IKN #367Premium

,
The IKN Weekly
Week 367, May 22nd 2016
Contents
This Week: Trades heads-up, In today’s issue, The Fed’s July raise will see gold tread water,
May Two Four.
Fundamental Analysis: Regulus Resources (REG.v) is a Top Pick, Continental Gold (CNL.to) is
a buy.
Stocks to Follow: Overview, Starcore Intl (SAM.to), Sandstorm (SAND) (SSL.to), Richmont
Mines (RIC) (RIC.to), Tinka Resources (TK.v), INV Metals (INV.to), B2Gold (BTG) (BTO.to),
Lara Exploration (LRA.v), Nevada Sunrise (NEV.v).
Copper Basket: Overview, HudBay (HBM.to)(HBM), Hot Chili (HCH.ax), NovaCopper (NCQ.to).
Low Cost Producer Basket: Overview, Buenaventura (BVN), Goldcorp (GG).
Regional Politics: Mexico and Chile: A mysterious deal for Guanajuato, Peru: The campaign
gets dirty.
Market Watching: Belo Sun (BSX.to) strangeness, A Minera IRL false rumour, The B2Gold
(BTO.to) (BTG) 1q16 financials anal ysis delayed again, Focus Ventures (FCV.v) announces its
revised pre-feas.
I remind subscribers that no part of this newsletter can be copied, reproduced or
given to any third party without the express permission of the author.
This Week
Trades heads-up
The regular heads-up here at the top, no excuses for missing the main events. Today I call
buy on Continental Gold (CNL.to) and will buy my first tranche next week. The time
window for the trade is roughly six months. I also promote Regulus Resources (REG.v) to
Top Pick on the back of its very significant news release of last week and plan to add to my
position starting next week and on regular occasions as the year unfolds. The time window for
this trade will be much longer, I’m willing to give REG.v the years it will need to fully develop its
story. If things go well, this is one of the “Can retire now” trades we dream about in this wildest
of sectors.
The Fed’s July raise will see gold tread water
“It is the wretchedness of being rich that
you have to live with rich people.”
Logan Pearsall Smith
There’s a mountain of nonsense being spoken about the Fed and rates and gold at the moment
let’s get to the bottom of all this, once and for all:
1) It’s not always so, but most of the time and under normal circumstances the US Dollar and
gold trade inversely. In the present...
1

,
....we’re in normal circumstances. Next and to underscore the above, the Michael Churchill 12
month chart featured in IKN355 and updated here (TY MC) shows inverse five year TIPS (white
line) against gold (gold line and fwiw the correlation is even tighter over a five year period):
Bottom line: You may not like the idea, you may think China is the future and you may consider
(rightly or not) that long-term the gold price driver story is changing but The United States of
America, via its currency and via its macroeconomy policy, is the number one influence on the
price of gold today.
Background done, let’s move to last week’s Fed Minutes release and the market didn’t take
more than a nanosecond or two to realize that the Fed is looking to raise soon. But rather than
listen to me, here are the thoughts of somebody who has made squillions by calling the US
Macro correctly over the years, Mohamed El-Erian (1), once of Pimco and now with Alianz:
"Moves in financial conditions as a whole are making (The Fed) more
confident about going forward and they were worried that the markets were
underestimating the possibility of a rate hike this year and they wanted to do
something about it. In the end, what's clear is a hike will definitely happen
this year. If the Fed unambiguously signals that it will move, you will see a
stronger dollar and that will have consequences on other markets.”
We good so far?
2

,
1) We’re in normal times for the gold/dollar relationship
2) The Fed is signalling higher rates (and Fedwatchers aren’t beating about the bush and
trying to nuance it, they know rates are going higher). You may think the Fed hike
comes in June (Fed fund futures call that a 26% chance this weekend, it was as high as
31% Wednesday afternoon) or you may think like me and expect it in the July meeting
(once the silly Brexit thing is over and the UK almost certainly votes to stay in Europe)
3) When those rates go up so does the Dollar. You can listen to the goldbug and
permabull arguments that find a case for gold going up under any circumstance, but
Occam’s Razor is clear on this, gold will take its inverse hit. Get used to the idea.
Here’s how the market interpreted the
Fed minutes for gold and the gold
stocks. It was clear and I’m happy
about it too, being as I am a buyer of
mining stocks at the moment. Better
buy lower, right?
The final clincher for the (June) July
hike argument was the reaction of the
market. If you remember back to the
heady days of February when gold
took off, its tail was finally lit by its
main driver, the fear trade. Back then
the market was screaming about how
it would crash if Janet went ahead
and raised, last week the bank stocks
(tell of all tells) rose on the implication of a hike in the pipeline and gold fell, no fear trade
bounce this time around, no wailing “we gonna be crashing” on CNBC, no fear about the next
raise in the broad market and that’s the final green light the Fed needed to push ahead. This
raise is happening, most likely July, it will sit on the gold price until then.
However, a quick look at the updated GLD inventory chart confirms the bull market is intact and
the market was still a net buyer of
gold after the Fed minutes were GLD gold holdings, March-May 2016 (metric tonnes)
published, GLD added 430,000 900
890
ounces to holdings on Thursday and 880
Friday (over half a billion dollars’ 870
worth of shiny metal). We mentioned 860
850
last week in the IKN366 introduction 840
that the increase in bullion holdings 830
are a lagging indicator these days 820
810
and “...won’t move the price but it’s
800
confirming the new bull in gold”. 790
This is your downside protection writ 780
770
large and the bears’ hopes for a gold
collapse in the near future are given
lie by the reality of money flows (it
talks, BS walks).
To put that into perspective, note how Lawrie Williams is keen and bullish on gold this weekend
(2) because Russia has added 500,000 oz per month to its holdings so far this year (and China’s
been no slouch either). That’s all good I’m sure, but Mother Russia’s idea of monthly purchases
is the type of volume GLD does in two flat days...and AFTER the Fed minutes that were
supposedly bad news for its price. GLD may not be the price driver any longer but you can bet
large that it’s a lagging indicator and all the near-term price support you’ll ever need.
Bottom line: The new normal for gold is the following:
3
61/1/3 61/3/3 61.7.3 61/9/3 61/11/3 61/51/3 61/71/3 61/12/3 61/32/3 61/82/3 61/03/3 61/1/4 61/5/4 61.7.4 61/11/4 61/31/4 61/51/4 61/91/4 61/12/4 61/52/4 61/72/4 61/92/4 61/3/5 61/5/5 61/9/5 61.5.11 61/31/5 61/71/5 61/91/5
mt
source: SPDR GLD data

,
1) Gold upside is limited in the near-term because the Fed will raise rates, possibly in June
but most likely in July. The drop in gold and the miners last week was part of the bake-
in process. TIPS this weekend indicate a forward inflation rate of 1.5% and that looks a
lot to me (even though the Fed targets 2%), which get me believing that last week’s
small dump in gold was close to all of the July (June) move baked straight in.
2) Gold downside is limited, there’s no collapse of the metal in the cards, money is still
flowing in.
3) We’re at a new normal. I expect a summer of flat gold prices, we may see U$1,200/oz
challenged and we may see U$1,300/oz challenged, but I doubt either of those. From
here until Labor Day gold’s not going to do much, we’ll see how the land lies for the
last quarter of the year when it comes around.
What that means for stocks is that we’re now out of the first phase of the mining bull, the bit
when they all explode upwards on the rising gold tide. That’s fine by me (and as already noted
above, the gold drop last week was welcome because I’m still a buyer We’re now moving into
the stock-picking phase where individual stories make the difference and sort out winners from
losers, the type of playing field I like, there are puzzles to solve and differences to make. To
kick that off, below find news of an recommendation upgrade in Regulus Resources (REG.v)
and a new purchase in Continental Gold (CNL.to). Both have stories to tell.
May Two Four
Enjoy your day off tomorrow, Canada, have a beer or...24. For the rest of us, a reminder that
the Toronto Stock Exchange is closed tomorrow because Canada is the only country in the
world that celebrates Queen Victoria’s birthday. Quite right too, any excuse for a day off is good
as far as I’m concerned.
Fundamental Analysis of Mining Stocks
Regulus Resources (REG.v): Our new Top Pick
As the price chart demonstrates, at least a few people understood how good the news from
Regulus Resources was last week. Although
trading was thin, REG shares rose by a cool
40% last week and the small tranche of
shares I already own are already sitting on
a handy double-plus. However, I am certain
that the move late last week on the back of
Wednesday’s news (3) is only the start of
the upswing in REG, because when the
wider market cottons on to the significance
of the news last week the share price won’t
be moving in dimes and nickels, it will be
moving in dollars.
It’s my job to take the long and
complicated looking NR from REG last
week, parse the information and explain just why it’s so good and to help me do that, as soon
as the news hit I got on to REG management and arranged a meeting. That happened the next
day Thursday, at the Regulus offices in Lima with CEO John Black and President/COO Fernando
Pickmann (pictured below).
4

,
Handsome devils. What follows is the result of that meeting and my anal ysis of what has been
going on and will go on at the Antakori project in Cajamarca. The phrase “Keep your eyes on
the prize” is one to consider. Let’s start by laying out the current share structure at REG:
Shares out: 56.391m
Options: 4.577m (at 45c)
Warrants: 5.556m (at 70c)
Fully diluted shares: 66.523m
Current share price: C$0.70
Market Cap: C$39.47m
Approx working cap per S/O: C$0.065
All prices are in Canadian Dollars unless stated. Forex U$0.80=CAD$1
Cash treasury is currently $3.7m at REG, which is that 6.5c/share number in the box above. It
also means that REG is currently burning at around $600k per month, so even without a drill
program to fund it will run out of cash by the end of 2016 at current rates. That means
something very simple; we can expect the company to go to market and raise cash this year.
When I asked CEO Black about this he was open and frank, agreed the company would need to
raise and he even gave the approximate timing, some time in 3q16. That makes sense because
it should be around the time the drill program gets going on Antakori/Tantahuatay. As for how
much they’d raise, it would mainly depend on the share price at the time but we can expect
something in the order of $5m to $10m, basically the REG strategy will be not to raise too much
and dilute out but get enough cash on board to see the company through to the end of 2017.
CEO Black was clearly more concerned about not blowing out the share structure more than
consider the cash number they raise, so I’d expect they’d keep things to an 8m share raise.
However, it’s mightily clear that REG has plenty of institutional support, not least from those
who won big with the Black/Heather team at Antares and Haquira, sold to First Quantum.
5

,
As for the share structure, the biggest single holder of REG is the Route One Investment
Company which holds 8,237m shares, or 14.61% of shares out. The combined holding of
directors is a decent 7.224m shares and to that we can add the 1.707m shares owned by Chief
Geological Officer, Hawaiian shirt aficionado and all-round rock wizard Kevin Heather, who isn’t
part of the director roster but is still a key player at the company, just like in the Antares days.
That puts key insiders at 8.931m shares or 15.83% of shares out. The key insiders also hold
most of the options and perhaps half the warrants, which is all good. There’s plenty of skin in
this game and I’d expect the same insiders to be takers of any future placement rounds, too.
There’s also those warrants, which are now (just) in the money and expire in late 2017. If
they’re exercised (and I fully expect them to be, 70c will be a price left in past history soon)
they bring in nearly $3.9m in cash to the company.
Last week’s news release
As the Top Pick call rests squarely on the NR out of REG last week, we need to go into detail
about what’s in there and why I like it so much. There are basically three elements to the
binding Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU):
1) A deal between REG and Coimolache on gold oxides, the material that’s currently being
mined and processed by Coimolache at its operating mine. This is a minor pat of the
deal in real terms.
2) A deal between REG and Coimolache on exploration for the copper/gold/silver sulphide
potential. This is the major and key part of the agreement and what we need to be
excited about.
3) A deal between REG and Colquirrumi on a separate but adjoining area to the Antakori
concessions. This may become more important as time goes on, but the price driver for
our purposes is the Coimolache exploration deal.
Let’s do these piece by piece and in order of importance, but to begin with we need to
understand that the NR last week didn’t not announce any standard or classic Joint Venture
(JV). For sure this is like a JV, but it’s really speaking it’s mining companies (mainly BVN and
REG, with some SCCO and a bit of local private) that have agreed to work together. It may
seem like splitting hairs at this juncture, but in fact it’s an important concept and one that
helped the deal happen.
The Coimolache oxides deal
To be clear, Coimolache SA is a Joint Venture mining company owned by Buenaventura (BVN
40.1%), Southern Copper (SCCO 44.2%) and a local privately held company “Espro S.A.C”
(15.7%) who are basically the family that were the original landowners. Coimolache, operated
by Buenaventura has been mining the Tantahuatay open pit oxide gold that’s good for around
144k oz gold per year (with a silver kicker).
Today’s Tantahuatay has two problems; firstly its gold is running out and the resource is now
becoming depleted, secondly it’s now mined right up to the limit of its concession and next door
the land is owned by REG. Therefore a deal between the two parties is a good one for
Tantahuatay, partly because it can possibly mine some of the ounces on the REG side of the
boundary but mainly because it can now develop the pit walls onto the REG side and mine the
ounces it knows it has on its side, but can’t get at them due to the engineering limits of the
benches. This is the first part of the Coimolache deal and in effect, REG isn’t going to benefit
financially very much from the deal. One of the clauses states that REG gets a 5% NSR on any
ounces mined from its side, but that’s not going to be a massive amount of money even in the
best circumstances. The benefit the REG is that it’s got Coimolache to the table to discuss the
big prize potential, namely the deeper sulphides. The oxides are small-scale stuff in this deal,
but they were in their own way important because they provided a foot in the door for little
REG to go and talk to big BVN (and to some extent big SCCO, but Tantahuatay operators BVN
were the true deal counterparties.
6

