Amerigo Res ARG.to 0.80 181.79 238.14 1.31 63.8%
7 Excelsior Min. MIN.to 1.12 273.585 158.68 0.58 -48.2%
8 Regulus Res. REG.v 1.07 101.85 80.46 0.79 -26.2%
9 Aldebaran Res. ALDE.v 0.455 125.24 72.64 0.58 27.5%
10 C3 Metals CCCM.v 0.115 438.56 70.17 0.16 39.1%
11 Doré Copper DCMC.v 1.00 53.304 45.31 0.85 -15.0%
12 Chakana Cop PERU.v 0.60 111.41 38.44 0.345 -42.5%
13 Element 29 Res ECU.v 0.45 68.281 38.24 0.56 24.4%
14 US Copper USCU.v 0.105 87.53 13.13 0.15 42.9%
15 Chibougamau CBG.v 0.165 53.077 12.47 0.235 42.4%
NB: All stocks in CAD$ Portfolio avg 29.19%
Down almost a percentage point, The Copper Basket was a mixed bunch last week but mostly
on light volumes as The Doldrums continue
70% The Copper Basket 2021, weekly evolution
to dominate (the lack of) sentiment. On the
60%
week there were six winners (OCO.v,
MARI.to, ARG.to, REG.v, DCMC.v, ECU.v), 50%
two unchanged stocks (CMMC.to, USCU.v) 40%
and seven losers (SLS.to, MIN.to, WRN.to, 30%
PERU.v, CCCM.v, ALDE.v, CBG.v), with the
20%
one double figure percentage winner (ECU.v
10%
up 16.7%) and one double figure percentage
0%
loser (PERU.v down 13.8%). Overall, another
week to forget.
Copper the metal traded lightly and to the
upside, even the Chinese stepping away from
the market a while and the world discounting
the likely non-effects of any industrial action in
Chile. There may still be some disruptions at
other mines, but Thursday’s announcement
BHP management had largely given in to
union demands and a deal reached at La
Escondida means there’s no further weighting
on copper prices.
Though the September contract remains the
near-dated, we’ve moved our focus to the
9
ts1
naJ
t01naJ ht71 ht42 ts13 ht7bef ht41 ts12 ht82 ht7ram ht41 ts12 ht82 ht4rpa ht11 ht81 ht52 n2yam ht9 ht61 dr32 ht03 ht6nuj ht31 ht02 ht72 ht4luj ht11 ht81 ht52 ts1gua ht8 ht51
source: IKN calcs

Dec’21 contract HGZ21 to close out the year, as open interest has now rolled over. For our
curated market comment this weekend, we stay with China and metals, but not with copper
(7):
SHANGHAI, Aug 13 (Reuters) - China announced scores of new carbon-intensive coal
and steel projects in the first half of 2021, research showed on Friday just days after a
key U.N. report urged immediate global action to curb use of fossil fuels and prevent
runaway climate change.
Last week, we noted that China has quietly reversed its environmental policies on scrap copper
imports, here we see them choosing growth over green. I doubt these new directions will cause
much surprise among readers of The IKN Weekly, but the implications for copper demand are
also reasonably obvious. Now our regular weekly segment on world copper inventories, data
supplied by Chile’s Cochilco:
 World aggregate copper stocks dropped by 5,781mt (-1.5%) on the week, with only
one exchange showing a move of note. Friday evening’s count came to 370,673mt, still
tight on a historic basis and particularly so for the season.
 Stock at the SHFE made the only big move, losing 6,454mt to drop to new low of
93,032mt. If China is serious about wanting to jawbone copper lower, it will surely have
to add stock here soon. If not, warehouses may literally run out of physical stock by
end December.
 The LME has another quiet week, adding just 400mt to stocks. The total is now
235,650mt.
 Same story at Comex, a second week of very light movements and 273mt of stock
added, this weekend’s total 41,991mt.
Here’s the Shanghai-only inventories chart:
Shanghai Futures Exchange Warehouse Stocks, 2014 to date
400000
350000
300000
250000
200000
150000
100000
50000
0
10
31'13ceD ht9 ht81 ht72 ht5tco ht41 dn22 5102
dr3yam
ht21 ht02 ht92 ht7bef ht71 ht62 ht4peS ht31 ht92 ht9 ht81 ht72 7102
ht5von
ht41 ht52 ht01 ht91 ht82 9102
ht6naJ
ht71 ht62 ht4gua ht31 dn22 0202ts1ram ht01 ht91 ht72 0202ht6ced ht41 ht52 1202ht4luj
Mt Cu
|
source: Cochilco
A thought experiment question: What happens when this line goes under 50kmt? My best
answer, it would indicate a de facto “no stock left” for the SHFE. It’s also in the cards if China’s
end users show their normal Q3 and Q4 demand for copper.
No company notes this weekend. We could point to Solaris having lost 6.0%, unusual in its
normal upward climb, but the calm nature of trading and uniform reactions of most stocks are
the main story.
The Producer Basket
After thirty-two weeks of 2021, the Producer Basket shows a loss of 12.83% to level stakes.

company ticker price 1/1/20 Shares out Mkt Cap (U$Bn) current pps gain/loss%
1 Newmont NEM 59.89 805 47.37 58.84 -1.8%
2 Barrick GOLD 22.78 1778.04 36.04 20.27 -11.0%
3 Agnico Eagle AEM 70.51 244.187 14.44 59.14 -16.1%
4 Kirkland Lake KL 41.27 267.056 10.82 40.51 -1.8%
5 Kinross Gold KGC 7.34 1261.07 7.67 6.08 -17.2%
6 Endeavour Min EDV.to 29.62 252.568 6.17 29.32 -1.0%
7 Pan American PAAS 34.71 210.262 5.57 26.51 -23.6%
8 B2Gold BTG 5.60 1051.697 4.12 3.92 -30.0%
9 Alamos Gold AGI 8.75 392.739 3.04 7.74 -11.5%
10 Pretium Res PVG 11.48 187.833 1.85 9.85 -14.2%
Prices in U$ except EDV.to (share price in CAD$ and mkt cap in approx USD) Port. avg -12.83%
Our basket average dropped by less than a tenth, a better performance than our GDX
benchmark for luck, rather than judgment, as we have Pretium (PVG up 9.4%) and the two
other winners on the week (BTG, AGI) at level weights despite their smaller market caps.
The 2021 Producer Basket: Percentage difference between
GDX benchmark and basket (negative = IKN basket ahead) 8.0%
7.0%
6.0%
5.0%
4.0%
3.0%
2.0%
1.0%
0.0%
There’s still a gap to cover, but it’s down to less than 4%. In other news, our seven losers on
the week dropped and rose on the same tide, one look at this chart saves extra script:
That’s the hack on GDX/J (over?)reacting to recent macro events, gold not so much.
Pretium Resources (PVG): The reason to include PVG in this year’s Producer Basket revolved
around its potential as an M&A target. Those
improved markedly last week with the company’s
2q21 financial results (NR here (8) which did this
to the stock:
This is a widely covered stock and you don’t
really need my two cents on the details, but it
was beat on all metrics, PVG rose 16.6% on the
11
ts1
naJ
t01naJ ht71 ht42 ts13 ht7bef ht41 ts12 ht82 ht7ram ht41 ts12 ht82 ht4rpa ht11 ht81 ht52 n2yam ht9 ht61 dr32 ht03 ht6nuj ht31 ht02 ht72 ht4luj ht11 ht81 ht52 ts1gua ht8 ht51
The 2021 Producer Basket: Weekly performance and 20%
comparative to GDX control
15%
10%
5%
0%
-5%
-10%
-15%
-20%
source: IKN calcs, NYSE/Nasdaq/TSX data
ts1
naJ
t01naJ ht71 ht42 ts13 ht7bef ht41 ts12 ht82 ht7ram ht41 ts12 ht82 ht4rpa ht11 ht81 ht52 n2yam ht9 ht61 dr32 ht03 ht6nuj ht31 ht02 ht72 ht4luj ht11 ht81 ht52 ts1gua ht8 ht51
basket
gdx control
source: Google, IKN Calcs

