IKN #629Premium

The IKN Weekly
Week 629, June 13th 2021
Contents
This Week: In today’s edition, Orezone.
Fundamental Analysis: Argonaut
Stocks to Follow: Orezone (ORE.v), Amarillo Gold (AGC.v),
Copper Basket: Overview, Final group update on the Peru copper stocks (REG.v, PERU.v,
CCCM.v, ECU.v), Chakana Copper (PERU.v), Copper Mountain (CMMC.to).
Producer Basket: Overview.
Tiny Dogs: Overview.
Regional Politics: Peru.
Market Watching: Mene.
I remind subscribers that no part of this newsletter can be copied, reproduced or
given to any third party without the express permission of the author.
This Week
“
In Today’s Edition
 A difference in presentation today, brought about by the way this edition developed.
The title lines are normal for the segments in which we follow market happenings
(Stocks to Follow plus The Baskets, see above), but the other main sections this week
come with one word titles.
 In the This Week section we have the title “Orezone”, which gathers thoughts on last
week’s sale, plus some policy decisions on The IKN Weekly and its future editorial line.
 In the main Fundamentals section we have “Argonaut”, as we run the numbers on
Argonaut Gold (AR.to) and I try to make up for lost time.
 In the Regional Politics section we have “Peru”, as we clear the decks of minor news
from other countries this week and try to make head/tail of the unholy mess that is
Peru’s 2021 Presidential election.
 In the Market Watching section we have “Mene”, an analysis held over from last week
of the 1q21 preliminary sales numbers released by our non-mining play, Mene Inc
(MENE.v).
 Then with The Copper Basket on your author’s best macro idea for 2021 and that’s this
week’s edition in 11 syllables and five words: Orezone, Argonaut, Copper, Peru, Mene.
Orezone
When push comes to shove, all an exploration stage junior mining company has is a story to
tell. Also true for many development stage mining companies, but for our purposes we focus on
explorecos companies because it’s true for them all. Ultimately, if your company has no
financial income from operations and goes about its normal business burning cash in order to
prove up a mine, your company needs funds shareholders and perhaps debt holders in order to
1

fund operations. Therefore, to fund your company you need to convince people to give you
their money and for that, management of an exploreco makes its offer: A story.
Don’t get me wrong, put starkly it sounds as though all junior exploreco CEOs are out there
telling tall tales all the time and that is not the case. It may well turn out that the person giving
you speil tomorrow morning turns out to be a saint, the story in question is great, a few years
later everything the CEO told you in 2021 comes true, everybody gets rich. Or it could be a
story backed up by a mountain of hard data, for example when you deliver a drill assay NR to
the market, or a 43-101, or it can be more subjective and based on what we might term in the
widest sense, “Optimism For The Future”. Those are also often perfectly legitimate statements,
such as a simple confirmation that your drill program is on budget and time and a mention that
the results should be back in X days. Or they may be more promotional, for example a company
adds a photo of a promising drill core to the NR before we know the lab assay results.
Et cetera. We could continue with several other nuanced examples to cut to the chase, we note
that the level of human subjectivity added to any company’s story will affect its image and,
ultimately, its share price. It’s the most effective promoters and marketers work too, for
example perhaps the world’s best in our sphere, Robert Friedland: He’ll make all the marketing
and promo noise in the world in the early stage of one of his mine developments, as (once he
and his are on board) it makes business sense to get the equity price up early, then fund the
project with less dilution. Robert Friedland gets serious market attention when he starts
pushing one of his project, because he has a track record of success and of making is trusted,
your story is far more valuable. However, Reputation Management 101 states that it takes a
long time to gain trust, a short time to lose it. The word of Friedland is trusted for good reason,
but when an exploreco says one thing and does another, or when it has weakness in its story it
doesn’t address, or when it prefers to obfuscate rather than clarify, those without the
reputational back-up of The Ivanhoe Guy can see their rep dissolve to nothing in quick time.
By all rights (and in any normal business sector), Orezone (ORE.v) would launch an internal
inquiry into last week’s obvious insider information trading, which would lead to the names of
the leaker(s) who is (are) then dismissed with cause. It would be straightforward to achieve, all
it takes is a company-wide meeting where the CEO informs staff the company will go to the
time and expense of tracking trade IDs of the buyers Monday morning, in order to see if there
were any unusual patterns or unexpected names showing…and if anyone would like a chat in
the next 24 hours, they know the number. However, we know what will happen is nothing. The
company knows what happened is illegal, it also knows the regulatory authorities are toothless,
ineffective and lacking in any preventative authority so if they say nothing and you say nothing
and we say nothing, it will all quietly go away. Leave that attitude to stew for a decade, which
is exactly what Canada has done, and your reward is a stock market nobody trusts, populated
by increasing numbers of companies that didn’t float on the market to raise capital, but to
distribute it (to themselves, and oftentimes immediately).
Which brings us to our lot, that of the junior investor. As a matter of fact, The IKN Weekly
tends to be read by a readership that’s been around the block at least once and understands
the pitfalls of the sector. You don’t need to read IKN Weekly or blog to know there are plenty of
dubious, untrustworthy, even plain outright scam companies out there and when scam CEO
knows the punishment for laying on the charm and BS is non-existent and near-term profits for
nasty tactics are often excellent, what happens next is not rocket science, either. Simply put,
we work in a sector of bad actors and always will. The law does not punish them, the market
rulebooks do not punish them, their peers turn a blind eye and impunity is the result, not just of
the truly bad and nasty boys and girls who have always been attracted to mining (like moths to
flames, read some Mark Twain will tell you there’s nothing new here), but also the “Casual
Corruption” referenced in last week’s blog post, it becomes the “the way it is”. These companies
and their officers are never punished, so they do it because others do it. They do it because it’s
easy money and nobody notices. They do it because, even if some mouthy idiot with a blog in
South America does notice, they’ll get away with it anyway.
2

As a retail investor, what to do?
ESG now stands for ‘Eric Sprott Governance’: Call me a sentimental fool if you must, but the
more I thought about the obvious insider info trading followed by implausible denial from
Orezone on Tuesday morning, the more Eric Sprott’s actions against Michael Collins a few days
previously came to mind. As you may remember, from either the event or last weekend’s intro,
after what can only be described as pulling fast one on the shareholders of Crescent Resources
(CRES.cse), its CEO Michael Collins was immediately fired from his other CEO job, over at
Exploits Discovery Corp (NFLD.cse). It was clearly the actions of someone highly influential to
NFLD and the whole nascent Newfoundland Gold Rush, but also a decision-maker with power
and enough plain common sense to act swiftly. Sherlock Holmes was not required for this one,
here’s how we put it in IKN628 last weekend:
“…Collins got the swift and clean boot, replaced by a board member with the “Canada
mining stalwart” image. Considering the close relationship CRES had to NFLD, this
move is a clear message on how seriously Eric Sprott is taking the nascent 21st
century Newfoundland gold rush and how he wants its image to remain squeaky
clean.”
Maybe so, but on further thought I may well owe Mr. Sprott an apology for selling him short
last weekend. Taking into consideration the swiftness of the axe, Eric Sprott had already made
a decision about what to do in these circumstances, or what lines would have to be crossed in
order for him to act on a moral basis (underlined as important). Indeed, Eric Sprott used his
position of high influence on NFLD, CRES and the wider NewfieRush patch, to make a moral
stand against the deliberate decisions of its CEO to loot company assets.
And it is a most welcome turn of events. A man who has forgotten more than most know about
the sector, Eric Sprott realizes as much as we do how toothless Canadian regulatory authorities
are. Their range and scope are limited, often you’ll fine their “desire to go after the big fish” is
limited (let’s say) and the snail’s pace at which it operates means perps are normally long gone
with their ill-gotten gains before anything happens. By way of another mirror, Canada compares
badly to its neighbours in the US SEC, an entity that actually puts people in jail for lying and
cheating as a certain David Sidoo knows very well, the type of Vancouver shark who gets
awards in Canada and just desserts when they come up against an unbendable system of
justice. Sidoo highlights the greater point of how Canadian securities law is lax, badly imposed
and even when applied, no form of deterrent to the increasing numbers of ne’er-do-wells and
securities fraudsters. When was the last time you hear of a Canadian executive in jail whose
first name isn’t Conrad?
But back to another famous name; Eric Sprott is certainly a benevolent force in mining, as
despite his occasional Old Uncle act he is a man of the utmost integrity as anyone who has
been close to him will quickly attest. Billionaire, activist, and still driven by mining, an
upstanding family man of the old school, as de facto rule-maker and applier of a new covenant
of moral behaviour on mining I can think of no better candidate. Therefore, when Eric Sprott
moved against Collins a chilling effect went further than merely the C-suites in Newfoundland
as I imagined last weekend. With his fingers in dozens of junior pies and strategic investor-
sized positions in most, those that would line their pockets at the expense of shareholders are
likely to think twice if Eric’s Sprott is now going active.
As I thought further about Orezone’s obvious, blatant insider trading on Monday in light of
Sprott’s moral stance, I realized I’d sold him short in the note of IKN628 last weekend. If
executive of mining companies go unpunished for the type of underhand, self-serving move
made by Michael Collins, others will do the same. In a sector with no obvious no moral compass
brought to bear by the regulatory bodies it’s now up to investors to get active and make their
presence felt via their feet, or wallet, or voting block. I am not Eric Sprott and neither do I want
to be, but on due consideration on Tuesday morning I decided to become a follower and
supporter of Eric Sprott’s moral lead on mining. As we do not have governance, we must
choose self-governance or none at all and in this case, not only should we cheer that Eric Sprott
3