,
The Colquirrumi deal
This is part 3) on the original list above, it’s the last part of the deal agreement in the NR on
Wednesday. To begin, Colquirrumi is 100% owned
subsidiary of BVN, so it’s a different entity to
Coimolache and the Tantahuatay mine.
Next up, this part of the deal is centered on the
large pink area you see in this map right (from the
NR), to the North and East of the Tantahuatay mine
and most of the REG concession areas. This area is
largely unexplored and offers plenty of grassroots
exploration potential, but there are areas close to
the REG concessions to the West that are
apparently ripe drill targets, according to CEO Black
at least.
Next, this part of the deal is in essence a more
classic optioning-in JV deal in which REG gets to
earn in to 70% of the project by drilling at least
7,500m on the property in three years (once drill
permits are received, that will probably take a year
from now), which comes with a ticket price of
perhaps $3m at current tarrifs in Peru. But then
there’s a twist, because if REG earns into its 70% and BVN likes what it sees (i.e. great
intersects etc) it can claw back to own 70% (i.e. REG back to 30%) by paying U$9m to REG.
There are other parts to the deal (check them out, including a part that will allow the
Coimolache/REG agreement to bite into the concession area) which are in essence to make sure
the deal remains fair and equitative for both sides, but we’ve covered the main points. What
this part of the deal has is a longer-term opportunity which will take at least a year to get
underway and start making enough noise to get into NRs (there are drill permits to get for one
thing). It’s certainly a good deal and REG gets to do what it likes to do, go out and search for a
mining elephant in elephant country. But it’s not the main part of the deal and it’s not what’s
made me call an immediate Top Pick on the stock. That’s because they’ve already found an
elephant.
The Coimolache sulphides deal
We get to the fun part. Although just one deal, the Coimolache SA/Regulus deal is partly the
oxides agreements we checked out above and mainly a separate agreement to explore and
develop the deeper sulphide mineralization that both sides know is there. It’s worth mentioning
at this point that this deal, though not a formal JV yet, is the first time all sides have managed
to get together and unify the project area in over 60 years. That’s not a small thing either and I
want to underscore a couple of things about that before getting into the guts of the deal,
because it’s a very important part of the whole show and why I believe REG to be a Top Pick
stock as from this weekend. The next paragraphs covers the points
1) The land packages and concessions may have split and gone under fractured ownership over
60 years ago, but it’s the last 30 years which are more important, the time in which large
porphyry/skarn deposits have turned into massive and extremely profitable mines. Cajamarca
isn’t a region stupid of naive about mining and, despite all the anti-Yanacocha sentiment these
days, is a mining culture and knows what mining is all about. That also means they know about
rocks and land. That in turn means that there’s no secret about the potential of
Antakori/Tantahuatay in the area and region, something confirmed to the Nth degree when
Coimolache started its operations on the oxide gold mineralization and over the years has
uncovered and learned more about the underlying sulphides. Ever since I’ve been covering
mining in Peru I’ve had people from all corners of the industry tell me words to the effect of,
7

,
“That Sinchao/Antakori/Tantahuatay deposit is amazing, but it’s going to be very difficult to get
a mine done there”. Be clear, last Wednesday’s deal announcement has unlocked the potential
of Antakori/Tantahuatay, it’s exactly why I’ve been a patient but small shareholder in REG all
this time and the deal struck is so good it’s why REG is going from “small, just holding for the
time being” at the bottom of the ‘Stocks to Follow’ table straight to “Top Pick” with a call to buy
and keep buying in the weeks and months to come.
2) The time was right for a deal, a convergence of issues helped all parties not only to get to
the table but to stay there. The combination has several factors, but includes a) getting
trustworthy and successful people in control of Antakori (ex-Sinchao) after a period of very
patchy and sketchy ownership. The arrival of John Black and Kevin Heather, who did a great
job at Antares, helped open the door. Another timing factor was Coimolache and its desire for a
deal with its neighbour that would allow it to continue mining the oxides for a couple more
years (something the locals also approve of, as there are around 500 jobs in play). Another was
the arrival on the scene of people who were willing and able to listen to local landowners and
land-users, rather just talk down to them and try to impose their will. Community relations is a
key part of this game and since REG arrived real progress has been made. Another was the
economic downturn in Cajamarca (caused, ironically, by the Gregorio Santos regional
government’s opposition to Yanacocha/Conga) which has people looking for new and better job
opportunities. Other matters too, but there is a carpe diem element to this deal which has
allowed it to go forward.
3) COO, director and Peru lawyer Fernando Pickmann has done an outstanding job to get this
deal closed. I’ve had a few conversations with Pickmann in the time I’ve been a shareholder of
REG (one of the reasons I’ve held the small amount of shares I’ve held all this time, it kept
channels of communication open) and without disclosing non-public material matters he’s kept
me informed of what’s going on. I’ve been highly impressed by his work and can say today that
without his efforts, this wouldn’t have had a chance of happening. Not all lawyers are bad
news.
4) Aside from doing plenty of work at a community level, one of the main barriers to getting a
deal done faced by Pickmann (and the rest of the REG team) has been the basic mistrust
between the business parties (e.g. REG and Coimolache and BVN). That’s improved greatly, but
it’s still something that needed to be addressed in the final deal as seen in the NR on
Wednesday. Today’s IKN piece is necessarily about the main and important points of the deal,
but it only takes a glance at the NR to see there are many more line items. Pickmann and Black
summed it all up very neatly during our meeting last week by saying that many of the different
clauses and terms are there after being thrashed out with the parties, all for one main purpose:
To make sure the deal is equitative. All sides have worked together to make sure the deal is
fair, is transparent, leaves no room for one side ripping off the other and above all, it allows a
framework that lets the companies work together and freely, getting thing moving as quickly as
possible and keeping it that way.
5) An example of the deal structure is the “5% NSR clause”, which is part of a binding MOU
that runs from now until December by which time a Definitive Agreement will be in place. The
NSR clause states, “Paying a 5% NSR to the other Party for mineralization processed from the
other Party's mining concessions”. On sitting down with the team I asked them about that and
why they’d need a NSR (and why so high) on a project that is obviously many years from going
into production. The answer is simply that it allows the parties to move forward and get
working together in a mutual trust atmosphere. We’re not in a JV here yet, one company hasn’t
tried to buy out the other (nor would REG ever consider selling out at these ultra-low price
levels, they know what they’re sitting on) but one of these days there’s going to be a different
deal structure in place on top of Antakori/Tantahuatay that consolidates all the land into a
single ownership package and builds the mine. The 5% NSR clause allows all sides to retain
autonomy and build their asset value while working together, a mutually agreed structure that
keeps everyone working for the same end while adding their own value and not worrying about
a partner that may or may not be ripping them off. I’ve always stated that the devil is in the
8

,
details of these deals, but this time REG has done one that protects both the shareholder and
their working relationship with partners. It’s innovative for sure, but it’s also an excellent
answer to a thorny issue that had kept the parties apart for so long. In other words, well done
Pickmann again.
Summing up the deal points I’ve tried to convey what I understand about the bones and
structure of the Wednesday NR. It’s not easy because it’s a complex deal and I haven’t gone
(and will not go) into the fine details because if we do, we just add more heat than light. The
takeaway from this part is absolutely important, however. REG and its counterparties have
thrashed out a deal which allows everyone to work together, drill together, do geology together
and share all data, put together a consolidated resource for the Antakori/Tantahautay deposit
for the first time ever and add value to all without being concerned about lack of trust and
getting ripped off further down the line at a corporate level. And why does everyone care so
much about working Antakori? That’s the next part I need to try and explain:
Why hunt for an elephant when one comes walking up to you waving its trunk?
We know quite a lot about Antakori/Tantahuatay:
• On the Tantahuatay side, Coimolache has been mining the upper oxide layer for many
years, exposing along the way (and drilling into, though we don’t know how much yet)
the sulphide underneath.
• We know that Coimolache is interested in developing the sulphide potential of
Tantahuatay. We know that because they’ve just done a deal (but I can also say via
anecdotals that they’re not just interested, they’re VERY interested).
• We know that the concession ownership is fractured and the deal done last week is a
massive step in consolidating that. All sides are now working together instead of
suspiciously separately.
• We know that Antakori has a 43-101 resource on its part of the overall project. Here’s
that table:
That resource is the product of things that are now out of date, such as metals prices much
higher than today (though costs have also dropped to counter that). It’s also restricted by the
rules of 43-101 and the fractured concession ownership of REG at Antakori, which turned it into
a mish-mash of separate pits and assumed underground block-caving because it was the only
way of reconciling the fractured nature of REG.v concession holdings, but it’s always been clear
that “the bits between” the REG.v concessions have the same type of rock.
To cut a long story short that resource is not a true reflection of what’s underground at
Antakori/Tantahuatay but is does have facts to be rescued from it, first and foremost mineral
grades. There’s strong copper and gold grades in the rock and they often get stronger at depth.
That’s exactly what you’d expect from a porphyry/skarn deposit. The overall grade of 0.48% Cu
and 0.36 g/t Au (with a reasonable silver kicker to boot) is one thing, the real prize is the
“underground grade” of 0.63% Cu and 0.44 g/t Au, the grade that’s likely to become more
representative of the larger two-company effort at the deposit (he says, making a verbal effort
to avoid the phrase “joint venture”).
9

,
Which brings us to what we can expect from the future of Antakori/Tantahuatay and to do that,
here’s one of the maps ripped from last week’s NR with a couple of things scribbled on it:
Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the elephant. Although it’s still up for debate and
confirmation (e.g, the Coimolache people reportedly think the circle I’ve sketched in should be a
little further to the South, whereas I’ve learned to trust Kevin Heather implicitly when it comes
to rocks), the circle you see on the map there is the prize up for grabs. All parties in this
project, not to mention the Cajamarca locals who know their mining and their region, believe
that under Antakori/Tantahuatay there’s at least that much sulphide mineralization (and it may
turn out to be better than that, being highly prospective to the North of that circle). As the
project moves forward and data gets shared by Coimolache and Regulus, we’ll get to confirm
the type of overall mineralized grade on offer and then as drilling programs get into gear the
resource area can be confirmed and a new, overall resource number gets to the public eye. But
what we’re looking at is, in the most general terms (and this is the type of public statement you
just cannot get from the mouth of a REG officer) is a 1.7km pit that contains 0.6% copper, 0.3
to 0.4 g/t gold and a decent silver kicker.
To put that into perspective, Antamina is a 1.7km diameter open pit mine. For sure Antamina
has a different metals make up (approx 1.1% Cu, 2% Zn, 12 g/t Ag and a small moly kicker), it
has its own complexities as a deposit, it’s an operating mine with cash flow and all the works.
10