day and was up 9.4% on the week. Friday’s ultra-high volume seals the deal, the 6.2m on the
official boards beaten only twice in the last two years. The company delivered on its metrics
and made special point of telling Mr Market how its balance sheet had improved. All good things
but the reason for PVG’s big reversal of fortunes is the new air of stability around guidance; no
matter that the mine is a different beast than the one advertised when raising the capital, this
mine has now settled into a more predictable and highly profitable rhythm of its own. With
jurisdiction advantages and the type of grade that
will always be able to absorb costs spikes and
remain profitable. Indeed a case in point, this very
quarter and the PVG reported AISC of U$1,099/oz.
That’s U$188 higher than the equivalent quarter of
2020 but the market took it in its stride. Margin is
what matters here.
If you were to ask me if PVG is now in play my
answer would be “yes”. However, no personal
position and no plans to change that for the
moment, which should also give you an idea of
the personal conviction level. If M&A becomes
obvious in the near future, that might change. Bottom line: A great quarter from PVG and with
regularity now becoming an attribute, consider this doubter won over.
The Tiny Dogs
After thirty-two weeks of 2021, the Tiny Dogs show a gain of 4.87% to level stakes.
company ticker price 1/1/21 Shares out Mkt Cap current pps gain/loss%
Antler Gold ANTL.v 0.205 61.348 5.83 0.095 -53.7%
Aston Bay BAY.v 0.045 163.975 7.38 0.045 0.0%
Constantine Met CEM.v 0.17 45.4 24.97 0.55 223.5%
Contact Gold C.v 0.115 240.757 18.06 0.075 -34.8%
Golden Pursuit GDP.v 0.22 40 5.20 0.13 -40.9%
Manitou Gold MTU.v 0.045 230.79 16.16 0.07 55.6%
Precipitate Gold PRG.v 0.240 106.241 9.03 0.085 -64.6%
QC Copper QCCU.v 0.315 105 18.90 0.18 -42.9%
Red Pine Expl RPX.v 0.400 95.806 45.03 0.47 17.5%
Warrior Gold WAR.v 0.090 91.818 7.35 0.08 -11.1%
Prices in CAD$, data from TSXV basket avg 4.87%
This section attempts to track the tinycap mining sub-sector of the market, our ten companies
chosen under the following criteria to put together a list representing the state of play in the
sub-sector of tinycap exploration company stocks. At least, that’s the plan.
 Market capitalization of under $20m. They have to be tiny. In two cases I’ve stretched the window a
little and allowed sub-U$20m market capper in that are just over the C$20m level, but the spirit is unaltered.
 A “non broken” stock price and project story. There are literally hundreds of tinycap juniors of the right
size, but it was a particularly depressing exercise to trawl through the whole of the TSXV and find companies
that are small enough, but with life in them. The vast majority of sub-$20m stocks are broken stocks, either
traded to death on the exchange or with projects that are a bust or with entrenched management more
interested in their monthly paycheck than anything else.
 Likelihood of meaningful newsflow in 2020. This connects to the company’s “unbroken” status, as we
want news and potential catalysts from companies with projects that can work.
 Decent management if possible. When you are down among the little guys it doesn’t pay to be too
choosy, but still I preferred companies that have teams or people with good peer reputations.
There were three losers (C.v, GDP.v, PRG.v), four UNCH stocks (ANTL.v, BAY.v, MTU.v, WAR.v)
and three winners (CEM.v, QCCU.v, RPX.v) in a largely quiet week, but we still got the basket
average moving up over 7% and back into the green. That’s all thanks to the concerted move
12

in Constantine (CEM.v up 34.2%) which continued into the last week, see below for more.
20% Tiny Dogs, 2021 weekly tracker
16%
12%
8%
4%
0%
-4%
-8%
-12%
13
ts1
naJ
t01naJ ht71 ht42 ts13 ht7bef ht41 ts12 ht82 ht7ram ht41 ts12 ht82 ht4rpa ht11 ht81 ht52 n2yam ht9 ht61 dr32 ht03 ht6nuj ht31 ht02 ht72 ht4luj ht11 ht81 ht52 ts1gua ht8 ht51
source: IKN calcs, TSX data
Red Pine Exploration (RPX.v): RPX won’t make the Tiny Dogs list next year, its re-
capitalized corporate structure making the market cap too big for the purposes of this segment,
so let’s comment while there’s still time. The objective of the corporate re-working was both to
consolidate and capitalize, then put together a more substantial drill program on the now 100%
owned Wawa project, with an emphasis on and around the Surluga target, and put years of
theorizing on what lays below to the test.
These early results from the Jubilee Shear Zone justify the program, and the price rise last
week was fully deserved. While the depth of the hole intersects may not appeal to some, we
should recall these results are down-plunge from an old mine with a substantial network of
underground workings and access to the mineralization is certainly feasible, as long as grades
and widths make it economic.
These results must have greatly pleased the RPX team, along with the announcement of a new
discovery zone on its large Wawa land package. The concern is the market’s apathetic reaction,
the rebound turning into a liquidity event for sellers. Your visual evidence is this ten-day chart
of RPX next to GDXJ.

Constantine Metal Resources (CEM.v): We may not have caught it or timed it, but The IKN
Weekly flagged the move:
Any criticism about not recommending CEM is also fair, however. The drive behind this new
interest is new large owner Michael Gentile CFA, who explains his rationale in this NR (9) and
with the man putting his money where his mouth is, it’s only fair to hear him out:
"I'm very pleased to make this strategic investment in Constantine, a story in my
opinion that is dramatically undervalued at its current market capitalization pre-
financing of $21 million. Constantine currently has a 46.7% working interest in the
advanced PEA-stage Palmer asset in Alaska, with a US$500 million NPV at current
spot prices, and a strong and motivated joint venture partner in Dowa Metals & Mining
Co., Ltd. This copper/zinc/silver VMS system has significant regional and near mine
exploration potential that in conjunction with plans to advance the current resources to
feasibility has the potential to dramatically expand the economic opportunity for
shareholders over time. Constantine has demonstrated the ability to identify and create
significant shareholder value through discovery and the spinout of high quality assets
into HighGold Mining Inc. With the recent acquisition of the Bouse copper-gold project
in Arizona and the potential acquisition of new assets, Constantine offers shareholders
a significant upside over the short and long term."
This new strategic investor now holds 11.5% of shares out and 19.4% fully diluted if he cashed
in his warrants, he also brings a welcome breath of fresh air around a stale story backed up by
real money (instead of, let’s say for example, newsletter waffle). We also agree with his point
of view on CEM, ultimately this trade is the same type of “North America exploreco land asset”
trade that sees this desk long Strategic Metals (SMD.v). Bottom line: I’ve seen far worse
strategic purchases than this one, wishing Mr. Gentile fortune on his trade, but personally not
going to chase it up at this point.
NB: Please be clear that The Tiny Dogs is NOT a list of recommended tinycap stocks. It is a list of companies with
market caps of under $20m offering a reasonable representation of the wider tinycaps market. It is possible that in the
future I may buy shares in one or several of these stocks, but at the moment both my opinion and my wallet are strictly
neutral.
Regional politics
A briefer Peru this week
A little respite in the madness and I don’t have to spend as much time on Peru macro politics in
this edition, but there are a few outstanding issues and new developments. First, Central Bank
head Julio Velarde has once again proven himself to be politically more adept than anyone in
Peru’s corridors of power. In the course of two meetings and one small public coment, he
managed to convince the President he was staying while laying down a list of requirements to
his new FinMin, Pedro Francke, in order that he stay. However, the main news is that we now
have a date for the exit of Guido Bellido as Prime Minister; that’s August 26th, when he appears
before Congress to seek Cabinet ratification. He’s not going to get it, and while nothing may be
certain in this insane year of Peruvian politics, its a call this desk makes with great confidence.
All you need to do is take the pulse of the political parties with Congressional representation
14