is willing to take the responsibility and become an activist shareholder in order to weed out bad
practices, but it’s time to join his side and add our little lot to the cause. Every little counts and
with a little momentum, it would do a lot more to “Save Canadian Mining” than a derisory ban
on the short uptick rule*. Therefore, let me be clear:
On Monday, Orezone (ORE.v) shares flew higher on no news, due to a prima facie case of
buying on inside information. When I addressed the company on the issue, its responses were
defensive, indignant and difficult to believe, as if seasoned Vancouverites had never even
imagined there were bad actors in the mining sector. On the other hand, I was informed how
my questioning was insulting to them (how could I even imagine such a thing). It was tooth
fairy level, a large red flag to add to the numerical evidence already staring us in the face on
Tuesday via ORE’s price chart. Therefore Tuesday lunchtime, I sent out the Flash update (see
Appendix 1), liquidated my position in Orezone and took profits. I will not return to ORE.
As for the future, this position is now house policy. Call it the “New ESG” (Eric Sprott
Governance) if you like, with junior mining CEO Collins’ just reward from Eric Sprott a blueprint
for self-governance by shareholders, with a view to cleaning up the mining sector and helping
others sponsor the good guys (and stay away from the bad guys). Therefore and going
forward, if any junior mining company held on these pages is discovered acting in blatant, self-
serving or illegal ways (e.g. Orezone last week), first the IKN subscriber base hears about it,
then the shares get dumped immediately. I’m also aware of some of the pitfalls of beginning
this type of Zero Tolerance policy against juniors and it might not be great for business, but
longer-term I hope people will realize that to get on these pages, a mining company has to do
things the right way.
*FWIW we need more access to shorting, not less. If Canada’s stock regulators made it easier for retail to short junior
mining stocks, the sector would have another tool for effective self-governance

Fundamental Analysis of Mining Stocks
An analysis of Argonaut Gold (AR.to)
Some mining stock analyses that appear in the main Fundies section do so after weeks and
even months of previous tracking, this is not one of those pieces. The reason Argonaut Gold
(AR.to) features as the main event of IKN629 is wholly due to the webinar presentation given
by CEO Pete Dougherty last Tuesday, found on this link (1). It was an occasion where I tuned
in more with curiosity than intent, but somewhere around this slide…
…I realized I’d dropped the ball and, to that point, ignorant of the progress made by AR. Here’s
the TL:DR:
 AR.to, via Magino, is becoming an interesting growth story
 With the Alio Gold merger now consolidated, AR has a reasonable and profitable
4

production base and a much-improved balance sheet.
 This strong financial position will allow it to develop Magino with minimal forward
dilution, an asset which is now off the back burner and set to become an exciting
Canadian precious metals story. The proximity and similarity of Magino to the Alamos
Gold (AGI) Island Gold operation makes this development story compelling.
 Straightforward financial metrics show the stock is still clearly undervalued, despite its
recent impressive run (see right versus
GDXJ).
However, before we dive in we also state
clearly that there’s still plenty about AR that’s
unlikeable. From Ana Paula in Guerrero to San
Antonio in Baja California Sur, AR has wasted
countless millions due to its poor read on CSR
in Mexico. The company is still run in a quaint
“oh shucks, great things now folks!” style by
CEO Dougherty (last week’s presentation was
archetype), the G&A is high, the ongoing hedge
program on San Francisco gold indicative of the
conservative management style. You’ll never
convince me on Cerro de Gallo, even the company admits its operating assets are somewhat
ratty (“but they make money”). Etc. Today’s note on AR isn’t trying to paint the company as a
top-to-bottom turnaround story, instead we focus on the two areas that have improved
dramatically. We go into Magino and its development below, first we run through the
company’s financials. We begin with the balance sheet and the assets chart:
AR.to: Assets
1200
1100
1000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
5
31q4 41q1 41q2 41q3 41q4 51q1 51q2 51q3 51q4 61q1 61q2 61q3 61q4 71q1 71q2 71q3 71q4 81q1 81q2 81q3 81q4 91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1
fixed
$m other current
cash
source: company filings
On most of the charts today we go back to quarters of 2017 or 2018, but on this one and a
couple of the other balance sheet visuals you get a Longview. Here we have three financial
phases of AR, first up to 2015 when it lived a lie, then came reality and PWC as auditors, who
have kept such a close eye on the company that it performs regular asset impairments on gold
in progress inventories on their leach pads. Finally, the latest financial iteration of AR began in
2q20, when the company merged with the woefully run Alio Gold and took over the running of
its Florida Canyon mine. So far at least, that has turned out to be a very smart decision.
More details on asset items below, but first the liabilities overview chart:
AR.to: Liabilities breakdown per qtr
320
300
280
260
240
220
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
31q4 41q1 41q2 41q3 41q4 51q1 51q2 51q3 51q4 61q1 61q2 61q3 61q4 71q1 71q2 71q3 71q4 81q1 81q2 81q3 81q4 91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1
source: company filings
srallod
fo
snoillim
LT liab
current liab

At first sight, those big new columns look like bad news for AR, in fact they’re not. F current
liabilities, around $50mm is standard accounts payable, then AR owes another $20m that
should go out soon (they have the cash). As for the newly expanded long-term liabilities, the
major items are either non cash (tax deferrals, land reclamation liability) or scheduled debt,
such as its leaseback or the debt financing that came with the Alio deal. By contract, AR cannot
pay that back and must simply service until 2023. The other thing about any problem about
liabilities is this:
AR.to: Working cap breakdown
300
280
260
240
220
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
6
31q4 41q1 41q2 41q3 41q4 51q1 51q2 51q3 51q4 61q1 61q2 61q3 61q4 71q1 71q2 71q3 71q4 81q1 81q2 81q3 81q4 91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1
$m
other working cap
cash
source: company filings
With the Alio deal and through profitable mining since, AR has amassed a cash pile of
U$227.35m, the cash part of a total working capital of $288.6m as at end 1q21.
To get an idea as to how, we move to operations and the main overview chart:
U$m AR.to: Operations overview
120
revenues
110
prod costs
100
dd&a/inventory adjust
90
gross profit
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
-10
-20
1q18 2q18 3q18 4q18 1q19 2q19 3q19 4q19 1q20 2q20 3q20 4q20 1q21
Source: company filings
There are four columns per quarter, with the most important change coming in the green
revenues bars, here separated out (below left). The incorporation of Florida Canyon has gone
well and the timing has been fortunate, with gold prices remaining strong.
AR.to: Quarterly Revenues
5.44 5.24
7.82
4.93 9.25 2.05 3.14 6.15 9.37 0.65 8.66 1.27 6.66 0.85
4.49
8.001
3.501
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40 30
20
10
0
71q1 71q2 71q3 71q4 81q1 81q2 81q3 81q4 91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1
$m AR.to: production costs per qtr
source: company filings
557.72 618.62 113.02 388.32 250.72 750.82 58.92 269.73
650.15
184.04 174.14
910.84
236.14 488.03
961.15 739.05
592.26
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
71q1 71q2 71q3 71q4 81q1 81q2 81q3 81q4 91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1
$m
source: company filings

Production costs (above right) saw some creep last quarter, but most of the $11m excess was a
one-time expense and AR should stay under $60m for the quarters to come. In fact, its costs
profile is a positive for the company, it may be high cash cost but it’s a reliable producer with
predictable costs. Also on the main overview chart, we feature DD&A and inventory
adjustments, then gross profit. Once again, AR has benefited greatly from the timing of the Alio
fusion and sequential quarterly gross profits of $31.64m, $30.92m and $27.56m have
vindicated the decision. Also, if we bring in the updated share count chart at this point, noting
that as at end 1q21 the company had 309.999m shares out (and form now on saying 310m)
and remembering the criticism they took for the massive dilution, your author included
400 AR.to: Shares Out
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
7
31q1 31q2 31q3 31q4 41q1 41q2 41q3 41q4 51q1 51q2 51q3 51q4 61q1 61q2 61q3 61q4 71q1 71q2 71q3 71q4 81q1 81q2 81q3 81q4 91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1
source: company filings/IKN ests
serahs
fo
snoillim
Operating EPS shows I was wrong and the purchase has been accretive to earnings:
AR.to: operating earnings per share
0.12
0.10
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0.00
-0.02
-0.04
-0.06
-0.08
-0.10
-0.12
71q1 71q2 71q3 71q4 81q1 81q2 81q3 81q4 91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1
$
source: AR filings, IKN calcs
The bottom line to Argonaut Gold financials, very impressive change. The company’s stated
policy has been to set itself up to harvest cash from operations, in order to self-fund its growth
pipeline. In the corporate literature, that’s Magino and Cerro de Gallo, but in reality the reason
to really like AR instead of merely liking it at today’s prices is here.
Magino: On its books for many years, AR has started developing Magino and last year it spent
$27m there. This year AR has got serious, budgeting a capex outlay program of between $180,
and to $190m, a substantial part of the overall estimated C$510m capex (which in my estimates
is U$510m). With its permitting process on track and permits popping out at the right time,
Magino is now on the way to becoming a mine and AR expects first gold pour in 2023, with
commissioning to official production by mid-year. The corporate plan for Magino was laid out
well by CEO Dougherty in last week’s presentation, but they are planning to bootstrap from 10k
to an eventual 20k tpd (with more capacity permitted and built in if required). When they are
done, we can expect Magino to produce at an initial 30k oz per quarter, before planned
increases get the mine to 40k oz production.
It was already an interesting presentation, the slides showing Magino’s upside potential (above
and here) made it even better:

In order to grasp the potential of Magino to AR.to, the place to look is next door at AGI’s Island
Gold operation because the above visual is not a mock-up for illustrative purposes: The AR
Magino project is literally right next door to Island Gold, they share a concession border and
what’s more, both companies have tracked mineralization to the frontier.
Island Gold shows the prize on offer, a mine that under AGI’s stewardship has become
everything it promised; a constant and regular 40k+ ounce/quarter, low cash cost gold mine,
but with oodles of upside, the mine’s low cash cost profile is all about the high grade
mineralization they are now finding at depth (see above). As for the financials, the recently
completed 1q21 at Island Gold facility was reasonably typical, with 42,200 ounces of gold
produced at a mine AISC* of U$732/oz. Or put another way, even if AGI’s Island Gold mine
gets a nasty dose of cost creep this Northern summer, it’s still going to produce 40k ounces and
sell them at a profit of at least U$1,000 apiece.
*Excludes the corporates, but in this case a reasonable like-for-like
This is the proposal offered by AR, literally next door at Magino. The similarities in cost
footprints and targeted production are hardly coincidence, the similarities between the two
deposits means they will be approached in the same way by the engineers. Thenthe similarities
continue, as AR is now drilling deeper and sure enough, finding the same type of grade
increase at depth. And now, with the rest of AR in Cash Harvest mode in order to fund its
future, Magino is underway and looking to be built at minimal further dilution to the company.
Discussion and conclusion: We’ve marked up the two major areas of improvement at Argonaut
Gold (AR.to), namely its current financials and its future growth, so to wrap up it’s time to
quantify their effects and to do that, this chart provides a useful hack:
4 Argonaut: EV/share versus PPS, 2013 to date
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
8
71q1 71q2 71q3 71q4 81q1 81q2 81q3 81q4 91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1 tse12q2
source: company filings
erahs/$
pps at qtr end
EV/share

The standard equation for corporate Enterprise Value is (Market cap+Total Debt – cash. At
today’s AR that equates to (1038 + (288-227)) and values AR.to at around U$1.1Bn. That’s
U$3.54 a share, higher than the company’s C$3.35 (U$2.68) but, as the chart above shows,
over the years, AR.to shares have traded very closely to its own enterprise value (EV), rarely
straying far from its overall ticket price on a per-share basis. Therefore, with current operations
set fair to deliver around 8c to 10c operating earnings per share, that is the amount of wealth
being created by the company in the period and no matter what it does with the money (pay
debt, use on Capex, send to treasury, etc), the EV and therefore the share price should improve
on the same per-share basis.
This gives us a baseline for investment in AR: So forget Magino, as just today’s operations will
add around 25c to 30c per share to Argonaut Gold in 2021, with a similar amount in 2022.
However, the real value addition comes when you consider what a fully-functioning Magino
means to AR and for that, let’s rough out today’s Island Gold in figures.
We begin with the corporate EV for AGI: Alamos currently has 392.7m shares out priced at
U$8.81, we then add the +$555m adjustment from the two required balance items (AGI has
always run a strong balance sheet) to its market cap of $3.48Bn. This brings an EV that’s as
close to U$4Bn that it no longer matters. The job now is to consider the importance of Island
Gold to the whole of AGI. As an operation, these days Island accounts for nearly half the
company’s book value and typically adds at least a third of operating and net profits to the
corporate whole. If we give credit for its long life and proven (rather than theorized) gold grade
increases, also its recent successful resource upside at depth, it’s not an exaggeration to value
designate at least a third of AGI’s current market cap to its flagship and star asset. In other
words, the Magino project currently being developed by AR next door, currently carried at
around $300m, one that is of very similar size, scope and gold production capacity, can be
reasonably estimated as a potential U$1Bn add to the books of AR, once developed and a
working mine. Back out the $300m in cash AR still needs to complete the build out, we arrive at
our estimate for the effect of Magino on AR.to shares as the mine moves into production. It
could add U$700m, of U$2.26 per share.
There is no personal buy decision today, so
instead of finishing this piece with a flourish
and a marketing spiel it closes quietly.
However, the value proposition on offer at AR
today is undeniable, those of you in the market
for a junior PM producer should put this
company high on your shortlist. We wrap with
the classic 12 month share price, its shape
reminding me a lot of the Copper Mountain
chart I bought in November.
Stocks to Follow
A largely flat week and, while there were eight losers too many (MAI.v, RIO.v, TMQ, AGC.v,
MIN.to, RYR.v, MIRL.cse), only Minera IRL (MIRL.cse down 15.0%) and TMQ (down 4.3%)
moved more than a penny with all other losers literally not more than a cent. The more positive
performances were also modest, with four small winners (WLF.v, GBR.v, ECR.v, AUL.v) and four
UNCHes (SMD.v, ALDE.v, QCCU.v, MENE.v). To the upside, the only outlier was Orezone (ORE.v
up 26.9%) which we sold anyway. That sale brings the number of open positions on our Stocks
to Follow list down to 15, our self-imposed maximum and I’m happy about that. Nine open
trades are in the green, four are in the red and two are unchanged, which could be better.
9

company Ticker this week Avg Price Reco date Current PPS Gain/Loss% Notes
TOP PICKS
Minera Alamos MAI.v STR BUY C$0.21 13-Oct-19 C$0.69 228.6% $1.14 tgt Aug'20, #1 idea
Rio2 Ltd. RIO.v STR BUY C$0.83 22-Apr-18 C$0.86 3.6% $1.58 tgt, finance capex due
Recommended stocks (In order of preference)
Trilogy Metals TMQ BUY U$1.84 15-Sep-19 U$2.86 55.4% Cu for 2021, going well
Amarillo Gold AGC.v STR BUY C$0.32 30-May-21 C$0.335 4.7% Gold developer awakening
Strategic Metals SMD.v STR BUY C$0.42 31-Jan-21 C$0.42 0.0% Canadian land asset bet
Excelsior Mining MIN.to STR BUY C$0.93 10-Mar-19 C$0.65 -30.1% Delayed, but still great value
Aldebaran Res. ALDE.v BUY C$0.68 16-May-21 C$0.69 1.5% Bet on big copper, pol risk okay
QC Copper &Gold QCCU.v STR BUY C$0.205 25-Apr-21 C$0.225 9.8% Cu Jr, fast-tracking resource
Royal Road Min. RYR.v BUY C$0.155 17-Mar-19 C$0.36 132.3% Model paying off in Nica
Wolfden Res. WLF.v spec buy C$0.30 11-Apr-21 C$0.325 8.3% near-term Zn trade
Great Bear Res GBR.v BUY C$15.83 26-Aug-20 C$16.51 4.3% Binary M&A trade, wait for print
Cartier Resources ECR.v hold C$0.32 21-Mar-21 C$0.305 -4.7% Binary M&A trade, wait for print
Aurelius Min. AUL.v spec buy C$0.75 28-Jun-20 C$0.53 -29.3% added 3 times, risky
Minera IRL MIRL.cse hold C$0.195 22-Jul-12 C$0.085 -56.4% CEO change will move stock
Long-term non-mining hold
Mene Inc. MENE.v LT Hold C$0.62 6-Dec-20 C$0.62 0.0% LT bet on jockey&horse,will add
Closed in 2021 closed close price
Fiore Gold F.v jan'21 C$0.98 21-May-20 C$1.17 19.4% closed as part of rebalance
Norsemont Mining NOM.cse feb'21 C$1.55 6-Sep-20 C$0.70 -54.8% Cut loser to reduce Au exp.
Element 29 Res ECU.v feb'21 C$0.49 7-Feb-21 C$0.54 10.2% Cut Peru exposure
Kuya Silver KUYA.cse feb'21 C$1.66 8-Nov-20 C$2.51 51.2% Cut Peru exposure
Pucara Gold TORO.v apr'21 C$0.65 4-Oct-20 C$0.26 -60.0% Cut loser, Peru risk call
Copper Mountain CMMC.to apr'21 C$1.40 22-Nov-20 C$4.18 198.6% tgt hit, profit taken
New Gold NGD may'21 U$0.76 9-Feb-20 U$2.14 181.6% Sold to buy AGC, nice win
Orezone Gold ORE.v jun'21 C$0.79 21-Jun-20 C$1.61 103.8% sold on pop, leaky boat
2015 to 2020 annual closed positions in appendices below, 2009 to 2014 closed positions in editions IKN553 or earlier
Now for notes on some of our covered stocks:
Orezone Inc (ORE.v): POSITION CLOSED. As per the Flash update of Tuesday midday (see
Appendix 1), this trade is now closed. A good win and no need to own any longer, the rant on
last week’s decision is in today’s intro. While still fully expecting Bomboré to be a success,
there’s enough doubt cast over the future of its share price to move on.
Amarillo Gold (AGC.v): Since breaking over 30c on the first day, this trade’s price action has
been very much as predicted. We had new news last week on some land consolidation around
the company’s second-strong Lavras do Sul project (2) which was a minor positive, without
ever being a catalyst. That remains firmly in the hands of the upcoming financing package and,
while we expect it to be in place come 3q21, we shouldn’t expect any more serious price moves
until it’s complete. This provides the clear opportunity in this trade, we have a window for all
the 33c and 35c you want and the opportunity to sell them higher to somebody else later on.
Aldebaran Resources (ALDE.v): Friday saw ALDE release the first of a series of in-house
videos designed to inform and educate the audience on the Altar deposit and project. Done in
the same style as the AntaKori series for Regulus, Friday was part one of many and is likely to
form the basis of a new marketing push by the company.
Minera IRL (MIRL.cse): MIRL’s share price took another downleg, ostensibly for the same
Peru political risk reasons as other companies exposed to the mess but really, because there
10