,
It’s never going to be an exact apples-to-apples comparative (they never are), but in Antakori
you’re looking at the same size of mineralized package, the same part of the world, the same
people to work it, the same country rules. Antamina is enormously profitable even under
today’s low price environment for copper (and zinc), it’s now depleted by 15 years worth of
operations (there are decades more to come though) and it has a net carrying value as stands
today of U$3Bn after a total investment of U$3.6Bn. And that’s what REG.v is sitting on top of
today at least 30% and depending how the circle finally ends, up to 50% of an Antamina sized
deposit. REG is valued this weekend at CAD$40m, give or take. This is a Top Pick stock, ladies
and gentlemen.
What happens now
With the deal now in place, we need to consider newsflow to come. This I’ll break down into
“rest of 2016”, then “2017 and beyond.
Rest of 2016: The first thing REG and Coimolache are going to do is run a whole series of
coordination meetings to get everyone on the same page so they can work together and
complement each others work. That’s a process that has already started and REG anticipates
that it’s the next few weeks in their lives.
From there we can expect drills to start turning on site. One of the advantages of working with
an operating mine such as Tantahuatay is that they have active and 100% drilling permits,
which include the areas inside their operations and a “buffer zone” around them. That buffer
zone includes the area North of the current pit where the REG concessions lay and once they’re
being drilled, it’s a relatively simple task under Peruvian laws and rules to extend the buffer
zone further. Along with the fact that both REG and Coimolache already have plenty of surface
rights access agreements signed and sealed with local landholders (in fact Coimolache is owner
of some of the important surface areas), the move to get drilling will be straightforward now
that last week’s deal is in place. In fact REG made it clear that in theory at least, they can start
drilling “tomorrow” but in order to do it right and to correctly co-ordinate with the partner
company and with local residents, the drilling will most likely begin in Q3. That’s fair enough.
As noted above in a little more detail, we can expect REG to go to market and run a funding
placement, again probably in Q3 (the typical “post-Labor Day” September period comes to my
mind, but that’s just my own guess and not based on any information from the company...the
financing may come a lot earlier). We can expect REG to be prudent about the size of the
offering and not add too heavily to the share count (notably, the Antares team was very keen
on protecting shareholders from over-dilution in the Haquira days, the same attitude is evident
here).
We can also expect the first consolidated resource number for Antakori/Tantahuatay sulphides
by the end of 2016. Again, that’s not a promise but a personal estimate based on what I’ve
heard from REG. It’s certainly their hope to get one out there as soon as possible. I believe that
it will be the first time the wider mining world latches on to the significance of the
Antakori/Tantahuatay deposit and what it all might mean, because whatever happens, the
number they come out with is going to dwarf the current 3.1Bn Lb copper (etc) resource, lower
metals cut-off or not.
2017 and beyond: One of the first things the companies will do together at
Antakori/Tantahuatay in 2016 is get the permit applications in for a bigger and more
comprehensive drill program at the project. That process is already starting, but the way of a
larger drilling program in Peru is that the permitting, for good or evil, takes its own sweet time
and the program REG/Coimolache has in mind will probably need a year or so before the green
light.
The company will also be working hard on its community relations and outreach program. I’ve
asked plenty of questions about this subject to the officers as it’s one of the key areas these
days, not least because we’re in Cajamarca and there’s a negative reputation there these days
11

,
Yes, there’s no doubting things can be difficult at times but I do know the company has already
done a lot of good work to get to where it is today (with plenty of surface access agreements in
place, a sure sign of progress) and that locals are generally receptive. There’s more about this
below in the “weaknesses” section, but I will state here that the opportunity to work together
with Coimolache also means pooling resources and ideas at a community relations level. REG
has told me that the two companies have different approaches to the community side of things
and one opportunity will be to sing from the same hymn sheet, do the same things and present
a united and coordinated front in relationships with locals. At this point I’ll underscore that the
job of community relations done by Antares at Haquira was second to none (I was eyewitness
to them, got to talk to the team, the locals, whole thing) and was one of the factors to help the
project move through to the take-over stage. Put bluntly, John Black is way better than the
median on community relations matters and understands that inclusive partnerships add value,
excluding peoples (they way used all too often in Peru that leads to conflict) is asking for
trouble in this day and age.
As the wider drill program gets started (which will likely coincide with the permitting and start
of the separate Colquirrumi option agreement drilling) we should start to see the project’s
resource become more defined. From there we work towards and PEA and beyond. This final
point brings up something the potential investor in REG needs to be clear about; this isn’t a
quick-hit trade, this is not one of the punctual opportunities I sometimes bring before you, nor
is it one that’s easily priced with my preferred 12 month price target. The Top Pick in REG is
going to be for the long haul and we’re going to be in this one for years, rather than weeks or
months, before it comes to fruition. Backing that up, here’s what it says in the REG MD&As:
“The scope of the mineralized system at AntaKori offers significant upside
potential but it will require several years and extensive drilling to fully develop
this project.
Drive that into your head, potential purchaser of REG.
Project weaknesses
One of the things CEO Black was keen on doing in our meeting last week was talking about the
potential weaknesses that the Antakori/Tantahuatay sulphides project has. This is par for the
course for him, his strategy always includes laying out the weak points and hammering at them
until they aren’t so weak any longer (he did it at Antares and says he learned the strategy from
Ross Beaty and David Strang and their string of “Lumina” successes. This time around with
Antakori/Tantahuatay REG sees three main risks
Arsenic: Ask around the geologist community for a while for opinions on the
Antakori/Tantahuatay sulphide deposit potential it won’t take long before you hear of “The
Arsenic Problem” at the project. To give a general number, at the 0.2% copper cut-off used in
the current resource estimate, overall Arsenic (As) levels are estimated at 422 parts per million
and at first sight, that’s a lot of penalty element if you’re going about producing concentrate for
a 0.6% copper mineralization. By way of a very quick and rough calculation, to produce a 25%
concentrate from those levels it would imply an overall arsenic content of 1.7%, that’s high and
is on the border of the generally accepted 0.2% barrier that incurs big penalties at the moment
you sell your wares to the smelters. A couple of things to note about this:
1) REG is well aware of the issue and after careful study of the data so far, believes that
most of the resource is arsenic light, with some specific areas, perhaps guesstimating
25% at the moment, to be in the arsenic penalty box.
2) What’s more, the eventual mining plan would include a starter pit in a place of very low
As content and high Cu that would achieve a fast payback on capital.
3) There are opportunities to blend an eventual concentrate to keep it under penalty
levels.
4) There is also new and developing technology to remove As from mineral at the time of
concentration, another line of inquiry the company is bound to take over time.
12

,
Bottom line: As at Antakori can be perceived as a risk and one of the things you’0re going to
hear as a critique of the project, but I doubt it’s a red flag project killer.
Community risk: I’ve split the “people risk” issue into two parts, because the local and the
regional factors are different. First community risk around the Antakori/Tantahuatay project site
and be in no doubt, you’re going to hear noise out of the area over time if you decide to follow
me in and go ong this stock. However, after careful investigation (and I’m leerier than most
about political risk factors in South America, recognizing them as the project killers they are)
I’m good about the situation here. For one thing, there are protests on occasion in the area,
particularly around the Coimolache operation (Google “Protesta” and “Tantahuatay” at your
leisure and stick a few of the reports through a Translate program, plenty of literature for your
consideration). You also ge them against the Gold Fields (GFI) Cerro Corona operation no more
than 10km away. But the protests are also a type of dance, a political strategy to keep the
miners on their toes and, not to put too fine a point on it, keeping the purse-strings open. It’s
complex and nuanced, I can’t give one example and say “That’s It!”, but just as one example
we can note that the vociferous and left wing politician from the nearby town of Bambamarca,
one Edy Benavides (who fell out with Gregorio Santos because he said Santos wasn’t left wing
enough) often organizes the type of anti-miner protest march mentioned in this paragraph. It
also just so happens that his wife is the owner of the company with the catering concession at
Cerro Corona.
What REG under CEO Black brings to the table is a strong track record in community relations,
of being able to win and maintain the trust of locals and include them as stakeholders in a
project. It worked at Haquira, it can work here. It’s also notable that despite having sometimes
different strategies the Coimolache company has managed to build, operate and keep operating
its gold mine at the very place in question, that’s not to be sniffed at either.
Regional political risk: The final major weakness can be summed up in a simple phrase, “It’s
in Cajamarca”. The case of Conga and the regional government’s well-known opposition to
Yanacocha S.A., as well as other less famous cases such as opposition and protests at the
Michiquillay, La Granja and Galeno projects, have brought the Gregorio Santos region a lot of
bad press and reputation. Some of it is indeed deserved, but it’s not a blanket policy to be anti-
mining in Cajamarca, a region that is a real live traditional mining region of South America and
steeped in that mythological quality of “mining culture”. The region is sometimes framed as
“Anti-Yanacocha” rather than anti-mining, but that’s a little too simplistic as well, the real story
is that they’re “Anti Mining Companies That Rip Cajamarca Off”. Locals watched as Yanacocha
came in, promised them this-and-that before starting up and then 20 years later wondered why
people living just a few kilometres from the mine were still in abject poverty. So when Conga
(the Yanacocha S.A project that would take over from the now-depleting first operation) was
put on the table it was suddenly payback time, all with a hard left governor to prosecute the
case.
We should recall that there are plenty of mining operations working and making money in the
region, not all of them with the Yanacocha-like poor reputation of sharing the wealth. That
includes Tantahuatay of course and we’ve also seen Rio Alto (now Tahoe) do a good job in
South Cajamarca at the Shahuindo project, moving it into production these last couple of years
and all during a sensitive election period and while Conga remains firmly blocked.
Again, REG and the attitude of its main officers are the right kind of people to take on a
potentially tricky large-scale mining project in Cajamarca and bring it to fruition. Nothing is a
given in this game and there will be work to do and for sure, questions raised by the stubborn
anti-mine brigade in Cajamarca and the well-oiled anti-mining NGO business. But calling
Cajamarca “anti-mining” at a regional level is simple plain wrong, there’s ample evidence to gie
lie to that.
Conclusion and recommendation
13

,
I’m going to start with a small confession: While about half way through my time with John
Black and Fernando Pickmann on Thursday, during lunch in fact, once the penny dropped about
the company and what the NR really means I got onto my broker, put in an order for a few REG
shares (not many I might add) and got them, which basically doubled my until then very small
position. Consider it now a small position and you’re going to have to forgive me on that one
but I can guarantee, I’m not selling them to anyone in the days or weeks to come. No way.
Regulus Resources (REG.v) last week published an important and very positive news release,
the significance of which wasn’t lost on at least some market participants. The stock climbed
sharply on thin trading, which is the result of people willing to take any ask looking at the thin
and under-traded stock with low normal volume. However, the switched-on buyers last week
were right to snap at any bid and luckily there weren’t many of them, not very many people
have worked out the significance of last week’s NR yet because when they do, this stock won’t
be rising in scales of 5c, it’ll be rising by quarters. And eventually by dollars.
The deal REG has put together, the first in 60 years, finally allows concession holders at the
Antakori/Tantahuatay project to work in collaboration on one of the most exciting copper/gold
prospects in South America (if not the world). Other explorecos go round looking for elephant-
sized deposits, this one has had an elephant camped out on its doorstep just waiting to be
shown to the world and that’s what last week’s NR is all about. We don’t know how big
Antakori/Tantahuatay is going to be yet but framing it as “the next Antamina” is no
exaggeration, even rough ballpark estimates (backed up by people who know the deposit and
have worked it) put the potential at one billion tonnes, that’s probably to the low side too. Start
doing the math on that and getting to 13Bn lbs copper is easy, so is getting to 11m oz gold (as
a byproduct kicker, so is getting to a 25 year mine life running at 110,000tpd. All those are pure
conjecture at this point of course, just trying to put a framework on the size and potential of
this project. But there’s no exaggeration either, all those are firmly in the realms of the possible
and the way things are today, REG holds maybe 30% of it, maybe even 50% and is led by
experienced and successful people that have done all this before and have the right
qualifications in geology, community relations and corporate gravitas.
The IKN Weekly promotes Regulus Resources (REG.v) to a Top Pick and your author
will be a buyer of the stock as from this week (Tuesday onward). It’s very difficult to give
a target price for the stock at the moment as I think we’re looking at a company that will
mature and give its best over years rather than months, its exit strategy will almost certainly be
the sale to a larger player in the way of Haquira. But I can say that I’m a happy buyer of this
stock to $1 under present circumstances and I expect there will be plenty of opportunities to
but at sub-$1 levels in the weeks and months to come, not just next week. I’m keenly aware
that by promoting a thinly traded stock like this that it may cause a price pop, so would urge
any of you thinking about joining me in this trade to take it steady and not buy any old price,
because in the end The IKN Weekly isn’t a big-name publication (and never wants to be), it
only moves stocks for a limited period and when the buying stops, this one will do the same as
just about anything else we recommend here and start dropping once the over-buying phase is
through. Don’t chuck your money down the toilet by buying all at once, the buying window on
this is going to last through to at least the end of the year (or when that integral resource
estimate is published).
All that said about calm and sensible portfolio management, be clear that thanks to the
excellent deal thrashed out by this company with its neighbours, one that’s virtually impossible
to fault and ticks every single box I wanted ticked by REG when taking out my original small
position, this company offers an opportunity to get in on the ground floor of the next massive
porphyry/skarn discovery and exploration trade. It’s a golden opportunity and that’s why it’s
going to be stuck at the top of my recommend stocks list for the year couple of years. I think
B2Gold is everything you’d want from a growing producer, I think Starcore is an excellent
risk/reward opportunity at current prices with limited downside and potential massive growth,
but if there’s one stock I’d urge you to own from my recommendations during the bullish cycle
we’ve just begun, it’s this one. By the time 2016 is done be an owner of some REG shares, I
14