and then do sums, there is no way this PCM gets to 66 votes and the simple majority he
requires to keep his job. At that point, he hands in his resignation as do all ministers in the
cabinet (protocol) and as outlined previously, it’s then and only then we find out which route
Peru takes to is inevitably calmer future:
The easy way: President Castillo picks a more moderate cabinet, which doesn’t have to be to
the complete taste of Congress but would be enough to receive the so-called “Vote of
Confidence”. That new PCM and/or cabinet would likely be centre-left in political stance, not
to the complete taste of the right wing or business groups but there would be enough
consensus for peace to break out.
The hard way: President Castillo insists on a hard line, left-wing PM and cabinet of Ministers.
It’s at that point Congress and Presidential Palace go on a collision course and, inevitably,
Pedro Castillo will be “vacated” from his position in the same way Martin Vizcarra was ejected
last year. This will mean conflict, with the likelihood of strike actions and social protest, mostly
in the provincial interior and under the banner of a “Right Wing Coup D’Etat”. However, at
some point the country will realize the winner of 19% of the popular vote on a Communist left
wing political ticket does not have a mandate.
Clearly, the second route will be longer and rockier for Peru, but it’s difficult to see beyond the
clear sequence of events now lining up: In August 26th, Congress will vote a hard left cabinet
down and ask its President to choose more wisely. Those things are easy to call, it’s at that
point we find out whether Castillo is smart enough to compromise because if not, he’s out.
Nicaragua: The upcoming election and mining political risk
At some point, non-mining political issues begin to affect mining. At the bottom of this report
(10) on how Nicaragua’s only real opposition newspaper, La Prensa, was raided last week and
its problems in going to print, the reporter added a matter-of-fact resume of the build-up so far
to the country’s elections in November:
Nicaragua is scheduled to hold national elections on 7 November as Ortega seeks a
fourth consecutive term. He placed an opposition vice-presidential candidate under
house arrest last week, then released her pending the outcome of an investigation.
Over the past two months, Ortega’s government has arrested nearly three dozen
opposition figures, including seven potential challengers for the presidency.
The opposition alliance, the National Coalition, said in a statement on Monday that it
did not recognise the current electoral process as a way out of Nicaragua’s political
crisis and urged Nicaraguans to not recognise it either.
Later that day, authorities announced the arrest of the opposition leader Mauricio Díaz
Dávila, a candidate for congress and a former ambassador to Costa Rica. He had
been called to the attorney general’s office as part of an investigation for alleged acts
against the state.
His party, Citizens for Liberty, said he was violently arrested. His ability to run for office
had been cancelled by the electoral court three days earlier. The party’s president,
Kitty Monterrey, whose Nicaraguan citizenship was withdrawn last week, called for his
immediate release.
Nicaragua will not get the type of massed and violent street protests that came in 2018,
because Daniel Ortega has been proactive this year and is nipping the dissent to his regime
firmly in the bud. It’s also a firm reminder that the Hard Left wing still leaves the Hard Right for
dust when it comes to human rights abuses, but we’re not here to talk political nuances today.
Second, let us note the way in which Nicaragua as a country is increasingly dependent on
precious metals mining for export growth, this dependence now being spun into official policy of
national pride. Indeed, this week saw Nica proudly announce (11) YoY precious metals exports
up 44% by volume and 58% by value in the fist six months of 2021, compared to the same
period of 2020. Mining’s increased political importance was highlighted last week when the
President’s Wife, in full pre-election campaign, (12) visited the so-called “Mining Triangle”
(Hemco et al) and announced “historic, record-breaking investment in education” by the State
in their and other precious metals mining regions. There’s money to be made and Daniel Ortega
15

knows it; new schools, roads and hospitals will now arrive in the Mining Triangle, catering for
the boom in formal, informal and artisanal/illegal/etc mining. That aside from the acceleration
in repairs from last year’s hurricanes, with 13 new bridges arriving to span rivers and improve
communications links (13).
As for a call, it’s a tricky subject to condense into one paragraph of analysis, but if there’s one
thing mining companies in Nicaragua have to worry about it’s political heat getting turned up
against the country’s dictatorial activities from now to November, that the repression of any
opposition to Ortega may begin to reflect negatively on those companies operating in the
country, etc. As for me, I went in eyes wide open and nothing has really changed. Considered
more broadly, we’re investing in this exact model. We bet on the growth of the strategic
partner model in high risk jurisdictions, it makes sense for companies such Agnico (AEM) to use
companies such as my own exposure to Nica, Royal Road (RYR.v), as their soft entry. However,
holders of direct risk in the country may see the risk premium increase accordingly as the
country’s politics come under wider criticism. FWIW, from the start CEO Coughlin and I talked
frankly about how his company works inside the political backdrops of both Nica and Southwest
Colombia, both difficult places. Without going into details today, he’s an exemplary CEO and I’m
a happy holder of RYR, this election period won’t change that.
“Guatemala is different”
A rapid rise in Covid-19 cases (reportedly Delta variant) and low levels of vaccinations done to
date has seen Guatemala’s embattled President Giammattei this weekend impose a “State of
Calamity” (indeed that is the translation) on the country, with heavy restrictions on travel, a
night-time curfew etc. By coincidence that suits his other cause, as the protests against his
government have not gone away and there is now a blanket ban on massed assembly back in
place, therefore one must expect trouble without desiring it.
For mining companies at least, the issue more the way in which their newly laid fast track for
concessions and permitting under the Giammattei government may come to a screeching halt.
Alejandro Giammattei is certainly FDI friendly and has encouraged foreign dollar investment, his
opponents may use that against him at some point. But back to today and the imposition of a
countrywide state of emergency (by any other name) means mining companies are likely to
announce their own logistics issues in the days to come, be that a delay to a drill program or
staff not able to show up for work etc. However, as a guatemalteco once told me with shoulder
shrug, “Guatemala is different” and the quietened streets are good news, artificial or not. That
alone may see stocks such as Bluestone (BSR.to) or Volcanic (VG.v) rise, rather than fall, now
that Covid-19 is back in town.
Market Watching
Tracking the Buy Peru call
The coast is not clear politically, but as this desks believes the worst is now behind Peru we
changed our call on the country a few weeks ago, now considering the jurisdiction a buy. Since
that time equities have continued to drop,
but last week’s moves were at least in
line with the larger market:
There’s still volatility out there, for
example look what happened to Peru’s
Banco de Credito (BAP) Friday. However,
Peru is now calmer waters for investment
purposes.
16