are no buyers for any modest seller. To its credit, the May month of production came in well at
Corihuarmi (3) and in the first two months of this quarter the company has sold 4,474oz, that’s
well ahead of guidance schedule for the year and welcome money with gold’s rally in May
MIRL: 2019/20 Corihuarmi gold prod & shipments, per month
11
9681 7051 3751 7902 7322 0731 6291 6662 3281 7412 0091 9581 4181 5261 6571 1602 4931 5641 5122 3102 9141 3122 0342 9871 3312
899
4472 5322
9322
4500
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500 1000
500
0
91naj bef ram rpa yam nuj luj gua pes tco von ced 02naj bef ram rpa yam nuj luj gua pes tco von ced 12naj bef ram rpa yam
Oz Au
contained oz
shipments
source: CSE
QC Copper & Gold (QCCU.v): It was QCCU’s turn up in front of Crux Investor last week, this
link (4) takes you to the Q&A with CEO Stephen Stewart, 37 minutes of in-depth on Opemiska,
QCCU and CEO Stewart expands the conversation to bring in his other “Ore Group” companies.
The best macro point he makes is one I’ve appreciated since my first pass contact with him
several years ago, his favourite phrase of “misplaced valuations”. He also agrees with me that
copper is in a secular bull market, which is good.
Rio2 Ltd (RIO.v:) Our Top Pick still hasn’t given up its financing news and, like AGC above,
isn’t going to move seriously until the package is known and agreed upon.
The Copper Basket
After twenty-three weeks of 2021, The Copper Basket shows a gain of 45.90% to level stakes.
company ticker price 1/1/21 Shares out Market Cap current pps gain/loss%
1 Solaris Res SLS.to 6.08 107.53 1284.98 11.95 96.5%
2 Copper Mtn CMMC.to 1.81 207.5 863.20 4.16 129.8%
3 Oroco Res OCO.v 1.85 186.96 635.66 3.40 83.8%
4 Marimaca Cop MARI.to 3.25 87.737 397.45 4.53 39.4%
5 Western Copper WRN.to 1.57 135.798 388.38 2.86 82.2%
6 Amerigo Res ARG.to 0.80 181.79 230.87 1.27 58.8%
7 Excelsior Min. MIN.to 1.12 273.585 177.83 0.65 -42.0%
8 Aldebaran Res. ALDE.v 0.455 125.24 86.42 0.69 51.6%
9 Regulus Res. REG.v 1.07 101.85 82.50 0.81 -24.3%
10 C3 Metals CCCM.v 0.115 438.56 70.17 0.16 39.1%
11 Doré Copper DCMC.v 1.00 53.304 50.11 0.94 -6.0%
12 Chakana Cop PERU.v 0.60 111.41 36.77 0.33 -45.0%
13 Element 29 Res ECU.v 0.45 68.281 34.14 0.50 11.1%
14 US Copper USCU.v 0.105 87.53 21.01 0.24 128.6%
15 Chibougamau CBG.v 0.165 53.077 16.19 0.305 84.8%
NB: All stocks in CAD$ Portfolio avg 45.90%
The Copper Basket saw the average drop The Copper Basket 2021, weekly evolution
70%
for the second week running, the trend
against the sector last week meant only five 60%
stocks improved (SLS.to, OCO.v, MARI.to, 50%
REG.v, ECU.v), while one remained 40%
unchanged (ALDE.v). The remaining nine
30%
were week-on-week losers and while there
20%
were several in the somewhat painful 6%
10%
0%
ts1
naJ
t01naJ ht71 ht42 ts13 ht7bef ht41 ts12 ht82 ht7ram ht41 ts12 ht82 ht4rpa ht11 ht81 ht52 n2yam ht9 ht61 dr32 ht03 ht6nuj ht31
source: IKN calcs

to 8% loss range, the only big drop came from Chakana Copper (PERU.v down 23.3%) and
under the circumstances, I am not surprised.
Copper did what it was supposed to do:
Though the July contract is still the nearest date traded now, the market has started to roll its
positions over and as a result, we’re now on HGU and the September contract. We could fixate
on the Friday rally that brought the metal back toward the U$4.60/lb line, equally we could
comment on the dip to U$4.45/lb early in the week as the US Dollar gained some strength.
However, that’s more about the USD and less about the metal and we continue to assume
medium-term consolidation at the current U$4.50/lb level, a call that drives our decision to
move out of medium-scale producers (e.g. CMMC) and into smaller copper juniors (e.g. QCCU).
Now for our regular slot, the weekly copper inventories coverage:
 World copper stocks lost a total of 15,085 metric tonnes (mt) last week, that0s a big
hole in a tight market and enough to see spot prices start to rise again. The total this
weekend is 365,269 and the world is starting to buy again.
 The but move was at SHFE, down 20,744mt to close at 180,967mt, under the 200k line
as seasonal de-stocking begins. The timing is normal, the worry is that SHFE doesn’t
have much copper left in its tank.
 At the LME, cancelled warrants are down to 9.8% of the total stock this weekend,
132,450mt. That rose by 7,775mt on the week and hs the look of arbitrage with SHFE,
though the low level of cancelled warrants also suggest low physical outflows in the
days to come. However, the larger picture is still a very tight for LME copper, this is still
a clear bullish signal.
 COMEX saw another modest depletion, this time down 2,116mt to close at 51,852mt.
Here’s Shanghai-only inventories, the first draw down of the 2021 Northern summer is in and
we should now watch to see how fast it takes our 150k and then approaches the key 100k line
that will really make the pips squeak:
Shanghai Futures Exchange Warehouse Stocks, 2014 to date
400000
350000
300000
250000
200000
150000
100000
50000
0
12 ht5naj ht61 ht52 dr3gua ht21 ts12 5102
ts1ram
ht01 ht91 ht72 ht6ced ht41 ht42 6102
dr3luJ
ht11 ht72 ht5beF ht61 ht52 7102
dr3pes
ht21 ts12 8102
ts1rpa
ht71 ht62 8102
ht4von
9102
ht31naj
ht42 9102
dn2nuj
ht11 ht02 ht92 ht8 ht71 0202ht62luj ht4tco 0202ht31ced ts12 1202dn2yam
Mt Cu
|
source: Cochilco

Now for some notes on a few basket stocks:
Final group update on the Peru copper stocks (REG.v, PERU.v, CCCM.v, ECU.v): With
the election now behind us and the topic in full view to the world, today’s should be the last
general overview. As the five day chart indicates, Element27 (ECU.v) had a decent week, while
the rest of the complex was mainly unchanged. Of our little bunch, only Chakana (PERU.v)
under-performed and we have some words on that stock below.
A focus on Chakana Copper (PERU.v): It was not a surprise to watch PERU.v slide badly at
the same time as Keiko Fujimori’s chances of governing for the next five years were
disappearing, because if anyone junior knows the
corrupting power of the Fujimorista party and its
members, it’s this one. During 2018 and 2019, the
Chakana Copper Country Manager in Peru, Juan
Valdivia, managed to embezzle $569.7m from the
company. When the ongoing crime was finally
discovered in September 2019 Valdivia was fired
and agreed to give up the 4, options in PERU.v he
owned, but the company didn’t get a penny of the
cash back and neither did it press criminal charges
against him. That’s because Valdivia is the son of
one of the Fujimorista stalwarts, Finance Minister
for the country under the Alan Garcia mandate of
15 years ago. Uch matters do not go unnoticed in Peru’s Ministry of Mining, not least because
Juan Valdivia was point man for the company for all its permittingwhile he was at the company
(and draining it of funds for his own use). To sum up, two years ago Chakana was ripped off by
the scion of a corrupt Fujimorista politician and decided to turn a blind eye. To put it mildly,
that’s not going to go down well under any new minister chosen by Pedro Castillo (5) and this
desk strongly suspects that last week’s persistent selling in the stock is connected to that fact.
Copper Mountain (CMMC.to): A reminder that cost creep is inevitable in mining comes in
the CMMC AGM results NR. While all directors were voted up and overwhelmingly in the 90%
ranges, the company hit more headwinds with its Say On Pay policy, which was approved by a
lesser 74%. It is time to call BS, loudly and clearly, on all types of “keeping costs under control”
talk now prevalent among mining companies. They can talk the talk, but it’s clear even the
people supposedly keen on controlling costs are quick to add to them when it suits. Technology
and efficiencies are out there to have, but there is no getting round…
 The price of rebar
 The price of sulphuric acid
 The price of a semi-skilled workforce
 The price of executive talent that can go elsewhere
 The price of webinar segments
13

…and a hundred other inputs. CMMC on executive pay is one example and in fact, it’s set to be
one of the least affected companies thanks to
its strong margins at current copper prices
and the CMC AGM results are a topical
reminder of a wider dynamic, no matter what
the metal mined may be. In mining in 2021,
every extra $100 added to the price of an
ounce of gold going forward does not mean
$100/oz added to company margins.
The Producer Basket
After twenty-three weeks of 2021, the Producer Basket shows a gain of 0.42% to level stakes.
company ticker price 1/1/20 Shares out Mkt Cap (U$Bn) current pps gain/loss%
1 Newmont NEM 59.89 805 56.60 70.31 17.4%
2 Barrick GOLD 22.78 1778.04 41.30 23.23 2.0%
3 Agnico Eagle AEM 70.51 244.187 17.41 71.28 1.1%
4 Kirkland Lake KL 41.27 267.056 11.52 43.15 4.6%
5 Kinross Gold KGC 7.34 1261.07 9.85 7.81 6.4%
6 Pan American PAAS 34.71 210.262 6.63 31.52 -9.2%
7 Endeavour Min EDV.to 29.62 252.568 6.34 30.11 1.7%
8 B2Gold BTG 5.60 1051.697 5.18 4.93 -12.0%
9 Alamos Gold AGI 8.75 392.739 3.46 8.81 0.7%
10 Pretium Res PVG 11.48 187.833 1.98 10.52 -8.4%
Prices in U$ except EDV.to (share price in CAD$ and mkt cap in approx USD) Port. avg 0.42%
A negative week for the PM producer sector, also reflected in our basket that had just three
winners (AEM, KL, EDV.to), with the other seven were losers. However, all moves were small in
either direction and the biggest shift was the drop in Pretium (PVG down 2.6%), nothing to
write home about. The gap between the underperforming basket and the GDX benchmark
remained the same, give or take a tenth. It would take a rally in under-performers such as BTG
and PAAS to put that right.
The 2021 Producer Basket: Percentage difference between
GDX benchmark and basket (negative = IKN basket ahead) 7.0%
6.0%
5.0%
4.0%
3.0%
2.0%
1.0%
0.0%
A quiet week, inertia was the only signal from the larger producers.
14
ts1
naJ
t01naJ ht71 ht42 ts13 ht7bef ht41 ts12 ht82 ht7ram ht41 ts12 ht82 ht4rpa ht11 ht81 ht52 n2yam ht9 ht61 dr32 ht03 ht6nuj ht31
The 2021 Producer Basket: Weekly performance and 20%
comparative to GDX control
15%
10%
5%
0%
-5%
-10%
-15%
-20%
source: IKN calcs, NYSE/Nasdaq/TSX data
ts1
naJ
t01naJ ht71 ht42 ts13 ht7bef ht41 ts12 ht82 ht7ram ht41 ts12 ht82 ht4rpa ht11 ht81 ht52 n2yam ht9 ht61 dr32 ht03 ht6nuj ht31
basket
gdx control
source: Google, IKN Calcs