,
can’t be clearer than that.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Continental Gold (CNL.to) is a buy
To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven:
A time to be born, and a time to die; a time to plant, and a time to pluck up that which is planted;
A time to kill, and a time to heal; a time to break down, and a time to build up;
A time to weep, and a time to laugh; a time to mourn, and a time to dance;
A time to cast away stones, and a time to gather stones together;
a time to embrace, and a time to refrain from embracing;
A time to get, and a time to lose; a time to keep, and a time to cast away;
A time to rend, and a time to sew; a time to keep silence, and a time to speak;
A time to love, and a time to hate; a time of war, and a time of peace.
Ecclesiastes 3, vv 1-8, King James Bible version
No this is not a joke. I plan to buy shares in Continental Gold (CNL.to) as of next week, with a
trade timescale for the rest of 2016. It’s a simple story, too.
1) We know that CNL has an advanced stage gold asset in its Buriticá project in Colombia.
It’s a large deposit of around 9m oz gold under 43-101 compliance (all category,
including inferred), the grade is high, the projected annual production levels are of the
type that move the dial and interest even the majors. CNL already has a Feasibility
Study (FS) for Buriticá with solid economics, good NPV and IRR, quick projected capital
payback and all the other things you’d like to see from a large-scale gold mine project.
2) We also know that in recent weeks, the national government of Colombia and regional
government of Antioquia have moved to clean up the town of Buriticá from the illegal
mining concerns that had moved in on the back of the CNL project. That we now
because we’ve followed the story fairly closely in both the Weekly and on the blog,
including last week’s segment in IKN366. Perhaps half the illegal/informal/artisanal
miners are now gone from the zone, which isn’t the full-scale victory CNL might have
wanted but is a definite improvement and the rule of law has returned to the town,
albeit artificially imposed by the large quantity of police and army personnel on site.
3) However, the thing that’s changed for your author is news of the permitting track. The
above factors certainly help the trade, but my main concern about CNL at Buriticá has
always been the problems it might face to get its permits, particularly the key
environmental impact permit (EIA) awarded. New information received last week has
made it clear that not only will CNL get its EIA permit, but it will probably come before
15

,
the current company 4q16 estimate. This will bring about a sharp re-rating for the
company and its share price will undoubtedly move higher.
4) It’s absolutely true that I am no fan at all of company CEO Ari Sussman, having
watched what he did at Colossus Minerals in Serra Pelada, Brazil. I’ve made my position
pretty clear over the years about his failure, the poor way he treated locals and
shareholders alike (not least another one of my own holdings, Sandstorm Gold (SSL.to)
(SAND), a company that lost hundreds of millions due to the failure) and how CNL at
Buriticá seemed to be following much the same story line. My opinion of Sussman has
not changed, I do not intend to hang around and sponsor his Colombia project into
production, be that via financing and construction under CNL (theoretically possible) or
an eventual buyout by a larger or more experienced mining company (more probable).
I’m comfortable about buying into his company because he is not a direct part of the
key permitting process in Colombia, the main players are the on-ground Colombia part
of CNL and the relevant government officials, not Sussman per se. My trade around
CNL is strictly 2016, it’s strictly on the very high likelihood Buritica is permitted and gets
its EIA, at that point I will sell and take my profits.
But before we go any further, I want to cover the bits of CNL that we’re not going to do in
great detail today (we can always return to them at a later date, this trade has a six month
time window after all. Today’s is a political risk buy call, rather than a buy reco on what CNL is
and has at its project, but it would be remiss not to cover at least the basics and show that
there’s plenty of potential upside is the story gets the de-risking event I now believe is in its
future.
Starting with the corporate and here’s how the current company structure looks, in which we
factor in the pro-forma of the current bought deal announced on May 3rd (4) and assume (as is
almost certain) that the 15% over-allotment facility is also fully filled:
Shares out: 141.33m
Options: 8.98m
Warrants: 5.75m
Fully diluted shares: 156.06m
Current share price: C$2.65
Market Cap: C$374.52m
Approx working cap per S/O: $0.27
All prices are in Canadian Dollars unless stated.
At current forex, that market cap is equivalent to U$285.55m. For that you get the following
gold reserve/resource (ripped straight from the latest corporate presentation):
• In global terms, an all-category 9m ounces of high grade gold with a good Ag kicker
• Half of that is under Measured and Indicated category
• Of the 4.48m oz in M-I, most of it (3.71m oz) is proven and probable reserve
We have no problem about the ounces in Buritica and their relationship to the market cap, in
other words (as long as there’s a mine to be built here, at least). On an all-count basis, the in-
16

,
situ works out at U$31.70/oz. Just the M+I (i.e. what’s in the feasibility study) is valued at
U$63.74/oz.
Compare that to Kaminak, a smaller deposit which Goldcorp is happy to pay U$132/oz M+I.
When it comes to the basic valuation, CNL is still on the cheap side even after its recent near-
doubling run to this weekend’s CAD$2.65 share price.
That’s enough of the basics, as noted we can come back to the numbercrunching on another
day run numbers and refine matters to our own taste. What I want to do today is tell you
what’s changed in my opinion of CNL at Buriticá. In other words, why I was wrong and why
changing my mind offers up a great trade potential.
What’s changed in the permitting process
In short, what’s changed is my own understanding of the process. Last week I had the chance
to sit down with somebody who does not work for CNL, but is very close to the story and the
permitting process. That person explained what was going on, answered all my questions about
concerns on the permitting track and, not to put too fine a point on it, convinced me that my
negative position on permitting was wrong. In short, I am entering this trade on intelligence
gathered. The issue dates back to September 2015 and takes in judicial events of February
2016.
In September 2015, CNL withdrew its project permitting from the regional Corantioquia
Environmental body jurisdiction and handed the permitting process over the the National
Environmental people. Subsequently, we found out that the truth behind that process was that
Corantioquia had already denied CNL its permit before they withdrew and moved over to the
National Government (in their terms “elevated”) to run the key environmental permitting under
the national PINES (National Strategic Projects of Importance) initiative. We covered this in this
blog post in January 2016 (C1) and here’s a section of that script, it sums up things nicely:
“...the director of the permitting body Corantioquia, Alejandro González Valencia, told
Colombia's biznews people El Colombiano that the permit was denied due to water reasons (too
much of it from the mine that wasn't being managed) and enviro-control reasons. The report
also said that according to the director of the body (translated), "...on September 11th 2015 the
environmental impact permit modification was denied (by Corantioquia)."
Got that? September 11th 2015. That was a Friday.
Now compare that to the CNL.to news release dated Tuesday September 15th 2015 entitled
"Continental Gold Elevates the Environmental Permit Application for the Buritica Project to the
National Level" in which the only mention made of the previous permitting program was,
"...Company has withdrawn its application for the modification of the EIA from Corantioquia,
the autonomous regional environmental authority of the department of Antioquia".
Got that? CNL tried to make out on the 15th of September, four days (and two full trading days)
after Corantioquia had DENIED the permit, that they had withdrawn their application. Maybe,
like me, you see a subtle difference between "withdrawn on 15th" and "denied on 11th".
That post was and still is factually correct, I stand by every word. So from September 2015
onward CNL could ignore the regional Corantioquia enviro people and just deal with the
national people under the PINES program, which was billed as a “fast track” permitting that
would speed things up. But then came a second hit to CNL when in February 2016 the country’s
Constitutional Court ruled on environmental matters pertaining to mining and part of the ruling
stated that the National Government environment body’s green light on any given project
wasn’t enough, to have a correct permit you also need the approval or the regional
environmental board. CNL put it this way (C2):
"The court also indicated that ANLA (the National Environmental Agency) will not
have sole exclusivity over permitting and maintaining environmental aspects of
PINES projects."
17

,
In the CNL NR at the time. This looked pretty bad for CNL at the time and I said as much on
the blog such as in this post (C3) which wrapped up like this:
“...thanks to Colombia's Constitutional court ruling yesterday that IKN told you all
about (but nobody believed) they have to go back to Coriantioquia and get the permits
from them, the very ones already denied to them before CNL pretended to withdraw
and go "fast track" with the PINES system. Hey, get the feeling that track won't be as
fast as you thought, Canadian brokerage anal yst suckers? Oh man, I'd love to be in
that room when the "Hi guys! Long time no see!" meeting goes on between the
regional enviro people and the CNL team.”
And that’s where my mistake in anal ysis began. Today that’s corrected and we show the
opportunity that’s afoot.
One thing I did and do know is that the National Government of Juan Manuel Santos are keen
on moving this and other mining projects forward. The PINES program was part of that, they
wanted to give a large project the chance of fast-tracking its paperwork, in short the
government “really wants a win” in the mining sector and with other projects such as La Colosa
and Gramalote stalled for their own reasons, plus Eco Oro at Angostura a very polemic hot
ticket environmentally, it fell to CNL at Buriticá to be the one they most wanted to happen. All
was going well until the Constitutional Court ruling in February, but as my words from that time
suggest I thought that going back to the regionals for approval would make this, once again, a
bureaucratic nightmare.
I was wrong. Permitting is going ahead on schedule.
What’s happened since then is that the National Government’s environmental people have
taken a very keen interest in everything Corantioquia is doing on its part of the permitting
track, up to and including putting a national guy in an office next door to the main Corantioquia
office to make sure all paperwork regarding Buriticá
It is also, of course, one of the reasons we’ve seen the large scale operation to crack down on
illegal/informal mining in the town and valley of Buritica during April and May. The government
wants its win and it’s now pulling out all the stops to ensure Corantioquia has no objections to
signing off.
The close involvement of the National enviro people at the regional enviro level was the mistake
in my analysis until now. My assumption was that because PINES wasn’t the only paper in town
and CNL needed the regionals to sign off, things wouldn’t move forward rapidly. That’s not the
case, the national government (the ones that really want their win in the mining sector) are
pressing and harrying the regional people and making sure there’s no problems, no errors, no
foot-dragging and no “political objections” (e.g. sour grapes from last September) to get in the
way of the permitting track. That’s the advantage that we have to play with today.
Bottom line: CNL says it will get its permits in 4q16 and now I believe them and in fact, the
permit may come earlier than 4q16 which is why I’m not beating round the bush, it’s time to
get on now. It’s not for nothing that CNL has staffed its corporate officer level with high ranking
Colombian legal people in recent months, who are now the people in full charge of the
permitting process on the company side. And what this means is that when (not if) CNL is
awarded its environmental impact permit it’s going to get a significant re-rating. In other words,
the share price is going to go up.
Buy low, sell high. It’s capitalism.
A price target on CNL in 2016
It’s time to hazard a guess on how high CNL might go under the expected re-rating it gets from
18

,
getting its key EIA permit (please note it’s not the last permit it will need, but it’s the big one,
the one that unties all the knots).
I do that like this:
1) We take its base case Buriticá NPV of U$860m (at U$1,200/oz gold and a 5% discount)
2) We note that Goldcorp just a few days ago was willing to pay 0.93X the NPV of the
Kaminak Coffee project in the Yukon (also 5% disc, but at a U$1,250/oz Au price).
3) We assume that, on the straight line, a CNL target multiple before it gets a bonus offer
from a major in the way of KAM would be 0.7X NPV, the same as KAM’s was before the
Goldcorp offer came in.
4) But we also acknowledge that CNL has a higher political and country risk than the safe
jurisdiction Coffee project which brings down the multiple. Then again, CNL at Buriticá
is bigger and better grading, so that would get people paying extra. Overall and to be
as conservative as possible without being silly, I’d use a 0.6X multiple on NPV at
Buriticá.
5) 0.6X of U$860m, then divided by the share count = U$3.66 = CAD$4.80 at today’s
forex.
6) Compared to this weekend’s close, that’s an 81.1% upside. More than enough for my
blood.
Conclusion
Getting a trade call wrong is all part of the business, as is misunderstanding what’s going on
inside a company or a government. I’ve been firmly in the camp that has CNL too difficult to
buy because of its vague and uncertain permitting process in Colombia, but now I’ve seen the
error and have been corrected by people very close to the story (without being part of the
company, I hasten to add) it also means there’s financial opportunity in saying “I was wrong”.
This isn’t a trade on the relative merits of the Canadian corporate end of the company, this is
pure and simple capitalism. What we have is a market that’s discounting CNL because there are
enough participants that still think the way I used to think. They’re not sure the mine will get its
permits and be allowed to build its mine. I was wrong, they will be proven wrong, CNL will get
its EIA and you have a whole country’s government betting on that outcome.
The IKN Weekly recommends Continental Gold (CNL.to) as a buy and sets a C$4.80 target on
the stock, representing an 81% upside to Friday’s close. The trade is to run during 2016 and
once the permit arrives, I’ll enjoy the bounce the re-rating offers it and then I’ll sell. I won’t be
around for the financing stage, nor will I be long if and when the buyout offer comes from a
larger mining company. Mine is a punctual trade, based around the asymmetric political risk
opportunity in Colombia, no more and no less.
19