Alexco Resource Corp (AXU) 2q21 financials
AXU reported its quarter last week and once again got somewhat unlucky with the timing, a
down day for silver making Thursday into a nasty liquidity event for the stock.
There was nothing particularly bad about the quarter either, the stock seems to have been
punished for honesty. CEO Nauman took time to explain about the slower than expected ramp
to commercial production and the market knee-jerked the stock. Never mind that…
AXU: Assets
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
17
41q4 51q1 51q2 51q3 51q4 61q1 61q2 61q3 61q4 71q1 71q2 71q3 71q4 81q1 81q2 81q3 81q4 91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2
C$m
fixed
other current
cash & eq
source: AXU filings
….there’s absolute nothing wrong…
AXU: Liabilities Breakdown per qtr
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
41q4 51q1 51q2 51q3 51q4 61q1 61q2 61q3 61q4 71q1 71q2 71q3 71q4 81q1 81q2 81q3 81q4 91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2
C$m
LT liab
current liab
source: company filings
…with the AXU financials.
50 AXU: Working Capital per qtr
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
41q4 51q1 51q2 51q3 51q4 61q1 61q2 61q3 61q4 71q1 71q2 71q3 71q4 81q1 81q2 81q3 81q4 91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2
source company filings/IKN ests
srallod
fo
snoillim

Our position to date has been to consider AXU a leveraged trade to silver the metal. The price
drop last week came from a company catalyst and that now provides excellent value as an
entry point. A lot depends on the price of the metals of course, we’d need to see a follow-
though on Friday’s rebound in the days ahead. However, set silver’s influence aside and those
of you sitting on the fence about AXU won’t have a better entry price than this.
Excelsior Mining Corp (MIN.to) 2q21 financials
This desk wishes there were more to report on the Excelsior Mining (MIN.to) 2q21 financials, in
fact the whole document reminds us we are still firmly in CEO Steve Twyerould’s previously
announced troubleshooting period. This ten-day price chart makes the point succinctly:
There are matters of note in the financials, for example that cash treasury remains healthy
during this “extended ramp-up period” (to be as supportive as possible):
MIN.to: Cash treasury per qtr
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
18
71q1 71q2 71q3 71q4 81q1 81q2 81q3 81q4 91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2
source: company filings/IKN ests
srallod
fo
snoillim
We acknowledge working capital is significantly lower than cash, at just over $8.5m as at end
2q21, that due to loan obligations arrive on the 12 month horizon:
30 MIN.to: Working Capital per qtr
25
20
15
10
5
0
91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 12q2
source company filings/IKN ests
srallod
fo
snoillim
At this point, cash is more important than working capital as we assume MIN de-bottlenecks its
Gunnison operation and gets to the first milestone of development, a run rate of 25m lbs cu per
annum. Regarding that matter (and to make sure we longs in MIN are on the same page),
here’s the relevant passage from this quarter’s MD&A:

“The reduced flow rates are slowing ramp-up to name plate productions of 25 million
pounds per annum. The Company believes this is a finite problem; however, in an
effort to speed up the removal of the effects of carbon-dioxide or reduce its impact, the
Company continues to investigate remedial processes. These are occurring in
conjunction with daily operations. At this time the Company is unable to forecast when
name plate production will be reached as it needs to complete its review of remedial
processes and fully assess any required adjustments to the operating plan. To the end
of the first half of 2021, total copper sold has reached 360,000 lbs., with an additional
80,000 lbs., in inventory. This low total production number is due to certain factors
including reduced flow rates and the wellfield operating at a reduced capacity through
the first half of 2021 as certain wellfield optimization initiatives were being tested.
Additional wellfield optimization initiatives are being planned or considered. Many of
these may initially be disruptive to production ramp-up due to the installation and/or
testing of equipment or the application of the initiative. While Management is focused
on mitigating the impact of these initiatives on ramp-up, they may contribute to further
extension of the production ramp-up period.
“In conjunction with the above, Excelsior is also maintaining a cautious approach to
expanding wellfield operations to allow for an operation that minimizes the risks of
COVID-19 transmission. To reiterate, Excelsior’s focus continues to be on attaining a
sustained production rate of 25 million pounds of copper per year, after which Excelsior
will focus on expanding that production rate. Achieving this outcome is contingent on
managing COVID 19 conditions, resolving ramp-up issues and successfully
implementing many of our wellfield optimization programs.”
The bottom line to the MIN.to 2q21 is simple: This desk continues to allow the company its
2021 to de-glitch its start of operations at Gunnison and start producing at profitable run rates.
I continue to pencil in my own add/hold/sell decision for the start of 2022.
Harte Gold (HRT.to): An eye on the side bet
No big changes this week, as the financial world now
understands the general nature of this stage of the
negotiations. No side need announce much for the
next few weeks and price movements will either come
from jungle drums or others realizing there’s deep
value to be had, just by coat-tailing Appian. Easy to
hold until real news appears, we’ll keep an eye on the
chart until then.
Minera IRL (MIRL.cse): Why Diego Benavides must go
This hasn’t been an easy note to write, not a scrap of pleasure involved either, so I’ve decided
to get the nonsense out the way first, which will allow us to focus on the real issue. Today’s
note has three parts:
 Personal stuff: To my distaste, explanations are required
 The stuff that matters: Ultimately, this is a case of corporate wrongdoing and is
actionable. CEO Diego Benavides has become an entrenched liability to the company
and we are better off without him, however his recent excesses of personal greed
mean we can do something about it. We already have the evidence to cause his
resignation, effective immediately.
 Other stuff: However, his excesses are not limited to three friends getting cushy jobs.
This desk has gathered evidence of other, long-standing activities that, if gathered in
one place, amount to a multi-million dollar fraud.
Personal stuff
I consider myself typical in keeping personal and business matters as separate as possible.
19