The Tiny Dogs
After twenty-three weeks of 2021, the Tiny Dogs show a gain of 4.02% to level stakes.
company ticker price 1/1/21 Shares out Mkt Cap current pps gain/loss%
Antler Gold ANTL.v 0.205 61.348 8.28 0.135 -34.1%
Aston Bay BAY.v 0.045 163.975 8.20 0.05 11.1%
Constantine Met CEM.v 0.17 45.4 11.12 0.245 44.1%
Contact Gold C.v 0.115 240.757 22.87 0.095 -17.4%
Golden Pursuit GDP.v 0.22 40 5.20 0.13 -40.9%
Manitou Gold MTU.v 0.045 230.79 18.46 0.08 77.8%
Precipitate Gold PRG.v 0.240 106.241 15.40 0.145 -39.6%
QC Copper QCCU.v 0.315 105 23.63 0.225 -28.6%
Red Pine Expl RPX.v 0.400 95.806 72.81 0.76 90.0%
Warrior Gold WAR.v 0.090 91.818 6.43 0.07 -22.2%
Prices in CAD$, data from TSXV basket avg 4.02%
This section attempts to track the tinycap mining sub-sector of the market, our ten companies
chosen under the following criteria to put together a list representing the state of play in the
sub-sector of tinycap exploration company stocks. At least, that’s the plan.
 Market capitalization of under $20m. They have to be tiny. In two cases I’ve stretched the window a
little and allowed sub-U$20m market capper in that are just over the C$20m level, but the spirit is unaltered.
 A “non broken” stock price and project story. There are literally hundreds of tinycap juniors of the right
size, but it was a particularly depressing exercise to trawl through the whole of the TSXV and find companies
that are small enough, but with life in them. The vast majority of sub-$20m stocks are broken stocks, either
traded to death on the exchange or with projects that are a bust or with entrenched management more
interested in their monthly paycheck than anything else.
 Likelihood of meaningful newsflow in 2020. This connects to the company’s “unbroken” status, as we
want news and potential catalysts from companies with projects that can work.
 Decent management if possible. When you are down among the little guys it doesn’t pay to be too
choosy, but still I preferred companies that have teams or people with good peer reputations.
A mixed bag of a week, with five winners (BAY.v, CEM.v, C.v, GDP.v, PRG.v), three losers
(MTU.v, RPX.v, WAR.v) and two unchanged stocks (ANTL.v, QCCU.v), with once again the main
story being the lack of movement in either direction and prices that showed no direction. The
only outlier in this list was Aston Bay (BAY.v), where one added penny to the share price was
enough for a 25.0% gain on the week. These aren’t called the tiny dogs for nothing, you know.
NB: Please be clear that The Tiny Dogs is NOT a list of recommended tinycap stocks. It is a list of companies with
market caps of under $20m offering a reasonable representation of the wider tinycaps market. It is possible that in the
future I may buy shares in one or several of these stocks, but at the moment both my opinion and my wallet are strictly
neutral.
Regional politics
The never-ending Peru Presidential election
Subjects covered in today’s only Regional Politics note:
 Results of the Peru election
 Likelihood that Pedro Castillo is not the next President
 Confirmed make-up of Congress
 The role of Congress in the upcoming administration
 An updated call on Peru political risk
Before we get into the weeds, let’s do some plain numbers and, this weekend with 99.89% of
votes counted, Pedro Castillo holds 50.15% of valid votes and Keiko Fujimori holds 49.85% of
valid votes. It might not be much, but by a slim margin Pedro Castillo is the de facto, though
not official, President–Elect of Peru. However, this ongoing 15-headed hydra nightmare of an
election still isn’t over yet. Castillo has not been called the winner yet because Keiko Fujimori
15

and the Fuerza Popular party have decided to contest the vote, bringing claims of fraud against
802 of the acts of tabulated votes. The way in which she has done it is via legal obstruction that
may take even weeks to resolve, with some commentators now voicing doubts that the normal
July 28th handover date can be honoured. The legal injunctions got plenty of initial support from
the right wing media in Peru, but the atmosphere this weekend quickly changed to animosity
toward Keiko, as it turns out the vast majority of the 802 “fraudulent ballots” have been queried
for the most specious of reasons, such as “her signature doesn’t look the same as on her ID
card”.
The other major dynamic this weekend is nerves and protests, as the other part of Keiko
Fujimori’s strategy is to attempt to destabilize the country. The current interim Sagasti
government gains nothing from heightened tensions in Peru today. As acting authority, by far
its most important role in the next month and a half will be to deliver the country to the
handover date as peacefully as possible. Same for the near-certain winner of the 2021 run-off,
Pedro Castillo, with everything to gain from calming the atmosphere and has made several
comments and public announcements to the effect this weekend. That it may not have been so
if the result were different is academic, he and his Perú Libre (PL) party are now the virtual
government as from end July 2021. However, Keiko Fujimori has a lot to gain from stirring up
trouble. It is again zero surprise to see accusations of voter fraud and legal injunctions placed
against the election results and the official Peruvian electoral body, the Jurado Nacional (JNE,
though admittedly it was more of a surprise to see self-titled defender of democracy, Mario
Vargas Llosa, also go all-in on Keiko’s flimsy claims of voter fraud. MVLL made enough public
noise and raised the temperature in Peru chattering classes to such an extent that President
Sagasti intervened, asking MVLL to ST_U (in more diplomatic terms than I, for sure).
However Keiko most blatant move came yesterday Saturday, the “Fuerza Popular” (FP) party
organizing “spontaneous” marches (to avoid Covid laws by mocking them) that descended on
the centre of Lima from various localities around the city. All illegal and the marches caused the
postponement of the day’s rounds of vaccinations in the capital (slow, though the roll-out is,
they are giving shots). At the same time on Saturday, Keiko Fujimori ran a press conference for
foreign journalists in which (and we quote here Twitter feed, “I told the world about the hard
battle we are fighting for Peruvians, in order not to fall into the hands of Communism.” The
present tense of the language, despite having been beaten in an election deemed free and fair
by all outside observers, shows she will fight at every corner. It’s going to be very difficult task
to make accusations of fraud and electoral ballot stuffing stick, but that won’t stop Keiko and
the FP party from causing as much social agitation in the meantime.
Can Keiko bludgeon her way to the Presidency? The real answer is “no” and Castillo will
become the next President, but that detail won’t stop her and Keiko is now dangerous because
she has very little to lose. The corruption charges that landed her in remand in jail last year
have not gone away, what’s more the (rather spleen-driven) fiscal in charge of her case has
just added more charges, saying she has broken the terms of her conditional release during the
campaign and must now go back to prison. If found guilty, faces up to 23 years in jail (and
FWIW the evidence against her is overwhelming, with plenty of accomplices having turned
State’s witness against her and a clear paper trail of corruption on show). Therefore, it’s also
worth considering that Keiko is trying to create some personal leverage and a bargaining chip, it
wouldn’t be a surprise to hear her conditional liberty upheld as putting her back in the slammer
may rile up the mob again.
With the present day outlined, we move our focus to the near future and attempt to outline the
most likely reality for Peru, from now to roughly August. To begin, expect a lengthy legal battle
from Keiko and her lawyers, even uncertainty on the handover date, but we must now assume
Pedro Castillo gets the job. That’s the executive we expect, we now turn our attention to its
counterweight the new 2021 to 2026 Congress. It took until this week to get confirmed
numbers of seats for each party, here’s the split of the 130 seat house, plus a note on each
party in brackets:
16