,
Stocks to Follow
It wasn’t a good week for the ‘stocks to Follow’ list as even though the raw count of four
winners (LRA.v, FCV.v, NEV.v, REG.v) and six losers wasn’t bad, and even though the only out-
sized wins were to the upside thanks to Regulus (REG.v up 40.0%) and Lara (LRA.v up 16.3%),
the big holdings were losers and that means a negative week on a personal level. And so be it,
with GDX down 2.9% on the week it’s the logical expression of a market consolidating and
getting bumped around by FedSpeak.
We currently have ten open positions on the list, five less less than our self-imposed maximum
of fifteen at any given time. That changes next week as CNL.to comes into the fold. Seven are
in the green, three are in the red.
company Ticker this week Avg Price Reco date Current PPS Gain/Loss% Notes
TOP PICKS
B2Gold BTO.to hold C$2.11 12-sep-14 C$2.64 25.1% New tgt C$2.96, holding
Starcore Intl SAM.to STR buy C$0.58 10-jan-15 C$0.78 34.5% Top Pick 2016, new
Long positions (in current order of preference)
Sandstorm Gold INV.to STR buy U$3.90 17-apr-16 U$3.97 1.8% StreamCo, 1q16 strong, buy
Tinka Res TK.v STR buy C$0.195 19-apr-16 C$0.24 23.1% Top value Zn/Sn/Ag stock
Richmont RIC buy U$7.60 01-may-16 U$8.38 10.3% M&A target, near-term trade
INV Metals INV.to spec buy C$0.25 03-apr-16 C$0.62 148.0% Near-term trade for 2q16
Lara Expl. LRA.v spec buy C$1.15 08-apr-12 C$0.93 -19.1% solid biz model, waking up
Focus Ventures FCV.v hold C$0.23 01-jul-12 C$0.085 -63.0% Now re-grouping
Nevada Sunrise NEV.v spec buy C$0.185 28-feb-16 C$0.22 18.9% V small Li spec play
Regulus Res REG.v hold C$0.30 06-apr-15 C$0.70 133.3% New Top Pick stock
Short positions
none at present
Closed in 2016 closed close price
Phoscan Chem FOS.to jan16 C$0.28 29-mar-15 C$0.265 -5.4% Buyout trade, bot but poor deal
True Gold TGM.v jan16 C$0.18 23-aug-15 C$0.25 38.9% okay trade, sold on pol risk
McEwen Mining MUX jan16 U$1.09 25-jan-15 U$1.20 10.1% sold due to lack of value
Lake Shore Gold LSG.to feb-16 C$1.10 07-apr-15 C$1.69 53.6% bot out, sold early in process
Atacama Pacific ATM.v feb-16 C$0.19 26-apr-15 C$0.40 110.5% sold for a double on big pop
New Gold NGD feb-16 U$2.06 24-jan-16 U$2.96 43.7% closed good near-term trade
Sandspring Res SSP.v mar-16 C$0.195 18-oct-15 C$0.32 64.1% Hit tgt, took profit
Teranga Gold TGZ.to mar-16 C$0.54 15-feb-15 C$0.60 11.1% disappointing trade
B2Gold BTG mar-16 U$0.85 13-jan-16 U$1.30 52.9% Separate trade on B2, hit tgt
Dalradian Res DNA.to mar-16 C$0.67 27-oct-13 C$1.00 49.3% Hit target, sold, good win
HudBay Min. HBM may-16 U$4.10 03-apr-16 U$4.36 -6.3% Short trade, poor timing
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 closed positions in appendices below
Now for some notes on current basket stocks.
Continental Gold (CNL.to): Buying. Just a quick note to make clear intentions, the rest is
above.
Regulus Resources (REG.v): Promoting to Top Pick, adding. Ditto.
Starcore Intl (SAM.to): Added again. As noted in last week’s edition, I added more on the
new Top Pick recommendation and the cost average took a bigger hike as a result of this
20

,
chunkier addition. SAM traded well all week but saw the same type of weakness as the market
in general on Thursday and Friday, the difference with a smallcap is that when the buying
interest evaporates, the bid/ask gap widens quickly as those looking to snaffle bargains offer
emergency-exit prices. It’s the way of the world. If gold sees U$20/oz added to its price next
week it’ll all be forgotten quickly. Tremendous buying opportunity.
Sandstorm Gold (SAND) (SSL.to): I managed cracking good value at today’s market deck.
Richmont Mines (RIC) (RIC.to): RIC was off and running again on the first trading day of
last week, but that came to a halt
on the evening of Monday 16th
and the news (5) RIC was running
a CAD$27m bought deal, which is
really a CAD$31m bought deal
because the overallotment is nigh
on certain to fill as well as the
primary offer. In all, RIC is placing
2.96m shares at CAD$10.40
apiece and as this ten day chart of
the RIC.to Canadian ticker shows
the way in which the stock traded
stubbornly above that price is all
the indication you need of a
successful placement in the
making.
As for the reasons behind the
deal, as noted on the blog (6) the evening of the news, the official reason given by RIC, "The
Corporation intends to use the net proceeds to aggressively expand the current exploration
program as well as potential organic growth opportunities at the cornerstone Island Gold Mine”,
sounds like one big crock to me. With well over C$60m in treasury RIC has no need for another
$30m in order to go exploring or growing Island, this is far more likely to be a defensive
measure against any eventual merger bid. The fact that it’s a bought deal lends itself to that, as
does the lack of dilutive warrant. The theory goes that any eventual friendly (or otherwise)
suitor would have to pay a 30% premium to buy out RIC and that now means they need to pay
$40 for the $30m in cash (now virtually) added to the corporate structure.
Which brings me to the dilemma. To the downside:
1) I went long RIC recently because I considered it a hot M&A play with an excellent
chance of seeing a buyout offer come.
2) Monday’s news strongly suggests that even without the anti-merger director
Chamandy, the board is up for fighting against any eventual offer.
3) As we’re still not in the phase of the market where hostile bids would work, we’ve just
seen the chances of RIC being bought out diminish significantly about getting on late
but not too late.
However, to the upside:
1) There’s no reason for me to sell my RIC shares at the moment. Although I’ve been
buying and continue to do so, I have the right size of cash on the sidelines and no
liquidity problems.
2) Even after the bought deal at a much lower price than its close and even after the
midweek Fed-inspired correction in gold, my position is showing a profit. Why not let it
run for a while?
3) I’ve been wrong for the right reasons often enough, perhaps it’s time to cut myself a
slice of luck and be right for the wrong reasons for a change.
21

,
Therefore, for the time being at least I’m in no hurry to liquidate my RIC position simply
because the chances of a takeover have dropped. However, that may change with my own
circumstances and if they do, I wouldn’t have a second thought about liquidating RIC even if
the eventual gain is a modest one.
I know that they were in merger talks (and fairly advanced ones too) but if we take the signals
at face value and consider last week’s bought deal as a defensive move in real terms, as well as
being a clear statement of intent, that ended with RIC saying “non merci” at some point. As I
ultimately run The IKN Weekly as my own portfolio and don’t need the liquidity (yet, though I
hasten to add that I’m not a bottomless pit of cash) I’m not selling, but for those of you who
got in for the same reasons and are looking for cash to re-deploy, you may make your own
different decision (I cannot see into your back pocket). As I’ve mentioned many times, the “this
is what I’m doing with my money” model used here is I believe the best way of doing a
newsletter but it’s hardly a perfect model. My decision today to hold on to my RIC for reasons
other than an impending M&A is an example of the weakness of the model.
Tinka Resources (TK.v): Tinka traded well enough and is now consolidated inside a tight 23c
to 25c trading range (give or take half a cent). We await the resource update. One thing I like
about TK today is that it’s not getting much mention when the subject is Zn juniors. Plenty
about Arizona Mining and other companies, TK seems to be lost and forgotten. Suits me just
fine.
INV Metals (INV.to): News from the Loma Larga project is of growing anti-mining activity.
On May 21st to 24th (i.e. tomorrow) the locality is playing host to an anti-mining forum as
reported in the local press (7). The guest list is interesting as well, as it includes Jen Moore of
Canadian anti-mining NGO MiningWatch
(she’s know to many of you I’m sure)
and Kléver Calle, who represents the
main indigenous umbrella Group
Yasunidos. Activities incluye a visit to the
Loma Larga Project site and the nearby
lakes around it, then today a
presentation on anti-mining activities in
the local town hall. Finally tomorrow sees
several presentations, including one from
Carlos Lozano, an anti-mining activist
from Colombia who has been at the
forefront of efforts to stop the Angostura
(Eco Oro EOM.to) project from going
ahead and to Project the ‘Páramo’ high
country in Colombia. Considering that
the Loma Larga Project shares many points in common, that’s not something that should be
taken lightly and I’m sure Señor Lozano gave locals plenty of advice on how to go about any
anti-mine campaign they were considering.
All this underscores your author’s plan to stick around this trade until the updated PFS is
published and then Get Outta Dodge on the likely liquidity event it was cause. On that subject,
trading was indeed light volumes-wise last week but due to the thing bid/ask things get skewed
quickly. INV reached as high as 80c early week but after Janet & Co had had their say, the
sellers moved in and we saw a 20%+ top to bottom move in the stock.
Lara Exploration (LRA.v): It turns out the interest in Lara Exploration is from Byron King,
one of the non-mining specialist stock tipsters at Agora who recommended LRA as an
alternative to those who had bought and won on sister company Reservoir (RMC.v) (at least
they have the same father in Miles Thompson). We hear that King is no expert on mining but
has a strong following among generalist retailers and the influx of cash to the shares is al his
22

,
doing. Fair enough.
Notably, management at LRA took the opportunity to exercise options and turn them into cash,
with several LRA officers exercising 25,000 option tranches at 27c and selling them into the
high-90s prices, so let’s approximate and say four or five of them made $17k or 18k profit each.
Which is a reasonable bonus.
Sandstorm (SAND) (SSL.to): I got a
couple of mails asking about the relative
weakness shown by SAND late last week
(post-Fed minutes) but if we take a slightly
longer 10 day view...
...there really isn’t that much to fret over,
as SAND was outperforming things like
streamer benchmark FNV and mining
benchmark GDX before the Fed news, it
looks as though it correctly more sharply as
a result.
The Copper Basket
After twenty weeks of 2016, The Copper Basket shows a 57.60% gain to level stakes.
company ticker price 1/1/16 Shares out Market Cap current pps gain/loss%
1 HudBay Min. HBM.to 0.35 235.23 1187.91 5.05 -4.9%
2 Ivanhoe Mines IVN.to 0.61 778.96 817.91 1.05 72.1%
3 Reservoir Min. RMC.v 4.08 48.69 417.27 8.57 110.0%
4 Capstone Min. CS.to 0.44 382.04 240.69 0.63 43.2%
5 NGEx Resources NGQ.to 0.65 205.06 174.30 0.85 30.8%
6 NovaCopper NCQ.to 0.395 104.33 77.20 0.74 87.3%
7 Western Copper WRN.to 0.38 94.19 70.64 0.75 97.4%
8 Cordoba Min. CDB.v 0.16 86.86 63.41 0.73 356.3%
9 Nevada Copper NCU.to 0.66 80.5 60.38 0.75 13.6%
10 Copper Mtn CUM.to 0.445 118.8 54.65 0.46 3.4%
11 Copper Fox CUU.v 0.125 417.64 50.12 0.12 -4.0%
12 Hot Chili Ltd HCH.ax 0.09 445.723 43.68 0.098 8.9%
13 Atico Mining ATY.v 0.28 97.59 39.04 0.40 42.9%
14 Amerigo Res ARG.to 0.205 173.61 25.17 0.145 -29.3%
15 Revelo Res. RVL.v 0.055 99.19 7.44 0.075 36.4%
NB: HCH.ax priced in AUD$, rest CAD$ Portfolio avg 57.60%
A significant slippage in the Copper Basket The Copper Basket 2016, weekly evolution
100%
overall average this week, as even though
80%
there were five winners (HBM.to, NGQ.to,
HCH.ax, WRN.to, ARG.to) and three 60%
unchanged stocks (CS.to, CUM.to. RVL.v) the 40%
seven losers (IVN.to, RMC.v, CUU.v, NCU.to,
20%
NCQ.to, ATY.v, CDB.v) outweighed them by
including big percentage losers such as 0%
NovaCopper (NCQ.to down 22.1%) and the -20%
previously high-flying Cordoba (CDB.v down
23
dr3naj ht01 ht71 ht42 ts13 t7bef ht41 ts12 ht82 ht6 ht31 ht02 ht72 r3rpa ht01 ht71 ht42 1yam ht8 ht51 dn22
source: IKN calcs