However, last week the people in Minera IRL, via a deliberately worded reply to shareholders
regarding my repeated request for a face-to-face meeting with them, decided to mix the
personal and the professional in order to spin matters to their own satisfaction. Due to that, I’m
going to take a paragraph to explain what happened from my perspective.
A few days ago, I was presented with facts that made CEO Benavides look bad. I will be honest
and say by that time (mid-2021) I wasn’t surprised about the details, but they were new to me
and learn them I did. At that point, I tried to contact CEO Benavides to get his side of the story.
He refused to answer his phone and eventually blocked my number. My next idea was to
contact his partner Trish Kent, as the information received directly involved that person as well.
I tried to contact her, but with the same non-response. After trying and failing multiple times to
phone through to both people, I started getting English language messages from a phone
carrier. My strong suspicions the couple were once again in The USA on vacation were
confirmed later, added to something I already knew, that this was another of a whole string of
quietly-taken vacations in the last two years, during which time CEO Benavides hasn’t done a
scrap of work. For example and according to publically available Peru migratory records, CEO
Benavides spent the whole of February this year on vacation, also in The USA. Anyway, long
story short at that point a few days ago I hit the roof, you can see some of the text messages I
sent (without knowing they were being picked up, even less that they’d be published by a VP of
Investor Relations). As stated in the public blog post I’m not at all proud about the language I
used, particularly when personal messages are used as a public weapon. However, and
knowing their meaning was understood at both ends, I stand by them all.
The stuff that matters
Bleating and hand-wringing over, that’s all the personal you get (hopefully). Instead, the task
today is to report corporate misdeeds and, thanks to CEO Benavides’ greed and over-reach, we
the shareholders can now do something about his presence at Minera IRL. It has been clear for
an extended time MIRL CEO Diego Benavides is a liability, rather than an asset, to the
company. His removal would allow progress to happen and shareholder value built, instead CEO
Benavides has entrenched himself and now puts his concerns long before those of the
company. However, his recent decision to hire unqualified personal friends for executive
positions allows us the formal mechanism to remove the CEO, with cause and without MIRL
having to pay his Change of Control parachute. Simple examination of the CVs of Steve Ngatai,
Susan Gabbie and Pedro Valdez demonstrate their patent lack of qualifications and experience
for their executive positions at the company. Combined with the obvious and long-standing
close personal relationship between the new employees and CEO Benavides gives a prima facie
case of company ethics violation. Therefore, the CVs of the three new officers at Minera IRL are
not merely curiosities to laugh over; they are the weak link that allows us to get rid of them all,
so here comes background on all three:
Steve Ngatai: Of the three, Ngatai is the one that can reasonable claim experience in mining,
He is a machine operator by training and from that point, moved to mid-level management at
Stracon GyM where he has been a project member (never a boss) for seven years. However, he
e has no relevant qualifications for an executive role in a
public company according to Peruvian law and cannot be
offered an executive post, the law design to stop exactly
the type of “friendly posts” we see her today. There is
reason to consider him a competent mining guy and he
would bring hands-on operating experience to the company.
But he machinist, with know-how in only one area of many
he needs to head up a project in Peru. The fact he is the
sentimental partner of Susan Gabbie is not irrelevant.
Pedro Valdez: It’s almost ironic Pedro Valdez wrote in his
reply to shareholders last week that the CVs and work
experience records of the new executives are available for
viewing online and in social media, and that the company
20

could not be more transparent. In fact, the day before writing those words Pedro Valdez altered
several of his social media accounts, including his
FaceBook account, and has adjusted his LinkedIn
account for people expecting a mining executive, rather
than a sworn translator, as VP IR. Also Pedro Valdez has
added another qualification to his thin CV, a “diploma in
business administration” taken in 2015 so let’s cover this
new information: For the record, this 16 week online
course is still available from Louisville University, total
cost U$655 (six hundred and fifty-five dollars) (14).
However, Valdez’s suitably massaged business profile
now leaves out most of the man’s business career:
He is a translator. His company, TISOL (an active
company, as seen here (15)), once used things like this
photo to drum up business, a now scrubbed 2019
FaceBook entry at a trade fair in 2019 (presumably
Covid-19 did for the 2020 conferences). He holds no
qualifications in communications, marketing or investor
relations, he is not a mining professional of any type and
hold no relevant experience. If he were to enter a
company like Minera IRL it would be for a junior or mid-
level post and even then, his lack of experience would
require a monitored trial period before becoming a full-
time member of the team. Peruvian labour laws (not codebooks or suggestions, but law) are
clear on these points but instead, Valdez was inserted directly at an officer level with a large US
Dollar salary to match.
Susan Gabbie: With Ms. Gabbie, we let her CV speak for itself:
Before joining Minera IRL, Gabbie was in part-time retail sales at “Interiors by Forma” in
Hamilton, New Zealand. Prior to that, she worked for Pedro Valdez as proofreader at his
translation firm. Prior to that we find potentially relevant work experience, two years at Aden
Services attached to Minera Cobre project in Panama (“Clients of all sizes from a wide range of
21

industries, including many listed on the CAC40, FTSE100, Forbes Global 2000, and Fortune 500,
count on ADEN for strategic outsourcing.”) but as anyone who has been on a mine site visit
knows, merely being in the location of a mine doesn’t make you an expert. The facts are clear,
Susan Gabbie has no qualifications at all to support her position of Chief Communications
Officer at Minera IRL. She does not have the experience for such a job, either, and while we are
on the subject can anyone explain what the difference between “VP Investor Relations” and
“Chief Communications Officer” is, please? As they sound like very similar roles, this desk would
have much preferred MIRL hire a real person for a job a mining company truly requires. It’s
worth reflecting that Minera IRL now has two people running corporate communications in
executive positions but no COO, no VP Exploration, not even a single qualified geologist at
officer level! However, according to CEO Benavides it needs both a VP Investor Relations and a
Chief Communications Officer and…well!...it just so happens some friends are in town…
Returning to the mail sent by Pedro Valdez to Minera IRL shareholders, specifically his
patronizing tone as he explained to veteran mining investors that companies sometimes hire
their friends should. The long-standing, obvious and clearly close friendship of the people at the
centre of this mess…
…is a factor that brings its own suspicions, but we underscore that if the people concerned
were qualified and able to do their job the issue would be of less concern. Those images from a
2015 edition of Peru’s “Hola!” magazine. However, the clear and long-standing friendships also
provide motive to give them officer roles and explains why they managed to enter, despite
lacking the relevant experience or know-how for their new executive positions in a publically
traded operating mining company. This ethics violation is serious enough to get MIRL
suspended from trading at the Bolsa de Valores de Lima (BVL). Here’s the relevant document
(16) and if you like your Spanish dry, check out item 51 on page 25 which explains this:
a) Los directores y gerentes están prohibidos de recibir en préstamo dinero o bienes
de la sociedad, o usar "en provecho propio, o de quienes tengan con ellos vinculación,
los bienes, servicios o créditos de la sociedad, sin contar con autorización del
Directorio";
b) Los directores y gerentes están prohibidos de valerse del cargo para, por cualquier
otro medio y con perjuicio del interés social, obtener ventajas indebidas para sí o para
personas con las que tengan vinculación
Clause B hits the nail on the head, you cannot do favours for friends. We now expect CEO
Benavides will try to use his black hole company, Kuri Kullu, to file their woefully lacking CVs
and try to keep them away from public examination. We shareholders cannot allow him to do
this, instead we should require both him and his managerial team to provide details of their true
work experience and qualifications, unhidden behind semantics and platitudes.
Summing up, CEO Benavides has made error after error during his term as CEO of MIRL, but
his latest mistake was to overstretch his greed. We now have cause to remove him from the
22