Perú Libre: 37 seats (Pedro Castillo, hard left wing)
Fuerza Popular: 24 (Keiko Fujimori, populist right wing)
Acción Popular: 16 (a political board church, socially conservative)
Alianza para el Progreso: 15 (right wing)
Renovación Popular: 13 (right wing)
Avanza País: 13 (right wing/libertarian)
Podemos Perú: 5 (hard right wing)
Juntos por el Perú: 5 (left wing Socialist)
Somos Perú: 5 (Centre)
Partido Morado: 3 (Centre)
For the last 30 years the magic number in Peru politics has been 66, that for a simple majority
in parliament. This brings up the issue seen in several analysis notes on the Peru election and
its fall-out that have passed this desk, the new consensus that Pedro Castillo’s government is
going to have a hard time in pushing reforms through this Congress. Its natural allies are
Juntos por el Perú and Somos Perú, and while the governing party could get ad-hoc support
from members of Accion Popular and the Morado parties. But even so, PL would need every
one of those votes to show up if the opposition right/hard right wing bloc decides to get
adhesive in the upcoming parliament. This numerical reality has caused many people to assume
Castillo is walking into a Dead Duck government, one that won’t be able to change Peru much
or get its reforms through. I’d certainly agree with that for the more radical proposals out of PL,
but it’s not as simple as getting out a calculator and reaching the magic 66.
What’s more important is the political capital of the first weeks of his government. Assuming we
get to the July 28th handover of power in good shape, we then hear President Castillo’s maiden
speech to Congress, highly significant moment in the Peru political calendar and one that maps
out his political strategy for the next five years. The last week in July is far more important than
any Keiko noise today as on that day, Peru as a political and economic entity goes one of two
ways in the near-term:
1) Congress decides, grudgingly, to work with the Castillo cabinet. This is a formal
procedure in Peru, where a President government picks their Prime Minister and suite
of ministers. Then Congress must give the PM and his cabinet approval via a vote, at
which point they are officially in the job.
2) Congress decides to be obstructionist and refuses to ratify Castillo’s executive team.
This is a far more dangerous course, as though the process will take some time and
we’re talking weeks/months rather than days, but it’s the direct route to Castillo
dissolving Congress and attempting to run the country by executive decree.
This gives more optics on the comment at the end of last week’s edition as we waited and
waited and waited for a result from the Peruvian electoral body:
“…Commie rhetoric or not, there’s not going to be a “blood on the streets” moment (in
the first year or two at least). Those thinking along the same lines and interested in
picking up longer-term value may want to wait until the new President, whoever she
or he is, is sworn in and the first week of August, when the new government will start
rolling out its high priority law projects. My best guess is that window will provide the
cheapest and easiest entry points for those of you with the required stomach and
patience, no matter who wins out once ONPE has tallied all the votes.”
In the first week of August, we’ll know whether Congress will play along with Castillo for the
near term (they won’t long-term, but that’s for another day) and then we’ll be in position to
make a more informed call on Peru’s mining sector, buy/sell/hold. If the scenario is 1), we
expect Castillo’s first move to be some sort of State burden increase for the mining sector (my
personal best guess a new windfall tax, as it will be easier to legislate). With his cabinet given
approval just days previously, Congress could not oppose the measure and Castillo gets his
flagship win against capitalism. That’s would be bad news for stocks exposed to the country,
but once the mining companies have adjusted their share prices accordingly they may be a buy.
17

However, if the scenario is 2) you won’t be hearing any buy calls on Peru from this desk. If
Congress decides to oppose, obstruct and stop a President Castillo from implementing any of
the policies from his manifesto, trouble will brew very quickly in Peru. As things stand today, I
simply do not know which way the country is going to jump, whether it’s going to be trouble
sooner or later. However, one scenario you should all wipe from your heads that of Peru “Going
Commie” or its democracy being usurped from the inside by hardline lefties. Peru’s institutions
may be politically and institutionally weak, but if mob rule starts to gain momentum nobody in
their right mind should expect the Peruvian military or police forces to step in and come down
hard on right-wingers up in arms about Communists. This is not Venezuela and never will be,
Peru’s officer stock are born and bred to the right wing, and the mere thought of any branch of
the armed forces under the control of some nefarious left wing insurgency is laughable. In that
respect, Castillo will find he has to tread carefully, but we are now getting ahead of ourselves.
The two most important moments for Peru’s politics are 1) when Castillo is ratified and 2) when
Congress decides to vote his cabinet up or down. That’s August, so until then the best advice
from these pages is to watch Peru until then without getting involved.
Market Watching
Mene Inc (MENE.v) and its excellent 1q21 (in CAD$)
A subject left unresolved from last weekend, today we cast plenty of light on the preliminary
sales and financial numbers out of our non-
mining play, the precious metals online
retailer with its own 24k niche, Mene Inc
(MENE.v).
On Monday May 31st in this NR (6)MENE.v
gave us its 1q21 financial results. As noted
on this chart (right), the results were greeted
by cheer and 130k volume on the day, but
the way in which the market’s attention
quickly moved on indicates that I wasn’t the
only person to let MENE’s results quarter
become a sleeper. That’s good news for us,
because here and now two weeks later we
can still enjoy the same bargain entry point
into a company that we’ve always marked as a bargain and a jewel in the making, but is now
growing even better and faster than expected. We now dive into the numbers in the usual way
with a final reminder that in this note, all dollars are Canadian unless otherwise stated.
We begin at the beginning, with top line revenues:
MENE: Revenues per qtr
8 7.11 7.203
7
6 5.157 5.423
4.654
5
4 3.51 3.218 3.439
3
2.7332.457
1.986
2 1.039 1.393
1
0
18
81q1 81q2 81q3 81q4 91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1
C$m
source: company filings
A blowout quarter, even better than the Christmas period sales and while driven to some extent
by higher prices for gold, MENE physical sales (below) managed to get within 12% of the

Christmas period number.
MENE: Precious metals sales in Kg, per qtr
80
70
60
50
40 75
67.7
30 53 50 56 20 44 39
10
0
3q19 4q19 1q20 2q20 3q20 4q20 1q21
source: MENE, IKN ests
19
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ronim
htiw(
uA
gK
That’s impressive and to frame the growth, consider once again these data from the US
Department of Commerce:
US Jewelry Sales Seasonality
(source US dept of Commerce)
Q1
19.0%
Q4
39.5%
Q2
21.6%
Q3
19.9%
One would normally expect a jewelry company with North America and Europe as its main
customers to see low sales in Q1, instead MENE delivered a record. As for costs, they stayed
under control as our combo chart shows:
MENE.v: Costs breakdown
976.1868.0 424.1361.1
998.1
777.1
757.1
725.2
255.2
450.2
38.1
159.1
867.1
465.2
997.2
557.3
127.1
441.4
582.1
125.2
133.1
548.3
319.1
914.5
35.1
664.5
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
81q1 81q2 81q3 81q4 91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1
$m
COGS operating exp
source: company filings,IKN ests
The above adds the MENE COGS numbers (they use for gross profit) to the “operating
expenditures” number (cost of making/selling/transporting/etc) to give a better idea of real
costs, the result of 1q21 seen here (right). To
the surprise of many, your author included, 1 MENE.v: Operating income, per qtr
MENE managed to return not just this operating
0.5
profit of C$0.207m, but also a net profit of
C$0.672m. The bottom line to the quarter 0
operations: Outstanding. Much better than -0.5
expected and while reliable YoY growth
-1
comparatives are non-existent in 2021 thanks
-1.5
to Covid-19, seeing sales get close to 4q20 in
kilos and beat them in dollars was most -2
-2.5
81q1 81q2 81q3 81q4 91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1
C$m
source: company filings

impressive. To wrap up the section on operations, here’s the overview chart, in which I’ve
added operating profit to show how the business model has developed to the point where
MENE moves into standard operational profitability.
MENE:v: Revenues and gross profit, per qtr
7.11 7.20
5.16 5.42
4.65
3.51 3.22 3.44
2.73 2.46 1.99
1.39 1.04
20
71.0 32.0 12.0
89.0 86.0 06.0 00.1
04.1
10.1 29.0
85.1 96.1 47.1
C$m
8.0 revenues
7.0 gross profit
6.0 op profit
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
-1.0
-2.0
1q18 2q18 3q18 4q18 1q19 2q19 3q19 4q19 1q20 2q20 3q20 4q20 1q21
source: company filings
We move to the balance sheet and more good news, this company is run impeccably. The
balance sheet side of MENE’s results was also interesting, as although the house best guess of
total assets of $27m was very close to reality ($26.774m) the way in which the money was
distributed was very different to my guesses. MENE has elected to stock up, adding plenty of
inventory in Q1 (and with gold rising, we applaud that move).
MENE.v: Assets, per qtr
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
81q4 91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1
$m cash inventories ST Inv other
source: company filings, IKN ests
This means cash is lower in the 1q21 snapshot, but zero issues here. MENE keeps C$5m in a
time deposit getting a bit of interest and has stated it expects to have enough liquidity for all
operations this year. As inventory sells down, cash will increase in Q2 and to detail that item,
this chart:
MENE: Inventories per qtr
C$m
20 Supplies
18 Finished Goods
Work in Prog
16
Raw Mat.
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
4q18 1q19 2q19 3q19 4q19 1q20 2q20 3q20 4q20 1q21
source: company filings
It’s good to see work in progress expanding, the implication obvious to all. Equally likeable is
the now steady state of finished good inventory, which has been at over $12m for two quarters
and built to the satisfaction of CEO Sebag. This means liquidity, with no extra revenue needed
to build precious metals stock. It came into 1q21 at C$12.8m and left at $12.4m, which means
they even had the luxury of toggling with cash flow at the right time. Enough to allow them to
return modest operating net profits, but indicative of a company that’s changing gears and
coming out of its loss making start-up period.