,
12.1%). In fairness the double figure gains in Hot Chili (HCH.ax up 21.0%) and Amerigo
(ARG.to up 11.5%) helped out.
Over in the metals pit, copper continued with its
move towards the U$2/lb level and the way things
are now it’s looking near certain we’re going to
breach that line at some point soon, even if
briefly. That could be the day the explorecos snap
and follow the producers down. That could be the
day I get ot buy some NGEx Resources (NGQ.to).
We move to the weekly copper warehouse
inventory bullet points:
• Total world copper stocks in the three
official warehouse systems dropped by
another large number last week, mirroring
the action of the week before and
showing the China de-stock in rude
health. We lost a total of 30,913 metric
tonnes (mt) (-6.2%) from world stock that
ended the week at 469,734mt and the 500k psychological line os history.
• Shanghai was again the main reason, with stocks dropping 28,876mt (-10.1%) to close
at 257,334mt.
• LME stocks also dropped, but very slightly, down 950mt (-0.6%) on the week to finish
at 155,725mt. Trading was again on the light side, according to trade paper reports.
• And to complete the trifecta Comex stocks dropped again, down by what’s becoming a
traditional 1k mt or so. This time it was 1,087mt (-1.9%) with the weekend stocks
number at 56,675mt.
Here’s the Shanghai-only chart and we’re now back at the previous record high point for copper
stocks in its system, which is a start. It’s come off quickly too, down 137,443 mt since March
20th...and that’s a lot of copper.
Shanghai Futures Exchange Warehouse Stocks, 2014-2016
400000
350000
300000
250000
200000
150000
100000
50000
24
31'13ceD ht91 ht9 dn2ram dr32 ht31 ht4yam ht52 ht51 ht6yluj ht72 ht71 ht7 ht82 ht91 ht9 ht03 ts12 ht11 ts1bef dn22 ht51 ht5rpa ht62 ht71 ht7nuj ht82 ht91 ht9 ht03 ht02 ht11 ts1von dn22 ht31 dr3naj ht42 ht41 ht6ram ht72 ht71 ht8
Mt Cu
source: Cochilco
Now for comments on some of our basket stocks.
HudBay Minerals (HBM) (HBM.to): Don’t dismiss the potential impact (pardon the pun) of
the latest truck accident out of Constancia last week, as reported on the blog (8). With the
mayor of the local town saying he plans to charge HBM criminally, there’s a clear indication that
locals have come to the end of their tether regarding the repeated accidents of trucks spilling

,
their loads of copper concentrate and polluting the local vicinity as a result. In January, one
such accident brought on a 72 hour strike and roadblock that halted the mine, we’re now in a
key and sensitive electoral period in Peru that gives any such protest more amplification.
I was asked by a couple of reader mails for a little more detail about what’s going on. Here’s
what I wrote back (the second person got my first answer copypasted without knowing it).
If it happens once, it's a driver thing. But this is the eighth accident so my best guess is
that there's a combination of overloading and performance pressure.
That overturned truck is (i'm pretty sure) a Foton 6, Chinese maker. Not world standard
build quality and even if you give the benefit of doubt, even 30 tonnes of conc is
limit/limit of its load capacity. It was carrying 35 metric tonnes according to the gubmint
people. Next, HBM sub-contracts the logistics and they'll be squeezing their own
drivers on every hour on the road. They don't roll fast enough and they'll lose their job.
Finally, the first 30or 40km out of Constancia is dirt track, until you get to the main road
that runs through Arequipa down to the coast. That's also where all the accidents have
occurred, you have drivers rolling too fast on a crappy surface.
In the blog post Thursday I used the word “irresponsible” for HBM at Constancia, which sums
things up well enough. Truck accidents of this sort aren’t unheard of in other mines, but they’re
not a frequent and regular occurrence in the way they are at Constancia either. The latest
report that had Peru’s OEFA stating that around 50% of 35 tonnes of concentrate had spilled
gives us a solid tonnage number and 25tonnes is too much for one of those vehicles even on
good roads, this is dirt track and they’re being driven by people under a productivity kosh.
Hot Chili (HCH.ax): The Australian listed copper play with the Chilean assets was last week’s
biggest mover on news (9) that it had come to an agreement with its minority JV partner,
Chile’s CMO, to sell an extra 2.5% of its flagship Productora project for $1.5m cash. This brings
CMP’s participation in the project to 20%, HCH with the other 80%.
As for the reason for the deal, the cruel reality comes in this quote from the NR:
• Funds from the sale of the 2.5% project stake in Productora will be fully applied to
reducing Hot Chili’s loan facility (Facility) of US$9.5 million with Sprott Resource
Lending Partnership (Sprott).
• The Company is also pleased to confirm that Sprott and Hot Chili have agreed to terms
for a 12 month extension to the Facility which is currently due for repayment on 30th
June 2016.
• Terms include payment by Hot Chili toward the reduction of the outstanding loan
balance and satisfaction of a standard extension fee. The extension is subject to
agreement of formal documentation and Hot Chili expects to execute a formal
agreement for the Sprott Facility extension in June 2016.
That needs a little translation, here’s a semi-Ottotrans for you:
• HCH owes the Rick Rule end of Sprott $9.5m and the due due is just round the corner
• HCH agrees to sell a portion of its asset and pay Sprott all that money.
• In return, Sprott boots forward the due date on the $8m due for 12 months.
• Oh, but there is of course “a standard extension fee” that HCH will have to pay to
Sprott in order to get that debt booted forward.
• In other words, HCH just lost 2.5% of its main asset to its JV partner in order to get
relief on an $8m loan which is probably closer to $8.5m once Rick Rule’s idea of a
“standard fee” is added...all with a year’s extra interest on top.
The hallmark of a distressed junior is one that has to sell property at this time, just at the cusp
of the moment when the market is putting equity value back into fixed assets. I might not like
Productora, but that’s not a reason to dump a slice of it for a net-net of less than a million
bucks. For a different example, neither do I like Caballo Blanco in Veracruz but the fact that
Timmins Gold (TMM.to) is selling it at this time speaks volumes about its financial problems.
25

,
All that aside, the market decided to reward HCH for this distressed and semi-forced deal
because the only other alternatives were 1) an equity raise to pay off the $9.5m it owes to
Sprott, which would mean something in the region of A$13.2m at current rates. Apply that to a
A$0.09 share price and you’re staring at a 146.7m share dilution...hey, let’s call it 150m and be
done! The market knew the Sprott loan was coming due and was bracing itself, but HCH has
bought itself 12 months of time with this expensive deal and the share reacted accordingly.
So ends another thrilling chapter in capital markets, but the main thing to remember is the
thing that hasn’t changed: Productora is a mediocre asset and HCH is still in danger of seeing
its share count blow out further, it’s an untouchable stock even if copper metal prices start to
shift upwards. The other thing to
remember is narrative and cast of
characters of The Merchant of Venice.
NovaCopper (NCQ.to): The law of
gravity in operation. It’ looks as though
somebody made out like a bandit on a
successful pump operation around the
turn of the month, but the story since
then is of dropping volume and a NCQ
that returns from whence it came, one
more time.
And another set of bagholders is created
by Vancouver sharks.
The Low Cost Producer Basket
After 20 weeks of 2016, the Producer Basket shows a gain of 91.97% to level stakes.
company ticker price 1/1/16 Shares out Mkt Cap (Bn) current pps gain/loss%
1 Barrick ABX 7.38 1164.67 21.20 18.20 146.6%
2 Newmont NEM 17.98 529.12 17.85 33.73 87.6%
3 Goldcorp GG 11.56 830.22 14.42 17.37 50.3%
4 Franco Nevada FNV 45.75 176.298 11.55 65.52 43.2%
5 Agnico Eagle AEM 26.28 217.67 10.05 46.18 75.7%
6 Ang/Ashanti AU 7.10 405.27 5.86 14.46 103.7%
7 Detour Gold DGC.to 14.41 170.85 4.81 28.16 95.4%
8 Sibanye Gold SBGL 6.09 228.71 2.82 12.35 126.6%
9 Buenaventura BVN 4.28 254.19 2.53 9.97 132.9%
10 New Gold NGD 2.32 509.89 2.15 4.21 81.5%
Prices in U$/NYSE tickers, except DGC.to (CAD$) Portfolio avg 91.97%
All ten registered losses last week but The Low Cost Producer Basket: Weekly performance
the range was from the two cents (less 130% and comparative to GDX control
than 0.1%) lost by Agnico Eagle (AEM) 110%
to the 10.5% lost by Sibanye (SBGL).
90%
Most of the losses were small, between
70%
1% and 3%, AngloGold Ashanti (AU)
50%
was down 4.6% as well so we again
30%
see the warning signal being sent out
10%
by the South African exposed stocks,
-10%
getting hammered down after their
early year out-performance. New Gold
(NGD) was the other outlier on the
26
dr3naj ht01 ht71 ht42 ts13 ht7bef ht41 ts12 ht82 ht6 ht31 ht02 ht72 dr3rpa ht01 ht71 ht42 ts1yam ht8 ht51 dn22
basket
gdx control
source: Google, IKN calcs

,
week, down 7.1%. That’s more likely about its junior size than any new problem at Rainy River.
Low Cost Basket: Percentage difference between
basket and GDX control, 2016
5%
0%
-5%
-10%
-15%
-20%
-25%
27
ht01 ht71 ht42 ts13 ht7bef ht41 ts12 ht82 ht6 ht31 ht02 ht72 dr3rpa ht01 ht71 ht42 ts1yam ht8 ht51 dn22
source: ikn calcs, NYSE/Nasdaq data
Buenaventura (BVN): We hear of movement in the permitting process for the company’s key
San Gabriel (ex-Chucapaca) project in the Moquegua region of South Peru. This was the project
due to have its Social Licence meeting in late December and early January, but the meeting
was called off due to protests by locals who demanded more information be given to them
before they sat down. That process has been ongoing and now the new date for the Social
Licence meeting has been set for June 17th (10) according to local reports.
Finally, yes I agree that the Antakori/Tantahuatay developments are big enough to move the
dial at this company too. You may want to consider that in your equations from now on, but for
this first phase I’m going to stick with the company with the C$40m market cap and the big
leverage.
Goldcorp (GG): This isn’t a story that I’m making much of a fuss about, but the source was
sufficiently weighty to give it credence and I’ll pass it on. Apparently, Eira Thomas hasn’t given
up hope of seeing a counterbid for Kaminak coming in.
Regional politics
Mexico and Chile: A mysterious deal for Guanajuato
The municipality of Guanajuato in Mexico is one of the country’s main centres for mining, with
many mines (silver, gold) located there an a generational tradition of mining among its people.
As for Chile, no need to explain its mining pedigree on these pages.
That’s the background done, on with the story. Last week, the mayor of Guanajuato, Edgar
Castro Cerrillo, went to Mexico’s capital and met with Chile’s Ambassador to Mexico, Ricardo
Nuñez Muñoz. After the meeting, Mayor Castro told reporters (11) that the municipality of
Guanajuato will in mid-June (next month) sign a collaboration agreement with the government
and country of Chile, the first of its kind for any municipality in Mexico, but aside from that
details were scant. Mayor Castro said (translated):
“It (the deal) is about mining, that’s what I can tell you. It’s excellent news for the city (of
Guanajuato) but I must respect the protocol and not give the details, as what we are going to
sign must first pass through the office of the Secretary of Foreign Relations.” He went on to
say, “The benefit will be the promotional aspect we will get from the work. The government of
Chile has mining in its culture and traditions and this will strengthen our program, because we
are of course a city with all of its culture and history connected to mining.”
Peru: The campaign gets dirty
In three Sundays’ time, Peru chooses its new President and it’s at this late stage that you’d
expect the big gun negative stories to show up. Right on cue, last week a report in one of the
most watched Sunday evening investigative reporting shows linked Keiko Fujimori’s campaign