company and, as this would be the first necessary step to reclaiming shareholder value, it is
better for the company that it happens as soon as possible. As a small sidebar, please do not
forget that the asset at the centre of all this Ollachea, is a fully permitted project that could be
producing in less than 18 months. It may not get much attention from the Canadian market or
overseas companies, but the project is well-known and understood in Peru and there would be
plenty of local interest if it came up for grabs, either via a break-up or through a new and
competent management team entering the company. Also, Corihuarmi is an operating and
profitable mine, it’s not as if this stock is worth zero even without Ollachea. The reason to
remove Diego Benavides from the company is strictly business, I’m a shareholder and under
him the stock is going to zero. Under new management, there’s value to be made.
However and as stated above, it’s not just the entry of three personal friends in fake executive
roles that is in play here. They provide mote than enough reason to get rid of the man, but
there are other matters to consider as well.
Other stuff
We preface this information with noting that another problem now facing CEO Benavides are
his shareholders in Lima. They were previously loyal to his cause, but due to the way the
company has been managed, many have abandoned the company and sold their shares. This
abandonment has also manifested in new information arriving at this desk, specifically
regarding the way the local Kuri Kullu subsidiary is used to keep names away from the
spotlight. By using Kuri Kullu to shield disclosure from the public, Minera IRL has for many
years hired and retained several members of his close entourage, who have been paid via
opaque consultancy fees and third party companies. The people who have quietly benefitted
from being hired off-book and away from the public light include his partner, Patricia Kent.
They also include his housekeeper, his chauffer and several members of the Benavides family,
ostensibly hired and kept on retainers for legal work. Just as one example, his partner Patricia
Kent has received U$5,000 per month via an ongoing consultancy contract, every month since
late 2015 when she left the company. Fees paid to her alone are likely to cover move than a
third of a million US Dollars, none of which was ever explained or declared by the company to
stakeholders or authorities. I am not privy to all the information, however I am privy to more
than enough to allow the burden of proof to shift. This is not a criminal case and much better
that way, because CEO Diego Benavides does not have the luxury of the presumption of
innocence. Quite the contrary, he as CEO should address his long-standing and highly
suspicious behaviour around the way the books are run at Minera IRL, with an important focus
on its wholly-owned subsidiary Kuri Kullu. For example he needs to explain why, from the
month she left formal employment at Minera IRL in 2015 and to this day, his long-term partner
Patricia Kent has been on $5,000/month consultancy fee at the company from then until now.
He needs to tell us why he has kept this obvious conflict from the knowledge of shareholders
for all this time. Do the math and we are over a third of a million US Dollars, this alone is a
breach of ethics which allows us, the shareholders of this company, to hand him his dismissal
with cause and subsequent non-indemnity of what would otherwise be a golden parachute of
around U$1.5m.
However, he has also surreptitiously employed several members of his own family in other high
paying consultancy roles, including his own sons, all again without any sort of declaration to the
outside world. He may of course claim his position to be legal, but it is a breach of ethical
business practices that once again allows us the opportunity to save $1.5m this year. If we start
adding up the “consultancy fees” paid to his family and friends over the years it is no
exaggeration to talk about a multi-million dollar fraud happening under our noses at Minera
IRL. Though it’s impossible to know for sure, maybe that was his whole plan: A CEO busy
siphoning off as much cash as possible before the banks foreclose on Ollachea, at which point
he shrugs his shoulders, apologises and exits, stage left with our money. This simply has to
stop and with CEO Benavides now officially overstepping the mark and employing three long-
term family friends to executive posts in the company to which none have the required
experience or qualifications, we now have the means to get Minera IRL moving again.
23

It will be interesting to see if the largely ignorant “independent” directors at MIRL continue to
sign off on Benavides’ largesse, as they should now consider carefully any document they are
handed in the near future (or have signed in the past). Directors Armando Lema and Chair
Gerardo Perez are friends of Diego Benavides, they may want to consider their loyalties. This
desk would also urge officers at Minera IRL to consider their positions, those inside the
company may or may not have known or suspected or heard such talk of quiet payments to
family members previously, but from now on ignorance isn’t going to be a useful defence. For
example, CFO Carlos Ruiz del Castillo may have accepted incomplete financials from MIRL
subsidiaries through ignorance, not knowing the shell game behind hides a non-stop constant
stream of “consultancy fees” to the CEO’s own sons and partner, among others. Also, while
doing the rounds and reconnecting with people last week I also found out he’s even lost favour
with the legal community; He tried to skip paying the legal fees for the Cofide settlement deal,
with the firm eventually having to start legal actions against Minera IRL before finally getting
their money.
Finally, by revealing what I have published today, I’m under no illusions as to what may happen
next, now up against a rich oligarch with a vested interest to keep him and his family connected
to the cash cow. Liars don’t suddenly get bouts of contrition when confronted by their lies, he
will try hard to protect what he considers his own personal property. A lawyer by qualification,
his likely course of attack will be to litigate me to kingdom come but frankly, I do not care. This
person simply cannot continue doing what he is doing, the truth will be known and if all that
sounds overly dramatic, then so be it and a little
dramatic flair as we close out this sorry tale leavens
the narrative a little. We require the resignation of
Diego Benavides from Minera IRL. He has broken
the company’s ethics laws, he has broken the
country’s labour laws and he has crossed the BVL to
the point where the stock now gets suspended from
trading. More than enough to fire the man with
cause and not pay his exit fee. At that point, and
with an Ollachea suddenly unencumbered by its
worst liability, Minera IRL the company would be
able to start adding value back to its shareholders.
However, hiring ineffective crony pals to fill
inexistent and irrelevant jobs is a business strategy
that will reap as it sows.
A brief opinion on New Gold (NGD)
After promising to write up its quarter in the preview post Thursday evening, on tackling the
numbers and considering them against the way the market reacted…
…I realized I didn’t have much of an opinion on the 2q21 financials posted by New Gold, aside
from that feeling you get when you miss a bullet as in hindsight, our sale in February at U$2.14
now looks good against this weekend’s U$1.21.
24

So much for the humblebrags, the issue with NGD’s quarter is grade at Rainy River and as
noted in a couple of mails to inquirers on NGD that day (always welcome), the mineralization
has always shown in discrete zones so the economics killer at Rainy River is mine dilution. The
first plan under Randall Oliphant was a failure, but after careful mapping and re-working of
plans, it seemed the revised mine plan under Renaud Adams had got a handle on the problem,
with near surgical mineral extraction from the host rock sometimes used to keep dilution down
and grade up. That assumption took a hit with this news and for that reason alone, I would
avoid NGD as a trade option until further notice.
Conclusion
IKN638 is done, we end with bullet points:
 Diego Benavides is a liar. Liars should not run mining companies. Plenty of shareholders
have been in contact already, if you’d like to put your name forward as part of a
potential group of concerned shareholders, you know my mail address.
 The one thing missing from the analysis of Argonaut Gold’s (AR.to) excellent quarter is
a decision to add to my position. I know I may regret not adding and taking this gilt-
edged opportunity to average down, but for the time being I’ll let the fear trade play
out and leave some cash on the sidelines. Don’t let that personal call fade your own
resolve, however, AR.to is a great investment now.
 Be long copper.
I thank you in advance for any feedback. Our Top Pick stocks are Minera Alamos (MAI.v) and
Rio2 Ltd (RIO.v). Flash updates will be sent if required by events.
I wish you good trading fortune, ladies and gentlemen.
Best, Mark
Footnotes, appendices, references, disclaimer
(1) https://www.reuters.com/article/global-precious-idUSL4N2PK20K
(2) https://www.argonautgold.com/English/news-and-events/news-releases/news-releases-details/2021/Argonaut-Gold-
Announces-Record-Quarterly-Production-of-63749-Gold-Equivalent-Ounces-Record-Quarterly-Revenue-of-120.2-
Million-and-Provides-Second-Quarter-2021-Operating-and-Financial-Results/default.aspx
25