Moving back to the balance sheet and liabilities, the big change is the paying down on the note
to one of the founder investors, who took cash
and shares. To clear up a small confusion in my
MENE.v: Liabilities Breakdown per qtr
preview of a couple of weeks ago, I took 40
borrowings down to zero by mistake and the 35
above chart is now correct. The result is to see 30
MENE’s equity (a decent proxy on its working 25
capital, which MENE reported slightly higher at 20
$16.5m) move up to C$15.972m, the weight of 15
debt off its shoulders. 10
5
There are so many things to like about the way 0
this company has moved into profitability, the
model has worked and sales growth has been
sharper in 2021 than most of us expected. The
prudent financial strategy at MENE, shown via a
balance sheet kept in good shape all though
the loss-making phase, is now ready to pay off
in cash flow and bottom line profits.
Discussion and conclusion
A great financial quarter from MENE, but
instead of highlighting any of the growth
numbers in the results I’m going to finish by
highlighting one line item, that of advertising
where expenditures remain low. That along
with other metrics offered by MENE in its NR
and MD&A tell us its advertising and marketing
program is working well. Based on largely word of mouth and often via social gatherings of high
net worth people, MENE uses social influencer type sponsors and well-regarded local figures to
promote the brand. The chart shows the cost to the company of that strategy compared to the
more traditional types of marketing used by the company previously:
MENE.v: Advertising expenses, per qtr
C$m
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
3q18 4q18 1q19 2q19 3q19 4q19 1q20 2q20 3q20 4q20 1q21
source: company filings
The strategy is clearly working and, aside from the near-term results, points us to the longer
term and more exciting levels of value addition from companies like MENE. We mining guys
tend to forget, as brand good will is rarely spotted on a mining company balance sheet, but
they way in which MENE reports continued and increasing media coverage in its target market
and that a full 64% of its sales are from repeat customers screams loudly that MENE is creating
a brand in front of our eyes. What’s more, a brand in the luxury goods/services sector where
such things become worth untold amounts of money.
 I read this weekend (7) 2021’s must-have handbag is from Hermés and made of
fungus. Prices start at $3,500, don’t expect discount for bulk.
 If you just want to know the time, think twice before paying $30,000 for an entry-level
21
81q4 91q1 91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1
source: company filings/IKN ests
srallod
fo
snoillim
note payable
other liab
borrowings
22 MENE.v: Equity per qtr
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
91q2 91q3 91q4 02q1 02q2 02q3 02q4 12q1
source company filings/IKN ests
srallod
fo
snoillim

Patek Philippe
 When you walk into Tiffany’s, you know you’ll pay for the box as well as the piece and
are happy to do so.
Those and all the other marques you and I admire, the more the word “Mene” gets brand
attachment to “24k investment jewelry”, the higher the share price no matter the bottom line
profits. As Jeff Bezos knows, good will goes to the balance sheet, not the P+L. With 243.998m
shares out, we calculate everything for MENE from 224m shares and this weekend’s C$0.62
share price give the company a market cap of C$151.3m, or U$121m using the standard house
0.8/1 forex. This is no longer subjectively cheap, this is cheap:
 An established and growing retail operation
 Dedicated and established online platform, ready at the right time
 For all intents and purposes now a profitable company and financially stable
 Fast sales growth and future profitability easily mapped
 Successful niche market of high net worth customers
 Increasing brand awareness and the potential for a luxury brand in the making
In previous updates on MENE, the call was to be on and positioned for the period when this
company moves into profit-making territory, becomes and self-funding enterprise and then
starts to grow using its own organic cash. That time has come and probably two or three
quarters earlier than expected, but MENE is now a financially steady, money-making retailer. No
small thing and Roy Sebag is going to become a very rich man through his company. The good
news is that due to its clean and transparent way of business, we can benefit as well by going
along on his ride. You should all own a few shares of this company, no matter if you lump them
in with your mining stocks or not.
Conclusion
IKN629 is done, we end with bullet points:
 Argonaut Gold (AR.to) stands out as a value proposition in the midcaps, the blueprint
and value of Island Gold is all it needs to repeat in order to double the stock price.
 Mene Inc (MENE.v) is developing well, at some point the rest of the world will eake up
to the fact and all the quiet, 60c trading will be consigned to history. This stock is going
a lot higher.
 Peru is a mess and I may have to leave the country. That’s my problem, for the time
being the best course of action is to wait on the sidelines and act according to what
goes down in August, rather than June or July.
 Even with four substantial notes, I managed to get the weekly done in 25 pages today.
That’s a welcome change, or I least I think so. Open to opinions.
I thank you in advance for any feedback. Our Top Pick stocks are Minera Alamos (MAI.v) and
Rio2 Ltd (RIO.v). Flash updates will be sent if required by events.
I wish you good trading fortune, ladies and gentlemen.
Best, Mark
22

Footnotes, appendices, references, disclaimer
(1) https://www.bigmarker.com/ftmig1/VID-IV-Day-1-Company-6?bmid=c6a8bd7f78b5
(2) https://amarillogold.com/investors/news/news-details/2021/Amarillo-consolidates-highly-prospective-land-package-
for-Lavras-do-Sul/default.aspx
(3) https://webfiles.thecse.com/MIRL-CSE_Form_7-Monthly_Progress_Report-May-
2021.pdf?hdbUYX_feBqkNU_Xcw3QExoPCbc9XLOO
(4) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-CDzyQFUnqA
(5) https://www.chakanacopper.com/news/2019/chakana-announces-filing-of-annual-and-q1-financial-statements-and-
md-a/
(6) https://finance.yahoo.com/news/mene-inc-reports-financial-results-210000619.html
(7) https://www.theguardian.com/fashion/2021/jun/12/its-this-seasons-must-have-hermes-bag-and-its-made-from-fungus
Appendix 1: Flash update dated Tuesday June 8th 2021
Good Tuesday to you, just gone midday locally.
Selling Orezone (ORE.v)
On due consideration on the news and price action in Orezone (ORE.v) on the back of this morning's news...
https://newsletter.adnetcms.com/l/892fV5RVEYo4N1Gb4s3sGi1Q/fbRryrKg7Mrrbh3xrFW763Wg/KwRD6reUxTUZH621
Zn0m892g
...of strong out-step and resource drill results from Bomboré, I am going to sell my position in Orezone (ORE.v) and take
profits. Reasons:
1) It's now a double and ORE has never been a core position. That cash for portfolio treasury will be very useful in the
weeks to come.
2) The way ORE rose yesterday was clear inside trading. Though the result is positive this time, it can quickly work
against shareholders who are not part of the special information insider circle on any future occasion.
3) With 16 open positions on the Stocks to Follow list, I am due a little active management on the portfolio.
A good win for the portfolio and the right time to leave, as despite the image it portrays, there is really no reason to
expose money to the shadier end of the mining world. We leave this company to its fate, expect a closing price on the
ORE trade plus a few extra comments on the subject in IKN629, this Sunday. Best, Mark
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2020
Closed in 2020 closed close price
TMAC Resources TMR.to Jan'20 C$3.41 20-Dec-19 C$3.61 5.9% TLS flip play, sold new year
Regulus Res REG.v Jan'20 C$1.10 20-Dec-19 C$1.30 18.2% TLS flip play, profit taken
Bonterra Res BTR.v Jan'20 C$1.90 9-Dec-19 C$1.66 -12.6% TLS flip play, loss taken
McEwen Mining MUX Jan'20 U$1.12 2-Dec-19 U$1.18 5.4% TLS flip play, profit taken
Core Gold CGLD.v Jan'20 C$0.255 7-Apr-19 C$0.305 19.6% arb trade, profit taken
HudBay Min HBM Jan'20 U$3.56 9-Dec-19 U$3.36 -5.6% TLS flip play, loss taken
Midas Gold MAX.to Feb'20 C$0.71 5-Jan-20 C$0.57 -19.7% sm & silly trade
Warrior Gold WAR.v Feb'20 C$0.08 3-Aug-18 C$0.05 -31.3% clean out non-perf sm stocks
Contact Gold C.v Feb'20 C$0.40 19-Aug-18 C$0.18 -55.0% clean out non-perf sm stocks
Sandstorm Gold SAND Feb'20 U$3.73 17-Apr-16 U$7.21 93.3% Sold during port rebalance
NexGen Energy NXE Feb'20 U$1.20 2-Dec-19 U$1.06 -11.7% TLS flip play, loss taken
MAG Silver MAG Apr'20 U$8.95 1-Mar-20 U$10.07 12.5% Sold to cut silver exposure
Alexco Res AXU Apr'20 U$1.69 7-Sep-17 U$1.69 0.0% sold to close Ag exp. in FY20
Bonterra Res BTR.v Jun'20 C$1.62 2-Feb-20 C$1.10 -32.1% under-performer cash moved
Regulus Res REG.v Jun'20 C$0.64 6-Apr-15 C$0.79 23.4% moved $ TMQ/MIN & Au stocks
Great Panther GPR.to Aug'20 C$0.60 21-Jun-20 C$1.10 83.3% Profit taken, good trade
Jaguar Mining JAG.v Aug'20 C$0.42 21-Jun-20 C$0.65 54.8% Profit taken, good trade
Sandstorm Gold SAND Aug'20 U$7.76 10-May-20 U$9.37 20.7% Profit taken, good trade
Integra Resources ITR.v Aug'20 C$2.23 13-Aug-18 C$5.40 142.2% Profit taken, good trade
Wesdome Gold WDO.to Aug'20 C$2.37 14-Oct-17 C$14.82 525.3% last 1/2 of big win closed
INV Metals INV.to Sep'20 C$0.40 17-May-20 C$0.45 12.5% Cut all Ecuador exposure
Cartier Resources ECR.v Nov'20 C$0.155 3-Aug-18 C$0.25 67.7% Exact close price TBA
Tinka Res TK.v Dec'20 C$0.195 19-Apr-16 C$0.195 0.0% Closed on a round trip fail
2015 to 2019 annual closed positions in appendices below, 2009 to 2014 closed positions in editions IKN553 or earlier
23

Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2019
Closed in 2019 closed close price
Atico Mining ATY.v jan'19 C$0.55 24-Jul-16 C$0.32 41.8% patience ran out, made room
Candente Copper DNT.to jan'19 C$0.075 3-Ago-18 C$0.05 -33.3% tiny trade, made room for new
B2Gold BTO.to feb'19 C$2.11 12-Set-14 C$4.05 91.9% Took 1/2 profits, reduce size
Western Copper WRN.to mar'19 C$0.80 20-Ene-19 C$0.81 1.3% Spec trade that didn't work
B2Gold BTO.to mar'19 C$2.11 12-Set-14 C$4.15 96.7% Took rest of profit.
GT Gold GTT.v mar'19 C$1.17 10-Oct-18 C$0.90 -23.1% Took loss. Story changed
NovaGold NG apr'19 U$3.84 13-Ene-19 U$4.15 -8.1% Short that didn't work, sm loss
Zinc One Z.v jun'19 C$0.47 14-Set-17 C$0.025 -94.7% clearing out dead trade
Amarillo Gold AGC.v jun'19 C$0.24 22-Ago-18 C$0.20 -16.7% clearing out dead trade
New Gold NGD aug'19 U$1.44 31-Jul-19 U$1.23 14.6% ST short win thru Q2 earnings
IMPACT Silver IPT.v aug'19 C$0.39 21-Jul-19 C$0.46 18.0% took a quick profit
Fiore Gold F.v aug'19 C$0.34 26-May-19 C$0.56 64.7% Took profit, 2q19 avg
Chakana Copper PERU.v oct'19 C$0.84 22-Mar-18 C$0.16 -81.0% Exploreco trade fail. Want space
Wesdome Gold WDO.to oct'19 C$2.37 14-Oct-17 C$7.57 219.4% Sold half, profit taking
Superior Gold SGI.v oct'19 C$1.46 8-Abr-18 C$0.47 -67.8% Failed sm spec on Au. Moved on
Amerigo Res ARG.to nov'19 C$0.91 23-Set-18 C$0.50 -45.1% worst trade of year, hefty loss
Guyana Goldfields GUY.to dec'19 C$0.94 14-Abr-19 C$0.56 -40.4% taking the loss, financials weak
Tethyan Res TETH.v dec'19 C$0.30 8-Set-19 C$0.16 -46.7% tiny trade, word of probs in co
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2018
Closed in 2018 closed close price
Amarillo Gold AGC.v jan'18 C$0.38 24-Mar-17 C$0.31 -18.4% Cut away losing trade
Riverside Res RRI.v jan'18 C$0.39 27-Jun-16 C$0.31 -20.5% Cut away losing trade
Eros Res ERC.v jan'18 C$0.175 1-Mar-17 C$0.16 -8.6% CEO sudden exit, not good
Excellon Res EXN.to jan'18 C$1.54 9-Oct-16 C$1.66 7.8% 4q17 poor, one too many bad qtrs
Wesdome Gold WDO.to jan'18 C$1.68 15-Dec-17 C$2.06 22.6% Near-term trade block, took profit
Sabina G&S SBB.to apr'18 C$2.06 17-Dec-17 C$1.77 -14.1% Near-term trade, bad timing, small
B2Gold BTO.to May'18 C$2.11 12-Sep-14 C$3.67 73.9% sold 25% to reduce exposure
Lara Expl. LRA.v May'18 C$0.65 11-Feb-18 C$0.58 -13.8% Spec on Brazil didn't work
Solitario XPL June'18 U$0.72 19-Mar-17 U$0.41 -43.1% Failed trade, may return in 4q18
SolGold plc SOLG.to July'18 C$0.475 19-Nov-17 C$0.415 -12.6% cut, trade didn't perform
Pan American PAAS July'18 U$17.90 1-Jun-18 U$16.30 8.9% modest win on short position
NGEx Res NGQ.to Sep'18 C$1.01 22-Oct-17 C$1.00 -1.0% Closed to reduce Argentina exp
Sandstorm Gold SAND Oct'18 U$3.73 17-Apr-16 U$4.13 10.7% partial sale to raise cash for GTT
Aldebaran Res ALDE.v Nov'18 n/a n/a n/a n/a liquidate spin out of REG
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2017
Closed in 2017 closed close price
Continental Gold CNL.to Jan'17 C$2.68 22-May-16 C$4.17 55.6% trade closed, profit taken
Focus Ventures FCV.v Jan'17 C$0.23 1-Jul-12 C$0.05 -78.3% Give up, a disaster trade
Wesdome Gold WDO.to Feb'17 C$1.72 28-Aug-16 C$3.00 74.4% Target hit, sold, good trade
Belo Sun BSX.to Mar'17 C$0.90 30-Jan-17 C$0.90 0.0% failed near-term flip trade
Lara Expl. LRA.v Mar'17 C$1.15 8-Apr-12 C$1.05 -8.7% cut to make room for new trade
Rye Patch Gold RPM.v Apr'17 C$0.31 2-Sep-16 C$0.32 3.2% cut for doubts & new stock
Cordoba Min. CDB.v Jun'17 C$0.75 15-Sep-16 C$0.63 -16.0% closed
Constantine Metal CEM.v Aug'17 C$0.135 9-Apr-17 C$0.28 107.4% spec trade closed, good win
Red Eagle Min. R.to Sep'17 C$0.67 13-Dec-16 C$0.27 -59.7% IKN's biggest failure in years
Starcore Intl SAM.to Sep'17 C$0.61 10-Jan-15 C$0.31 -49.2% Patience ran out
B2Gold BTO.to Dec'17 C$2.11 12-Sep-14 C$3.39 60.7% sold small portion for liquidity
24

Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2016
Closed in 2016 closed close price
Phoscan Chem FOS.to jan16 C$0.28 29-mar-15 C$0.265 -5.4% Buyout trade, bot but poor deal
True Gold TGM.v jan16 C$0.18 23-ago-15 C$0.25 38.9% okay trade, sold on pol risk
McEwen Mining MUX jan16 U$1.09 25-ene-15 U$1.20 10.1% sold due to lack of value
Lake Shore Gold LSG.to feb-16 C$1.10 07-abr-15 C$1.69 53.6% bot out, sold early in process
Atacama Pacific ATM.v feb-16 C$0.19 26-abr-15 C$0.40 110.5% sold for a double on big pop
New Gold NGD feb-16 U$2.06 24-ene-16 U$2.96 43.7% closed good near-term trade
Sandspring Res SSP.v mar-16 C$0.195 18-oct-15 C$0.32 64.1% Hit tgt, took profit
Teranga Gold TGZ.to mar-16 C$0.54 15-feb-15 C$0.60 11.1% disappointing trade
B2Gold BTG mar-16 U$0.85 13-ene-16 U$1.30 52.9% Separate trade on B2, hit tgt
Dalradian Res DNA.to mar-16 C$0.67 27-oct-13 C$1.00 49.3% Hit target, sold, good win
HudBay Min. HBM may-16 U$4.10 03-abr-16 U$4.36 -6.3% Short trade, poor timing
Nevada Sunrise NEV.v may-16 C$0.185 28-feb-16 C$0.23 24.3% V. small, no big deal either way
Richmont RIC jun-16 U$7.60 01-may-16 U$9.30 22.4% near-term trade, profit taken
INV Metals INV.to jul-16 C$0.25 03-abr-16 C$0.95 280.0% Trade closed on time
HudBay Min. HBM aug16 U$4.98 09-jun-16 U$4.80 3.6% short trade covered, no big deal
Miranda Gold MAD.v oct-16 C$0.125 03-jul-16 C$0.10 -20.0% tiny spec trade, didn't work
Avino G & S ASM nov-16 U$2.00 21-oct-16 U$1.40 -30.0% Abandon trade on bad bot deal
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2015
Closed in 2015 closed close price
Argonaut Gold AR.to jan'15 C$1.47 14-dec-14 C$2.53 72.1% Big gain small time, profit taken
Amerigo Res ARG.to jan'15 C$0.405 20-jul-14 C$0.285 -29.6% Given up on weak Cu prices
Reservoir Min. RMC.v jan'15 C$6.05 18-jun-14 C$4.12 -31.9% sold on Cu downturn
Coro Mining COP.to jan'15 C$0.075 26-jan-14 C$0.035 -53.3% sm, sold on Cu downturn
Fortuna Silver FSM mar'15 U$4.12 10-nov-14 U$3.75 9.0% Short used as hedge
GoldQuest Min. GQC.v mar'15 C$0.26 27-oct-13 C$0.085 -67.3% given up ghost
Rio Alto Mining RIO.to apr'15 C$2.30 07-apr-11 C$3.57 55.2% Top pick, bot out, big win
Timmins Gold TGD jun'15 U$0.60 19-apr-15 U$0.62 3.3% near-term trade, out of time
First Majestic AG jul'15 U$10.51 10-aug-14 U$4.55 56.7% horrible failed trade
NovaCopper NCQ.to jul'15 C$1.05 09-apr-14 C$0.50 -52.4% no more Cu exposure, sm sell
McEwen Mining MUX aug'15 U$0.695 21-jul-15 U$0.92 32.4% Closed nearterm flip for win
Midas Gold MAX.to sep'15 C$0.39 21-sep-15 C$0.35 -10.3% Sm. trade idea that didn't work
New Gold NGD oct'15 U$2.18 23-aug-15 U$3.05 39.9% trade closed, profit taken
Legend Gold LGN.v nov'15 C$0.085 01-mar-15 C$0.035 -58.8% tiny "land grab" idea, failed
Timmins Gold TGD nov'15 U$0.245 20-sep-15 U$0.15 -38.8% small near-term loser
Please note that due to space considerations closed positions 2009 to 2014 are now
available on request, or were published in any edition to IKN553 (end 2019).
Important Disclosure
The information and opinions contained within this report reflect the personal views of the author and therefore all
material within should not be construed as accurate or reliable or be utilized as advice for investment or business
purposes. Independent due diligence and discussions with ones own investment and business advisor is strongly
recommended. Accordingly, nothing in this report should be construed as offering a guarantee of the accuracy or
completeness of the information contained herein, as an offer or solicitation with respect to the purchase or sale of any
security or as an endorsement of any product or service. All opinions and estimates included in this report are subject to
change without notice. It is prohibited to copy or redistribute this report to any type of third party without the express
permission of the author.
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