,
manager, Joaquin Ramirez, to a DEA investigation into narcotrafficking and also had the main
witness saying that Ramirez had told him he’d laundered U$15m of money for Keiko during the
2011 election campaign. Hilarity ensued when Keiko Fujimori rang the live TV show during the
program, argued with the presenters, slammed the phone down, then rang again saying she’d
been “cut off” during the argument. In the days that followed the Fujimori party damage
control team got into gear, the campaign manager has resigned “in order to clear his name and
not besmirch that of Keiko” (etc, or something like that) and Keiko accused the PPK people of a
dirty tricks campaign, citing the lack of evidence and the way hearsay was being used.
The next few days will be key, as tonight (Sunday evening) we have the main live TV debate
between the two candidates and the next week is the last full week of campaigning, poll-
gathering and the last potential negative attack window available.
Meanwhile in the world of Peru mining, word is that locals around the big Las Bambas copper
mine (owned by China’s MMG), currently in first production stages and ramping up to
commercial production, are considering another protest starting May 29th (i.e. a week before
the election, nicely timed) including roadblocks and all the fun things as they haven’t made
progress in their negotiations with the company. In this case they’re not against the mine, they
just want a better deal. At least they’re open about the reality.
Market Watching
Belo Sun (BSX.to) strangeness
In a note to clients on Thursday May 19th, Daniel Earle wrote that “...management expects to
complete major permitting for its Volta Grande Project (100%) in Brazil with the receipt of an
Installation License imminently.”. Here are a couple of thoughts on that:
• It’s known that Earle is an anal yst that’s (to use the expression) “close to Belo Sun”
(BSX.to). He’s also good at his job and not the kind of person to throw out false
speculation to clients, so we can assume he’s had some off-record briefing.
• We know that BSX and the regional government had a scheduled signing ceremony
planned and on for late April (up to and including a hotel conference room booked and
assorted bigwigs confirming their presence), but the show was called off just a couple
of days before due to the protests and threats of strike action and suchlike from the
locals around the BSX Volta Grande project. The great majority of locals are firmly se
against the project.
• We know that because we carried the story in IKN363 dated April 24th, which had the
Secretary of the Environment for Pará saying (translated), “The programmed event has
been delayed, no date has been set for the delivery of the licence”.
• Ever since the Daniel Earle heads-up I’ve been monitoring the national and local Brazil
news sources that typically carry Belo Sun/Volta Grande news and updates. There has
been nothing on the airwaves all week.
Put those somewhat disparate items together and we get a couple of possible scenarios:
A) The company and government are going to sign the permits in a low key, off radar manner
and get the job done before any locals get wind of the plan.
B) BSX is feeding “overly-hopeful” (sounds better than false) information to the market via back
channels, but it’s not likely to be able to get its permits quite a “imminently” as it expects.
On balance I hope it’s scenario B) or a variant thereof, because if the regional government and
28

,
BSX decide to go the sneaky route there’s going to be hell to pay afterwards.
A Minera IRL false rumour
I picked up on a rumour that did the rounds at the Peru Gold Symposium last week (it was a
lacklustre event all told, nothing much to report otherwise) which then got enough bounce on it
for it to cause mails received from other places. The rumour, almost certainly propagated by
those still sore about losing out in the power struggle for the company that we covered closely
last year, went that Diego Benavides is no longer part of the company. I can assure all readers
that nothing could be further from the truth. We should soon see news of the next step in the
structural re-organization of Minera IRL as it does what needs to be done to re-list in first the
Lima and then the Toronto stock market and Diego Benavides will certainly be a part of that.
The B2Gold (BTO.to) (BTG) 1q16 financials anal ysis delayed again
I’ll get to these eventually but the sudden opportunities laid out by Regulus (REG.v) first and
foremost, then Continental Gold (CNL.to) means I wanted to concentrate on their stories this
weekend. And I see no rush in covering B2 for the moment, everything’s fine, my call is to hold
happily, nothing’s much is going to change
Focus Ventures (FCV.v) announces its revised pre-feas
So what did we learn about Focus Ventures (FCV.v) last week, on the back of its updated Pre-
Feasibility study announcement (12) that hit the wires pre-open on Monday morning?
• We learned that the project is much better than it looked from its first and rushed PFS
we saw in early January.
• We learned that the market likes the story, but there is still plenty of selling pressure in
the stock and many people took the news as a liquidity window and a chance to sell.
• We learned that the PFS is only part of the story and to get this stock moving higher,
it’s going to have to do two more things. First it needs to sort out its balance sheet and
remove the burden of the financial debt owed to Sprott (Rick Rule end). Second it
needs to find a bigger company to go JV and sponsor this project through
development.
I’m willing to be patience about FCV, especially at this low low price. We’ve seen so many
juniors (and not just gold juniors)
suddenly start springing from low levels
this year that it could always happen to
FCV at any time (particularly if the
balance sheet gets cleaned up) so I see
no need to sell at these discounted
levels. On the other hand, I’m not a
buyer of FCV for the time being, either.
The next hurdle will be September and
payback time, I’m quite certain they’ll be
able to do a deal and at the very least
boot the debt forward (or better), but at
what cost? See today’s piece on HCH for
more details. Or that Shakespeare play.
Conclusion
IKN367 is done, we end with bullet points:
• The Regulus Resources (REG.v) news last week could not have been better. Forget the
oxide deal, it’s smallfry stuff. Put the larger hectare area Colquirrumi deal on the back
29

,
burner, it could become something down the line and there’s a drill program that’s
going to kick it in the medium-term, but it’s not the reason to own this stock. Today’s
REG update is all about “Eyes on the Prize” and that’s the sulphide pit potential of the
Coimolache agreement. The patient construction of this deal will finally allow the
potential of Antakori/Tantahuatay to be revealed. This is the next Timok-sized story in
the world of mining, get on before the rest and be a long-term supporter of this
company, Antares II is off and running.
• I know a lot of you are going to push back against my apparent 180° change on
Continental Gold (CNL.to), but that’s okay. This isn’t about my own personal likes and
dislikes, it’s not even about the property these days (which has seen good work done
on its and a more solid mining plan in place for the project, backed up by data rather
than hope thanks to continued drilling success over the years). It’s not even about the
clean-up process at the town of Buriticá, not directly anyway though it doubtless helps
the company’s cause. The reason is the permitting track and CNL is going to get its
permits from the government this year, both national and regional. After that it’s up to
you if you want to hold the stock and sponsor it into production, wait for the buyout
offer or hold in hope for years. For me this is a permitting trade, when Colombia
awards the papers I’ll sell and take my profit. It’s capitalism, baby.
• Buy. Hold. Win.
I thank you in advance for any feedback. Our Top Pick stocks are Regulus Resources (REG.v),
B2Gold (BTG) (BTO.to) and Starcore Intl (SAM.to). Flash updates will be sent if required by
events.
I wish you good trading fortune, ladies and gentlemen.
Mark
Footnotes, appendices, references, disclaimer
(1) http://www.cnbc.com/2016/05/18/mohamed-el-erian-federal-reserve-is-torn.html
(2) https://lawrieongold.com/2016/05/22/russia-ups-gold-reserves-by-500000-ounces-in-april/
(3) http://www.regulusresources.com/regulus-resources-announces-agreements-collaborative-exploration-antakori-
copper-gold-project-peru/
(4) http://www.continentalgold.com/en/continental-gold-announces-25-million-bought-deal/
(C1) http://incakolanews.blogspot.pe/2016/01/continental-gold-cnlto-scratching-itch.html
(C2) http://finance.yahoo.com/news/continental-gold-comments-colombias-constitutional-153217691.html
(C3) http://incakolanews.blogspot.pe/2016/02/continental-gold-cnlto-market-begins-to.html
(5) http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/richmont-mines-announces-can27-million-bought-deal-financing-of-
common-shares-tsx-ric-2125427.htm
(6) incakolanews.blogspot.com/2016/05/richmonts-ricto-ric-feeling-defensive.html
(7) http://www.eltiempo.com.ec/noticias-cuenca/183618-activistas-invitan-a-un-foro-antiminero/
(8) http://incakolanews.blogspot.pe/2016/05/hudbay-hbm-hbmto-at-constancia-yet.html
(9) HCH11CMP-to-Purchase-Additional-Stake-in-Productora18052016.pdf
(10) http://diariocorreo.pe/edicion/moquegua/minem-convoca-a-nueva-presentacion-del-eia-de-la-mina-san-gabriel-
673792/
(11) http://mineriasustentable.com.mx/guanajuato-y-chile-potencializaran-mineria-y-turismo/
(12) http://finance.yahoo.com/news/focus-delivers-pre-feasibility-bayovar-073000973.html
30

,
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2015
Closed in 2015 closed close price
Argonaut Gold AR.to jan'15 C$1.47 14-dec-14 C$2.53 72.1% Big gain small time, profit taken
Amerigo Res ARG.to jan'15 C$0.405 20-jul-14 C$0.285 -29.6% Given up on weak Cu prices
Reservoir Min. RMC.v jan'15 C$6.05 18-jun-14 C$4.12 -31.9% sold on Cu downturn
Coro Mining COP.to jan'15 C$0.075 26-jan-14 C$0.035 -53.3% sm, sold on Cu downturn
Fortuna Silver FSM mar'15 U$4.12 10-nov-14 U$3.75 9.0% Short used as hedge
GoldQuest Min. GQC.v mar'15 C$0.26 27-oct-13 C$0.085 -67.3% given up ghost
Rio Alto Mining RIO.to apr'15 C$2.30 07-apr-11 C$3.57 55.2% Top pick, bot out, big win
Timmins Gold TGD jun'15 U$0.60 19-apr-15 U$0.62 3.3% near-term trade, out of time
First Majestic AG jul'15 U$10.51 10-aug-14 U$4.55 56.7% horrible failed trade
NovaCopper NCQ.to jul'15 C$1.05 09-apr-14 C$0.50 -52.4% no more Cu exposure, sm sell
McEwen Mining MUX aug'15 U$0.695 21-jul-15 U$0.92 32.4% Closed nearterm flip for win
Midas Gold MAX.to sep'15 C$0.39 21-sep-15 C$0.35 -10.3% Sm. trade idea that didn't work
New Gold NGD oct'15 U$2.18 23-aug-15 U$3.05 39.9% trade closed, profit taken
Legend Gold LGN.v nov'15 C$0.085 01-mar-15 C$0.035 -58.8% tiny "land grab" idea, failed
Timmins Gold TGD nov'15 U$0.245 20-sep-15 U$0.15 -38.8% small near-term loser
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2014
Closed in 2014 closed close price
Fortuna Silver FVI.to jan'14 C$2.80 23-dec-13 C$3.19 13.9% small ST trade closed
Rio Alto Mining RIO.to jan'14 C$2.06 07-jun-13 C$2.30 11.7% trading position finally closed
Network Expl. NET.v feb'14 C$0.01 22-jul-12 C$0.005 -50.0% position closed, did nothing
Tahoe Resources TAHO feb'14 U$13.10 08-apr-13 U$21.72 -65.8% short closed due to reality
Darwin Res DAR.v mar'14 C$0.10 14-jul-12 C$0.045 -55.0% tiny risk play dropped
B2Gold BTO.to mar'14 C$3.07 28-nov-12 C$3.35 9.1% closed to free up capital
Pretium Res PVG mar'14 U$5.38 22-nov-13 U$6.50 -20.8% short closed as port longer
Gold Res Corp GORO may'14 U$5.07 26-jan-14 U$4.12 16.7% took profit
Bear Creek Min BCM.v may'14 C$1.63 23-mar-14 C$2.05 25.8% Took profit, sm near-term win
Eco Oro Min. EOM.to aug'14 C$0.48 22-sep-13 C$0.26 -45.8% sold small loser to make room
True Gold TGM.v sep'14 C$0.395 02-feb-14 C$0.41 3.8% M&A won't happen, sold
Santacruz Silver SCZ.v sep'14 C$1.04 26-jan-14 C$0.86 -17.3% silver/M&A spec, rel. small
Timmins Gold TGD nov'14 U$1.38 09-apr-14 U$0.99 -28.3% failed trade, sell, raise cash
Kinross Gold KGC nov'14 U$2.90 20-oct-14 U$2.15 -25.9% V small trade, didn't work, chau
Salazar Res SRL.v hold C$0.28 02-mar-14 C$0.145 -48.2% lost China sponsor
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions 2013
Closed in 2013 closed close price
USA Graphite USGT feb'13 U$0.93 08-jan-13 U$0.17 81.7% short tgt made/trade closed
Lachlan Star LSA.to feb'13 C$1.50 30-sep-12 C$0.95 -36.7% sold to reduce port risk
United Silver USC.to mar'13 C$0.21 28-oct-12 C$0.095 -54.8% small Ag sector trade, failed
Aurcana Corp AUN.v apr'13 C$1.07 11-nov-12 C$0.55 -48.6% closed on poor YE results
Gold Res Corp GORO apr'13 U$14.11 25-jan-13 U$9.38 33.5% short tgt made/trade closed
Marlin Gold MLN.v apr'13 C$0.075 10-feb-13 C$0.065 -13.3% closed trade
Bear Creek BCM.v may'13 C$2.58 01-apr-13 C$2.40 -7.0% near-term, time ran out
Lupaka Gold LPK.to may'13 C$1.12 23-oct-11 C$0.32 -71.4% towel thrown in
Tahoe Resources TAHO may'13 U$18.62 08-apr-13 U$14.70 21.1% took profit on ST short
OceanaGold OGC.to jun'13 C$3.03 16-sep-12 C$1.18 -61.1% sold on gold drop
IMPACT Silver IPT.v jun'13 C$1.14 13-jan-13 C$0.62 -45.6% sold on silver drop
Duran Ventures DRV.v jun'13 C$0.045 10-may-13 C$0.025 -44.4% ST trade never worked
Plata Latina PLA.v jun'13 C$0.79 10-apr-12 C$0.13 -83.5% closed
Bellhaven BHV.v jun'13 C$0.065 03-jun-13 C$0.12 84.6% closed ST trade
B2Gold BTO.to aug'13 C$3.07 28-nov-12 C$3.44 12.1% sold 1/2 to raise cash
31