(3) https://www.argonautgold.com/English/investors/financial-reports/default.aspx
(4) https://s22.q4cdn.com/115151820/files/doc_presentations/2021/08/AR-WEBCAST-Q22021-FINAL.pdf
(5) https://seekingalpha.com/article/4448306-argonaut-gold-inc-arngf-ceo-peter-dougherty-on-q2-2021-results-earnings-
call-transcript
(6) https://www.rio2.com/post/rio2-limited-closes-c-35-144-122-public-offering-and-private-placement
(7) https://www.reuters.com/business/sustainable-business/china-cranks-up-carbon-intensive-projects-climate-crisis-
grows-research-shows-2021-08-13/
(8) https://www.pretivm.com/news/news-release-details/2021/Pretivm-Records-Second-Quarter-2021-Operating-and-
Financial-Results-Remains-On-track-for-Annual-Guidance-Cash-Position-Now-Exceeds-Debt/default.aspx
(9) https://investingnews.com/news/gold-investing/michael-gentile-cfa-announces-filing-of-early-warning-report-related-
to-acquisition-of-units-of-constantine-metal-resources-ltd/
(10) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/14/nicaraguan-police-raid-opposition-newspaper-la-prensa
(11) https://tn8.tv/nacionales/nicaragua-realizara-historica-inversion-mejoramiento-infraestructura-escolar/
(12) https://www.el19digital.com/articulos/ver/titulo:119303-mti-entrega-13-nuevos-puentes-en-matagalpa-y-triangulo-
minero?__cf_chl_captcha_tk__=pmd_f6a2989bd98138de147d139fd05d45352ccf405a-1628963256-0-
gqNtZGzNA2KjcnBszQhi
(13) https://business.louisville.edu/learnmore/projectmanagement/
(14) https://www.universidadperu.com/empresas/translation-interpretation-solutions.php
(15) https://www.smv.gob.pe/uploads/peruleymercadovalores.pdf
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2020
Closed in 2020 closed close price
TMAC Resources TMR.to Jan'20 C$3.41 20-Dec-19 C$3.61 5.9% TLS flip play, sold new year
Regulus Res REG.v Jan'20 C$1.10 20-Dec-19 C$1.30 18.2% TLS flip play, profit taken
Bonterra Res BTR.v Jan'20 C$1.90 9-Dec-19 C$1.66 -12.6% TLS flip play, loss taken
McEwen Mining MUX Jan'20 U$1.12 2-Dec-19 U$1.18 5.4% TLS flip play, profit taken
Core Gold CGLD.v Jan'20 C$0.255 7-Apr-19 C$0.305 19.6% arb trade, profit taken
HudBay Min HBM Jan'20 U$3.56 9-Dec-19 U$3.36 -5.6% TLS flip play, loss taken
Midas Gold MAX.to Feb'20 C$0.71 5-Jan-20 C$0.57 -19.7% sm & silly trade
Warrior Gold WAR.v Feb'20 C$0.08 3-Aug-18 C$0.05 -31.3% clean out non-perf sm stocks
Contact Gold C.v Feb'20 C$0.40 19-Aug-18 C$0.18 -55.0% clean out non-perf sm stocks
Sandstorm Gold SAND Feb'20 U$3.73 17-Apr-16 U$7.21 93.3% Sold during port rebalance
NexGen Energy NXE Feb'20 U$1.20 2-Dec-19 U$1.06 -11.7% TLS flip play, loss taken
MAG Silver MAG Apr'20 U$8.95 1-Mar-20 U$10.07 12.5% Sold to cut silver exposure
Alexco Res AXU Apr'20 U$1.69 7-Sep-17 U$1.69 0.0% sold to close Ag exp. in FY20
Bonterra Res BTR.v Jun'20 C$1.62 2-Feb-20 C$1.10 -32.1% under-performer cash moved
Regulus Res REG.v Jun'20 C$0.64 6-Apr-15 C$0.79 23.4% moved $ TMQ/MIN & Au stocks
Great Panther GPR.to Aug'20 C$0.60 21-Jun-20 C$1.10 83.3% Profit taken, good trade
Jaguar Mining JAG.v Aug'20 C$0.42 21-Jun-20 C$0.65 54.8% Profit taken, good trade
Sandstorm Gold SAND Aug'20 U$7.76 10-May-20 U$9.37 20.7% Profit taken, good trade
Integra Resources ITR.v Aug'20 C$2.23 13-Aug-18 C$5.40 142.2% Profit taken, good trade
Wesdome Gold WDO.to Aug'20 C$2.37 14-Oct-17 C$14.82 525.3% last 1/2 of big win closed
INV Metals INV.to Sep'20 C$0.40 17-May-20 C$0.45 12.5% Cut all Ecuador exposure
Cartier Resources ECR.v Nov'20 C$0.155 3-Aug-18 C$0.25 67.7% Exact close price TBA
Tinka Res TK.v Dec'20 C$0.195 19-Apr-16 C$0.195 0.0% Closed on a round trip fail
2015 to 2019 annual closed positions in appendices below, 2009 to 2014 closed positions in editions IKN553 or earlier
26

Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2019
Closed in 2019 closed close price
Atico Mining ATY.v jan'19 C$0.55 24-Jul-16 C$0.32 41.8% patience ran out, made room
Candente Copper DNT.to jan'19 C$0.075 3-Ago-18 C$0.05 -33.3% tiny trade, made room for new
B2Gold BTO.to feb'19 C$2.11 12-Set-14 C$4.05 91.9% Took 1/2 profits, reduce size
Western Copper WRN.to mar'19 C$0.80 20-Ene-19 C$0.81 1.3% Spec trade that didn't work
B2Gold BTO.to mar'19 C$2.11 12-Set-14 C$4.15 96.7% Took rest of profit.
GT Gold GTT.v mar'19 C$1.17 10-Oct-18 C$0.90 -23.1% Took loss. Story changed
NovaGold NG apr'19 U$3.84 13-Ene-19 U$4.15 -8.1% Short that didn't work, sm loss
Zinc One Z.v jun'19 C$0.47 14-Set-17 C$0.025 -94.7% clearing out dead trade
Amarillo Gold AGC.v jun'19 C$0.24 22-Ago-18 C$0.20 -16.7% clearing out dead trade
New Gold NGD aug'19 U$1.44 31-Jul-19 U$1.23 14.6% ST short win thru Q2 earnings
IMPACT Silver IPT.v aug'19 C$0.39 21-Jul-19 C$0.46 18.0% took a quick profit
Fiore Gold F.v aug'19 C$0.34 26-May-19 C$0.56 64.7% Took profit, 2q19 avg
Chakana Copper PERU.v oct'19 C$0.84 22-Mar-18 C$0.16 -81.0% Exploreco trade fail. Want space
Wesdome Gold WDO.to oct'19 C$2.37 14-Oct-17 C$7.57 219.4% Sold half, profit taking
Superior Gold SGI.v oct'19 C$1.46 8-Abr-18 C$0.47 -67.8% Failed sm spec on Au. Moved on
Amerigo Res ARG.to nov'19 C$0.91 23-Set-18 C$0.50 -45.1% worst trade of year, hefty loss
Guyana Goldfields GUY.to dec'19 C$0.94 14-Abr-19 C$0.56 -40.4% taking the loss, financials weak
Tethyan Res TETH.v dec'19 C$0.30 8-Set-19 C$0.16 -46.7% tiny trade, word of probs in co
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2018
Closed in 2018 closed close price
Amarillo Gold AGC.v jan'18 C$0.38 24-Mar-17 C$0.31 -18.4% Cut away losing trade
Riverside Res RRI.v jan'18 C$0.39 27-Jun-16 C$0.31 -20.5% Cut away losing trade
Eros Res ERC.v jan'18 C$0.175 1-Mar-17 C$0.16 -8.6% CEO sudden exit, not good
Excellon Res EXN.to jan'18 C$1.54 9-Oct-16 C$1.66 7.8% 4q17 poor, one too many bad qtrs
Wesdome Gold WDO.to jan'18 C$1.68 15-Dec-17 C$2.06 22.6% Near-term trade block, took profit
Sabina G&S SBB.to apr'18 C$2.06 17-Dec-17 C$1.77 -14.1% Near-term trade, bad timing, small
B2Gold BTO.to May'18 C$2.11 12-Sep-14 C$3.67 73.9% sold 25% to reduce exposure
Lara Expl. LRA.v May'18 C$0.65 11-Feb-18 C$0.58 -13.8% Spec on Brazil didn't work
Solitario XPL June'18 U$0.72 19-Mar-17 U$0.41 -43.1% Failed trade, may return in 4q18
SolGold plc SOLG.to July'18 C$0.475 19-Nov-17 C$0.415 -12.6% cut, trade didn't perform
Pan American PAAS July'18 U$17.90 1-Jun-18 U$16.30 8.9% modest win on short position
NGEx Res NGQ.to Sep'18 C$1.01 22-Oct-17 C$1.00 -1.0% Closed to reduce Argentina exp
Sandstorm Gold SAND Oct'18 U$3.73 17-Apr-16 U$4.13 10.7% partial sale to raise cash for GTT
Aldebaran Res ALDE.v Nov'18 n/a n/a n/a n/a liquidate spin out of REG
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2017
Closed in 2017 closed close price
Continental Gold CNL.to Jan'17 C$2.68 22-May-16 C$4.17 55.6% trade closed, profit taken
Focus Ventures FCV.v Jan'17 C$0.23 1-Jul-12 C$0.05 -78.3% Give up, a disaster trade
Wesdome Gold WDO.to Feb'17 C$1.72 28-Aug-16 C$3.00 74.4% Target hit, sold, good trade
Belo Sun BSX.to Mar'17 C$0.90 30-Jan-17 C$0.90 0.0% failed near-term flip trade
Lara Expl. LRA.v Mar'17 C$1.15 8-Apr-12 C$1.05 -8.7% cut to make room for new trade
Rye Patch Gold RPM.v Apr'17 C$0.31 2-Sep-16 C$0.32 3.2% cut for doubts & new stock
Cordoba Min. CDB.v Jun'17 C$0.75 15-Sep-16 C$0.63 -16.0% closed
Constantine Metal CEM.v Aug'17 C$0.135 9-Apr-17 C$0.28 107.4% spec trade closed, good win
Red Eagle Min. R.to Sep'17 C$0.67 13-Dec-16 C$0.27 -59.7% IKN's biggest failure in years
Starcore Intl SAM.to Sep'17 C$0.61 10-Jan-15 C$0.31 -49.2% Patience ran out
B2Gold BTO.to Dec'17 C$2.11 12-Sep-14 C$3.39 60.7% sold small portion for liquidity
27

Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2016
Closed in 2016 closed close price
Phoscan Chem FOS.to jan16 C$0.28 29-mar-15 C$0.265 -5.4% Buyout trade, bot but poor deal
True Gold TGM.v jan16 C$0.18 23-ago-15 C$0.25 38.9% okay trade, sold on pol risk
McEwen Mining MUX jan16 U$1.09 25-ene-15 U$1.20 10.1% sold due to lack of value
Lake Shore Gold LSG.to feb-16 C$1.10 07-abr-15 C$1.69 53.6% bot out, sold early in process
Atacama Pacific ATM.v feb-16 C$0.19 26-abr-15 C$0.40 110.5% sold for a double on big pop
New Gold NGD feb-16 U$2.06 24-ene-16 U$2.96 43.7% closed good near-term trade
Sandspring Res SSP.v mar-16 C$0.195 18-oct-15 C$0.32 64.1% Hit tgt, took profit
Teranga Gold TGZ.to mar-16 C$0.54 15-feb-15 C$0.60 11.1% disappointing trade
B2Gold BTG mar-16 U$0.85 13-ene-16 U$1.30 52.9% Separate trade on B2, hit tgt
Dalradian Res DNA.to mar-16 C$0.67 27-oct-13 C$1.00 49.3% Hit target, sold, good win
HudBay Min. HBM may-16 U$4.10 03-abr-16 U$4.36 -6.3% Short trade, poor timing
Nevada Sunrise NEV.v may-16 C$0.185 28-feb-16 C$0.23 24.3% V. small, no big deal either way
Richmont RIC jun-16 U$7.60 01-may-16 U$9.30 22.4% near-term trade, profit taken
INV Metals INV.to jul-16 C$0.25 03-abr-16 C$0.95 280.0% Trade closed on time
HudBay Min. HBM aug16 U$4.98 09-jun-16 U$4.80 3.6% short trade covered, no big deal
Miranda Gold MAD.v oct-16 C$0.125 03-jul-16 C$0.10 -20.0% tiny spec trade, didn't work
Avino G & S ASM nov-16 U$2.00 21-oct-16 U$1.40 -30.0% Abandon trade on bad bot deal
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2015
Closed in 2015 closed close price
Argonaut Gold AR.to jan'15 C$1.47 14-dec-14 C$2.53 72.1% Big gain small time, profit taken
Amerigo Res ARG.to jan'15 C$0.405 20-jul-14 C$0.285 -29.6% Given up on weak Cu prices
Reservoir Min. RMC.v jan'15 C$6.05 18-jun-14 C$4.12 -31.9% sold on Cu downturn
Coro Mining COP.to jan'15 C$0.075 26-jan-14 C$0.035 -53.3% sm, sold on Cu downturn
Fortuna Silver FSM mar'15 U$4.12 10-nov-14 U$3.75 9.0% Short used as hedge
GoldQuest Min. GQC.v mar'15 C$0.26 27-oct-13 C$0.085 -67.3% given up ghost
Rio Alto Mining RIO.to apr'15 C$2.30 07-apr-11 C$3.57 55.2% Top pick, bot out, big win
Timmins Gold TGD jun'15 U$0.60 19-apr-15 U$0.62 3.3% near-term trade, out of time
First Majestic AG jul'15 U$10.51 10-aug-14 U$4.55 56.7% horrible failed trade
NovaCopper NCQ.to jul'15 C$1.05 09-apr-14 C$0.50 -52.4% no more Cu exposure, sm sell
McEwen Mining MUX aug'15 U$0.695 21-jul-15 U$0.92 32.4% Closed nearterm flip for win
Midas Gold MAX.to sep'15 C$0.39 21-sep-15 C$0.35 -10.3% Sm. trade idea that didn't work
New Gold NGD oct'15 U$2.18 23-aug-15 U$3.05 39.9% trade closed, profit taken
Legend Gold LGN.v nov'15 C$0.085 01-mar-15 C$0.035 -58.8% tiny "land grab" idea, failed
Timmins Gold TGD nov'15 U$0.245 20-sep-15 U$0.15 -38.8% small near-term loser
Please note that due to space considerations closed positions 2009 to 2014 are now
available on request, or were published in any edition to IKN553 (end 2019).
Important Disclosure
The information and opinions contained within this report reflect the personal views of the author and therefore all
material within should not be construed as accurate or reliable or be utilized as advice for investment or business
purposes. Independent due diligence and discussions with ones own investment and business advisor is strongly
recommended. Accordingly, nothing in this report should be construed as offering a guarantee of the accuracy or
completeness of the information contained herein, as an offer or solicitation with respect to the purchase or sale of any
security or as an endorsement of any product or service. All opinions and estimates included in this report are subject to
change without notice. It is prohibited to copy or redistribute this report to any type of third party without the express
permission of the author.
28