,
Colossus Min. CSI.to aug'13 C$0.72 24-jul-13 C$0.79 9.7% closed thru nerves on future
Pretium Res PVG.to aug'13 C$8.20 11-jun-13 C$10.14 23.7% closed to raise cash
Bear Creek BCM.v sep'13 C$2.06 30-may-13 C$2.20 6.8% sold on pol risk decision
MAG Silver MVG oct'13 U$7.00 12-sep-13 U$5.62 19.6% near-term short
Gold Res Corp GORO oct'13 U$9.52 03-may-13 U$4.98 47.7% short tgt made, covered
AQM Copper AQM.v oct'13 C$0.31 16-oct-11 C$0.125 -59.7% closed failed trade
First Majestic AG nov'13 U$11.51 07-nov-13 U$10.50 8.8% v near term short, closed
Fortuna Silver FSM nov'13 U$4.00 07-nov-13 U$3.68 8.0% v near term short, closed
Primero PPP nov'13 U$5.70 07-nov-13 U$5.75 -0.9% v near term short, closed
Starcore Intl SAM.to nov'13 C$0.235 08-sep-13 C$0.17 -27.7% ST trade didn't work, sm loss
B2Gold BTO.to dec'13 C$2.22 28-nov-12 C$2.16 -2.7% closed ST trade to raise cash
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions, 2012
Closed in 2012 closed close PPS
Soltoro SOL.v jan'12 C$0.87 07-nov-11 C$0.94 8.0% cash moved to BCM.v
Gold-Ore Res GOZ.to feb'12 C$0.84 13-oct-10 C$0.98 16.7% trade closed on ELG.v offer
Minefinders MFN feb'12 U$11.68 17-nov-11 U$14.80 26.7% target made, trade closed
Iron Creek IRN.v mar'12 C$0.58 26-sep-10 C$0.31 -46.6% time up on small bad trade
U.S. Silver USA.to apr'12 C$2.18 15-mar-12 C$1.86 -14.7% ST trade no good, cut loss
Augusta Res. AZC.to may'12 C$3.10 29-jan-12 C$2.07 -33.2% bad mkt, bad trade cut loss
Bellhaven BHV.v may'12 C$0.50 22-sep-10 C$0.28 -44.0% new mgmt not impressive
Zincore Metals ZNC.to may'12 C$0.325 29-jul-11 C$0.17 -47.7% bad mkt, bad trade cut loss
Soltoro SOL.v may'12 C$0.70 18-mar-11 C$0.41 -41.4% bad mkt, bad trade cut loss
U.S. Silver USA.to aug'12 C$1.78 27-jul-12 C$1.36 -23.6% fail ST trade close pre split
Estrella Gold EST.v aug'12 C$0.91 27-mar-11 C$0.14 -84.6% Closed on port realignment
Fortuna Silver FVI.to sep'12 C$1.07 03-may-09 C$5.32 397.2% sell call $6.17/ Mar25
Strait Minerals SRD.v oct'12 C$0.125 09-dec-11 C$0.12 -4.0% closing coverage til FY13
Sunward Res SWD.to oct'12 C$1.47 13-mar-11 C$1.21 -17.7% sold, took loss
Gold Res Corp GORO oct'12 U$21.47 09-sep-12 U$17.40 19.0% Short trade closed
Yellowhead Min. YMI.to nov'12 C$1.00 01-apr-12 C$0.63 -37.0% sold, took loss
Primero Mining PPP nov'12 U$7.26 07-oct-12 U$6.73 7.3% Short trade closed
Bear Creek Min. BCM.v nov'12 C$3.38 07-nov-11 C$3.72 10.1% Took small profit
Vena Resources VEM.to dec'12 C$0.70 31-may-09 C$0.18 -74.3% Failed trade (caps F)
Galway Res GWY.v dec'12 C$2.19 24-nov-12 C$2.30 5.0% closed good ST arb trade
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions, 2011
Closed in 2011 closed close PPS
Sunward Res SWD.v jan'11 C$1.05 21-nov-10 C$1.63 55.2% target made, trade closed
Serengeti Res SIR.v mar'11 C$0.245 05-dec-10 C$0.285 16.3% sold pre-tgt, ST trade fail
Fronteer Gold FRG apr'11 U$2.37 03-may-09 U$15.24 543.0% buyout, trade closed
Minefinders MFN apr'11 U$9.09 07-nov-10 U$16.89 85.8% target made, trade closed
Metalline Min. MMG may'11 U$1.04 26-jan-11 U$0.89 -14.4% exit, resource disappointed
Peregrine Met PGM.to jul'11 C$0.87 06-mar-11 C$2.60 198.9% buyout offer, closed
Dynasty Metals DMM.to jul'11 C$4.20 03-may-09 C$2.85 -32.1% Sold. Fail. Move on.
Aura Silver AUU.v aug'11 C$0.22 13-oct-10 C$0.16 -36.4% Bad pick. Take loss
U.S. Silver USA.v aug'11 C$0.52 26-jan-11 C$0.71 36.5% closed to make room
B2Gold Corp BTO.to sep'11 C$2.80 12-may-11 C$4.27 52.5% target made, trade closed
Bear Creek Min. BCM.v sep'11 C$3.80 27-may-11 C$4.17 9.7% macro sell call victim
Minefinders MFN sep'11 U$14.70 10-aug-11 U$15.15 3.1% macro sell call victim
Great Panther GPR.to sep'11 C$3.03 22-aug-11 C$2.64 -12.9% macro sell call victim
Fortuna Silver FVI.to sep'11 C$1.07 03-may-09 C$5.36 400.9% sold 20%, macro sell call
Focus Ventures FCV.v nov'11 C$0.40 20-apr-10 C$0.20 -50.0% cut losses, bad trade
Regulus Res. REG.v dec'11 C$1.17 14-aug-11 C$0.52 -55.6% cut on news of poor 43-101
2009 and 2010 closed positions in appendices below
32

,
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions, 2010
Closed in 2010 closed close PPS
B2Gold Corp BTO.to Jan'10 C$0.88 08-nov-09 C$1.49 68.2% target made, trade closed
Radius Gold RDU.v Jan'10 C$0.18 23-aug-09 C$0.40 122.2% target made, trade closed
MAG Silver MVG mar'10 U$5.60 23-nov-09 U$7.28 30.0% closed in pdac week
Riverside Res RRI.v mar'10 C$0.435 20-sep-09 C$0.60 37.9% closed in pdac week
Amarillo Gold AGC.v mar'10 C$0.81 31-may-09 C$0.70 -13.6% closed in pdac week
B2Gold Corp BTO.to apr'10 C$1.24 18-feb-10 C$1.50 21.0% target made, trade closed
Lumina Copper LCC.v apr'10 C$0.84 14-jun-09 C$1.55 51.2% total position now sold
Troy Resources TRY.to may'10 C$1.10 03-may-09 C$2.25 104.5% sold on negative results
AuEx Ventures XAU.to may'10 C$2.51 24-may-09 C$3.38 34.7% trade closed
Nevada Copper NCU.to jun'10 C$3.27 14-mar-10 C$2.03 -37.9% need to lower Cu exposure
Carpathian Gold CPN.to jun'10 C$0.39 14-mar-10 C$0.35 -10.3% too exposed to cap raising
Amerix PM Corp APM.v jun'10 C$0.065 08-nov-09 C$0.05 -23.1% victim of macro bear
Antares Minerals ANM.v jun'10 C$1.42 06-dec-09 C$2.10 47.9% sold half
Vena Resources VEM.to jun'10 C$0.37 31-may-09 C$0.23 -37.8% sold half
Minera Andes MAI.to sep'10 C$0.75 28-jul-10 C$0.95 26.7% ST trade closed
Gold-Ore Res GOZ.to sep'10 C$0.52 01-aug-10 C$0.75 44.2% target made, trade closed
B2Gold Corp BTO.to sep'10 C$1.45 25-may-10 C$2.01 34.5% target made, trade closed
Blue Sky Uran BSK.v oct'10 C$0.41 19-may-10 C$0.22 -46.3% v small v bad trade closed
Dia Bras Expl DIB.v oct'10 C$0.14 30-aug-09 C$0.35 150.0% target made, trade closed
S. Amer. Silver SAC.to nov'10 C$1.38 24-oct-10 C$1.60 -15.9% loss on short, small fail
Ventana Gold VEN.to nov'10 C$7.92 27-jun-10 C$13.51 70.6% trade closed on buyout
Lumina Copper LCC.v nov'10 C$1.42 11-aug-10 C$3.65 157.0% trade closed
Antares Minerals ANM.v dec'10 C$1.42 06-dec-09 C$8.40 491.5% trade closed
Rio Alto Mining RIO.v dec'10 C$0.69 23-mar-10 C$2.16 213.0% trade closed
Coro Mining COP.to dec'10 C$0.585 03-oct-10 C$1.24 112.0% target made, trade closed
Stocks To Follow Closed Positions, 2009
Closed positions closed closing PPS
Cardero Res CDY/CDU.to May'09 U$1.20 03-May-09 U$0.87 -27.5% sold on negative news
Eastmain Res. ER.to May'09 C$1.04 06-May-09 C$1.315 26.4% trade closed
Radius Gold RDU.v May'09 C$0.165 03-May-09 C$0.235 42.4% trade closed
Latin Amer Min. LAT.v May'09 C$0.12 03-May-09 C$0.158 29.2% trade closed
Aquiline Res. AQI.to July'09 C$2.03 16-Jun-09 C$1.68 -17.2% took loss, bad timing
Chariot Resources CHD.to Aug'09 C$0.20 12-Jul-09 C$0.415 107.5% trade closed
Castle Gold CSG.v Sep'09 C$0.64 02-Aug-09 C$0.60 -6.3% ST trade didn't work out
Guyana Goldfields GUY.to Sep'09 C$2.30 12-May-09 C$4.50 95.7% profit taken
Los Andes Copper LA.v Sep'09 C$0.09 21-Jun-09 C$0.09 0% trade closed
Pediment Gold PEZ.to Oct'09 C$0.80 09-Aug-09 C$1.00 25.0% trade closed
Minera Andes MAI.to Oct'09 C$0.68 03-May-09 C$0.71 4.4% too much bad news
Dynasty Metals DMM.to Nov'09 C$4.18 03-May-09 C$6.01 43.8% half sold
Rusoro Mining RML.v Nov'09 C$0.55 03-May-09 C$0.57 3.6% underperformed
Important Disclosure
The information and opinions contained within this report reflect the personal views of the author and therefore all
material within should not be construed as accurate or reliable or be utilized as advice for investment or business
purposes. Independent due diligence and discussions with ones own investment and business advisor is strongly
recommended. Accordingly, nothing in this report should be construed as offering a guarantee of the accuracy or
completeness of the information contained herein, as an offer or solicitation with respect to the purchase or sale of any
security or as an endorsement of any product or service. All opinions and estimates included in this report are subject to
change without notice. It is prohibited to copy or redistribute this report to any type of third party without the express
permission of the author.
33